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A Note on the Use of Abbreviations and Non-English Sources 
 
Abbreviations: 
Throughout the text, I used the Turkish initials for the abbreviations of all the Turkish names 
of organizations, institutions, parties - except the WWHR because the organization is well 
known through its English name.  
 
Translations: 
I translated quotations from Turkish or German sources into English to facilitate the reading - 
except when translation was at hand or existed.  
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Introduction 
 
On 18 July 2010, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the head of the ruling Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) invited about 90 representatives from 
various women’s rights organizations in Turkey to discuss the institutional steps necessary to 
take to strengthen democracy and to resolve the Kurdish-Turkish conflict as part of a reform 
process called “Democratic Opening” (Demoktratik Açılım).1 Participant women presented their 
concerns and suggestions such as the reduction of the electoral threshold (10 %), the 
introduction of electoral quotas for women, implementing further laws to achieve gender 
equality, to allow Kurdish as a language of instruction in public schools, and the recruitment of 
Kurdish speaking personnel in state courts and hospitals in the Kurdish populated regions. 
Erdoğan dismissed almost all of these demands in his speech, emphasized women’s primary 
roles as ‘mothers’ and added: “I do not believe in the equality between women and men. I prefer 
to use the term ‘equal opportunity’, rather than equality. Women and men are created 
differently; they are not equal, rather complementary to each other” (Pelek 2010). This 
statement was a clear challenge to women’s civil society organizations (CSOs) that strive for 
empowerment of women and gender equality. At the same time, it contradicted AKP’s political 
rhetoric that emphasized the importance of the engagement in dialogue with civil society (CS) 
to consolidate democracy in Turkey. This paradoxical approach towards women’s rights 
organizations raises many questions about the dynamics of state-society relations and the 
nature of Turkey’s democracy. How can Turkish democracy consolidate if the government does 
not respond to demands of civil society groups? Can democracy consolidate if women’s political 
and civic participation are curtailed? How could women’s CSOs play a role in strengthening 
democracy, if their main concern was categorically rejected by the head of the ruling AKP? 
Before searching for answers, it is helpful to clarify what is meant by democracy. A vast 
amount of democratization studies relies on the two-dimensional definition of democracy 
developed by Dahl (1971), and this study is not an exception (see Chapter 1). Drawing upon the 
                                                          
1 Bianet, 19 July 2010, online: http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/123520-zozan-ozgokce-basbakan-oneri-
almadi-had-bildirdi (rev. 22.11.2014) 
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Dahlian definition, democracy is defined here as a type of a political regime that draws upon the 
processes allowing: 1) political competition through free, fair, and regular elections; and 2) 
participation of all citizens by guaranteeing civil freedoms such as freedom of expression, 
freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of information. Accordingly, democratic 
consolidation can be understood as the institutionalization and stabilization of these two 
dimensions (see section 1.1). 
The starting point of the analysis is the widely-acknowledged assumption of the 
democratization literature claiming that a vibrant CS2 pluralizes democratic politics and is 
conducive to consolidation of democracy (see Chapter 1.2). To put it differently, the more CS 
participates the more inclusive the political system will be. Following this argument, the main 
assumption here is that the greater the participation and inclusion of organized women3 in 
politics, the more engendered and consolidated democracy is. Thus, engendering democracy can 
be understood as a ‘strengthening’ of democracy in its two core dimensions of: a) participation, 
and b) inclusion with respect to the specific demands, needs, and interests of women, which are 
explicitly recognized by political decision-making in all relevant policy areas. 
Women’s participation and inclusion have rarely been studied in the mainstream 
democratization literature. The relatively newer gender-and-democratization literature has 
extensively examined women’s activism in the transition to democracy and suggested tentative 
conclusions about the “gendered” analysis of democratization processes (Alvarez 1990; Baldez 
2003; Jaquette 1994, 2001; Rai 2002; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 1994, 2003). But a few studies 
have exclusively analyzed women’s participation in the consolidation phase (Franceschet 2001; 
Waylen 2007). Such studies mainly look at how women in formal politics participate in political 
processes and to what extent they engender democracy (see section 2.4), i.e. to what extent they 
translate women’s demands in concrete laws and policies that are set up to strengthen and 
protect women’s rights. They claim that organized women on their own are unlikely to achieve 
change in the post-transitional context because key activists enter in state institutions (Waylen 
2007: 91). Therefore, they focus on women’s participation in formal political arena. In contrast, 
                                                          
2 CS is understood as a network of self-organized collective bodies that are autonomous from the state and the 
economic sector. I discuss the term CS in Chapter 1. 
3 Organized women is understood as “the idea that women’s self-organizing to further their own empowerment” 
(McBride and Mazur 2008:  226). 
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the present study suggests that women who are organized outside of formal politics play an 
essential role in pushing for women-friendly changes in the consolidation phase. Organized 
women as independent actors make politicians and public opinion aware of the gendered 
differences in political procedures and can push governments to reform. The examination of the 
role of organized women in democratic consolidation not only contributes to the gender-and-
democratization literature, but also expands the scope of the consolidation literature. 
Based on the empirical evidences on women’s CSOs in Turkey, the study examines what 
role women’s CSOs played in engendering Turkish democracy under AKP rule. To this end, the 
study looks at to what extent women’s CSOs participated in decision-making processes in gender 
policies and what their impact on those policies was under the ruling AKP. To put it differently, 
to what extent did the AKP respond to political objectives of organized women in gender 
policies? It thereby aims to elucidate on the democratic consolidation process in Turkey under 
AKP rule. In doing so, the research also finds answers to the following questions: How do 
women’s CSOs participate in and exert influence on decision-making processes regarding 
women’s issues? What has been achieved in gender policies since the AKP came to power? What 
remains to be changed? What were the main obstacles for women’s CSOs under AKP rule? Has 
the relationship between women’s CSOs and the Turkish state changed? Has the democratic 
consolidation process influenced the relations among organized women in Turkey? 
As indicated by the title, the study will mainly concentrate on AKP rule. The AKP period 
is especially striking because of the fast pace of change linked to the democratic consolidation 
process since the party came to power in 2002. Although the AKP, compared to the former 
Turkish governments, has worked more closely with civil society actors, and included them in 
policy-making processes, the AKP’s relations to women’s CSOs have been ambivalent, as it can 
be understood from Erdoğan’s speech cited above. Women’s role in public space and gender 
policies in general are a contentious arena for the religious-conservative base of the AKP. 
Therefore, the discussion on the role and impact of women’s CSOs is well-suited to assess how 
inclusive and pluralistic democracy has become under the ruling AKP. In other words, the 
analysis of the role of organized women will serve as a litmus test for understanding whether or 
not the AKP aimed at building a pluralistic democracy, where women and men have been equally 
participating. Here, it is important to note that studying an ongoing process, i.e. the democratic 
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consolidation process, is very much like aiming at a moving target, and it is thus difficult to 
study. However, the present study attempts to give a snapshot of the first decade of AKP rule, 
i.e. until the end of 2012, by solely focusing on the relationship between women’s CSOs and the 
state that manifests one dimension of state-society relations.  
The main impetus for the present study was the compelling story of organized women 
amid the democratic consolidation process and the rising power of an Islamist government in 
staunchly secularist Turkey. At this point, it must be noted that the study does not aim to 
compare the impact of women’s CSOs with the other parts of CS in Turkey. Rather, it will shed 
some light on the less explored actors, namely organized women in the process of democratic 
consolidation. Hence, it is not an attempt to measure to what extent the whole CS influences the 
democratic consolidation process in Turkey. 
State of the Art 
In the extensive body of literature on Turkish politics, Turkish democracy has been analyzed 
from various perspectives. The early studies employed a top-down perspective on the subject 
matter and exclusively focused on the functioning of the state and its core institutions. In 
particular, the constitution, the parliament, the electoral and political party system and their 
level of institutionalization have been carefully examined (e.g. Heper and Landau 1991; Heper 
and Evin 1994; Özbudun 2000). In addition to the institutional setting, the role of the key actors 
such as the military and bureaucratic state elite has been studied with regard to democratization 
(Heper 1992; Özbudun 2000; Poulton 1999; Rustow 1970). Scholars pointed out that the 
dominance of the military, the fragmented and polarized party system, the military-made 
constitutions (1961 and 1982) and a weak checks-and-balances system are the main obstacles in 
the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.  
Moving on from explaining the structural impediments and why Turkish democracy has 
not been consolidated, the scholarly attention has focused on the role of social actors. While the 
Islamist and Kurdish movements have attracted much scholarly attention (Barkey 2000; Ergil 
2000; Smith 2005; Somer 2007), a growing body of literature on Turkish politics has investigated 
the potential role of CS in democratizing state-society relations and changing the socioeconomic 
structures. Scholars claimed that limited leeway of CS and the intolerant attitudes and 
conflicting interests of the state elites hampered the growth of a free CS in Turkey (Kalaycıoğlu 
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2007; Keyman and Içduygu 2003; Şimşek 2004; Toprak 1996). Information gathered from both 
the top-down and bottom-up analyses proved particularly useful for outlining the historical 
development of the Turkish democratic consolidation process (sections 4.1 and 4.2). 
The number of studies focusing on Turkish politics under AKP rule has skyrocketed. 
While a bulk of literature underlined the influence of the European Union (EU) accession process 
(Kubicek 2005; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Düzgit and Keyman 2007, Ulusoy 2007), others have examined 
the economic development, the role of CS, and the influence of globalization as important 
factors in the democratic consolidation process (Çarkoğlu and Cenker 2011; Keyman and 
Içduygu 2003; Öniş 2009). Studies analyzing the AKP period agree on the fact that major 
institutional changes expedited the political transformation process and were crucial steps in 
consolidating Turkey’s democracy. A more recent branch of literature seeks to understand why 
the democratic consolidation process began to stagnate and how the AKP’s political dominance 
shapes it (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2010; Öniş 2013). This literature was particularly useful in 
describing the institutional context of the late AKP rule (section 4.3). 
The literature on women’s activism in Turkey is considerably rich and analyzes under 
which conditions and with what demands different women’s groups emerged and developed in 
the civil society arena (Arat 1994, 2000, 2008; Bodur 2005; Coşar and Onbaşi 2008; Diner and 
Toktaş 2010; Kandiyoti 1995; Tekeli 1995). These studies clearly show that women’s groups have 
been greatly influenced by the political dynamics and conflicts in Turkey (Arat 2008; Diner and 
Toktaş 2010). While studies on the independently organized Islamist and Kurdish women shed 
light on their opposition to the Turkish state and their relations with their own movements 
(Arat 1998, 2005; Marshall 2008; Merçil 2005; Saktanber 2002; Yüksel 2003), studies on feminist 
and Kemalist women delineate their efforts to change the state’s gender policies (Marshall 2009; 
Tekeli 1995). Particular attention has been paid to their crucial role in the pluralization of the 
civil society arena. This literature helped to illustrate the motives and aims of different groups 
of organized women. Recently, scholars began to analyze the broader scope of women’s groups 
with recourse to their potential to offer alternative political visions, and how they changed their 
relations with the state in order to be more influential (Coşar and Onbaşi 2008; Diner and Toktaş 
2010; Marshall 2005, 2009). Later publications (Arat 2010; Coşar and Yeğenoglu 2011) 
demonstrate how the AKP government began to push its Islamist agenda in gender policies and 
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to ignore demands of organized women. These studies contain valuable information about how 
and with what demands organized women participate in civil society realm and the general 
characteristic of gender policies under AKP rule. They make general assertions on organized 
women’s role as influential democratic agents, but they do not specifically examine why, how 
and to what extent organized women contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in 
Turkey under AKP rule. Overall, there is no systematic and comprehensive study analyzing and 
comparing the role of different women’s groups in engendering democracy in Turkey.  
Research Design  
The present study seeks to understand the role of organized women in the democratic 
consolidation process and the gendered outcomes of this process in Turkey. In the research, the 
variable to be explained is how engendered Turkish democracy is under the AKP government, 
understood as the measurable improvements in laws and policies regarding women’s lives. This 
will be assessed by looking at the concrete changes in laws and codes, and in regulations and 
policies in three issue areas: violence against women, women’s rights and gender equality, and 
discrimination against women. These areas have been chosen for several reasons. First, they are 
considered to be the most important dimensions of the women rights regime, both on the global 
and national level. Second, they are framed and discussed differently by each group within 
organized women in Turkey. 
The independent variables include the role of women’s CSOs and the institutional 
context in which they operate. Thus, the activities of women’s CSOs and the extent to which 
they could articulate their demands will be analyzed in great details. This will help to analyze 
the extent to which they participated in political decision-making processes regarding gender 
issues. In doing so, the study looks at the alliances they have made and their success, or failure, 
in putting gender issues on the political agenda of democratic consolidation process. But the 
analysis also considers the institutional context in which women’s CSOs interact with each other 
and the state. Thus, the general characteristics of the political system before and during AKP 
rule is described before the empirical analysis. There are also number of intervening variables 
that include: the impact of international gender regime, referring to all gender arrangements 
that shape international and national institutions, and the international organizations such as 
the United Nations (UN) and the EU. 
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Methods and Sources 
Since the study not only delineates the activities and strategies of women's CSO, but also their 
interactions among each other and with state institutions, and policy outcomes, the study 
employs a qualitative research strategy. Qualitative analysis is better suited to showing the 
nuances and dynamics of human interaction. 
Organized women in Turkey are classified here in four different groups: feminist, Kurdish, 
Islamist4 and the Kemalist5 women’s CSOs. These four groups of women’s CSOs represent the 
salient political cleavages of Turkish politics that have been regarded as the impediments in 
consolidating Turkish democracy: Kurdish vs. Turkish nationalism and Islamism vs. secularism 
(see Chapter 4). Thus, the analysis of these four groups will provide valuable insights into the 
analysis of the boundaries and limits of the consolidation process in Turkey, understood as the 
strengthening the inclusion dimension of democracy. 
The selected women’s CSOs are chosen not only from metropolitan cities such as 
Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, but also from Van and Diyarbakır (Kurdish populated provinces in 
East Turkey) which enables to capture the broader picture in examining the role of women’s 
CSOs in the democratic consolidation process. For each group, three women’s CSOs have been 
selected that have high records of visibility and recognition within organized women and the 
broader CS in Turkey, and that have participated in policy-making processes. All these women’s 
CSOs are committed to adjust gender policies and, thereby, to change the content of politics in 
Turkey.  
The empirical material for this study is collected from both primary and secondary 
sources. First, based on in-depth and semi-structured interviews with representatives of the 
women’s CSOs, the study delineates the motives, activities, and strategies of these organizations 
in the issue areas under consideration -violence against women, women’s rights and gender equality, 
and discrimination against women-, and their interactions with state institutions in these issue 
areas. Individuals such as academics and lawyers who have been involved with these women’s 
CSOs are also interviewed. Second, the study has also gathered information from the websites, 
blogs, and pamphlets of women’s CSOs under consideration and from interviews published in 
                                                          
4 I use the term Islamist to capture the activism of religiously-oriented and politically-motivated movements. 
5 The Kemalist ideology refers to the founding ideology of the Turkish state and adherents of this ideology are 
labeled as Kemalist throughout the study. 
19 
 
mass publications such as online newspapers, and websites of TV channels. Third, the study has 
also profited from the “grey literature”. The surveys, reports, and statements of state 
institutions, research institutes and CSOs have been analyzed to obtain further information on 
the strategies and projects of both the women’s organizations and the state. The research also 
relies on the data drawn from the secondary sources. Thus, the study has drawn on the valuable 
scholarly works on Turkish politics in general and on the history of the democratization process, 
the agency of CS, and organized women in Turkey in particular. 
Outline of the Study 
The main objective of Part I is to suggest a conceptual framework to analyze the role of 
organized women in the democratic consolidation processes. To this end, Chapter 1 first defines 
the concept of democracy and the notions of democratization and democratic consolidation to 
reach a working definition of democratic consolidation. Second, the chapter gives an overview 
of the state of the art of democratic consolidation research. As the special attention is given to 
the role of CS, the subsequent section (1.2) introduces the term CS, and then discusses different 
theoretical perspectives on the interplay between CS and democratization processes. While the 
mainstream literature on democratization refers to women’s activism within the context of CS, 
it remains mainly gender-blind, i.e., it does not focus on women’s participation in 
democratization processes or the gendered nature of those processes. At this point, the study 
claims that a ‘gendered’ perspective is needed to examine the relationship between women, CS, 
and democratic consolidation. Therefore, Chapter 2 first describes why and how to integrate 
‘gender’ as a category in the analysis of politics. Drawing upon the assumptions of the gender-
and-politics literature, the chapter then shows how gender is implicated in the structures and 
dynamics of CS and democratization processes that will, in turn, have implications for the 
analysis of the role of organized women in democratic consolidation. The analytical framework 
(2.4) seeks to provide a holistic analysis of the relationship between democratic consolidation, 
CS, and women from a gendered lens that will be applied to the case study, and can be applied 
to further case studies. Part I concludes with Chapter 3 that maps out the methods employed in 
the research. The chapter provides a thorough description of the research design, case selection, 
and sources, and explains how the data is collected.  
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To examine the role of organized women in democratic consolidation, it is necessary to 
describe the institutional context; i.e., political structures in which women’s CSOs are embedded 
need to be taken into account. The institutional context shapes, if not determines, actors’ 
strategies and objectives as well as political outcomes. Therefore, Part II describes the historical 
and institutional context in which women’s CSOs have emerged, operated, and exerted influence 
on policy-making processes regarding women’s issues. Chapter 4 first reviews the adventures of 
Turkish democracy before AKP rule to understand the institutional and political background of 
the consolidation process. The last section in Chapter 4 (4.3) pays special attention to the era of 
the AKP by delineating three distinct periods of AKP rule. It thereby discusses how both the 
external and domestic factors gave impetus to the democratic consolidation process in Turkey 
and sheds also light on the current situation of this process.  
Part III embarks upon the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 presents positive gender 
outcomes in laws and policies before and during AKP rule by focusing on three issues areas: 
violence against women, women’s rights and gender equality, and discrimination against women. Positive 
gender outcomes refer to women-friendly changes in the legal framework and policies that are 
implemented to improve women’s rights. The reason why I prefer first to demonstrate outputs 
than inputs is to avoid repetition in the analysis of the roles of four women’s groups of women’s 
CSOs. To put it differently, since the strategies of each women’s group and the extent of their 
role in policy-making differ, but outputs do not vary, I present the positive gender outcomes 
under AKP rule as the first chapter of the empirical part. Moreover, an earlier presentation of 
the impact of women’s CSOs on policies helps to assess more exactly the role of each group of 
women’s CSOs in policy changes. The following chapters (6, 7, 8, and 9) examine how and to what 
extent four groups of women’s CSOs (feminist, Kurdish, Islamist and Kemalist women) 
influenced policy-making processes under AKP rule in the three issue areas mentioned before. 
Part III concludes with the analysis of the findings with regard to the analytical framework 
presented in Part I. Chapter 10 thus compares and contrasts the gathered evidences on the role 
of four groups of women’s CSOs in engendering Turkish democracy under AKP rule.  
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the key findings, discusses the limitations of the 
research, and addresses the prospects for the future research. 
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PART I 
Theories and Methods 
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Chapter 1 
Democracy and Civil Society 
The main motivation of this chapter is to build the conceptual framework that will serve as the 
foundation for the analysis of the relation between democratic consolidation and civil society 
(CS). The first section (1.1) discusses the relevant concepts and notions to reach a working 
definition of democratic consolidation. The working definition will help assess under what 
conditions a democracy becomes consolidated. As the particular attention is paid to the role of 
CS in the process of democratic consolidation, the subsequent section (1.2) critically discusses 
what CS is, or not, and how it contributes to democratic consolidation. This conceptual 
framework allows an analysis of the research question, i.e. the role of organized women in the 
processes of democratic consolidation. However, in accordance with the gender-and-politics 
literature, the present study argues that a ‘gender’ perspective is needed to analyze the role of 
organized women in democratic consolidation. Since women’s participation has changed what 
counts as ‘political’, the chapter (2) critically discusses how to integrate ‘gender’ as a category 
both in the analysis of CS and democratization. The analytical framework that serves as the 
foundation for the empirical analysis in Part III will be then presented. The analytical framework 
(2.4) seeks to provide a holistic analysis of the relationship between the democratic 
consolidation, CS and women from a gendered lens that will be applied to the case study, and 
can even be applied to different case studies.  
1.1 Assessing Democratic Consolidation  
The term “democratic consolidation” includes two different discussions: 1) the perennial 
problem of scholarly debate over the definition of ‘democracy’, and 2) how we define the 
‘consolidation’ of democracy (Schneider 2009: 9). Democracy is one of the most debated concepts 
in political science. Especially after the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991)6, 
scholars have faced the challenge of conceptually dealing with diverse forms of democratic 
regimes. Thus, scholars have sought to increase conceptual differentiation and created 
hundreds of subtypes of democracy such as ‘illiberal democracy’, ‘pseudo-democracy’, ‘tutelary 
                                                          
6 Huntington (1991) identifies the long first wave of democratization from 1828 to 1926, and the second wave from 
the post- Second World War to 1964. 
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democracy’, ‘delegative democracy’, ‘defective democracy’, or ‘hybrid regimes’ (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997; Merkel 2004; O’Donnell 1994; Valenzuela 1992; Zakaria 1997).7 These diminished 
subtypes generally identify “specific attributes of democracy that are missing” (Collier and 
Levitsky 1997: 438) or combine “some democratic features with authoritarian practices” (Wigell 
2008: 230). As Collier and Levitsky aptly note, diminished subtypes are useful for characterizing 
different regimes in the real world, but “they raise the issue of whether these regimes should in 
fact be treated as subtypes of democracy” (1997: 450). Hence, they claim that scholars must 
clearly define and explicate the concept of democracy they are using instead of inventing new 
terms and concepts. In the following, a working definition of democracy will be suggested by 
relying upon the most widely employed ‘procedural definitions’8 of democracy in the research 
on democratization.  
The Concept of Democracy  
In comparative politics, democracy is referred to as “a type of a political regime”  9 or “a form of 
governance” (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring 1992; O’Donnell 1992; 
Schmitter and Karl 1991). By explaining why, when, and where democracy happens, a large 
volume of empirical work has relied on the “two-dimensional” procedural definition of 
democracy put forward by Robert Dahl. Dahl suggests that democracy is a political system that 
allows: 1) ‘political competition’ or ‘public contestation’ through regular, free, and fair elections, 
and 2) ‘participation’ in this system of political contestation (1971: 2). Accordingly, Dahl 
attributes eight institutional requirements for a functioning democracy:  
1) Freedom to form and join organizations; 2) Freedom of expression; 3) Right to vote, 4) 
Eligibility for public office; 5) Right of political leaders to compete for support; 6) Free and 
fair elections; 7) Alternative sources of information; and 8) Institutions for making 
government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Ibid.: 3).  
                                                          
7 Collier and Levitsky (1997) reviewed a large volume of democratization studies and found around 550 examples of 
“democracy with adjectives”.  
8 Procedural definitions of democracy focus on procedures (political and legal institutions) in a political system, see 
further: Collier and Levitsky (1997) and Mair (2008). 
9 A regime refers to “an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; 
the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to 
gain access; and the rule that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions” (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 
76). 
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This set of rights and liberties makes political participation more inclusive. Thus, 
democracy, as Dahl calls “polyarchy”10, requires not only pluralism of political candidates but 
also “a broader societal pluralism that makes political contestation and participation truly 
meaningful” (Diamond 1997: 7). Hence, the participation dimension is of a great importance for 
a genuine democratic regime.  
Some studies on democratization employ even a “thicker” conceptualization and add to 
the two-dimensional definition of democracy further criteria such as the rule of law, horizontal 
accountability (checks and balances), effective power to govern, the accountability of rulers or 
the distribution of power in society (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1997; Karl and Schmitter 
1991; Merkel 1999, 2004; O’Donnell 1996; Valenzuela 1992; Wigell 2008). However, more 
substantial notions of democracy might complicate the theoretical analysis, and the root 
concept can become fuzzier (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Schneider 2009).  
Relying on the Dahlian (1971) definition of democracy, the present study regards a 
political regime as democratic: 
 if competitive elections are conducted freely, fairly and at regular intervals 
{public contestation}, 
 if all adult citizens have the right to vote and to compete for votes and for support, 
without facing any coercion {inclusive participation}, 
 and if the regime allows its citizens to articulate and to signify their preferences 
by guaranteeing political and civil liberties such as freedom to form and join 
organizations, to assembly and freedom of information and of expression. 
In democracies, the above mentioned political and civil liberties must be effectively available to 
all citizens without hindrance. ‘All’ citizens allude to literally all, irrespective of gender, 
ethnicity, age, class, religion, race, sexual orientation or disability.  
                                                          
10 Since political regimes in the real world only approximate the democratic ideals to a certain degree, Dahl prefers 
to call a relatively democratized regime as ‘polyarchy’. 
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Defining the Process of Democratization  
It is widely acknowledged that transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one is 
called the “democratization” or “transition” process. The general consensus is that the 
introduction of competitive elections is the crucial step in the democratization process. But 
political regimes in the real world vary in the degree of permitting competitive elections. Thus, 
Dahl suggests that for a relatively democratized regime, the dimension on public contestation 
has to be accompanied by inclusive political participation by means of effective guarantees of 
civil liberties (1971: 4f.).  
To facilitate a persuasive analysis, scholars divide the democratization process into three 
stages: “liberalization (breakdown)”, “democratization (transition)”, and “consolidation” 
(O’Donnell 1992; Przeworski 1986). Liberalization refers to “an easing of repression and 
extension of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime” (Mainwaring 1992: 298), but this does 
not necessarily lead to a democratic transition. Democratization requires “open contestation 
over the right to win control of the government” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 3). The last stage, 
democratic consolidation, refers to the post-transitional context, and it is usually conceived of 
as “the durability or stability of new democracies” (Gasiorowski and Power 1998: 741) or as “the 
institutionalization of elections and their surrounding freedoms” (O’ Donnell 1996: 37). The 
division of the transition phases allows scholars to assess the preconditions and determinants 
of each stage separately, although there is an overlap between phases, and helps to understand 
how exactly a transition unfolds (Waylen 2007: 17). But how do scholars study democratization? 
What are the major theoretical approaches in the democratization literature? 
Overview of the Democratization Literature 
The comparative literature on the transition to democracy is preoccupied with the questions 
how and why transition occurs, whereas studies on consolidation seek to answer under what 
conditions a democracy becomes consolidated, or which democratizations end up with 
consolidation. In order to answer these questions, democratization scholars have developed 
diverse analytical models and focused on various explanatory factors. The early democratization 
literature has generally concentrated on the socio-economic factors such as the level of economic 
development, the extent of urbanization, or the level of education that are thought to be 
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conducive to democratization (Lipset 1959).11 Such studies also regard ‘economic development’ 
as the key to democratic stability (Przeworski 1991; Przeworski et al. 1997). Other macro-level 
analyses scrutinize class structures of given societies to explain democracies or non-democracies, 
and question the likelihood of democratic transitions (Moore 1967; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens 1992). A large volume of the democratization literature pays particular attention to 
political institutions such as the electoral system, the party system, or the division of power to 
explain differences across the newly democratized regimes (Diamond et al. 1997; Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Merkel 2004). These studies also argue that the nature of the previous authoritarian 
regime influences the transition path; in other words, they inquire into the relation between 
the previous regime type and the forms of transition (Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski 1992). 
In this regard, in different types of non-democratic regimes, the transition might be ‘negotiated’ 
or ‘pacted’ between the authoritarian elites and the oppositional groups, and might hold 
different challenges and outcomes for the consolidation of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996: 
65). 
Since the early 1990s, “actor-based models” have dominated democratization studies. 
While a group of scholars examines the role of political elites (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 
1986; Przeworski 1992), others focus on the role of interest groups, social movements, and CS 
(Croissant et al. 2000; Diamond 1994; Schmitter 1993). There are also studies focusing on the 
values and attitudes of the population in explaining the transition to or the consolidation of 
democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Huntington 1991). Besides the internal factors, the 
democratization literature also emphasizes the role of external factors and points out wars, 
revolutions, democratization waves in neighboring regions as well as the role of the 
international organizations such as the EU as decisive factors, which might contribute to the 
collapse of a non-democratic regime or to the democratic consolidation process (Gasiorowski 
and Power 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schneider 2009; Schneider and Schmitter 2004).  
Clearly, democratization is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. Scholars employ 
different approaches and suggest a multitude of indicators, and different theoretical models to 
                                                          
11 Socio-economic factors have been employed by the modernization theory, which claims that the high level of 
economic development increases the chances of the transition to democracy or the likelihood of the survival of 
democracies. Although the modernization theory has been contested in the literature, the economic indicators are 
still regarded as influential factors in the democratization literature. 
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explain democratization as well as consolidation. However, in the democratization literature, 
consolidation is a highly contested term, and it is not clear what scholars refer to while 
discussing the notion of consolidation. Thus, the working definition of the consolidation of 
democracy in the present study should be clarified. 
A Working Definition of Democratic Consolidation  
In examining consolidation, most scholars focus on the ‘stability’ of democratic regimes. 
Stability usually refers to “the survival of the newly democratized regime” over a period of time 
by “avoiding a democratic breakdown or erosion” (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Merkel 2008; 
O’Donnell 1997; Schedler 1998; Valenzuela 1992).12 Accordingly, scholars argue that a democracy 
consolidates when democratic rules and practices are “firmly institutionalized” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996: 5), and when “a return to the authoritarian rule is highly unlikely” (Gasiorowski 
and Power 1998: 743; Schedler 2001: 66). In addition to responding to these challenges of 
impeding democratic breakdown, consolidating democracy may also involve positive tasks of 
“deepening of a full democracy” or “completing a semi-democracy” (Schedler 2001: 67). 
Obviously, there are competing meanings and definitions of consolidation. In a consolidated 
regime, as many consolidation scholars would agree, democracy becomes strengthened and 
stabilized. 
Recently, a group of consolidation scholars have sought to develop means of framing and 
assessing “the quality of democracy” (Diamond and Morlino 2005: ix). This stream of the 
literature partly focuses on deepening of democracy in its procedural dimensions (Ibid.: xii), 
thus overlaps with the consolidation literature. Studies on the quality of democracy in fact 
evaluate how ‘good’ a democratic regime is. They deal with the democratic performance and 
effectiveness of the regimes by identifying the quality of the democratic contents, procedures, 
and outcomes such as the rule of law, the accountability of the government, equality in access 
to power, distribution of resources, broadly legitimated regime that satisfies citizen expectation, 
                                                          
12 Schedler argues that many scholars use democratic consolidation as close synonyms for the terms such as 
“democratic stability, stabilization, survival, guarantee, continuity, maintenance, permanence, endurance or 
persistence” (1998: 5). Despite acknowledging the fact that it is highly debated whether stability is equal to 
persistence or durability, the term stability is used interchangeably with the terms endurance, persistence and 
maintenance in the present study. It is not within the scope of this study to debate the differences between the 
mentioned terms. 
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or whether the constitutional provisions are enforced evenly to all citizens (Karl and Schmitter 
2002). However, there are plenty of notions around the term ‘quality’, and this pluralism around 
the core concept impedes creating a clear typology. For this reason, the quality-of-democracy 
approach will not be employed here.  
In the present study, the term ‘democratic consolidation’ refers to the institutionalization 
of democratic institutions. In other words, democracy becomes consolidated when 
aforementioned two-dimensions of democracy have been institutionalized and stabilized. Yet, 
in defining consolidation as the stability of democracy, I do not claim that the consolidation is 
an irreversible condition; it is rather “a relatively stable equilibrium of a democratic system’s 
defining components” (Merkel 2008: 15). In other words, even when a democracy is thoroughly 
consolidated, democracy can always become weaker or stronger (Diamond 1997: 3). In the 
following discussion, I review some of the major approaches to the study of democratic 
consolidation, and identify several explanatory factors that have plausibly been suggested to 
foster the consolidation of democracy. 
Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Consolidation  
Despite the lack of a consensus on the definition of democratic consolidation, most scholars 
agree on some preconditions of the consolidation of democracy. Firstly, it is acknowledged that 
there can be no democratization, or democratic consolidation, unless there is a ‘state’ (Dahl 2000; 
Linz and Stepan 1996; Rustow 1970). Scholars, thereby, refer to the state’s effective capacity to 
rule within a “territorial unit” (Linz and Stepan 1996; Schneider 2009). Secondly, scholars claim 
that a democracy can only be consolidated, when the transition to free and competitive politics 
is completed (Linz and Stepan 1996; Shin 1994). Yet, there is a considerable disagreement over 
where to draw the line between the end of the transition and the beginning of the consolidation 
process. Some scholars argue that there can be “overlaps” between these two phases (Merkel 
1998; Schedler 1998, 2001).  
A great deal of the debates on consolidation has focused on the survival of a democratic 
regime. Accordingly, a democracy is consolidated when competitive elections and the 
surrounding political rights and civil liberties are institutionalized, and when such a regime is 
likely to endure (O’Donnell 1997: 43). Similarly, Linz and Stepan (1996) put forward, a 
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consolidated democracy is the political situation when democracy becomes “the only game in 
town”.13 This expression has been adopted by many students of consolidation. But when does 
democracy become ‘institutionalized’ and ‘stabilized’?  
The influential consolidation scholars Linz and Stepan suggest three dimensions to assess 
consolidation: 
“Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant 
national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources 
attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to 
violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state.  
Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion 
holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way 
to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem 
alternatives is quite small or is more or less isolated from pro-democratic forces.  
Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and 
nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, 
and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and 
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process” (1996: 6). 
With the behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional consolidation, a democratic regime is likely 
to endure. However, Linz and Stepan concede “two caveats” (Ibid.). First, they do not exclude 
the possibility of the tendencies towards de-consolidation or a democratic breakdown, so that 
they avoid to present consolidation as a teleological concept; i.e., consolidation is not “an 
irreversible final condition” (Merkel 2008: 15). Second, Linz and Stepan do not claim that there 
is “only one type of consolidated democracy” (1996: 6). Consolidated democracies can either 
continue to deepen democracy by raising the democratic quality, or continue to strengthen the 
newly democratized institutions. Linz and Stepan argue that it is important to understand the 
specific tasks of crafting democratic consolidation (Ibid.). 
 In a similar vein, Schedler identifies three main approaches in the consolidation 
literature that differ in their objects of observation as well as in their causal assumptions: the 
behavioral, attitudinal, and structural approaches (2001: 69). While some researchers focus on 
                                                          
13 Linz and Stepan remark that they owe the expression “the only game in town” to Guisseppe di Palma, To Craft 
Democracies (1990). 
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the behaviors or attitudes of the key actors in the political realm, others focus on the structural 
environment perceived as the institutional and socio-economic context (Ibid.). Schedler argues 
that these three explanations of consolidation are hierarchically ordered, and that the 
behavioral approach dominates both the attitudinal and structural approaches (2001: 85). In 
other words, the behaviors of political actors are decisive for the sustainability of a democratic 
order. 
Likewise, Przeworski argues that democratic consolidation occurs when democracy 
becomes the ‘only game in town’ and “no one can imagine acting outside of the democratic 
institutions” (1991: 26). For instance, if the armed forces or paramilitary groups do not attempt 
to overthrow the democratically elected government, then that regime can be regarded as 
consolidated (Agüero 1992; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). By the same token, Schneider and 
Schmitter refer to the consolidation of democracy “as the process, or processes, that make 
mutual trust and reassurance among the relevant actors more likely” (2004: 61). These authors 
argue that politicians and citizens might not agree on substantive goals and policies, but they 
do have to agree on a common set of rules for democracy (Ibid.: 62). These scholars underscore 
the importance of the fit between formal democratic rules and the behavior of the relevant 
actors (O’Donnell 1997: 47). 
By contrast, Diamond gives particular attention to the attitudinal consolidation and 
asserts that democracy becomes truly stable “[…] only when people come to value it widely not 
solely for its economic and social performance but intrinsically for its political attributes” 
(Diamond 1993: 430). Several consolidation studies argue that the democratic “legitimacy” is the 
only explanation for consolidation; i.e., people hold a strong belief that democratic rules and 
practices are the only possible way to conduct politics (Lipset 1959; Morlino 2005; O’Donnell 
1997; Valenzuela 1992). Indeed, there is a considerable amount of evidence that a high level of 
support for democracy provides security for the survival of the regime. As Schedler claims, if we 
take legitimacy as a variable for assessing democratic stability, it will lead the analysis in a vast 
terrain of inquiry with “boundless series of structural and institutional exigencies” (2001: 75). 
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Therefore, the analysis of legitimacy will not be operationalized for the examination of 
consolidation. 14 
It is important to underline that the behavioral and attitudinal consolidation can be 
reached only through formal rules; i.e., when democratic rules are embedded in the 
constitution. This brings us to the discussion about constitutional consolidation. In accordance 
with Linz and Stepan (1996), O’Donnell also contends that consolidated democracy embodies “a 
set of rules and institutions (many of them complex organizations) that is explicitly formalized 
in constitutions and auxiliary legislation” (1997: 45). He believes that formal rules are “good 
predictors of behavior and expectations” (Ibid.: 46). The government, state institutions, officials, 
and citizens must all be subjected to a set of laws embedded in the constitution.  
In sum, both the behavioral and attitudinal dimensions are crucial in examining 
democratic consolidation. That is, when democratic rules and procedures are respected and 
habituated by political actors, and when the democratic institutions are accepted by citizens as 
the only possible locus for managing and moderating political processes, then the regime is 
likely to endure. Therefore, in a consolidated democracy, “destabilizing factors”  15 are isolated 
by the constitution (O’Donnell 1992; Przeworski 1991; Valenzuela 1992). Accordingly, Merkel 
(2008) argues that the constitutional consolidation can be seen as a first level of democratic 
consolidation. In addition to constitutional frameworks, scholars also focus on institutional 
conditions such as the institutional design (parliamentarianism or presidentialism) (Stepan and 
Skach 1993), or the party and electoral systems (Carey 1997; Mainwaring 1992). 
Other than the behavioral and attitudinal approaches, scholars also pay attention to 
‘structural determinants’ that contribute to the consolidation of democracy. The most studied 
structural factors are socio-economic conditions: economic development, the distribution of 
wealth, class structures and the level of education (Gasiorowski and Power 1998; Lipset 1959; 
Przeworski et al. 1997; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). Another group of studies 
                                                          
14 For further analysis of legitimation as an object of study, see: Beetham (1991); for legitimacy in nondemocratic 
regimes, see: Schlumberger (2010). 
15 Valenzuela lists destabilizing factors, or “perverse institutions” as he calls them, as follows: “tutelary power; 
reserved domains of policy; egregious and deliberate distortions of the electoral system and political 
representation, and the existence of the widespread belief that non-electoral means are possible to form the 
national government” (1992: 93). 
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have examined the strength of CS (Diamond 1994; Schmitter 1997); or prior democratic 
experiences (Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schneider 2009). Structural approaches 
point to political, economic, and societal conditions that produce democratic actors, behaviors, 
and attitudes (Schedler 2001: 80). Hence, structural factors are worth studying in the analysis of 
democratic consolidation.  
Linz and Stepan suggest that “five interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions” 
must be present for the consolidation of democracy:  
“First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, 
there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a 
rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational 
life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic 
government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society.” (1996: 7) 
With regard to these conditions, consolidated democracy must be conceived as an interacting 
and multi-level system, rather than a single-regime (Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell 1997; 
Schneider and Schmitter 2004). All the above-mentioned conditions can only function properly 
with the support from the others. Yet, Linz and Stepan consider the first three conditions as 
“definitional prerequisites” of a consolidated democracy and state that: “to achieve a 
consolidated democracy, the necessary degree of autonomy and independence of civil and 
political society must further be embedded in and supported by the rule of law, our third arena” 
(1996: 10).16 The politically significant actors must agree on and respect the rule of law and obey 
the democratic procedures (Ibid.). For an autonomous political society and a free CS, public 
contestation and inclusive participation need to be guaranteed by the regime. The other two 
arenas, a usable bureaucracy and an institutionalized economic society, support the first three 
conditions.  
Likewise, Merkel suggests that a consolidated democracy consists of five “partial 
regimes”: the “electoral regime”, “political rights of participation”, “civil rights”, “horizontal 
accountability” (division of power) and “the guarantee of the effective power to govern”, i.e. 
state power is hold only by elected representatives (Merkel 2004: 38-42). He asserts that these 
partial regimes jointly guarantee the functioning of a democratic state. At the very core, Merkel 
                                                          
16 The coming section on CS explicates what CS consists of and how it differs from a political society. 
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relies on the Dahlian approach to democracy, but expands the notion by introducing ‘horizontal 
accountability’ and ‘the effective power to govern’. Similar to Linz and Stepan (1996), Merkel 
claims that a stable liberal democracy is possible only if these five regimes function effectively, 
and are “mutually embedded” (2004: 43). ‘Mutual embeddedness’ refers to these partial regimes 
supporting each other, but not dominating each other. In addition, Merkel mentions three 
structural factors that form the external environment of a consolidated democratic regime: “the 
socio-economic context; a strong CS, and the international and regional integration” (2004: 44). 
A consolidated regime, hence, depends on the interplay between the strong external conditions 
and the mutual cooperation of the partial regimes. In a similar vein, Valenzuela (1992) suggests 
that the electoral system, a functioning party system, judicial independence and respect for 
human rights should be affirmed and strengthened in a consolidated democracy (1992: 58). Both 
Merkel (2004) and Valenzuela (1992) stress the crucial role of the rule of law. 
Recently, studies have also considered the external political environment that might 
contribute to the consolidation of democracy, that is, scholars have examined the influence of 
the states, transnational or international organizations or democratization waves in 
neighboring regions (Merkel 2004; Schneider 2009). For instance, the EU has historically been 
an influential actor in democratizing authoritarian regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe. 
The concrete EU membership prospect has, for instance, accelerated democratization processes 
or helped stabilize newly democratized regimes in Eastern Europe (Merkel 2004; Schneider 2009; 
Waylen 2007).  
In examining democratic consolidation, scholars mainly focus on the stability or 
sustainability of the democratic order. They claim that a consolidated democracy requires much 
more than elections and the availability of political rights and civil liberties for the participation 
in elections. Accordingly, consolidation scholars point to the importance of the behaviors of 
political actors, the attitudes of citizens, and the constitution, all of which enable a democratic 
regime to endure over a period of time. This three-dimensional understanding of consolidation 
- behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional- encompasses a multitude of indicators that vary 
from institutions and structural factors to the agency of internal actors. A holistic approach 
needs thus to take these multitude of variables into consideration in order to explain the process 
of consolidation.  
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Table 1.1: CONSOLIDATION of DEMOCRACY 
Consolidation of 
Democracy 
Indicators  
Constitutional 
Dimension  
(institutional 
context) 
 free, fair and regular elections   
 institutionalized civil liberties such as freedom of assembly 
and association, freedom of information and of expression 
 the rule of law  
 balance of power between the executive, the legislative and 
the judicative 
 an institutionalized party system 
Behavioral 
Dimension 
(actors) 
 No veto power, i.e. no significant group advocates 
antidemocratic changes (armed forces, paramilitary groups, 
landowners, business or radical groups);  
 results and outcomes of the elections are respected by the 
elected officials 
Attitudinal 
Dimension 
(actors) 
 the resolution of any political, societal, and economic crisis 
by means of democratic rules 
 
Socio-economic 
factors 
 Level of economic development 
 the level of industrialization 
 the literacy rate 
 the level of urbanization 
International 
influence 
 democratization waves in neighboring regions/countries 
 wars 
 the impact of international organizations such as the EU and 
the UN  
Sources: Linz and Stepan (996) and Merkel (2008) 
A considerable amount of democratization studies have employed a top-down perspective 
on democratization processes and analyzed institutional settings, or what role political elites 
play in the transition to or consolidation of democracy. In these studies, the role of popular 
movements in bringing about political change or in consolidating democracy has rarely been 
addressed. However, with the success of civil societies, especially in Eastern Europe, it was 
acknowledged that forms of collective participation are equally important in understanding 
democratic transition or consolidation. This bottom-up approach; i.a., explores how a mobilized 
CS interacts with state institutions and political society and in what ways it can contribute to 
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the consolidation of democracy. The following discussion devotes particular attention to the 
role of CS and seeks to understand the relationship between CS and democratic consolidation.   
1.2 Understanding Democratic Consolidation from below: The Role of CS  
The Conceptualization of CS 
The concept of CS has become increasingly popular with the rise of the oppositional movements 
in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Scholars have praised the role of CS and claimed that “a 
lively and free CS” plays a significant role in democratization processes, if not the major role 
(Bernhard 1993; Croissant et al. 2000; Diamond 1994; Foley and Edwards 1996; Grugel 2002; Linz 
and Stepan 1996; Merkel 2004; Schmitter 1993). Even though there is a large body of literature 
on CS, there is a lack of consensus on the definition of CS.  
 CS emerged as a historical phenomenon in Europe. By the late eighteenth century 
relatively autonomous social groups began to challenge the power of monarchies. In this 
process, ‘a sphere of autonomy’ for these social actors began to emerge. This new public space 
was located between ‘the official public life of the state’ and ‘the private and/or communal life’ 
(Bernhard 1993: 308). In this public space, political groups such as political parties, associations, 
social movements, and the press “were able to autonomously organize themselves outside the 
dominant official political sphere and to compel the state through political struggles to 
recognize and respect their existence” (Ibid.). Thus, CS has been regarded as the public space for 
associational life that lies between the state and the private life.  
Based on this conceptual tradition, many contemporary scholars define CS as “a set or a 
system of private voluntary organizations” which act in the “self-organized public space” 
between the state and the private sphere of the family (Cohen and Arato 1992; Diamond 1994; 
Keane 1988; Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1993; Shils 1991). Actors in CS pursue specific 
interests and join together for common purposes. Like the notion of democracy, due to the 
disconnection between the idea of CS and CS as an observable reality, the notion of CS became 
also difficult to describe (Malena and Heinrich 2007: 338). But scholars agree on that the state is 
regarded as the ‘regulatory power’ that enacts laws which set the rights and boundaries of CS 
(Bernhard 1993; Merkel 2004; Schmitter 1993). Accordingly, scholars argue that CS must be 
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legally separated from the state by law, and the private actors within CS must be guaranteed 
specific civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association, to pursue their 
broadly conceived interests (Bernhard 1993: 309; Diamond 1994: 5; Shils 1991: 10).  
Drawing upon these definitions, the present study describes CS: as the public realm in 
which a network of collective bodies joined together for common purposes, organized voluntarily, 
and can act autonomously from the state for the pursuit of non-private and non-commercial 
interests. CS is bound by a legal order and both distinguishable from the state and the family.17  
Characteristics of CS 
CS has three defining components. First component is ‘collectivity’; i.e., people coming together 
to discuss social matters in an attempt to advance their interests and to influence political 
society and policies (Foley and Edwards 1996; Schmitter 1993; Shils 1991). Second, people 
organize on a ‘voluntary basis’, not guided by the state or the rules of primordial collectivities 
(Shils 1991: 4). Therefore, the vast majority of CS theorists conceive CS to be beyond the 
boundaries of the private realm of the family (Cohen and Arato 1992; Diamond 1994; Schmitter 
1993; Shils 1991). Third, CS acts within the pre-established rules in a refined or civil manners 
(Diamond 1994; Schmitter 1993; Shils 1991). But what does not belong to CS? 
What is not CS? 
With the proliferation of diverging interests of the citizenry, CS has been conceived in 
opposition to political society (political parties, political leadership, elections, or the parliament) 
and economic society, i.e. business networks, business or economic lobby groups. However, 
there is a long-standing debate whether economic units belong to CS or not. While some scholars 
assert that CS comprises economic groups (Diamond 1994; Shils 1991), others oppose this view 
and argue that CS functions differently than the market entities (Cohen and Arato 1992; 
Schmitter 1993). Actors in CS do not aim at gaining profits or replacing private actors of the 
economy (Schmitter 1993). Civil society organizations (CSOs) are in pursuit of specific public 
goods and interests, whereas lobby groups pursue private interests to achieve particularistic 
goods. Thus, economic firms or business corporations and networks are not considered civil 
                                                          
17 Here, I refrain from stating that CS lies between the state and the family. This issue will be discussed below. 
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society actors, but if workers or consumers organize around a common interest, as is the case 
with labor unions and consumer organizations, then they can be defined as a member of CS.18 
For instance, the Daimler Company (one German automotive corporation) is clearly not a 
member of CS, but any labor union, which Daimler’s workers belong to, is part of CS. 
Studies on CS also differentiate between a ‘political society’ and CS. As Linz and Stepan 
state, political society - in a democratized setting - is the arena in which political entities contest 
for the legitimate right to exercise control over the state power (1996: 8). The core institutions 
of a political society are political parties, the electoral system and rules, legislatures, and the 
political leadership. Both political parties and CS meditate between the state and individual, but 
they do so in different ways and have different functions. The values and interests of CS can 
determine or shape the political society in a democratic context; however, CS does not seek to 
acquire the state power or take the responsibility of governing practices (Linz and Stepan 1996: 
14). This is the function of political parties. CS can represent specific public needs and interests, 
but they cannot translate their actions into national decisions or policies. Thus, political parties 
are not regarded as a part of CS in the present study. 
Following the discussions above, CS does not aim to obtain the state power or pursue 
profit-making interests, nor does it aim to replace family relations (Diamond 1994; Linz and 
Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1993).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Some scholars use the term “third sector”. As Seibel and Anheier contend, “the third sector designates all 
organizations which are neither profit-oriented businesses nor governmental agencies or bureaucracies” (1990: 7). 
Organizations in the third sector can employ private interests for public goods.  
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Figure 1.1: CIVIL SOCIETY, STATE, and MARKET 
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One of the major disputes on CS is about its normative character. The literature on CS 
presupposes that individuals or groups in CSOs articulate their interests and demands 
“peacefully”, without exercising violence (Diamond 1994; Glasius 2001; Keane 1988; Schmitter 
1993; Shils 1991). Hence, CS acts within “the pre-established rules of a ‘civil’ and legal nature” 
(Schmitter 1993: 4). The norm of ‘civility’ refers to “a widespread pattern of refined or civil 
manner” (Shils 1991: 4). Scholars thus include values and principles such as tolerance, equality 
before law and justice, pluralism, transparency or accountability into the definitional core of CS. 
Following this definition, scholars contend that the public goal or activities of civil society 
groups do not violate the existence and rights of others, i.e. they respect pluralism and recognize 
the rule of law (Diamond 1994; Merkel 2004; Schmitter 1993). Such a definition of CS is mainly 
associated with democratic regimes. 
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There is, however, a converse view about the civil character of CS. It claims that the 
multiple forms of interaction and collectivity within CS can be fragile and subject to serious 
conflicts (Glasius 2001: 6; Keane 1998: 50). Hence, CS can become an arena for political conflict 
or extremist ideas. Criminal associations such as paramilitary groups, human trafficking 
networks or extremist groups (racist, nationalist, or religious) can easily infiltrate CS. Also, 
authoritarian political elites might use CS to suppress other groups within CS (Kopecky and 
Mudde 2003; Malena and Heinrich 2007). Such groups employ non-democratic methods and 
practices – violence in demonstrations, agitation or hate speeches - in order to achieve their 
goals (Malena and Heinrich 2007: 341). In the literature, they are subsumed under the category 
of an “uncivil society” (Kopecky and Mudde 2003; Mercer 2002) or “the dark side” of CS 
(Croissant et al. 2000; Lauth and Merkel 1997). The dark side of CS lacks the civility (Kopecky and 
Mudde 2003); i.e., it neither recognizes state authority nor accepts the plurality and diversity 
within CS. Hence, they are in general excluded from the analysis on the role of CS in democracy 
or development. Civility is useful in defining CS as an 'ideal', but is less useful in assessing the 
reality of CS around the globe (Malena and Heinrich 2007: 341). As Kopecky and Mudde argue, 
an ‘uncivil society’ is part of the vibrant associational life, and it can enable us to find out why 
democratization fails (2003: 11). Although there is truth in this view, for the purpose of the 
present study, groups or organizations that use violent acts and hate speeches in order to 
achieve their goals will not be regarded as CS actors.  
Forms of Organizations in CS  
CS is referred to as the arena that comprises organizations that vary from voluntary 
associations, civil initiatives, and advocacy groups to non-governmental (NGOs) and non-profit 
organizations (NPOs). The term ‘NGO’ usually refers to those “organizations that are officially 
established, run by employed staff (urban professionals or expatriates), well-supported (by 
domestic, or as is more often the case, international funding), and that are often relatively large 
and well-resourced” (Mercer 2002: 6). NGOs are driven by rules and policies and can operate on 
a regional, national, or on an international level.19 As Yaziji and Doh (2009) state, there are 
                                                          
19 In a non-democratic context, regimes may try to co-opt donor assistance to NGOs by creating NGOs that are 
labeled as GO-NGO (government-organized NGO), or donor assistance itself may prompt the formation of 
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different types of activities NGOs pursue: “advocacy”, “service” and “hybrid” NGOs. Advocacy 
NGOs engage in lobbying, can serve as representatives and advisory experts to decision-makers, 
conduct research, hold conferences, disseminate information to key constituencies, develop and 
promote codes of conduct, and organize boycotts, mass demonstrations, petitions or investor 
actions for their specific demands (Yaziji and Doh 2009: 8). They can be active in different issue 
areas including equality, education, environmental protection, women, minority or human 
rights. By contrast, “service” NGOs provide goods and services to people with unmet needs, such 
as the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders, while hybrid NGOs pursue both sets of activities 
simultaneously, or evolve from one to the other (Ibid.: 11).  
NGOs are seen as different from “grassroots organizations” (GROs) that are usually 
understood “to be smaller, often membership-based organizations, operating without a paid 
staff but often reliant upon donor or NGO support, which tend to be (but are not always) issue-
based and therefore ephemeral” (Mercer 2002: 6). Both NGOs and GROs provide opportunities 
for more citizen participation. NGOs may have a broader influence on public policy-making than 
GROs, because they are well-organized and better networked. If a NGO has an extensive global 
outreach with thousands of direct members to deal with specific issues in many countries, it is 
considered ‘International NGO’ (INGO) (Nelson 2007: 3). Amnesty International, Oxfam 
International or Greenpeace are examples of INGOs. 
Defining CS and describing the public space in which CS acts are important steps in 
assessing the role of CS in the transition to or the consolidation of democracy. There are, 
however, diverse and conflicting views about the relationship between CS and democratization. 
In the following, I highlight the discussion on the interconnectedness of CS and democratic 
consolidation, and examine this relationship in a more general level.  
The Nexus between CS and Democratic Consolidation  
In democratization studies, scholars have argued that a vibrant CS promotes democratic 
stability, and that it enhances the effectiveness of democratic governments. (Bernhard 1993; 
                                                          
institutions specifically to secure external funding, hence, called DO-NGO (donor-organized NGO) (Carapico 2000: 
14). 
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Diamond 1994; Kamrava and Mora 1998; Kopecky and Mudde 2003; Schmitter 1993; 1997; 
Tusalem 2007). There is, however, little consensus on the exact role of CS in the democratization 
process. It is hard to generate a theoretical model that can exactly capture the role of CS in the 
process of democratization, because its role varies according to the political context in each 
country. While studies on consolidation and on the quality of democracy have paid attention to 
the stabilizing and strengthening role of CS, transition studies have tried to specify how CS has 
been successful in initiating democratic transitions. Such diverse views on the role of CS can be 
subsumed under two categories: the “liberal” and the “radical” perspective on CS (Foley and 
Edwards 1996; Grugel 2002; Mercer 2002; Waylen 2007).  
The liberal perspective regards CS as a key to a “healthy” democracy (Diamond 1994; 
Mercer 2002; Putnam 1993). Accordingly, CS is defined as “the realm of organized social life” 
(Diamond 1994: 5) that is said to promote effectiveness and stability in a democratic polity (Foley 
and Edwards 1996; Tusalem 2007). The more CS participates the more inclusive the political 
system will be, thus, state-society relations can develop into a more democratic form (Diamond 
1994; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Putnam 1993). However, this depends to the political 
context. If a country's political institutions are capable of channeling and redressing grievances, 
then CS can buttress political stability and democracy (Berman 1997: 569). How exactly does CS 
promote effectiveness and provide democratic stability? First, CS can be a vital instrument in 
containing the power of democratic governments and in preventing the resumption of power 
by authoritarian actors, especially during economic or political crises (Diamond 1994; Linz and 
Stepan 1996). Second, a rich associational life can help political parties stimulate participation 
and increase the political efficacy (Diamond 1994: 7). Third, CS can also be a crucial arena to 
develop democratic values and norms such as tolerance, moderation, social trust, or respect for 
others (Diamond 1994; Mercer 2002; Putnam 1993; Tusalem 2007). This function of democratic 
CS has also been analyzed under the term “social capital” which can bolster the performance of 
the polity (Putnam 1993: 173). Last, CS acts on an intermediate level between the state and 
citizens, which serves as the basis for resolving conflicts in society and for controlling the 
behavior of its members (Diamond 1994; Foley and Edwards 1996; Schmitter and Karl 1991). By 
channeling the demands and concerns of social groups to the state, CS underpins an effective 
and streamlined state, ensuring legitimacy, accountability and transparency (Mercer 2002: 7). 
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However, if CS is weak, underdeveloped, and polarized along ethnic and cultural cleavages 
within a given society, then it can even undermine the democratic performance (Diamond 1994; 
Mercer 2002; Schmitter 1993).  
The liberal perspective also regards CS as “an aid to the state, especially in terms of 
reducing the load the state carries, and as a check on state excesses” (Grugel 2002: 95). In this 
regard, recent studies interpret the role of CS as diminishing the role of the state to a minimal 
level so that politically mature citizens take on their own social responsibilities. Nevertheless, 
some scholars have claimed that the liberal perspective is limited in explaining the role of CS in 
case of oppositional movements in the transition to democracy (Grugel 2002; Waylen 2007), and 
only emphasizes the “positive effects” of associational life for democratic governance (Foley and 
Edwards 1996: 39). 
The radical perspective, on the other hand, points out the “transformative capacity” of 
CS. The radical perspective emerged in the aftermath of the transformations in Eastern Europe, 
where CS came to be seen as a way of resisting the “tyrannical state power” (Foley and Edwards 
1996: 39). It assumes that civil society activism is a way to challenge the unequal power relations 
by exposing the abuses of non-democratic states, to force the state to change and thereby to 
foster political transition and an eventual democratic consolidation process. Civil society’s 
opposition to the state was useful in democratic resistance. Hence, in this view, the struggle 
between the state and CS is considered a way to achieve democracy (Grugel 2002: 95). In contrast 
to the liberal view, the radical view includes groups that enable citizens to counter state power. 
Accordingly, the civil society realm can be interpreted as a key terrain to undermine the 
legitimacy of non-democratic states, to construct the vision of an alternative political order or 
to limit state authority (Diamond 1994; Grugel 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996). Compared to the 
liberal perspective, the radical view is more helpful to analyze the democratic potential of 
oppositional or anti-systemic movements (Grugel 2002; Waylen 2007). With the help of the 
radical perspective, the role of marginalized groups such as women’s movements, indigenous or 
ethnic minority movements20  in transforming regimes can be better understood.  
                                                          
20 The analysis of “collective actions based on shared beliefs and solidarity” in contentious politics are generally 
embedded in social movement theories, see further: Tarrow (1998). These theories are interested in the dynamics 
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Both the liberal and radical perspectives emphasize the importance of a vibrant and 
independent CS in building democracy, but interpret the role and nature of CS differently. While 
the radical arguments on CS lay special emphasis on the autonomous and resisting character of 
CS and regards it as a counterweight to the state, the liberal arguments underscore the 
complementary power of CS that strengthens and deepens the democratic system and practices. 
Foley and Edwards thus argue that there is “a degree of contradiction” between these two 
arguments (1996: 39). But they claim that their difference lies in the sociopolitical settings in 
which these perspectives have emerged (Ibid.: 42). The liberal argument is framed by the liberal 
democratic view in which strengthening CSOs is beneficial for enhancing legitimacy of the 
democratic state and providing stability (Mercer 2002: 20), whereas the radical argument 
emerged as a response to the authoritarian state and its apparatus, including state parties, 
unions and organizations (Foley and Edwards 1996: 43). Hence, scholars claim that what kind of 
role CSOs play rather depends on the larger political settings (Foley and Edwards 1996; Mercer 
2002). 
Instead of seeing these arguments as conflicting or diverging views on the role of CS in 
democratization, the present study sees them as complementary parts of one civil society 
argument. Both perspectives assert that CS pluralizes the public arena and provides citizens 
with more opportunities to engage with the state power (Grugel 2002; Mercer 2002). While the 
liberal perspective on CS highlights the stabilizing and strengthening role of CS in consolidation, 
the radical perspective focuses on the opposing role of CS during the breakdown or transition 
process. It can thus be assumed that what the literature fails to identify is that these arguments 
explain different stages of the democratization process. Thus, the liberal perspective on CS is 
more useful in explaining democratic consolidation processes.  
As Linz and Stepan put forward, “a robust civil society, with the capacity to generate 
political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions get started, help 
resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen 
democracy” (1996: 9). The autonomous existence from the state, the capacity to pluralize the 
                                                          
of social contention, rather than examining their specific impact on political outcomes. Thus, social movement 
theories will not be employed in the present study. 
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political arena, and to challenge or push the state towards a political change make CS a crucial 
component of both in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy (Diamond 1999; 
Grugel 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996, Merkel 2004; Tusalem 2007).  
However, there is also a more pessimistic scenario for the role of CS in the 
democratization process. CS can lose its strength and capacity to push for reforms after a 
transition to democracy. Several reasons have been suggested to explain such a decline in CS 
activism: 1) the loss of enthusiasm and solidarity, 2) coopting by those who still control the state 
apparatus, 3) the expansion of political society, and 4) the fragmentation of CS after successful 
democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 55ff.). Following this, the state can re-assert its 
control over society and can disable CS for its political strategies. At this point, certain groups 
may claim that they are satisfied with the degree of democratization, while others may try to 
push for more reforms and some others may pronounce anti-democratic sentiments within CS. 
For instance, several scholars claim that the newly democratized regimes of the Third Wave 
have failed to exhibit adequate interests in including CSOs in the consolidation process 
(Croissant et al. 2000; Merkel 2004; Schmitter 1993). Therefore, a transition to democracy does 
not ensure the further survival and development of CS. Considering the varieties of the forms of 
CS around the globe, the success or failure of CSOs in democratization not only depends on the 
structural properties of such organizations, but also on the sociopolitical setting they are 
embedded in - as mentioned above. The general pattern in consolidating democracies has shown 
that CS does not disappear from the public realm, rather CSOs become more institutionalized 
within a democratic public space than prior to a democratic transition.  
In measuring the strength of CS, scholars focus on a multitude of factors that can be 
subsumed under four dimensions: “the external environment, the internal structures, the values 
and the impact of CS” (Malena and Heinrich 2007: 341). The external environment refers to the 
institutional context in which CS operates and to the ways in which it interacts with other 
partial regimes of the political system; while the internal structures denote the size of CS, its 
actors and their activities (Ibid.). These four dimensions enable us to assess the strength or 
weakness of CS in a holistic manner. For instance, an important segment of CS is women’s rights 
organizations. In order to assess their impact on state policies, scholars first look at the legal 
structures which govern the possibilities and limits of action for women’s organizations, then 
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the internal structures of those organizations and the values they promote. To examine the 
impact of women’s CSOs, scholars focus on significant policy changes regarding women’s issues, 
and how much such changes reflect demands of women’s CSOs. Conclusively, to assess the role 
of CS in democratic consolidation, scholars not only consider the structures of CSOs, but also the 
legal, political and social context in which CSOs operate and interact with other actors.  
Until now, the theoretical discussion has elaborated on the role of CS in democratization 
or consolidation processes. Let us now focus on a specific group within CS: ‘organized women’. 
By organized women, scholars specifically refer to women’s collective activities in which women 
organize explicitly as women, engage in improving the circumstances of women’s lives, and 
promote gender-based interests in the public realm (McBride and Mazur 2008; Ray and Korteweg 
1999). Although there are some democratization studies referring to women’s mobilization 
within the broader frame of CS, only a handful of studies have closely examined the role of 
organized women in the transition to or consolidation of democracy (Alvarez 1990; Jaquette 
1994; Viterna and Falon 2008; Waylen 1994, 2003). In a similar vein, the literature on CS, or on 
social movements, has examined women’s movements, but has rarely examined the analytical 
relationship between women and CS (Beckwith 2000; Weldon 2004). In a nutshell, both the 
research on democratization and on CS has remained “gender-blind” (Waylen 2003, 2007). A 
slowly growing body on the gender-and-politics literature has claimed that a thorough 
examination of women’s political and civic participation is only possible by taking women’s lives 
and experiences into account. This entails employing a “gendered” perspective that more 
explicitly integrates women into theoretical and empirical analyses.  
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Chapter 2 
Gendering CS and Democracy 
This chapter combines the assumptions of both the gender-and-politics literature and 
democratization literature to examine the role of organized women in democratic consolidation 
processes. To this end, it first briefly discusses how women can be integrated in the analysis of 
politics by introducing ‘gender’ as ‘a category of the analysis’. This enables us to perceive women 
as political subjects, as much as men are, and help reconsider women’s participation and 
representation both in the political sphere and CS. At this point, it must be noted that the 
integration of the term ‘gender’ does not aim to add another ‘ambiguous’ concept to the 
overblown research of democracy, it rather seeks to present a notion of democracy that 
substantially includes women by underlining two dimensions of democracy: women’s 
participation and inclusion. In the same vein, the gendered perspective on CS does not aim to 
stretch the concept, rather it highlights how women participate in the civil society sphere with 
their gendered identity. This gendered approach in the theoretical analysis will include women 
not only in the definitions of democracy and CS, but also in the operationalization of these 
concepts. 
2.1 Gender in Political Science  
Feminist theory claims that for centuries, the debates on politics have proceeded as if women 
were not existent in the political realm (Pateman 1989; Phillips 1991). Women and politics 
literature claimed that the early political theories of eighteenth and nineteenth century based 
their understanding of the ‘universal’ concepts such as rights, freedom, justice or democracy on 
the idea of “an abstract individual male citizen” (Pateman 1989; Phillips 1998a). This patriarchal 
understanding, in which the role of the male regarded as the primary authority figure, took little 
notice of women as citizens (Okin 1998; Young 1998). Thus, this literature sought to “[…] 
establish ‘women’ as a politically relevant group whose inclusion in political science research 
was necessary for drawing generalizations, and whose exclusion from such arena has no 
scholarly merit” (Beckwith 2005: 128). In short, the excluded part - who comprise almost the 
half of the world population - had to become included.  
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To fill this gap, feminist theory has offered the term ‘gender’ as “a category of analysis” 
(Beckwith 2005; Hawkesworth 2005; Scott 1986). Gender is defined as the “socially constructed” 
roles or identities of women and men (Beckwith 2005; Hawkesworth 2005; Scott 1986; Staudt 
2007).21 Gender as a category helps question how femininity and masculinity are constructed 
and institutionalized through social and cultural codes, and how they regulate the relations 
between women and men (Beckwith 2005; Scott 1986; Staudt 2007). By integrating gender into 
the analysis, scholars could reveal that identities, values, and practices in the political realm are 
not ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-inclusive’ in nature, but rather they serve to exclude women 
categorically. Accordingly, gender and politics literature contended that the concepts and 
theories of political science have to be reconsidered and reshaped by taking gendered 
perspectives into account (Mazur and Goertz 2008; Phillips 1991, 1998). 
With the help of the term gender, scholars can include women into the theoretical and 
empirical analyses and can acquire a better understanding of the different dimensions of 
politics. Research on gender and politics claims that the gender bias in political theory depends 
on the particular way of conceiving ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres (DeLue 1996; Okin 1998; Phillips 
1998).  
2.2 Rethinking the Public/Private Divide 
In political theory, the idea of the ‘public sphere’ refers to a general realm in which political, 
economic, or societal affairs take place, whereas the ‘private sphere’ refers to the domestic life; 
i.e., the family, household, childcare, kinship, and friendship relations (DeLue 1997; Dietz 1998; 
Okin 1998). In traditional political theory, as gender scholars contend, the public sphere has 
been conceived as a ‘male’, whereas the private sphere was looked upon as a ‘female’ domain 
(Fraser 1990; Okin 1998; Pateman 1989; Phillips 1991). Thus, men were thought to be preoccupied 
with the economic or political life in the public sphere, whereas women, as mothers and wives, 
were related to the domestic life of the private sphere (Okin 1998: 118). These socially 
                                                          
21 The term ‘gender’ is differentiated from the term ‘sex’, which refers to the biological differences between men 
and women (Scott 1986). As Scott asserts, the term ‘gender’ sounds more objective than ‘women’ does, and the term 
“[g]ender seems to fit within the scientific terminology of social sciences and thus dissociates itself from the 
(supposedly strident) politics of feminism” (1986: 1056). 
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constructed gender roles of men and women have passed through generations and have shaped 
power relations between the sexes within politics and society.  
Feminist scholars have argued that this assumed demarcation between the private and 
public sphere in political theory represents a view of society from a traditional male perspective 
(Moghadam 2003; Okin 1998; Phillips 1991; Waylen 2007). This mainstream understanding tends 
to exclude women as political subjects from the analysis. The public/private divide also excludes 
so-called “private” issues that really are not of a private nature and interests related to women 
from the public debate (Fraser 1990: 73).  For instance, domestic violence against women and 
children was thought to be a ‘private’ matter and has not been of public concern. Thus, the state 
has not taken any action to eliminate domestic violence, even though it was a threat to the lives 
of its female citizens and of children. Hence, the public/private demarcation in political theory 
has worked to women’s and children’s disadvantage and ignored women’s role as citizens and 
political subjects (Okin 1998; Pateman 1989; Phillips 1991, 1998).  
Feminist theory has claimed that the private and public need to be conceived as mutually 
connected, rather than completely separated (Phillips 1991: 95). This is based on the argument 
that the family and the household are not immune from the power dynamics of the public realm 
(Okin 1998: 124). Thus, feminist scholars have contended that public policies such as social 
security, health insurance, and education influence the relations inside the family. Conversely, 
the relations in political or economic life are shaped by the sexual division of labor in the 
household. Thus, what is considered to be a ‘private’ matter, can be of equally high ‘political’ 
concern. In comprehending private and public spheres as interrelated, women should not only 
be defined by their roles as mothers or wives, but also as equal individuals who can take full 
advantage of their citizenship rights (DeLue 1997; Okin 1998). This will not only include women 
as political subjects in the analysis, but also put women’s concerns on the political agenda and 
thereby expand our understanding of what is ‘political’ (Phillips 1991; Waylen 2007). The 
reshaping of the public/private divide would alter the relations within the household and open 
the ways for women’s participation in the political realm, and this would make democracy more 
inclusive and representative (Fraser 1990; Okin 1998; Phillips 1991, 1998; Waylen 2007). 
The reconsideration of public and private as mutually dependent has also important 
implications for the way the CS is conceived. In its conceptual history, CS has been differentiated 
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from the family, and, thereby, theories on CS could overlook women as political subjects (Howell 
2007; Okin 1998; Phillips 1998). CS theories have not paid enough attention to the analytical 
relationship between gender and CS, neither have gender theories (Howell 2007; Reverter-
Bañón 2006). Both literatures have employed diverse theoretical frameworks to analyze 
women’s inclusion/exclusion in the public sphere, but neither of them has explicitly 
conceptualized the term CS from a gendered lens.  
2.3 Toward a Gendered Approach to CS   
The theoretical discussions in the CS literature have mostly revolved around the relationship 
between the state and CS, both of which were established and managed primarily by men. 
Despite the growing number of studies on women’s civic participation in different political 
contexts, the gendered nature of processes and practices in CS have not been analyzed 
thoroughly. Why has the CS literature failed to understand the gendered relations in the civil 
society arena? First, the gender-blindness of CS theories can be traced back to the failure of 
political theory to integrate gendered concepts and theories into the analysis (Howell 2007: 421). 
Second, as most CS theories claim, the private sphere of the family, which is implicitly linked 
with women, lies beyond the sphere of CS. Therefore, the private sphere of the family, through 
which gendered practices are transmitted to the political sphere, has not been considered in 
examining the state-CS relations. Hence, a gendered analysis of CS seemed irrelevant (Howell 
2007: 423). As Howell contends, if CS theories have integrated the gendered perspective on the 
public/private division, they could have explained how the behaviors and dynamics of the 
family shape norms and practices in CS as well as how gendered power relations pervade the 
sphere of CS (2007: 423).  
In a similar vein, the gender-and-politics literature has also scarcely paid attention to the 
concept of CS (Howell 2007; Weldon 2004). The reasons are twofold: first, it was because feminist 
theory has in general subsumed CS under the public realm which has been defined as a ‘male-
dominated’ sphere. Thus, CS has not been taken into consideration as “an organizing category 
for analyzing gender relations” (Phillips 2002: 72). Second, gender scholars have been mainly 
concerned with revising the assumed demarcation between the private and public spheres in 
order to expand the realm of ‘politics’ for women. In short, the concept of CS offers valuable 
insights to the study of politics from a gender perspective. Howell argues that if the gender 
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perspective of the public/private demarcation is applied to the concept of CS, scholars can 
better reveal inequalities in civil society arena and theorize “how CS discourses, spaces, and 
organizations, and practices are shaped by, and in turn reproduce, particular configurations of 
gender relations” (2007: 419).  
Rather than creating a new concept, it is possible to ‘engender’ the existing concept of CS 
with the help of gender and politics research. First, research needs to conceive of women’s roles 
as citizens who seek to take full advantage of their citizenship rights. Second, it needs to 
acknowledge that the structures and practices within CS are gendered, that is, the socially and 
culturally constructed roles of women and men influence behaviors, practices and dynamics 
within CS. By integrating gender into the analysis of CS, scholars will be able to include women 
in the analysis. In this regard, Howell proposes a theoretical model22 that captures the four sites: 
the family, CS, the state, and the market (2007: 426). At this point, Howell suggests that “a circuit 
of gender relations” infuses each site and connects them with each other (Ibid.). This implies 
that culturally and historically designed gender roles, identities or norms are created, and 
reproduced, in the public realm of the state, the market, and CS that are perceived as 
interconnected (Beckwith 2005; Howell 2007; Mazur 2008).  
Similarly, Reverter-Bañón (2006) suggests that in order to link the concept of CS to gender, 
researchers need to take into consideration the interrelatedness between the state, citizenship 
rights, CS, and the family. She claims that the idea of the family not only shapes the gender roles, 
but also the idea of citizenship, the state, and CS (2006: 24). In sum, a gendered perspective on 
CS proposes a new model where the sites of the state, the economy, CS, and the household are 
thought to be interconnected, rather than being distinct and separated from each other. This 
helps reveal how gendered dynamics of these spheres might hinder women’s participation in 
CS, and how gendered behaviors shape the institutions and structures in the public realm.  
Drawing upon the views of Howell and Reverter-Bañón, the present study claims that the 
gendered perspective on CS can also provide an answer why politically active women prefer to 
participate in the civil society realm, rather than participating in formal politics. For instance, 
                                                          
22 This is a model based on the work of Diane Elson (1998) who constructed a conceptual model of the political 
economy capturing modes of production. 
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in the last three decades, women’s CSOs have become among the fastest growing groups within 
the civil society arena. Women contend that combining civic engagement with their everyday 
life is easier than engaging in formal politics. In other words, women’s gendered roles – being 
mothers, daughters, sisters, or wives - shape also their ways of participation in the public 
sphere.23 Moreover, the gendered perspective on CS highlights the differences, or the 
similarities, in forms and structures of organizing of women and men within the civil society 
arena. To exemplify this, while well-structured, mix-gender CSOs in general are organized in a 
hierarchical manner, feminist organizations lay great emphasis on organizing in non-
hierarchical manner to encourage women to participate in all dimensions of civic engagement 
from grassroots and agenda-setting to advocacy, and lobbying decision-makers. To this end, 
members of feminist organizations take decisions on a collective basis, or they implement a 
rotating management system in the organizational structure. In sum, the gendered perspective 
on CS provides a better understanding of women’s participation in the public sphere. 
Gender inequalities are obvious in the political and economic life. Men mostly dominate 
leadership positions in politics and economics, whereas women are represented in lower 
echelons of political bodies or economic enterprises. However, CS provides a fertile ground for 
women organizing outside of formal politics, and increases the chances of women’s access to 
political and economic institutions, and CSOs. In this regard, women’s CSOs, mainly struggling 
for gender equality, have been successful in extending the boundaries of politics for women and 
proliferated the chances of women’s political participation and representation in political 
offices. This has led to a considerable change in what counts as ‘political’, and it has gendered 
the structures, dynamics, norms, values, and practices in politics. To put it differently, organized 
women in CS, understood as “the idea that women’s self-organizing to further their own 
empowerment”, has challenged the male-dominated public sphere and made democratic 
politics and the policy-making process more inclusive (Weldon 2004: 1).  
The gendered conceptualization of the public and private spheres and acknowledging the 
gendered practices and structures within CS, the state, and the market have implications for the 
                                                          
23 At this point, it must be stated that the ways of participation in public sphere are not only shaped by gender 
differences but also by ‘class’ differences. But the argument how class impacts the way of political or civic 
participation remains out of the scope of this study. 
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democracy theory. Clearly, socially constructed gender roles and identities are important 
factors in shaping the institutions, and that they structure and influence the behavior of 
political actors, all of which contribute to democracy. 
2.4 Gendering Democracy 
Gender-blindness of Democratization Studies 
The process of political democratization provides women (and men) with new opportunities for 
political participation (Viterna and Fallon 2008: 668); however, the mainstream democratization 
literature has rarely paid attention to the impact of gender on the processes of democratization 
and largely neglected women in the analysis. This has several reasons: First, women as political 
subjects have not been taken seriously, or gender as a category has been absent in the theoretical 
analysis (Phillips 1991, 1998; Paxton 2008; Tremblay 2007). This becomes particularly clear in the 
measurements of democracy. If women’s suffrage is effectively included in the measurement, 
the notion of the waves of democratization is no longer supported, or established democracies 
in the West do not have a hold on early democratization (Paxton 2008: 68). To put it differently, 
democratization studies do not regard the introduction of women’s suffrage as a determinant of 
the transition. The most prominent example related to the ineffectiveness of women’s suffrage 
is the case of Switzerland. Although female citizens in Switzerland obtained the right to vote 
only in 1971, the mainstream democratization literature has usually labeled the country as a 
democratic state since the nineteenth or the beginning of the twentieth century. If a significant 
part of the population, in this case women, is hindered to participate in politics, then such a 
regime cannot be classified as ‘democratic’. As the Swiss example exposes, even though women 
are included in the definitions of democracy, they are mostly ignored in measurements. Hence, 
researchers must take into account women’s inclusion not only in their working definitions, but 
also in their operationalization (Paxton 2008: 70). 
Second, democratization scholars have mainly been concerned with how to achieve and 
endure institutional democracy (Waylen 2000, 2003). Such studies are confined to studying 
institutional processes or the behavior of political elites in the transition to or the consolidation 
of democracy (Jaquette 1994; Waylen 2007). Since the number of women have remarkably been 
low within the political elite, they have been implicitly excluded from the analysis of 
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democratization. Moreover, such studies limit the scope of their analysis to the upper echelons 
of political institutions, where women are not usually represented, and, in consequence, ignore 
women’s issues in the process of democratization (Waylen 2007: 5). 
Third, a group of democratization scholars shifted their focus from the upper to the lower 
echelons of politics and began to question the role of CS in the process of democratization 
(Croissant et al. 2000; Diamond 1994; Foley and Edwards 1996; Schmitter 1997). However, none 
of these studies has explicitly discussed the role women played in democratization, even though 
women formed the majority in many popular movements, especially in the Latin America 
transitions (Waylen 1994: 334). Because of the lack of interest in women’s mobilization and 
gender issues, these studies have ignored the relationship between gender and the 
democratization process. 
In sum, women’s role as political actors and women’s issues have been ignored in the 
literature on democratization. This incomplete understanding of politics, democracy, the public 
sphere, and CS has made it impossible to place gender in the processes or outcomes of 
democratization (Waylen 1994: 335). The integration of gender as a category in the analysis of 
democratization would thus broaden the scope of democratization theories. This is not only 
because women will be added to the range of political actors to be analyzed, but also women will 
put forward a new and broader set of issues to achieve democratic politics and society.  
A Gendered Approach to Democratization  
Since the late 1980s, there is a growing body of literature on gender-and- democratization. 
Especially after the success of women’s movements in the Latin American transitions, gender 
scholars have begun to scrutinize the role of organized women in bringing down authoritarian 
regimes and in building democracy (Alvarez 1990; Jaquette 1994; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Rai 
2003; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 1994, 2000, 2003, 2007). These single-case and comparative 
studies not only analyze why and how women mobilize, but also how women’s participation and 
their interaction with political institutions contribute to democratization and consolidation 
processes (Waylen 2003: 159). Some of the key findings of the literature on gender-and-
democratization are:  
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 Strong women’s mobilizations in the transitional period are central for state-level 
changes in gender policies after the transition (Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 1994, 
2003, 2007).  
 The existing political institutions, i.e. the institutional context, during the transition to 
democracy can shape, and change, the strategies and aims of organized women as well 
as gender relations (Beckwith 2005; Waylen 2007). 
 If the presence of influential political parties that are open to demands of women’s 
movements, and that have feminist activists within them, coincides with a transition 
path that facilitates the participation of women in those processes, it is more likely that 
progressive gender policies will ensue (Waylen 2003: 173).  
 When women’s movements develop cohesive coalitions, they are more effective in 
influencing the newly established democratic regime (Franceschet 2001; Viterna and 
Fallon 2008). 
The special focus in all these studies is exclusively on women’s participation and representation 
in the broader political realm. These studies have introduced a new analytical dimension in the 
democratization literature and have sought to make a theoretical sense of engendering 
democratization.  
Given that democratization research has divided the process of democratization into 
phases, gender scholars also use this periodization, and analyze the role women play in different 
stages of democratization. The periodization helps gender scholars to comprehend and compare 
how differences in the institutional context in each stage of transition have differing ‘gender 
outcomes’ (Franceschet 2001; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 2003, 2007). In analyzing the 
regime breakdown, gender-and-democratization scholars primarily concentrate on women’s 
mobilization and the circumstances under which women make gender claims visible in 
oppositional politics (Waylen 2007: 65). As regards the transition to democracy, scholars explore 
where women organize in the newly forming political arena and focus on their interactions with 
the changing political context, i.e. with the institutions in the new political regime. 
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In the democratization phase, women usually engage in CSOs or in grassroots movements. 
Accordingly, scholars look at the activities and strategies women’s organizations pursue, as well 
as at their effectiveness in putting gender issues on the policy agenda of transitional politics 
(Waylen 2007: 69). By comparing different case studies, gender scholars have found out that 
different transition paths have diverging impacts on the effectiveness of organized women 
(Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 2003, 2007). While the ‘pacted’ transitions to democracy can 
offer opportunities for women’s organizations more time to mobilize to develop strategies to 
unfolding events during the transition (Waylen 2007: 71), the modifications of the laws 
regarding women’s lives might be easier in ‘un-pacted’ transitions since the opposition parties, 
which are open to women’s demands, can refuse the overtures of the authoritarian regime 
(Viterna and Fallon 2008). However, the impact of transition paths on the effectiveness of 
women’s movements after the transition is closely related with other factors such as the level 
of women’s mobilizations before the transition, the characteristics of the movements, and the 
openness of the transitional regime to women’s demands (Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 
2007). 
Moreover, gender-and-transition scholars claim that the international gender agenda has 
a considerable impact on the success of women’s movements in the context of democratization 
process. For instance, the positive impact of the UN’s declaration of the years 1976-1985 as the 
‘UN Decade for Women’, the UN’s ‘World Conferences on Women’ and the influential 
‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (CEDAW)24, 
introduced in 1979, helped popularize and legitimize the struggles and demands of women’s 
movements in a multitude of transition countries (Jaquette 1994; McBride and Mazur 2008; 
Viterna and Falon 2008; Waylen 2007). Especially, the Fourth World Conference on Women in 
Beijing in 1995, which declared “women’s rights as human rights” in the framework of the 
Beijing Platform for Action, pointed to the need to focus on the concept of gender and to 
recognize all relations between men and women within the entire structures of society and to 
re-evaluate them.25 Accordingly, national women’s movements began to refer to the Beijing 
                                                          
24 The CEDAW agreement is considered “an international bill of rights for women”. CEDAW consists of thirty articles 
and defines ’discrimination against women’ in its possible broadest sense. It sets a political agenda for national 
action to counteract discrimination against women. For further details on the Convention, see: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (rev. 25.10.2014) 
25 See further: http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/women/ (rev. 25.10.2014) 
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Declaration and reminded their governments to take action for empowering women and 
ensuring gender equality in their countries. 
In analyzing democratic consolidation from a gender perspective, scholars have studied 
whether organized women could translate their mobilization against authoritarian regimes into 
institutional political power in the newly democratized political regime (Ray and Korteweg 1999: 
54). In doing so, the literature first examines the levels of women’s “descriptive representation” 
in the political life, which denotes the numbers of elected women in parliaments, assemblies, 
and governmental bodies (Tremblay 2007; Waylen 2007). In the aftermath of the Beijing 
Conference, quotas for women candidates have been discussed globally to enhance women’s 
descriptive representation (Cornwall and Goetz 2005; Tremblay 2007; Waylen 2007). Since then 
quotas have been adopted by political parties or imposed through legislature or constitutional 
mechanisms to raise the numbers of women in representative bodies, in both developed and 
developing countries (Cornwall and Goetz 2005; Waylen 2007). Even though the effectiveness of 
quotas is still debated, quotas have been implemented as an effective strategy to counteract 
women’s under-representation on different levels of politics. 
However, the focus on the numbers of women in formal politics is not sufficient. The 
attention should also be given to gender policy outcomes (Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 2003, 
2007). This refers to the “substantive representation” of women; i.e., the expression of women’s 
interests in policy-making (Waylen 2007: 3). Scholars therefore look at the political outcomes in 
gender policies in the post-transitional phase of regimes, and scrutinize how and through what 
ways organized women and women in elected bodies and other state institutions exert influence 
on the legislative to pass the laws related to women’s issues (Jaquette 2001; Waylen 2003, 2007). 
For instance, the “national machineries for women” (state’s women’s machineries) have 
emerged as a unit inside the government to advance women’s substantive representation and 
have become influential in supporting gender mainstreaming in all public policy areas (Rai 2003: 
17). As it is the case in the democratization phase, both the differences in the nature of the 
transition path and of the institutional settings; i.e., how the electoral system, the party system, 
or the legislature is organized, have a considerable impact on gendered policy outcomes in the 
consolidation phase (Ray and Korteweg 1999; Tremblay 2007; Viterna and Falon 2008; Waylen 
2003, 2007).  
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In sum, a gendered analysis of democratic consolidation focuses on two dimensions: 1) the 
extent of the participation of women in the political sphere, and 2) the representation of 
women’s needs and interests in gender policies. To this end, scholars study if women have been 
included in decision-making processes and have achieved policy outcomes corresponding to 
their demands and interests. As gender-and-democratization scholars argue, to achieve a fully 
consolidated democracy in a gendered sense, states need to include women in policy-making 
processes and to mainstream gender equality in their policies (McBride and Mazur 2008; Paxton 
2008; Phillips 1991, 1998; Sauer 2006; Tremblay 2007).  
It is often discussed that larger numbers of women in formal politics would bring about 
‘positive gender outcomes’ and would engender democracy (Jaquette 2001; Sauer 2006; Tremblay 
2007; Waylen 2003, 2007). Following this argument, gender scholars have extensively focused on 
the role of women in the formal political arena, that is, the electoral, constitutional/legal and 
bureaucratic/state arenas (Waylen 2007: 9). They have sought to explain how women in formal 
politics shape gender policies in a post-transitional period. In doing so, they look at the roles 
that a range of female actors – not just women’s movements – play in translating the articulation 
of gender issues into positive gender outcomes (Ibid: 91). However, there are few studies that 
explore exclusively the role of women organized outside of formal politics in the democratic 
consolidation process. This is because the literature claims that women’s CSOs, as CS in general, 
decline both in numbers and in their impact in the consolidation phase (Jaquette 2001; Waylen 
2007). However, it can be contended that organized women, as much as other groups within CS, 
gain new opportunities to interact with the government, state institutions, and political parties 
and to continue their struggles to influence the gender policy agenda in the consolidation phase. 
The present study follows the latter argument and argues that more empirical work is needed 
that analyzes politically active women in the public sphere beyond the state (and the market), 
i.e. in the civil society arena, as well as their effectiveness in achieving gendered outcomes in 
the consolidation period. As discussed in the first section (1.1), consolidation process in general 
is the most controversially debated phase in the democratization literature. Thus, the 
examination of the role of organized women in democratic consolidation not only contributes 
to the theoretical perspective of the gender-and-democratization literature, but also expands 
the scope of the consolidation literature. 
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2.5 Gender, CS, and Democratic Consolidation: Engendering Consolidation 
The present section lays the foundation for the analysis of the intersection between democratic 
consolidation, CS, and gender that will be applied to the case study, and can even be applied to 
other comparative case studies. Before proceeding to the discussion, the present study claims 
that engendering democratic consolidation can best be understood as the strengthening of 
democracy in its two core dimensions: a) participation, b) inclusion with respect to the specific 
demands, needs, and interests of women, which are explicitly recognized by political decision-
making in all relevant policy areas. 
The gender-and-democratization literature has offered a variety of assumptions for 
explaining the relationship between women and democratic consolidation as reviewed above. 
However, different than those elaborations, the main focus here is directed to the relation 
between women organized in the civil society sphere and the democratic consolidation process, 
rather than between women in formal politics and democratic consolidation. In doing so, the 
study relies upon the discussions of both the mainstream democratization and gender-and-
politics literatures. The democratization, or transition, literature, as mentioned before, claims 
that a free and lively CS contributes to the consolidation of democracy (cf. Section 1.2). The 
collective, autonomous, and voluntaristic character of CS provides citizens channels to 
articulate and defend their interests within the public sphere, to monitor government policies, 
to balance the strength of the state power, and to influence policy-making (Diamond 1994; Foley 
and Edwards 1996; Schmitter 1993). Accordingly, scholars focus on the extent and density of 
CSOs and examine their activities and strategies, which enable them to push the government 
for reforms in consolidation processes. Relying upon existing evidence, they explore the 
relationship between CS and the consolidation of democracy. By the same token, a gendered 
examination of the relationship between CS and democratic consolidation has to consider the 
participation of organized women and their inclusion in decision-making processes. This entails 
looking on the activities and strategies of organized women during the consolidation of 
democracy (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 2007). A gendered 
analysis also needs to look at the extent of the participation and inclusion of women’s CSOs in 
decision-making processes regarding gender policies. But the key point is the impact of women’s 
CSOs on the political agenda of democratic consolidation. Therefore, such a study needs to focus 
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on the achievements of women’s CSOs in formulating and implementing policies to improve 
women’s lives by looking at, what Waylen (2003, 2007) calls “positive gender outcomes”.  
Large numbers of active women within CS would pluralize the political realm beyond the 
state and render democratic policy-making more inclusive of women’s voices. Gender scholars 
thus look at the levels of women’s participation in CS. Furthermore, the activities and strategies 
of women’s CSOs are important for the analysis. Women ‘organized as women’ explicitly use a 
gendered discourse, i.e. their ideas, goals, and claims contain a language about the gendered 
identity of women (McBride and Mazur 2008: 228). Accordingly, women’s CSOs point to gendered 
inequalities prevailing in the political, economic, and social life, criticize the gendered power 
structures that hinder their participation in society and politics, and insist on an engendered 
version of democracy.  
In the gendered examination of the interplay between CS and democratic consolidation, 
the level of inclusion of women’s CSOs in decision-making processes is the salient point. It has 
been demonstrated that in the consolidation phase, the political realm becomes more inclusive; 
thus, women’s CSOs, within the broader spectrum of CS, gain more space to interact with 
politicians, political parties, and state institutions (Jaquette 2001; Viterna and Fallon 2008; 
Waylen 2007). In an inclusive political environment, women’s CSOs can freely voice their gender 
specific needs and interests, influence public debates, and to participate in the formulation of 
new gender policies.  
To voice their concerns, women’s CSOs organize protest demonstrations, petitions and 
launch campaigns or boycotts. They thereby insist on the full citizenship status under the 
protection of equitably applied laws and push the government towards the passage of legislation 
beneficial to women as a group (Phillips 1998; Young 1998). Another important strategy women 
CSOs conduct is political lobbying. For lobbying, women’s CSOs work with key female politicians 
who formerly might have been active in the civil society arena. Women’s organizations discuss 
their objectives with female representatives, and these women then promote gender issues 
inside parliaments and other state institutions. Such a cooperation helps women’s CSOs to 
indirectly take part in decision-making processes. Another lobbying channel is cooperation with 
the ‘state’s national machineries for women’ (Jaqeutte 1994; Rai 2003; Waylen 2007). These 
institutional mechanisms, as part of the governmental structures, exert direct influence on 
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gender policies and is the arena for gender mainstreaming.26 Thus, women’s CSOs make politicians 
and public opinion aware of the gendered differences in political procedures and show them 
how policies, even ‘high-politics’ issues such as security or economic and financial policies, have 
different impacts on the lives of women and men respectively (Sauer 2006: 259).  
Finally, studies have argued that the greater the chances for women in participating in 
political decision-making are, the more ‘women-friendly’ policies come about (Rai 2007; Waylen 
2007). The impact of women’s CSOs on the consolidation of democracy can best be understood 
by looking at gendered outcomes in the sense of policies, practices, and institutions that are 
implemented to improve women’s lives (Viterna and Falllon 2008; Waylen 2003, 2007). In other 
words, the question here is to what extent the democratically elected governments respond to 
political objectives of organized women in state’s gender policies. To assess positive gender 
outcomes in the consolidation period, there are several factors to take into account: first, 
‘women-friendly’ changes in laws that are passed during the consolidation of democracy, especially in 
the development of new drafts of civil and penal codes; second, the existence of national 
machineries for women inside the state apparatus as this increases opportunities of influencing 
the executive to draft or to reform gender-related laws (Sauer 2006; Waylen 2003, 2007). Third, 
as Waylen (2007) argues, one can evaluate positive gender outcomes in policy-making by specifically 
looking at policy outcomes in a number of key issue areas such as domestic violence, the divorce 
and family laws, the regulations on the reproductive rights or the rights of women in labor 
markets.  
One may pose the question that if the achievement of ‘positive gender policy outcomes’ 
refers to the deepening the quality of democratic contents (see the discussion on the quality of 
democracy), rather than to the consolidation of democracy, understood as the 
institutionalization of democratic practices and rules. At this point, it must be reminded that 
the policy outcomes in democratic regimes, whether in gender and social policies or some in 
‘high-politics’ issues, need to reflect the demands and interests of its citizens. Thus here, the 
focus on the role of organized women in achieving gendered policy outcomes does not refer to 
                                                          
26 Gender mainstreaming is defined as the strategy making women’s and men’s concerns and experiences an 
integral dimension of all levels of politics, see: United Nations Economic and Social Council Report (1997). 
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deepening social and economic rights of women, rather it reflects that organized women are 
included in policymaking processes with respect to their specific demands and needs, and that 
their demands are explicitly recognized by political decision-making. Moreover, the 
examination of gendered policy outcomes does not make any inference on how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
the policies are, it rather looks if the demands of organized women are reflected or not. 
The effectiveness of women’s CSOs in a country rises also with the degree to which they 
are linked to and affiliated with the international or transnational women’s networks. 
Internationally operating women’s organizations such as the UN Women and the CEDAW 
Committee support women’s CSOs in newly established and consolidating democracies and 
provide them some discursive space on a national level, legitimacy, and sometimes material 
resources to push their governments to reform gender policies (Viterna and Fallon 2008; Waylen 
2007). Especially after the UN Conferences on Women in Beijing 1995, the impact of the gender 
rights regime has increased and gender concerns have been discussed in terms of human rights 
and democracy (Waylen 2007: 35). As it will be explored in the empirical chapters, the 
international networks of women’s CSOs had a considerable impact on pushing the Turkish 
governments to reform gender policies. 
In sum, in order to illustrate the relationship between women’s CSOs and democratic 
consolidation from a gendered perspective, the present study considers both the role of actors 
and the institutional context as well as the interaction between them in the consolidation phase. 
It is then possible to assess how the processes of democratic consolidation are gendered. The 
interaction between organized women and institutions are also influenced by the external 
factors such as international agreements on gender rights or international networks of women’s 
CSOs. In assessing the role of women’s CSOs in democratic consolidation, this study takes the 
three factors into account: 1) the activities and strategies of women’s CSOs, i.e. their 
participation within the civil society arena 2) the level of inclusion of women’s CSOs in political 
decision-making processes, and 3) policy outcomes in gender-related issues.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Design, Method, and Cases  
The present chapter presents the research design and methods used in the empirical part (Part III) 
of the study. The initial task is to re-state the research question to identify the cases to be 
selected as well as to figure out which kinds of data are pertinent. The study explores the role of 
women’s CSOs in the democratic consolidation process under AKP rule in Turkey. Drawing upon the 
widely-acknowledged assumption of the democratization literature that a free and lively CS is 
positively related to the consolidation of democracy, this study argues that the high level of 
women’s activism in the civil society sphere is vital for engendering democracy. In other words, 
the greater the participation of women’s CSOs, the more engendered and consolidated democracy 
becomes. Thus, the study examines to what extent Turkish democracy is engendered under AKP 
rule. 
In the present study, the dependent variable is democratic consolidation understood from 
a gendered perspective. The gendered approach gives a better understanding of the political 
processes where women are involved. Therefore, the evidences generated from the case under 
consideration may enable us to understand the opportunities and constraints that a 
consolidation process can provide for an engendered democracy. The engendered democracy 
would thus integrate women’s needs, demands, and interests into the laws and practices of 
democratic politics. It entails looking at positive outcomes in gender policies during the 
democratic consolidation process. Policy outcomes can be best assessed by evaluating: 1) 
changes in laws and codes during the consolidation process, 2) the existence of state’s body for 
women’s issues, and 3) changes in specific gender issue areas. Here, the study considers three 
issue areas: violence against women, women’s rights and gender equality and discrimination against 
women. They will be measured in terms of improvements from the previous situation (Waylen 
2007: 38).  
What are the independent variables in the analysis? Any gendered analysis of the 
democratic consolidation needs to include both the role of actors and structures, i.e. the 
institutional context. In the present analysis, the main focus is the role of women’s CSOs. The 
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examination of how and to what extent women’s CSOs participate in political decision-making 
processes will help to assess what their impact is on those processes. In order to assess the extent 
of women’s civic activism the study first looks at the legal status of women in the constitution. 
Citizenship rights women enjoy shape their access to and participation in the political realm as 
well as the civil societal sphere. Having formal political and civil rights, however, does not 
necessarily imply an effectively increased women’s participation in the public space. Therefore, 
the study also looks at: the demands, activities, and strategies of women’s CSOs and the extent of their 
participation in the political decision-making processes regarding gender issues. The analysis of 
the activities and strategies of women’s CSOs provides information about how they shape policy-
making processes. The extent of their participation in decision-making processes can be 
measured by looking at the strength of women’s CSOs. This entail looking at the organizational 
characteristic, the relationship with other groups of women’s CSOs, the autonomy from the state 
authorities, political parties and other institutions, and the visibility within CS. The extent of 
the participation of women’s CSOs will enable us to make inferences on the extent to which 
organized women are included in the democratic consolidation process.  
But why did the present study choose organized women from a diverse array of actors 
within CS? Organized women in Turkey has challenged the male-dominated public sphere and 
made democratic politics and policy-making processes more inclusive. Since organized women 
have been among those in the vanguard demanding change, rights, freedom, and democracy in 
Turkey, and in many regions around the world, a democracy cannot be regarded as consolidated 
without women’s participation and the representation of their needs and demands in policies. 
Thus, the present study concentrates on organized women’s agency, and examines democratic 
consolidation in Turkey from a gendered lens.  
It is also imperative to look at the wider institutional context where women’s CSOs operate. 
The institutional context does not determine, but shapes the relationships among actors and 
influences the interactions between actors and institutions and the possibilities for policy 
changes.27 Thus, the study looks at both the institutional context during the AKP regime and the 
                                                          
27 Pierson and Skocpol (2002) claim that the historical institutional approach to politics helps hypothesize about 
the combined effects of institutions and processes. 
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legacy of the previous governments. This will help to see if and what kinds of improvements 
took place in the institutional context. In doing so, the study pays special attention to several 
factors: the role of the military, the extent of civil liberties, the rule of law and the constitution, and the 
party system (see Chapter 4). The analysis of the institutional context will help us to understand 
how broad, or narrow, the leeway for CS is.  
There is one important intervening variable: the external environment, i.e. international 
influences: the impact of the international women’s networks such as UN Women, the 
international gender regime such as the CEDAW treaty, and the international organizations such 
as the EU. The presentation of both the institutional and external context in which organized 
women operate will enable us to trace back under what conditions organized women have 
articulated and put their demands on the political agenda. In doing so, the study also considers 
the roles played by both actors and their institutional context before the period of investigation, 
i.e. AKP rule. It is then possible to explain the differentiations in political outcomes.  
Although outputs, i.e. policies and regulations, are results of inputs, i.e., demands and 
supports, the study reverses this perspective and first looks at outcomes in gender policies. This 
reverse order simplifies the examination of the extent of the participation and inclusion of each 
group of women’s CSOs in policy-making processes. In other words, since the gendered policy 
outcomes are the results of collective bargaining of women’s groups, a more fine examination 
of the efforts (activities and strategies) and the level of participation enables the investigation 
of the intersection of gender, CS, and democratic consolidation. Thus, the empirical analysis 
begins with the examination of policy outcomes. 
The study is confined to the AKP era. It is mainly because Turkey under AKP rule made not 
only a remarkable progress on its path to consolidate its democracy, but also went through 
several political crises. In other words, the democratic consolidation process has experienced 
several “ups and downs” during the twelve years of AKP rule. Gender policies in general have 
been a contentious arena for the religious-conservative base of the AKP. Therefore, it is time to 
contemplate what has been achieved or what remains to be done for the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey, understood as engendering democracy that would integrate women’s 
needs, demands, and interests that are recognized by all levels of policy-making. 
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This theoretically driven single-country case study is ideal for digging into political 
phenomenon how they come about and provide data and information that might be useful for 
the comparison of other cases. Scholars also claim that single-country studies use analytical 
concepts that might be applicable in other countries or develop new concepts that may become 
applicable. Such studies may also help develop new classifications, generate hypotheses for 
theories, confirm or infirm theories, and explain the presence of deviant countries that do not 
conform to the theoretical expectations of the researcher (Landman 2003: 34f.).   
3.1 Units of Analysis 
Over the years, women’s CSOs have helped articulate women’s demands, institutionalize 
women’s movements, and increase the public awareness on women’s problems. By their 
commitment to empower women, to change gender relations in Turkish society and politics, 
and to push the government to reform gender policies, women’s rights organizations are 
regarded as influential actors within the democratic CS in Turkey (Arat 2008; Ergun 2010; 
Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Kubicek 2005;). Due to their considerable achievements, many scholars see 
them as democratic agents (Arat 1994; Marshall 2009). Therefore, a thorough analysis of the 
participation and inclusion of women’s CSOs would provide a valuable insight into the analysis 
of the relationship between CS and the democratic consolidation process in Turkey.  
 There are more than 500 women’s CSOs in Turkey.28 They all focus on empowerment of 
women in social, cultural, economic, or political life, but they employ different strategies to 
achieve their goals. Some of these women’s CSOs do not necessarily fight for gender equality, 
but their presence and plurality enrich the public space available for women. To analyze the 
relationship between organized women and democratic consolidation, the present study takes 
only women’s CSOs into account that actively seek to change state’s gender policies.  
Organized women in Turkey are not a unified bloc. Broadly speaking, there are four groups 
of women’s rights CSOs whose demands overlap occasionally (Arat 2008; Coşar and Onbasi 2008; 
Diner and Toktaş 2010; Patton 2010): feminist, Kurdish, Islamist, and Kemalist women’s CSOs. These 
selected groups are proponents of different political movements in Turkey. The feminist CSOs 
                                                          
28 A list of women’s organizations in Turkey can be found on the website of Flying Broom (Uçan Süpürge) which is 
one of the influential women’s CSOs in Turkey, see: (www.ucansupurge.org/dernekler/derneklerlist/php). (rev. 
20.10.2014) 
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are selected on the basis of their crucial role within the broad spectrum of organized women in 
Turkey. They have been the first group of women that challenged the patriarchal structures in 
Turkish society and brought up issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment, 
incest, women’s bodily rights, and gender equality in the private sphere. Organized feminists 
have two groups within themselves: radical and socialist feminists, but the present study does not 
differentiate between these two groups since they act, to a great extent, together. The selected 
feminist organizations have both radical and socialist feminist members. The Kurdish, Islamist, 
and Kemalist women’s CSOs are selected due to their political identities that represent the 
dominant political cleavages within Turkish politics and society. While organized Kurdish 
women have criticized the nationalistic character of the Turkish state, organized Islamist 
women have demanded more religious freedom and the reconsideration of the secularism 
principle of the Turkish state. Both groups have also challenged dominancy of men within their 
respective movements and independently formed their own gender-based struggle in the civil 
society sphere. In opposition to the Islamist and Kurdish women’s CSOs, organized Kemalist 
women have positioned themselves as the defenders of the secularist and nationalist principles 
of the Turkish state. They are the defenders of women’s rights that were granted by the early 
Kemalist state elite. 
 For each of these four groups, I selected three organizations with high records of 
visibility and recognition within their own groups and the broader CS in Turkey.29 The selected 
CSOs represent, to a great extent their, own groups. But I have to remark that the selected 
Islamist women’s CSOs are unique examples within the broader spectrum of organized Islamist 
women due to their openness to cooperation with other women’s CSOs and their independence 
from religious parties and sects (tarikats). Despite the ideological differences, all these women’s 
groups have participated in broad organized women’s platforms to push the AKP government 
for reforming gender policies in Turkey. Considering the large numbers of women’s CSOs, 
studying only twelve women’s CSOs might raise doubts on the representativeness of the study. 
While aware of the limitations, I consider the sample to be representative because of their 
capacity to represent the political cleavages that crosscut organized women in Turkey. 
                                                          
29 A detailed information on the selected CSOs will be provided in the empirical chapters discussing each women’s 
group. 
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The selected women’s CSOs are organized on a voluntary basis, autonomous from the state 
and political parties, and have a high level of organizational capacity. They cooperate with state 
institutions, women’s shelters, women’s studies programs, national and foreign CSOs, and 
international organizations. These women’s CSOs have not only been chosen from major cities 
such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, but also from Van and Diyarbakır (Kurdish provinces). This 
will indeed yield a broader picture on the role of organized women throughout Turkey.  
Table (3. 1): SELECTED CSOs  
Women’s Groups CSOs Cities 
Feminist CSOs Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation (Mor 
Çatı Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı)  
Women for Women’s Human Right-New Ways 
(Kadının İnsan Hakları Derneği- Yeni Çözümler) 
Amargi Women’s Cooperative (Amargi Kadın 
Kooperatifi) 
Associations for Supporting and Training 
Women Candidates (Kadın Adayları Destekleme 
ve Eğitme Dernegi - KADER);   
Istanbul 
Islamist women’s 
CSOs 
 
Rainbow Women’s Platform (Gökkusağı Kadın 
Kuruluşları Platformu - GIKAP) 
Capital City Women’s Platform (Başkent Kadın 
Platformu - BKP)  
Women’s Rights Association against 
Discrimination (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları 
Derneği - AKDER)  
Istanbul, Ankara 
Kurdish women’s 
CSOs 
Women’s Center (Kadın Merkezi - KAMER) 
Selis Women’s Association (Selis Kadın Derneği) 
Van Women’s Association (Van Kadın Derneği - 
VAKAD); 
Diyarbakır, Van 
Kemalist women’s 
CSOs 
Turkish Women’s Union- Istanbul branch 
(Türk Kadınlar Birliği, TKB - Istanbul)  
Istanbul, Izmir 
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Istanbul Women’s Associations Platform 
(Istanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu - IKK) 
Izmir Women’s Associatioms Platform (Izmir 
Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu) 
 
Here, three issue areas have been selected for further examination of the impact of 
women’s CSOs: violence against women, gender equality and women’s rights, and discrimination against 
women.  They are considered to be the most important dimensions of the women rights regime, 
both on the global and national level. Violence against women comprises range of acts from 
physical and sexual abuse to verbal harassment, coercion, exclusion, humiliation, threat, 
intimidation, and hindrance. The end of this spectrum is murder of women. The international 
organizations such as the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) have described gender-
based violence as a violation of women’s human rights. Gender equality refers to the view that 
men and women need to have equal access to political, economic, social, and cultural resources 
and receive equal treatment in these spheres of life. It is thus implicitly related with 
discrimination against women.  The CEDAW treaty, seen as the international bill of women’s 
rights, defines discrimination against women as the exclusion, distinction, or restriction based 
on sex which have severe effects on women’s lives. Though these issues seem interrelated in 
terms of their contents, they are framed and discussed differently within organized women in 
Turkey. 
3.2 Methods and Sources 
Since the study examines the role of organizations made up of actors and their interactions with 
state institutions, it employs a qualitative analysis. Qualitative data are more suited to showing 
the dynamics of human interaction. The empirical data for this study is largely collected from 
the primary sources accumulated from 2010 to 2014. First, I have conducted semi-structured, in-
depth interviews with the executive members as well as the activists of the women’s CSOs under 
consideration during my two-month research trips in 2010 and 2011. In identifying interview-
partners, I used the snowball method, “a method of identifying interview subject-participants by 
which you ask each subject-participant to recommend other interview subject participants” 
(Clarks 2006: 419). To contact one of the Kemalist women’s organizations, it was necessary to 
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contact a third party through personal relations to set up the interview. Surprisingly, the 
interviewee explained her reservations on accepting random interviews by underlining her 
concern of being “misrepresented” in the researches (especially in foreign surveys). According 
to her, such studies make inferences without thoroughly reflecting on the sociopolitical context 
and on political dynamics in Turkey. Interview questions were sometimes re-phrased for 
different interviewees – as was done here by using a flexible set of questions – to increase the 
respondents’ willingness to share information. 
Besides the members of women’s CSOs, individuals outside of the women’s CSOs such as 
academics and lawyers have also been interviewed. These individuals are selected due to their 
involvement and cooperation with women’s CSOs under consideration. Second, I reviewed 
publications, pamphlets, public statements, interviews in newspapers and social media accounts 
of the selected women’s CSOs to supplement the data. Information on feminist WWHR and 
Islamist GIKAP has mainly been collected from their own websites and publications. Third, the 
study also profited from the grey literature. The surveys, reports, and statements of the Ministry 
for Family and Social Policies and the state’s women’s machinery (the General Directorate of 
Women’s Status) as well as quantitative surveys of the national and international research 
institutes and NGOs have been analyzed to obtain further information on state’s strategies and 
projects aiming at empowering women. Fourth, some data have also been drawn from organized 
women’s mail groups. I shall note that mail groups encompass a wide variety of women’s CSOs 
sharing information on a daily basis, which has helped me reconfigure the debates among 
women’s CSOs and understand their different positions. 
Further data have also been collected from secondary sources, e.g. the newspaper 
coverage, and journal and magazine articles on gender issues and gender policy reforms. The 
studies on Turkish politics with a special focus on democracy and CS as well as on organized 
women in Turkey have provided the background information about the CSOs, and supplemented 
the data.  
 Based on the collected data, the study illustrates the motives, demands, and 
achievements of the women’s rights organizations under consideration, identifies the problems 
they face in the area of their work, and provides information on the improvements in gender 
policies. In sum, by looking at organized women’s roles in the democratic consolidation process, 
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the present study shows how far women’s CSOs have come in engendering democracy and how 
much more work remains to be done.  
3.3 Structure of the Analysis 
In the following, Part II delineates the institutional context of democratic consolidation process 
in Turkey. To this end, it first examines the pre-AKP period by looking at different dimensions 
of democratic consolidation. This will help to see the changes in the pre-AKP period. It is 
followed by a closer examination of the democratic consolidation process under AKP rule. 
To outline the participation and inclusion of the four women’s groups in policy-making 
during the consolidation process under AKP rule is the task of Part III. Part III consists of five 
empirical chapters, starting with the presentation of gender policy outcomes before and under 
the AKP governments, and then is followed by the analysis of four groups of women’s CSOs under 
consideration. The beginning with the gendered outcomes instead of the analysis of each 
women’s group helps to avoid the repetition in the analysis since gendered policy outcomes are 
the same, but the extent of participation and inclusion of each group of women’s CSOs in policy-
making processes vary. In each chapter, I analyze the activities and strategies of three women’s 
CSOs in the aforementioned issue areas. Each chapter is also preceded by an introductory part 
that outlines the emergence and the institutionalization (by describing their goals and 
principles, organizational structures, presenting their fields of activities, financial resources, 
and their international ties) of women’s CSOs under consideration. Then, the analysis 
exclusively looks at their inclusion in policy-making processes and their achievements. The 
demonstration of achievements of each group in the 1990s helps understand the evolution of 
women’s CSOs from being ‘marginal’ social groups into the influential civil society actors, in 
other words ‘agents of change’ under the AKP governments.  
The last chapter in this part compares and contrasts the findings, and discusses them with 
regard to democratic consolidation delineated in the theoretical part. Accordingly, more general 
conclusions will be drawn as regards the successes and limits of civic activism in the process of 
democratic consolidation. 
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PART II 
The Institutional Context 
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Chapter 4 
 
Consolidating Democracy in Turkey: An Unfinished 
Project? 
 
In democratization studies, Turkey constitutes an unusual case. Although the transition to 
multi-party politics has been accomplished six decades ago, Turkey has neither been 
transformed to an authoritarian regime, nor has it been consolidated into a fully 
institutionalized plural democracy. The following chapter offers a chronological overview on 
Turkey’s democratic development. The first subchapter (4.1) briefly outlines the political 
context in Turkey from transition to democracy in 1946 until the last direct military coup in 
1980. The focus on this period helps us to understand how the military as an actor dominated 
the Turkish politics and how this dominance hindered the consolidation of democracy. The 
following subchapter (4.2) describes the institutional context by focusing on the political space, 
in which political actors and CS operated, and the socio-political cleavages that shaped the 
dynamics of Turkish society and politics before the period of investigation, i.e. before AKP rule. 
It concludes with a brief discussion on the limits of democratic consolidation following the 
multi-dimensional explanation of consolidation presented in the theoretical chapter (cf. 
Chapter 2). This part will shed light on the nature and the legacy of the pre-AKP period. The last 
subchapter (4.3) pays special attention to the era of the AKP and delineates three distinct periods 
of AKP rule. Each part discusses the achievements and limits on the path to democratic 
consolidation by considering both the internal and external impetus for consolidation. The 
subchapter 4.3 thus serves as a backdrop for describing the institutional context in which 
women’s CSOs voice their demands, interact with the state, and seek to translate their demands 
into women-friendly policies in the AKP era. 
4.1 Democratic Transitions, Recurrent Regime Crisis, and Military Interventions: Turkish 
Politics (1950-1980) 
Scholars of Turkish politics argue that the transition from the authoritarian single-party rule to 
the multiparty system in 1946 is the advent of Turkish democracy (Ahmad 1993; Heper and 
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Güney 2000; Keyman 2007; Özbudun 2000; Sunar and Sayari 1986). Before the transition to 
multiparty politics in Turkey, state power was centralized in the hand of the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), which was formed under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
(Atatürk). The single-party rule enabled Atatürk and the CHP elite to conduct their 
modernization project30 and to control all political and social affairs in the country. This “top-
down” political approach extensively shaped the future development of democracy and state-
society relations in Turkey (Ahmad 1993; Pawelka 1993). After the death of Atatürk in 1938, the 
CHP’s elite adhered to Kemalist ideology31 and continued to rule the country single-handedly 
(Ahmad 1993; Barkey 2000; Heper 2002). But in the post-World War II world order, Turkey found 
itself at a critical crossroads. The CHP’s state elite decided to democratize the country to be part 
of the Western bloc and introduced competitive elections in 1946 (Ahmad 1993; Heper 2002; 
Özbudun 2000). In the 1950 parliamentary elections, the newly formed Democrat Party (Demokrat 
Parti, DP), which advocated economic liberalism and appealed to conservative rural masses, won 
a landslide victory. It was a watershed in the history of modern Turkey. 
 The new political elite of the DP, representing industrial bourgeoisie, merchants, 
peasants, and conservative local elites, reengaged formerly excluded religious and traditional 
segments of the population in politics and curtailed gradually the monopoly of the Kemalist 
state elite in politics (Keyder 1987; Özbudun 2000). The DP era witnessed the emergence of civic 
engagements in forms of associations, trade unions and media organizations (Özalp 2008: 13). 
However, the political pluralization approach of the DP reached its limits at the end of the 1950s. 
Especially after the 1957 parliamentary elections, the DP reacted to its declined support by 
resorting to authoritarian measures against the oppositional groups (Özbudun 2000: 30). The 
party’s increasing repression and its departure from the Kemalist principles, in particular from 
etatism and laicism, prompted the first military intervention in May 1960 (Hale 1994; Özbudun 
2000). The military seized power from May 1960 to November 1961 to restore democracy. The 
interim military government introduced a new electoral law, a new Constitution (1961) that 
broadly defined political rights and civil freedoms, and established the National Security Council 
                                                          
30 The modernization project aimed to build a modernized and westernized Turkish nation and introduced a series 
of political, economic, and cultural reforms that are known as “Atatürk’s reforms” or “Kemalist reforms”, see 
further: Ahmad (1993), Pawelka (1993), Zürcher (2005).   
31 Kemalist ideology, known also as Kemalism, is based upon six principles: nationalism, populism, etatism (statism), 
republicanism, laicism (secularism) and reformism, see: Ahmad (1993), Zürcher (2005). 
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(Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK).32 The MGK consisted of the president, prime minister, and several 
ministers as well as the chief of general staff and four commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces 
(Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK), i.e. army, navy, air force, and the gendarmerie. The MGK’s aim was 
to defend both the country and the Republic against the external and internal threats (Heper 
and Güney 2000: 637).  
The Turkish military, drawing upon its constitutional powers provided by the MGK, took 
an active part in politics for decades to come. Almost in every political deadlock, the military 
elite intervened in politics (in 1971 and 1980) to safeguard the regime and to restore Turkish 
‘democracy’ according to their understanding of democracy (Demirel 2005; Heper and Güney 
2000; Satana 2008). Unlike the Latin American and Southern European military regimes, which 
retained control over politics for longer periods, the Turkish military has always withdrawn 
from power after initiating the re-democratization process and implementing new institutions 
(Cizre 1997; Özbudun 2000; Satana 2008). But political processes were to a great extent 
influenced by the preferences of the military, rather than of citizens. Özbudun rightly claims 
that the Turkish case confirms the hypothesis of the democratization literature that “military-
led transitions to democracy leave institutional traces in the political system”, such as tutelary 
powers for the military, which in turn hinder the consolidation of democracy (2000: 26).33 Since 
the Turkish military elite has not internalized the rules of democracy and intervened in times 
of political crises, the behavioral dimension of the democratic consolidation (cf. Chapter 2) was 
not fully attained, and Turkey’s democracy could not consolidate, and Turkey was rather labeled 
a ‘hybrid regime’ (Altan-Olcay and Içduygu 2012; Schneider 2009). 
4.2 Turkey’s Democratic Development before the AKP (1980-2002) 
Turkey under Military Tutelage  
The military coup on 12 September 1980 has been the strongest military intervention in the 
history of modern Turkey. The military intervened by claiming that the recent governments 
were unable to end growing violence between various political factions (namely between the 
                                                          
32 Despite its liberal traits regarding civil liberties, the 1961 Constitution provided the military with political powers 
through the MGK. For a thorough discussion on the constitution, see: Özbudun (2000). 
33 As discussed in Chapter 2, influential scholars O’Donnell (1992), Przeworski (1991) and Valenzuela (1992) argue 
that “destabilizing factors” such as tutelary power, reserved domains of policy, or deliberate distortions of the 
electoral system and political representation impede the consolidation of democracy. 
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leftist and the rightist groups), and that the internal threats against the “unitary nature of the 
state” were rising (Heper and Evin 1994; Özbudun 2000). The military junta banned all political 
parties and put their leaders in prison, prohibited all forms of political activity, and strictly 
controlled CS. Gürbey aptly states: “While the 1960 coup was carried out to protect civil society 
from the repression of the state, the motivation behind the 1980 coup was to re-strengthen the 
state against civil society” (2006: 13). From September 1980 until the parliamentary elections in 
November 1983, the military junta controlled the country under martial law, which meant that 
military officers retained the ultimate decision-making authority at the local level (Poulton 
1999: 48). The 2012 report of the ‘Research Commission on Military Coups and Interventions’ of 
the Turkish Parliament revealed that during the 1980-1983 military rule, 230,000 people stood 
trial for their former political activities in the State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri, 
DGM)34, 517 were sentenced to death, and thousands lost their lives in prison as torture and 
mistreatment were widespread practices.35  
 The military junta drafted a new constitution in November 1982. The new constitution 
banned former politicians from politics and restricted civil liberties such as the freedom of 
association, assembly, and of expression to depoliticize the highly polarized society (Heper 2002; 
Özbudun 2000). The 1982 Constitution also introduced a relatively high national electoral 
threshold (10 percent) and annulled the formerly used d’Hondt method of proportional 
representation.36 Most notably, the 1982 Constitution enhanced the prerogatives of the MGK 
compared to the 1961 Constitution (Özbudun 1994; Heper and Güney 2000; Sunar and Sayarı 
1986). Article 118 of the Constitution stipulated: “According to the political agenda, the 
ministers and the persons concerned may be invited to the Council’s meetings for 
consultations”. Drawing upon this article, the MGK could reinforce its decisions on the elected 
governments and control policies concerning the national defense and the matters of internal 
security which was defined broadly (Cizre 1997; Demirel 2005; Heper and Güney 2000). It was, of 
course, the military that decided the timing and pace of the re-democratization of the political 
                                                          
34 State Security Courts (DGM) were established to try cases involving crimes against the security of the state and 
organized crime. One of the three judges in each DGM included one military judge. DGMs in general regarded all 
kinds of political activity as a threat to the state’s security. 
35 For more information, see: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss376_Cilt1.pdf (rev. 15.07.2014) 
36 D'Hondt system allocates seats to political parties in proportion to the number of votes received. With such a high 
threshold, the military elite aimed to keep the smaller parties, which were considered as the source of political 
instability in the 1970s, out of the Turkish Parliament. 
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system and set the date for the first competitive elections in November 1983 (Demirel 2005; Evin 
1994). But the military elite allowed only three newly formed political parties to run for the 1983 
elections.37 Hence, the return to democracy took place in a seriously constrained political 
leeway.  
Return to Democracy: The Limited Political Environment 
The 1983 elections and its aftermath marked a significant turning point in the democratic 
development of Turkey. Contrary to the preferences of the military elite, the newly established 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) under the leadership of Turgut Özal won the 
parliamentary elections (Heper and Evin 1994; Özbudun 2000). During the military rule, Özal had 
served as the state minister responsible for economy and implemented economic reforms that 
transformed the inward directed Turkish economy (import substitution industrialization 
model) into an export-based economy (Heper and Evin 1994; Kalaycıoğlu 2002).38 Özal’s political 
success lied on his attractive economic projects and reforms aiming at integrating Turkey into 
the market economy (Öniş 2004: 118). The ANAP, as a politically conservative but economically 
liberal party, ruled the country until the 1991.  
 Özal realized that to improve Turkey's international image the return to a functioning 
democracy was necessary. In 1984, the parliament allowed some political parties that were 
banned by the military junta to run for municipal elections and lifted martial law in several 
Turkish provinces (Metz 1995). In September 1987, the bans on former politicians, who were 
overthrown in the 1980 coup, were lifted by a referendum, and they returned to politics with 
their older parties under new names (Heper and Landau 1991; Özbudun 1994). Meanwhile, the 
ANAP government changed the election law to increase its own advantage as a large party and 
sought to gain both from the high electoral threshold (10 percent) and from the way how extra 
seats were allocated to strongest political party.39 In November 1987, all political parties took 
part in the parliamentary elections, which were held under the most democratic conditions 
since the 1980 coup, and the ANAP was re-elected. 
                                                          
37 These were the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi), the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti), and the 
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). The former two parties were established by the military elite. 
38 Özal symbolized all the transformations that Turkey has gone through in the spheres of politics, culture, and 
foreign policy in the post-1980 era, see further: Heper and Landau (1991), Kalaycıoğlu (2002), Öniş (2004). 
39 http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/index.php/EN/yd/icerik/14 (rev. 10.11.2014) 
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 In November 1989, Özal became the president of Turkey, and the ANAP furthered the 
institutional reform process with Özal’s directives.40 In April 1991, the Anti-Terror Law (No. 
3713) entered into force by repealing Articles 141 (regarding membership in anti-system 
organizations such as communist parties), 142 (banning communist or separatist propaganda), 
and 163 (regarding membership in or propaganda for anti-secular organizations) of the Turkish 
Penal Code (Poulton 1999: 51). The Turkish Parliament also repealed Law 2932 that limited the 
use of Kurdish language. However, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law was used by the state 
prosecutors to convict journalists, politicians, and human right activists for having used the 
word ‘Kurdistan’. In April 1993, the newly elected government41 eliminated the state’s monopoly 
on radio and television broadcasting (Article 133), and the establishment of private channels 
was allowed (Yazici 2011). Thanks to these constitutional amendments, the political realm 
became liberalized.  
 As noted above, the military-made 1982 Constitution has envisioned a depoliticized 
society by seriously limiting political participation and activities (Kalaycıoğlu 2007; Özbudun 
1994). Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution, for instance, stipulated: “Voluntary associations, 
professional organizations, and trade unions are banned from engaging in all kind of political 
activity and having relationships with political parties”. Therefore, the connection between CS 
and political society was severely damaged, and the capacities and effectiveness of political 
parties in political processes were curtailed (Gürbey 2006: 14f.). Surprisingly, the limits on 
political participation led citizens to shift their attention to civilian politics and to engage in the 
civil society realm.  
Expanding Public Space: CS as a Democratic Agent? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a vital and strong CS is essential for the consolidation of democracy. 
Since the state has been strong in Turkey; i.e., it strictly controlled the public sphere, CS could 
not really unfold until the 1980s (Poulton 1999; Toprak 1996). But the economic transformation, 
rapid urbanization, the reduction of the state’s social-welfare policies, and spread of corruption 
                                                          
40 Although the president was regarded as a ceremonial figure in the Turkish Constitution, Özal wanted to act both 
as the head of the state and the ANAP. See further: Heper and Evin (1994). 
41 The prominent politician of the former decades Süleyman Demirel came to power with his True Path Party (Doğru 
Yol Partisi, DYP). He formed a coalition government with the Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı 
Parti, SHP) under the leadership of Erdal Inönü. The DYP-SHP coalition continued to govern until 1993, when 
Demirel became the president because of the sudden death of Turgut Özal.  
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in the 1980s paved the way for the emergence of CSOs demanding more freedom, equality, and 
democracy in Turkey (Keyman and Içduygu 2003; Toprak 1996). From the mid-1980s on, the 
number of autonomous and self-organized associations, which were committed to civilian 
politics, has increased (Içduygu 2007; Toprak 1996).  
 Newly emerging feminist groups were the first group that had the courage of challenging 
the military dominance and voicing their demands for more freedom and gender equality (Arat 
1994; Tekeli 1995).42 In 1987, feminist groups organized a mass demonstration condemning 
domestic violence, which was considered the first visible democratic opposition to the state-
dominated public sphere (Arat 1994, 2000). Turkey also witnessed a slow growth in the number 
of CSOs whose areas of interests varied from environmental issues to human rights, and from 
religious groups, regional solidarity associations (hemşehri dernekleri) to cultural rights.  
 The main reason for the increase in the number of CSOs was the introduction of several 
constitutional reforms in 1995. Aforementioned Article 33, which restricted the relations 
between CS and political parties, was lifted (Özbudun 2000: 130). Moreover, public workers such 
as university staff were allowed to engage in political activities (Yazici 2011). Although Turkey 
faced serious political conflicts in the 1990s, the expansion of political rights and civil liberties 
led to the proliferation of different types of CSOs, and thus the pluralization of the civil society 
arena. 
 In the 1990s, CS came to be seen as a way of resisting the strong state and as a tool to 
push for consolidating democracy in Turkey. This idea was also positively influenced by the rise 
of contentious movements that played an important role in Central and Eastern Europe 
democratization processes. It was believed that CS would challenge the unequal power relations 
between the state and society. This radical perspective on CS (cf. Chapter 2) has been idealized 
in Turkey. But while praising the proliferation of CSOs, scholars have ignored the fact that 
political space in Turkey, in which CS was operating, was still limited. The leeway of CSOs was 
determined by the state’s stronghold. The state elites were inimical to all forms of expression 
other than the official Kemalist line and closely monitored the activities of CSOs that were 
critical of the Kemalist state (Özbudun 2000; Poulton 1999). Since the relationship between CS 
and political parties was in its infancy, political parties have not really represented the interests 
                                                          
42 Chapter 6 examines in great depth organized feminist women in Turkey. 
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of CS, and the access of CSOs to political processes was almost non-existent. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the number of independent CSOs in Turkey have increased, CS could not 
substantially exert influence on the government. 
 While CS was struggling to fully integrate itself in the political sphere, the Turkish state 
was experiencing a serious legitimacy and identity crisis. The two core principles of the Kemalist 
state, Turkish nationalism and secularism, were contested by the resurgence of Kurdish 
uprisings and the political Islam (Ergil 2000; Özbudun 2000; Smith 2005; Somer 2007). Both the 
Islamist and the Kurdish movement have clamored for the recognition of their religious and 
ethnic identities and demanded inclusion in the political processes.  
Challenges to Democratic Consolidation: The Rise of Kurdish Separatism and Political 
Islam 
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist state elite (the military and the 
state bureaucracy) had suppressed the identity claims of the religious and ethnic segments of 
society by imposing a rigid understanding of secularism and ‘Turkishness’ (Öniş 2013: 105). This 
approach has led to major discontents within the religiously conservative as well as the Kurdish 
segments of Turkish society. While stressing the Turkishness of citizenship, the Kemalist state 
elite denied the existence of the Kurdish identity, which over the years resulted in several 
Kurdish insurrections (Satana 2012: 171). The most challenging one emerged in the aftermath of 
the 1980 military coup. In 1984, a separatist insurgency by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya 
Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), an extreme left-wing group set up by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978, began 
armed attacks on the Turkish security forces mainly in the Kurdish populated south-east of 
Turkey (Ergil 2000; Poulton 1999; Satana 2012). The PKK fought for the self-determination of the 
Kurds and initially demanded a separation from Turkey to establish a free Kurdish state.43 The 
PKK leadership saw the violent resistance as the only possible way to contest the limited political 
space for Kurds (Satana 2012: 172). The violent conflict between the Kurdish PKK and the Turkish 
military has escalated throughout the 1990s and cost more than 30,000 lives. 
 During the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the Kurdish region witnessed the state of 
emergency, recruitment of Kurdish villagers to take arms against the PKK (known as “village 
                                                          
43 For an overview of the Kurdish question in Turkey, see: Ergil (2000), Kirisçi and Winrow (1997). 
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guardians”), the burning down the villages, displacement of the Kurdish population from 
villages to the cities, and disappearances under police custody (Ergil 2000; Satana 2012). Even 
though the ban on the use of the Kurdish language in cultural activities was partly lifted in 1991, 
spoken Kurdish was a taboo in daily life. All these facts have escalated the Kurdish-Turkish 
conflict even further. While the PKK maintained its guerilla warfare, Kurdish human rights 
organizations, such as the ‘Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People’ 
(İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği, MAZLUMDER, close to the Islamist circles) and 
‘Human Rights Association’ (İnsan Hakları Derneği, IHD, close to the leftist circles), carried out an 
effective work on making torture and ill treatment in the Kurdish region publicly visible. They 
also criticized the Turkish state’s militaristic approach towards the Kurdish question. These 
CSOs faced pressure and censure imposed by the state authorities. Meanwhile, the Kurdish 
political parties were often banned, and their politicians were put in prison (Ergil 2000; Poulton 
1999). Since the participation and inclusion of Kurdish citizens in the political system were 
hindered and the “tutelary power” (Valenzuela 1992) of the military shaped the daily lives of 
the Kurdish population, the Kurdish question became a major political problem for the 
consolidation of Turkish democracy in the 1990s.  
 In the same decade, Turkish democracy also faced the Islamist challenge. The rise of the 
political Islam was a boomerang effect of the military elite’s attempt to unify society under the 
banner of religion. Although the military considered itself the guardian of secularism, the 
military junta of the 1980-1983 decided to impose religion in public life to counteract the ‘alien 
ideologies’ such as Marxism and fascism (Gürbey 2006; Heper and Güney 2000; Poulton 1999). 
Accordingly, the Turkish state by means of the constitution, the military, the government, and 
the bureaucracy promoted a conservative nationalist-religious ideology in social and cultural 
life that has been labeled “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (Arat 1994: 245). The military junta, for 
instance, introduced compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools, which 
is still in force (Article 24). The promotion of Islamic morals throughout the 1980s prompted the 
Islamist movement, and it began to develop its own political strategy for expanding the Islamist 
awakening.  
 The Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), under the leadership of prominent 
politician Necmettin Erbakan, embraced the urban poor who were hit by the economic and 
political instability of the 1990s. Erbakan’s RP promised to provide a “just system” (adil düzen) 
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by referring to the fair distribution of wealth (Yavuz 2000: 35). The masses appealed to political 
Islam as a response to the rough urbanization, a backlash against globalization, and the erosion 
of cultural identity (Smith 2005: 314). In 1994, the RP won the local elections in major cities, 
including Istanbul and Ankara, and the parliamentary election in 1995. For the first time in 
Turkey’s history, an Islamist party had gained a majority in the electoral arena. Yet the RP’s 
success alarmed both secularist segments of society and the Kemalist state elite. Even though 
the RP formed a coalition government with the secularist center-right True Path Party (Doğru 
Yol Partisi, DYP), the secularist-Islamist tension within society became radicalized. At the MGK 
meeting on 28 February 1997, the military elite forced the RP-DYP government to enact several 
measures to prevent Islamist activities in public life in order to protect secularism. The 28 
February intervention was called the “post-modern coup” in public debates, because it was not 
a direct military intervention, and unlike the previous coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) it was 
followed by a civilian government (Ozcetin 2009: 111). Since Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan 
hesitated to implement the MGK recommendations, he was later forced to resign from his office. 
In 1998, the RP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court, and the party’s leadership were 
banned from political activity for a period of five years (Demirel 2005; Heper and Güney 2000; 
Özbudun 2010). Paradoxically, the democratically elected RP was closed down in the name of 
secularism and “balancing” democracy, as the military defines it. The repercussions of the 28 
February intervention determined Turkish politics in the years to come. 
 Clearly, to understand the points of divergences within CS and the conflicts in the 
political life in Turkey, one needs to take into account the dynamics of Turkish politics conveyed 
mainly by the Kurdish question and the Islamist movement. The best example is the 
fragmentation of organized women’s movement due to these two political cleavages. In the 
1990s, women activists were not merely labeled “Turkish women with secular persuasion”, but 
referred as feminist, Islamists, Kurdish feminist, or Kemalist women (Arat 2008: 400).  
Limitations on Democratic Consolidation in the 1990s 
Drawing upon the theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 2, scholars labeled Turkey a 
‘defect democracy’ or a ‘hybrid regime’ in the 1990s (Heper 2002; Özbudun 2000).44 Despite 
                                                          
44 For brief definitions of hybrid regimes or deficit democracy, cf. Chapter 2. 
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political reforms, Turkish democracy suffered from several deficits. As briefly discussed, the 
dominant role of the military in politics through the MGK had inhibited the effective power of 
the incumbent governments. Political crises have not been solved by means of democratic rules, 
but rather by the military’s interference in politics. Hence, elected governments lived under the 
shadow of possible military coups. This has, in turn, restricted the autonomy of the political 
society, i.e. political parties, political leadership, and elections. The recurrent military 
interventions and the Constitutional Court decrees to ban the political parties have disrupted 
party continuity and their organizational development as well as their capacity. Between 1990 
and 2000, the Court has banned sixteen parties45, which made the party system weak and 
volatile. Moreover, the limited capacity to develop strong organizational roots within CS was a 
further obstacle for political parties to fulfill their roles as mediators between the state and CS.  
 The major problem was the lack of the rule of law. Even though the 1982 constitution 
stipulated that “Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law” 
(Article 2), basic rights of individuals such as right to freedom of speech, expression, and 
assembly were not protected. For instance, those who raised topics such as rights of the Kurdish 
minority have been subjected to a variety of extra-legal measures such as arbitrary arrest, 
threats, physical violence, or even murder (Poulton 1999: 58).  In addition, the absence of the 
rule of law severely damaged the separation of powers. As mentioned above, the judiciary was 
acting in line with the Kemalist ideology, rather than protecting individual rights and 
democracy. Despite the extensive economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey had 
severe economic problems such as low productivity, high inflation, decreased wages, and unfair 
income distribution (Barkey 2000; Öniş 2004). The privatization of state enterprises has led to 
weakening of the bureaucratic apparatus with costly consequences that became evident with 
recurring corruption scandals (Öniş 2004: 127). Consequently, none of the ‘partial regimes’ 
(electoral regime, civil rights, political liberties, the rule of law, and CS), that are deemed to 
necessary for the consolidation of democracy has functioned.  
Conclusively, constraints on political rights and civil liberties (especially for Kurdish and 
Islamist groups), the illiberal nature of the 1982 Constitution, the upper hand of the military in 
politics, and deficiencies in the rule of law have hampered political inclusion, and thus the 
                                                          
45 See: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/siyasi_partiler.html (rev. 25.07.2014) 
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democratic consolidation process in Turkey. The ill-equipped Turkish political system failed to 
establish a fully consolidated democracy. 
4.3 Consolidating Democracy in Turkey? The AKP Era 
At the turn of the century, Turkey entered another phase in its democratic development. Several 
external and internal factors revitalized the democratic consolidation process. First, Turkey was 
granted the status of a candidate country for EU membership at the 1999 European Council’s 
Helsinki Summit (Kubicek 2005; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Öniş and Keyman 2003; Öniş 2009). The 
European Commission emphasized the requirement to fulfill the political aspects of the 
Copenhagen criteria, which meant to provide the stability of democratic institutions and to 
respect the rule of law and its corresponding freedoms and institutions (Aydın and Keyman 2004; 
Müftüler-Baç 2005). Thanks to the EU membership prospect, CSOs in Turkey developed relations 
with the EU institutions and acquired skills and tools, and even funding, to conduct their 
activities in a more effective way (Ergun 2010: 508). A vast array of CSOs strongly supported 
Turkey’s EU bid (Ergun 2010; Kubicek 2005). 
The coalition government at that time (1999-2002), consisting of the center-left 
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the center-right ANAP, and the far-right 
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), formed a parliamentary commission 
to prepare constitutional changes to harmonize Turkish laws with the legal framework of the 
EU. Diverse segments of Turkish CS, journalists, and intellectuals strongly supported the 
political reform process for the EU candidacy. At the beginning of the 2000s, Turkish society’s 
support for the EU membership was around 64 percent (Kubicek 2005: 371). Despite the internal 
conflicts and long bargaining processes, the DSP-ANAP-MHP government succeeded to launch 
a set of reforms (34 amendments to the Constitution): the limitation of the use of death penalty 
to times of war and criminal offences related to terrorism; the revision of the Anti-Terror Law 
(No. 3713); changes that made the prohibition of political parties more difficult; the 
strengthening of civil authority in the MGK; lifting restrictions on broadcasting in languages 
other than Turkish; and the introduction of a modernized Civil Code that granted gender 
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equality in the family (Aydın and Keyman 2004: 15; Müftüler-Baç 2005: 22). This so called 
“Europeanization” process has been conducive to Turkey’s democratic consolidation process.46  
The second factor that fostered the democratic consolidation process was the 
devastating economic crisis in Turkey in February 2001, which was a result of both the economic 
failure and “the populist clientelist and corruptive nature of Turkish politics” (Aydın and 
Keyman 2004: 11). The economic growth was negative, the Turkish lira had lost value against 
the US dollar, and many thousands of small firms had to file bankruptcy. To overcome the crisis, 
the coalition government acquired the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF’s 
stabilization programs were launched by Kemal Derviş, who was appointed by the government 
as Minister of Economics and who successfully managed to bring Turkish economy out of this 
severe crisis by privatizing state assets and reducing budget deficits. The government was 
thereby pushed to free the economic sector from the dominance of the state (Ibid.). 
As a third factor, on the domestic level, CS was an influential actor in furthering 
democratic consolidation process (Aydın and Keyman 2004; Ergun 2010; Kubicek 2005; Toros 
2007). Since the 1990s, CSOs have slowly appeared in the political arena and addressed issues 
such as reducing poverty, protecting human rights, and strengthening democracy (Öniş and 
Keyman 2003; Toros 2007). During the EU pre-accession process, CSOs became highly active and 
developed relations with state institutions to push for democratic reforms. 
Last, but not least, during the reform process, the incumbent coalition government 
experienced internal conflicts and decided to hold an early parliamentary election in November 
2002. While the parties in government were defeated, the newly formed Islamist AKP, with its 
market-oriented and reform-based political ambitions, won a sweeping victory (34.2 percent of 
the votes).47 It was a tectonic change for Turkish politics because the decades old parties were 
thrown out of the Turkish Parliament. The results reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the 
major political parties, political instability, corruption, and the unjust distribution of wealth 
(Aydın and Keyman 2004; Insel 2003; Öniş 2009).  
                                                          
46 In the literature, the influence of the EU on domestic politics of the member states and candidate countries is 
labeled the “Europeanization process” or “European integration”, see further: Featherstone and Radaelli (2003). 
The concept has become a buzzword in most studies dealing with the EU-Turkey relations. Clearly, the EU pre-
accession process had an important effect on Turkish domestic politics, but the analysis of the Europeanization 
process in Turkey remains out of the scope of this study.  
47 In the 2002 elections, the CHP gained 24.6 percent of the national votes. The remaining 46 percent of electoral 
preferences remained unrepresented in the Parliament due the 10 percent threshold. 
86 
 
The AKP was formed by a reformist group who had split from the constitutionally banned 
Islamist Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) that was the successor of the aforementioned RP. 
Different than both of its predecessors, the AKP has represented itself as a “conservative-
democratic” party, rather than a religious one (Insel 2003; Öniş and Keyman 2003). It advocated 
economic liberalism, entrepreneurship and efficiency, and culturally conservative values that 
also harbor a vigorous nationalistic vein (Insel 2003: 301).48 In its party program, the AKP 
emphasized the centrality of religion as “an institution of humanity” and characterized 
secularism “as a pre-requisite of democracy and an assurance of the freedom of religion and 
conscience”.49 In December 2002, drawing upon its parliamentary majority, the AKP formed the 
first single-party government since the end of the ANAP government in 1991.  
A New Momentum in Democratic Consolidation: The AKP’s first term (2002-2007) 
During the AKP’s first term in the government, the prospect of EU membership continued to be 
an influential factor in the democratic consolidation process in Turkey. Contrary to their 
predecessors, the AKP politicians acknowledged the importance of the perspective of an EU 
accession to transform the state-centric political system in Turkey and to limit the role of the 
Kemalist state elites (Insel 2003; Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012). Accordingly, the AKP 
accentuated the needs for the removal of constraints on political rights and civil freedoms and 
the democratization of the judiciary to strengthen democracy. The AKP government, first under 
the leadership of Abdullah Gül and later under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, furthered the political 
reform process initiated by the previous government (Müftüler-Baç 2005: 24).50 Between 2003 
and 2005, the AKP government made great strides in strengthening civil freedoms and launched 
seven democratization packages. As Table 4.1 demonstrates, these institutional reforms aimed 
not only to remove the restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, but also to democratize 
the civil-military relations as well as socioeconomic life in Turkey. The AKP’s impressive 
achievements paved the way to the opening of the EU accession negotiations in December 2005 
                                                          
48 For a detailed analysis of the AKP, see: Hale and Özbudun (2010), Insel (2003), Müftüler-Baç and Keyman (2012), 
and Tepe (2005). 
49 https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_ (rev. 24.07.2014) 
50 When the AKP came to power in November 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was banned from politics for reciting a 
religiously incriminating poem during a public speech in 1997. But the Turkish Parliament annulled his political 
ban, and Erdoğan could be elected from Siirt province and became Prime Minister of Turkey in March 2003. 
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that obliged Turkey to adopt the EU’s legal order (acquis communautaire), consisting of various 
chapters, each covering a specific policy area. 
 
Table 4.1: LEGAL CHANGES (2002-2005) 
Issue areas 2002/2003 2004/2005 
Freedom of expression Lifting of Article 8 (regarding 
propaganda against the 
indivisible unity of the state) 
of the Anti-Terror Law  
Article 46 of the Penal Code 
(death penalties turned into 
life imprisonment) 
 
 
 Amendments to Article 312 
(inciting people to enmity 
and hatred by pointing class, 
racial, confession and 
religious differences) 
Revision of the Council of 
Higher Education 
(Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK) 
 Easing Article 159 (insulting 
the state and state 
institutions) 
 
Freedom of press The penalties for media 
outlets in violation of the 
resolutions of the Supreme 
Board have been reduced 
The Press Law amended to 
repeal prison sentences for 
criminal offences related to 
the press 
  Restructuring the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council 
(Radyo ve Televizyon Üst 
Kurulu, RTÜK), (no military 
representative) 
Freedom of associations Expansion of freedom of 
establishing associations 
Revision of the Law on 
Associations (lifting the 
restrictions regarding 
government approval for 
the establishment of 
associations; and regarding 
restrictions on the activities 
of foreign associations in 
Turkey) 
 Abolishing the restrictions on 
the acquisition of the 
property of non-Muslim 
community foundations 
 
 Liberalization of the Political 
Parties Law 
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The rule of law Retrial of cases decided in 
State Security Courts (paved 
the way for retrial of the cases 
of Kurdish politicians in 
prisons 
Abolishing the State 
Security Courts (DGM), 
replaced by the Heavy Penal 
Courts 
 Revision of the laws in the 
Penal Code to prevent 
torture 
Full abolishment of death 
penalty   
 Adoption of the Protocol 6 of 
the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), Conversion of 
all death sentences into life-
time imprisonment 
Subordination of domestic 
law to international law in 
the case of fundamental 
rights and liberties 
Strengthening civilian 
politics  
Restructuring the MGK (its 
policy-setting role 
downgraded to an advisory 
one) 
Strengthening civil control 
over the military (a civilian 
has been appointed to head 
the MGK for the first time) 
 Increase of parliamentary 
oversight of military 
expenditures 
 
Improvement in women’s 
rights51 
 Revision of the Turkish 
Penal Code, esp. in laws 
pertaining to violence 
against women and 
children, increase in 
penalties for sexual offences 
(took effect in June 2005) 
Sources: Aydın and Keyman (2004); Müftüler-Baç (2005); Öniş (2013); Freedom in the World Index Turkey 
Reports (2005, 2006 and 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, the AKP government has been consistent in implementing the IMF 
stabilization program launched by the previous coalition government and continued to pursue 
the policy of privatization of the banking and energy sectors, to reform the welfare and tax 
systems, and to provide greater access for foreign investors (Karakas 2007: 32). Within three 
years, the government could achieve rapid economic growth, to increase annual per-capita 
income around 8 percent, and to reduce the two-digit inflation rate to under 10 percent (Ibid.). 
The AKP had also a slightly more success in distributing the wealth compared to the previous 
governments. It developed diverse welfare policy programs to help the poor and improved local 
government services in the poor suburban areas (Öniş 2009: 24).  
                                                          
51 A more detailed analysis of the legal improvements in women’s rights will be presented in the coming chapter. 
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The Role of Civil Society 
Along with the external push from the EU, there was also the internal pressure for democratic 
change on the AKP government. Since the 1990s, a considerable number of CSOs have been 
successful in raising public awareness about democratic needs and the controversial issues such 
as human rights violations, the Kurdish and the Armenian questions. Many scholars argue that 
the EU membership prospect provided even more legitimacy for the democratic struggle of CSOs 
in Turkey and strengthened them in demanding protection of political rights and civil freedoms 
(Altan-Olcay and Içduygu 2012; Ergun 2010; Kubicek 2005 and 2011; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Toros 
2007). Accordingly, CSOs developed their networks with European CSOs, and initiated projects 
with European funding designed to cultivate CS in candidate countries. The AKP, as it has 
promised in its election campaigns, engaged CS into policy-making processes. Between 2002 and 
2005, prominent CSOs such as the ‘Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association’ (Türk 
Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği, TÜSIAD), ‘Helsinki Citizen Assembly’ (Helsinki Yurttaşlar 
Derneği), the ‘Economic Development Foundation’ (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı), and aforementioned 
Human Rights Association (IHD) initiated projects with European partners and assisted the AKP 
government to implement democratic practices and institutions such as the rule of law, human 
rights, and the protection of minorities (Kubicek 2005: 368). For instance, the AKP government 
worked with the ‘Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code’ (Türk Ceza Kanunu Kadın 
Platformu), which consisted of a group of influential women’s NGOs and legal experts, on the 
revision of laws in the Penal Code regarding women’s lives (see Chapter 6). During the AKP’s first 
term in the government, the number of CSOs skyrocketed and Turkish politics became 
pluralized. The inclusion of CS in decision-making processes was indeed conducive for the 
consolidation process.  
However, the CS sphere was not completely free of state’s control. Associations “with 
names and objectives that are considered contrary to the Turkish Constitution” were still facing 
restrictions by registration, in accessing to government funding or state institutions (Altan-
Olcay and Içduygu 2012: 167). Conclusively, despite the liberalization in the Association Law and 
the increased participation of CS in political decision-making processes, the stronghold of the 
state shaped the activities and strategies of CSOs. 
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The Limitations to Political Inclusion 
The bright picture, however, had its dark spots. There were still serious impediments in freedom 
of speech. Article 301 of the revised Penal Code (2005) on “denigrating of Turkishness, the 
Republic, and the foundation and institutions of the State” was used against journalists, activists, 
and novelists who discussed controversial topics such as the Kurdish and Armenian questions, 
military’s excessive powers, and the Cyprus issue.52 Furthermore, the prevailing military 
struggle against the PKK, the official as well as informal discrimination against Kurds, and the 
state’s denial of the Kurdish identity and culture hampered improvement in protecting 
democratic rights of the Kurdish minority (Öniş 2013; Satana 2012). But contrary to former 
governments, the AKP government showed a more liberal approach towards the Kurds, by 
acknowledging the Kurdish question. Freedom of information was also curtailed. For instance, 
a court, relying upon its prerogative to block websites whose content is deemed to be anti-
constitutional, briefly banned the access to YouTube in March 2007 over a video allegedly 
insulting Atatürk. Meanwhile, EU-Turkey relations ran into various difficulties in 2007 due to 
disagreements on several other issues and the disregard of some European politicians for 
Turkey’s membership perspective. 53 Gradually, the EU lost its impact as an external actor for 
Turkey’s reform process.  
Between 2005 and 2007, the political reform process has slightly slowed down because of 
the tension between Islamists and secularists. Both the secularist state elite and secularist 
segments of CS regarded AKP’s democratization reforms as a means of weakening the military’s 
power and accused the AKP of having a “hidden Islamist agenda” (Insel 2003; Müftüler-Baç 2005; 
Öniş 2009). The tension between secularists and Islamists has strongly manifested itself in the 
headscarf debate. The two camps had diverging views on headscarf-wearing in public 
institutions.54 In 2004, the AKP tried to lift the ban on headscarf wearing in universities, but the 
Constitutional Court, one of the bastions of the Kemalist institutions, decided that the headscarf 
                                                          
52 One of the high-profile and internationally known cases was against the 2006 Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk, which 
was later closed. 
53 The whole picture of the EU-Turkey relations under the AKP government is a broader discussion and exceeds the 
scope of the thesis. Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis (2008) give an excellent overview on the achievements and limits 
of EU-Turkey relations, but see also: Kubicek (2011) and Öniş (2008).  
54 After many political discussions throughout the 1980s, the Constitutional Court banned headscarf-wearing in 
public institutions in 1989 by claiming that it contradicts the secularity principle of the Turkish state. The headscarf 
debate will be explored in great depth in Chapter 7 on Islamist women’s CSOs. 
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is a political symbol and cannot be regarded as the ‘freedom of conscience’ or ‘freedom of 
religion’. Similar tensions surfaced shortly before the presidential elections in April 2007, when 
the AKP nominated Abdullah Gül, then Foreign Minister, as the presidential candidate.  Like in 
the 1990s, military elites feared that the AKP with the backing of a president with an Islamist 
background, and whose wife is wearing a headscarf, could undermine the secularist legacy of 
the Turkish state (Aksoy 2015). On 27 April 2007, the military tacitly warned the AKP in its choice 
for the presidential post on its website by underlining their role as the protector of the secular 
regime.55 Secularist opposition parties and CSOs organized massive demonstrations to condemn 
the Islamist agenda of the AKP. Subsequently, Prime Minister Erdoğan called for an early 
parliamentary election on 22th July 2007. These recurring internal tensions between the AKP 
government and the secularist state elites have jeopardized the political reform and democratic 
consolidation process. 
Overall, the AKP has recorded significant political accomplishments for the 
consolidation of democracy during its first term in power. From 2002 to 2007, Turkey's civil 
liberties rating improved from 5 to 3 in the Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” Index (1 = 
Best, 7 = Worst). Öniş (2014) thus describes the period as the AKP’s “golden age”. On the one 
hand, CSOs could operate more effectively and were included in policy-making and 
implementation processes, but on the other hand, some part of CS faced restrictions in pursuing 
their activities. Clearly, the most important achievement in consolidating democracy was to 
reduce the involvement of the military in politics. The AKP government succeeded to limit the 
prerogatives of the military in the political and judicial sphere and to establish the civilian 
control over the military. Thanks to the domestic push as well as the impetus coming from the 
EU, the AKP government extended the frontiers of democratic politics in Turkey in this period 
(Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012; Öniş 2013). 
                                                          
55 Several columnist and scholars in Turkey labeled this military intervention “e-memorandum”, see; Turkish daily 
newspapers Radikal, Hürriyet, and Zaman in April 2007. 
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The Stagnation of Democratic Consolidation: The Second Term of the AKP (2007-2011) 
Despite serious challenges from the secularist state elites, the AKP won a landslide victory in the 
July 2007 parliamentary election by raising its votes from 34 up to 47 percent (Müftüler-Baç and 
Keyman 2012; Öniş 2009). It was a clear response that Turkish voters wanted no more military 
intervention in politics and insisted on their democratic choice. Subsequently, Gül was re-
nominated and has been elected as the president of the Turkish Republic by the AKP-dominated 
Turkish Parliament.  
In the aftermath of the 2007 parliamentary election, the bitter power struggle between 
the secularist Kemalist elite and the Islamist AKP continued to hamper the reform and 
democratic consolidation process. After Abdullah Gül has been elected as the eleventh president 
of the Turkish Republic, the AKP’s first move was to alter the regulations of the presidency. In a 
referendum in October 2007, citizens approved the constitutional amendment that reduced the 
presidential term from seven to five years, with a possibility for re-election and that enabled 
presidents to be elected by popular vote, rather than by the parliament. The second move posed 
a more direct challenge to the secularist elites. In January 2008, the AKP government, with the 
support of the nationalist party MHP, proposed, once again, a draft law to lift the ban on 
headscarf wearing in universities by arguing that female students were deprived of their right 
to education. Despite the objections of the secularist CHP, the Turkish Parliament approved the 
draft law in February 2008 (Arat 2010; Turam 2008). In its immediate aftermath, the chief 
prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal (Yargıtay) brought a case to the Constitutional Court 
and requested to ban the AKP for its alleged anti-secularist activities and seventy-one political 
figures from seeking electoral office for five-years, including President Gül and Prime Minister 
Erdoğan (Cagaptay et al. 2008). 
In June 2008, the Constitutional Court rejected the prosecutor’s request on the 
prohibition of the AKP, but imposed financial penalties on the party (Özbudun 2010: 137). This 
decision was welcomed both by domestic and international actors, such as the EU, and the 
democratically elected AKP could remain in power. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court 
overturned the law on headscarf wearing in universities and re-implemented the ban. Öniş 
states that these moves by the secularists represented threats to the party at the peak of its 
power (2013: 14). In 2008, another pending closure case was waiting for the Constitutional 
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Court’s decision. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP)56 
was accused of being linked to the PKK, which was considered as a threat to the territorial 
integrity and unitary character of the country (Öniş 2013; Satana 2012). Contrary to its decision 
on the AKP’s case, the Constitutional Court decided to ban the DTP in December 2009, and two 
Kurdish parliamentarians were forced to resign despite their political immunity. The rights of 
Kurdish citizens to political competition were once again constrained. The remaining Kurdish 
parliamentarians formed the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) over 
the heels of the closure of the DTP.  
Party prohibition cases in Turkey have not been a rarity. The Constitutional Court, 
drawing upon its constitutional powers, has mainly acted according to the Kemalist state 
ideology and banned parties by emphasizing the interests of the state, rather than considering 
political party freedom as an indispensable part of a democratic order (Özbudun 2010: 125). 
Kurdish, Islamist as well as leftist parties have often been banned as the Constitutional Court 
perceived them as a threat to state’s integrity and secularism. Therefore, human rights 
associations, liberal, Islamist, and Kurdish CSOs have persistently stressed the need for removing 
the restrictive provisions in the Law on Political Parties, but the incumbent AKP showed no 
political will to amend the law. 
The struggle between secularists and Islamists continued to dominate public debates. In 
July 2008, a massive investigation began against the alleged members of a clandestine 
ultranationalist group called Ergenekon, including retired army and police officers, lawyers, 
academics, politicians, journalists as well as CS activists (Reynolds 2013). The court charged 
eighty-six people for conspiring to stage terrorist attacks, and thus provoke a military coup 
against the AKP. The Ergenekon case was seen as a challenge to the “deep state”57 in Turkey 
(Öniş 2013: 107). The liberal intellectuals and CSOs advocating to overcome the military tutelage 
in Turkey paid special attention to the court trials and endorsed the investigation. The 
government attempted to ban reporting of the Ergenekon case, but the court overturned this 
proposal. As the Ergenekon investigation continued and widened to other trials, hundreds of 
                                                          
56 Kurdish politicians of the DTP entered the 2007 parliamentary elections as independent candidates to overcome 
the 10 percent threshold and after being elected, they formed their group within the Turkish Parliament. 
57 The term “deep state” in the Turkish political context refers to the interactions between formal political 
institutions and informal groups such as organized crime groups, guerilla groups, autocratic clique, and the mafia. 
For a further analysis of the deep state in Turkey, see Söyler (2012). 
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additional suspects were charged, and their cases were eventually folded into the main trial 
(Öniş 2013; Satana 2012). Meanwhile, prominent secularist CSO, such as the ‘Society for 
Supporting Modern Life’ (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği), were closely investigated because of 
their alleged ties to the Ergenekon group. More arrests followed in 2010, as 200 active and retired 
military officers were accused of plotting a military coup in 2003 against the AKP, the so called 
‘Operation Sledgehammer’ (Balyoz Harekatı). The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases58 seriously 
polarized the country, leaving secular segments of society furious at the AKP government. Given 
the long detention periods and high numbers of the detainees, many critics from diverse 
political parties and secularist CSOs accused the AKP government of staging these trials to 
eliminate its secularist opponents and manipulating the judiciary for its own political purposes. 
During this power struggle, the consolidation process lost its momentum. Compared to 
the substantial amendments to the Constitution in its first term in power (2002-2007), the AKP 
rather introduced cosmetic changes in its second term. The Table 4.2 shows the legal changes 
implemented by the AKP government between 2007 and 2011.  
 
Table 4.2: LEGAL CHANGES (2008-2011) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Freedom of 
expression 
Penal Code section 
on insults to “the 
Turkish nation” is 
revised, reducing 
the maximum 
sentence from three 
to two years in 
prison 
Last restrictions 
on Kurdish 
broadcasting are 
lifted 
 An 
internet 
filtration 
system is 
introduced 
Minority 
Rights 
  Restoring the 
Kurdish names of 
the villages in the 
south-east of 
Turkey 
 
Rule of law New laws to 
prevent torture, 
 Constitutional 
reforms  
 
                                                          
58 These legal investigations on two alleged groups are extensively discussed in Turkish and international 
newspapers, and in working papers of international and Turkish research institutes. Clearly, these cases need a 
profound analysis from a political science perspective. Such an analysis can provide an alternative insight on 
describing civil-military relations, the political processes between formal and informal institutions and its impact 
on state-society relations both in semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes. Yet this discussion is beyond the 
scope of the present study. 
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including a policy 
involving surprise 
inspections of 
police stations 
(changed after the 
2010 referendum) 
Freedom of 
religion  
Lifting the ban on 
headscarf wearing 
in universities 
(annulled by the 
Constitutional 
Court) 
   
Strengthening 
Civilian 
Politics 
 A law restricting 
the use of 
military courts 
Limiting the 
jurisdiction of 
military courts to 
military personnel 
 
  Source: Based upon the reports of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index 2009, 2010, 2011, and 
2012 
 
The most remarkable reform was the constitutional reforms in 2010. The AKP drafted a reform 
package to amend the Constitution (1982) in accordance with the EU requirements. Owing to 
the disagreements with other parties in the Turkish Parliament, the AKP brought the issue to a 
referendum that took place on 12 September 2010. 
Constitutional Referendum (2010) 
During the constitutional reform process, the opposition parties CHP and MHP as well as 
secularist actors within CS claimed that the AKP was seeking to cement its hold on power, rather 
than to consolidate democracy (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012: 86). According to the 
oppositional parties, if these legal changes were enacted, the government would gain more 
influence on the judiciary through its control of appointments and promotions of the judges. 
Therefore, the CHP and the MHP campaigned for “No” votes for the referendum, whereas the 
Kurdish BDP boycotted it. Table 4.3 shows in which areas the AKP government aimed to 
implement constitutional changes. They focused on political and civil freedoms, economic and 
social rights, structure of the judiciary and military justice. The referendum resulted in a 58 
percent “Yes” votes against 42 percent “No” votes. 
 
Table 4.3: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 2010 
Article 10: Equality before the law 
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Applying positive discrimination favoring women, children, the elderly, the disabled, 
widows and orphans of martyrs and veterans do not violate the principle of equality. 
Article 20: Right to privacy 
Protection of individuals' personal information, which can only be obtained with individual's 
permission or in certain legal circumstances. 
Article 23: Freedom of movement 
The right to travel abroad may be restricted only during ongoing criminal probes and upon 
a judge's order. 
Article 41: Children's rights 
The increasing of the state’s responsibility to protect the child against all forms of abuse 
and violence/ 
Article 51: Right to organize labor 
Workers are entitled to enroll in more than one trade union in a single sector. 
Article 74: Right to petition 
Individuals can file complaints and requests for information to a government-appointed 
ombudsman. 
Article 84: Loss of membership in the Parliament 
MPs, whose actions were judged by a court as a reason to ban a political party, should not be 
expelled from the Parliament  
Article 94: Administration of the Parliament 
Changes in the length of the parliamentary speaker's term in office 
Article 125: Recourse to judicial review 
Allowing soldiers discharged by a Supreme Military Council decision to appeal against such 
decisions 
Articles 128, 129: Public service 
Civil servants gained the right to collective bargaining and to appeal disciplinary action 
Article 144: Inspection of judicial services 
Only judges or prosecutors can inspect the prosecutors of the Ministry of Justice 
Articles 145, 156, 157: Military justice 
Military personnel would not be tried in military but in civilian courts. Civilians shall not be 
tried in military courts. 
Articles 146, 147, 148, 149: Constitutional Court 
17 judges, instead of 11, each chosen for a 12-year term. They face mandatory retirement at 
the age of 65. 
Turkish Parliament and the president would nominate judges to the court. 
Top generals will be tried for offences related to their duties by the Constitutional Court. 
Article 159: Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
Formatting the Council and the way its members are selected. It creates 22 regular and 12 
substitute members on the board. 
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Article 166: Economic planning 
Establishment of the Economic and Social Council as a constitutional institution 
Provisional Article 15: 
Allows prosecution of members of the MGK and bureaucrats who had legislative and 
executive powers following the 1980 military coup 
Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/12/us-turkey-referendum-articles 
idUSTRE68B28B20100912, and Freedom in the World Overview (2011) 
 
This referendum represented an important step in terms of overcoming the authoritarian 
legacies of the 1982 Constitution drafted by the military elites (Öniş 2013: 106f.). However, the 
opposition was bitter about the referendum because they claimed that the AKP has pushed for 
changes according to its own preferences without regarding the demands of other segments of 
Turkish society (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012; Öniş 2013).  
In the second term of the AKP government, freedoms of expression and press were 
seriously downgraded. The aforementioned Article 301 of the Penal Code continued to be used 
against journalists. In 2011, prominent journalists, who were reporting on the flaws in the 
indictments related to Ergenekon case, were arrested because of their alleged links to the 
Ergenekon group. Although the state channel expanded its daily Kurdish broadcasting from six 
to twenty-four hours (2009), the Kurdish newspapers were often closed down by court decisions, 
and their websites were blocked. Likewise, freedom of public assembly was violated, as the police 
was using excessive force against peaceful demonstrators. Moreover, newspapers critical of the 
government, especially those that belong to the Doğan Holding, faced financial investigations, 
and were sentenced to pay fines for tax evasion (Puddington and Csaky 2012). Thus, the liberal 
segments of society and CSOs, which had strongly supported the AKP during its first term, 
became disillusioned with the declining impetus of the democratic consolidation process (Öniş 
2013: 107).  
The political rights of Kurds were further constrained. In October 2010, 151 suspects, 
including twelve mayors from the BDP, were sentenced for alleged ties to the organization called 
the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civaken Kurdistan, KCK), which was linked to the PKK 
(Üstündağ 2010). Like in the Ergenekon case, Kurdish politicians and activists from the BDP were 
detained for long periods with alleged evidences. The court rejected the request of the 
defendants to present their defense in Kurdish with the claim that they know enough Turkish. 
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The laws were changed in a positive sense, but freedoms of speech and assembly for Kurdish 
citizens were still limited.  
Indeed, constraints on political rights and civil freedoms have narrowed the political 
leeway for CS. CSOs that have been active and effective in the initial years of AKP rule have lost 
their influence on political processes. The loss of the momentum for a bottom-up push for 
reform had several reasons. First, relying upon its electoral power, the AKP government began 
to take little notice of the views of the democratic CS. Second, the repercussion of the 
secularist/Islamist conflict has polarized CS even more. Third, CSOs working on taboo topics 
such as the Kurdish issue, human rights abuses or the Armenian question have been subjected 
to harassment by state authorities (Kubicek 2011: 921). Lastly, although the EU’s financial aid for 
strengthening CS continued to flow to Turkey, CSOs that are critical of the AKP government 
could not reach these funds and grants.59  
Overall, the reformist spirit of the AKP waned in this period. Thanks to the constitutional 
reforms, the AKP consolidated its power within the state structure and took more control over 
the judiciary and the military. Between 2007 and 2011, the democratic pendulum swung from 
consolidating democracy to majoritarian democracy where the majority ruled by ignoring the 
demands of the minority.60 In a nutshell, the AKP under the leadership of Erdoğan, by drawing 
on its electoral majority, wanted to be the ‘one-man’ who determines the rules of the game. On 
the one hand, the AKP accomplished important reforms eliminating the military’s influence in 
politics and strengthening civilian politics, but on the other hand, showed authoritarian and 
anti-liberal reflexes towards the opposition and the critical media. This political paradox was 
also the result of the stalemate in the negotiation process with the EU and the resulting decline 
in Turkey’s aspirations for EU membership. As Keyman states laconically: “the increasing power 
of the reform-oriented AKP did not result in democratic consolidation” (2010: 324). Turkish 
politics and society was polarized between the AKP-supporters and -skeptics (Somer 2011). 
The Hegemony of the AKP and the Democratic Reversal: 2011 and beyond 
In such a polarized political context, the parliamentary elections took place on 12 July 2011. In 
this election, Kurdish was for the first time allowed to be used in electoral campaigns. The AKP, 
                                                          
59 Almost all my interviewees mentioned this problem. 
60 I am thankful to Ayşen Candaş from Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International 
relations, for this comment. She described the political situation in 2011 as such. 
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for the third time, won the elections by increasing its votes up to 49.9 percent. The party made 
it clear that it was the absolute winner in Turkish politics. Table 4.4 demonstrates that it has 
been the AKP’s highest vote-share in three consecutive parliamentary elections since 2002. This 
was a unique experience in the history of the Turkey’s multiparty system.  
 
Table 4.4: ELECTION RESULTS IN PERCENTAGE (%) 
Parties 2002 2007 2011 
AKP 34.2 46.66 49.9 
CHP 19.4 20.85 25.9 
MHP 8.4 14.29 12.9 
Independents 
(Kurdish political 
parties) 
- 5.20 6.65 
  Source: http://www.electionresources.org/tr/ 
 
As mentioned before, the constitutional reforms helped the AKP to overcome the military’s 
dominance in politics. The first issue addressed by Prime Minister Erdoğan was the drafting of a 
new constitution in consultation with the opposition, CS, and academics to get rid of the 
military-made 1982 Constitution and to establish a presidential system in Turkey (Müftüler-Baç 
and Keyman 2012: 93). Accordingly, President Gül assigned the ‘Constitution Reconciliation 
Commission’ (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu), which consisted of representatives from the parties 
represented in the parliament, to negotiate and prepare the draft for a new Constitution.61 The 
AKP was represented with a majority in this commission and sought to push forward its own 
preferences. This, of course, led to tensions between the AKP’s members and the oppositional 
MPs, especially with the BDP and CHP parliamentarians. While negotiating on the draft for a 
new constitution, members from the BDP and the CHP addressed the unfair treatment of their 
party members in the ongoing pretrial detentions of the Ergenekon and KCK cases. Moreover, 
there were disagreements on issues such as the extension of democratic rights of Kurdish 
citizens, redefining secularism, and transforming the parliamentary system into a presidential 
one. This commission continued its work until November 2013 without succeeding to prepare a 
                                                          
61 http://yenianayasa.tbmm.gov.tr/calismaesaslari.aspx (rev. 15.09.2014) 
100 
 
new draft and has therefore been abolished by the Head of the Parliament. Scholars argue that 
to replace the authoritarian 1982 Constitution by a more democratic and liberal one is only 
possible with the active participation of key political parties and in cooperation with CSOs; 
otherwise drafting a new constitution will not succeed (Cengiz 2014; Kubicek 2011; Öniş 2013; 
Keyman 2010). 
 Despite the barriers to EU funding and the very limited local funding, democratic CSOs 
have continued their advocacy efforts in different issue areas. As we will discuss in the coming 
chapters, women’s CSOs have been highly active in the issue of the strengthening women’s 
rights, but also local CSOs have become active in the economic and social development of their 
cities. Meanwhile, CSOs developed new strategies and began to form bigger coalitions or 
networks. For instance, the Checks and Balances Network (Denge ve Denetleme Ağı), which is 
supported by the US-based National Democratic Institute, is a broad coalition comprised of more 
than 130 diverse Turkish CSOs.62 The Network’s mission is to strengthen Turkey’s checks and 
balances system as well as checks by individual citizens, CSOs, and independent media. Yet the 
overall effect of CS remained limited. However, CSOs of ethnic and religious groups, especially 
the Alevites, the Armenians, and Greeks, who demanded more freedom for their communities, 
were closely monitored (Freedom in the World, Turkey Report 2013). 
Drawing on its electoral power, its increased autonomy from the military, the weakness 
of the oppositional parties as well as the economic prosperity of the country under its 
leadership, the AKP became a self-confident party and began to turn a blind eye to social and 
political demands of the opposition and democratic CS. Both civil liberties and political rights 
were seriously curtailed. By the end of the 2011, almost 4,000 people were arrested in the KCK 
case, 1,000 of them were BDP politicians from different ranks (Aksoy 2012: 87). In 2012, CHP 
members elected in 2011 elections were still in prison due to the Ergenekon case. By September 
2012, 3,000 university students were in prisons, many had been charged with terrorism offenses 
because of participating in demonstrations demanding free higher education (Freedom in the 
World- Turkey 2013). Moreover, police force ruthlessly suppressed almost all public 
demonstrations opposing the AKP government. As regards to freedom of press, Turkey became 
the biggest prison for journalists. By the end of 2011, seventy-six journalists were in prisons, the 
                                                          
62 http://www.birarada.org/ (rev. 17.11.2014) 
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majority of them were Kurdish and charged under the Anti-Terrorism Law (Reporters without 
Borders 2012). Prime Minister Erdoğan was using a harsh tone towards any criticism from liberal 
media, and has accused critical journalists of being “Ergenekonists”. This situation led also to 
self-censorship of the media, and many prominent journalists, who criticized the AKP 
government’s policies, lost their jobs.  
The judicial processes continued to harass the AKP-opponents. In September 2012, 329 
military officers were imprisoned in the Sledgehammer case. The major incident in the 
Ergenekon trial was that the former chief of the general staff (2008-2010) Ilker Başbuğ was 
accused of being a “terrorist” and sentenced to life imprisonment. The secularist parties and a 
diverse array of CSOs have constantly voiced their concerns about the flaws in these legal 
processes. Both domestic and international observers claimed that the AKP government was 
using the coup trials and KCK arrests to completely silence oppositional politics in the country. 
Indeed, both Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials resulted in the consolidation of power of the 
AKP government and weakened both the secularist opposition in politics and CS.  
Not surprisingly, Turkey’s overall civil liberties rating in the Freedom in the World Index 
2013, based on the evaluation in 2012, declined from 3 to 4. The growing pressure on the press 
and the judiciary as well as the increased exclusion of the oppositional segments of CS prompted 
a widespread concern about the AKP’s intentions. The AKP-skeptics were concerned about the 
creeping authoritarianism and Islamist rhetoric that have been accumulated in the party’s 
recent actions and political statements. The AKP and its leadership, in particular Erdoğan, have 
employed a religious rhetoric in social policies concerning women’s, children’s and youth’s lives, 
and disregarded the views of CSOs working on these sections of society. Some scholars argue 
that the AKP instrumentalizes these issues to keep its conservative-religious establishment 
content and to gain support from the traditional voters, whereas others fear that the recent 
policy changes pertaining to social life would transform the country into an authoritarian 
political system similar to Putin’s Russia or China (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012; Öniş 2013; 
Özbudun 2014). 
The increasing tensions between the AKP government and the oppositional segments of 
society were reflected in the widespread Gezi Park demonstrations against the autocratic style 
of Erdoğan in the summer 2013. Indeed, the Gezi uprisings were a breakthrough in Turkey’s 
recent era. On the one hand, this certainly showed the AKP government that liberal segments of 
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society, particularly educated youth in urban centers, were dissatisfied with the political status 
quo under the AKP government. On the other hand, it showed the limits of “politics from below” 
in transforming the state-centric Turkish politics (Öniş 2014: 7).63 After the end of the uprisings, 
the AKP government, without cooperating with the opposition or taking the demands of CS into 
account, launched a democratization package in September 2013, including the removal of 
restrictions on the headscarf wearing in public institutions (except in the army, judiciary, and 
security offices), and allowing the use of different languages during the elections campaigns 
(Keneş 2013). These reforms, however, were cosmetic changes, rather than a real democratic 
change. 
In this negative picture, there was one important development for the consolidation of 
democracy in the latest phase of the AKP era. The AKP government has initiated a peace process 
in cooperation with the BDP politicians who regularly communicated with the imprisoned PKK 
leader Öcalan. As a short-term effect, the PKK launched ceasefire, and the clashes between 
Turkish armed forces and the PKK were terminated. At the time of writing (September 2014), 
the Kurdish leaders push for the institutionalization of peace talks by a parliamentary decree. It 
remains to be seen, whether these talks will lead to a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. 
Given the turmoil and violence close to the Turkish border to Syria and Iraq, and complicated 
conflicts in this region, this remains doubtful. 
Overall, in the latest phase of the AKP, there is growing evidence for democratic reversal 
of the democratic consolidation process in Turkey. The party emphasizes an economically 
strong Turkey with a rather minimalist understanding of democratic rights and institutions 
(Öniş 2013: 114). The hegemony of the AKP increasingly limits the leeway for the opposition and 
political pluralism. With the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the presidency in August 2014, 
there arise many further questions about the future of Turkey’s democracy.  
Conclusion 
As many scholars argue, Turkey has succeeded in establishing “electoral democracy”, but has 
failed in terms of generating a “consolidated” democracy based on a genuinely pluralistic and 
                                                          
63 Since the end of the Gezi demonstrations, there appeared many scholarly analyses on the causes and dynamics 
of the protests. However, the effects and repercussions of the Gezi uprisings on Turkish politics, both on domestic 
and international level, remain unanswered. 
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inclusive political order (Kemahlıoğlu and Keyman 2011; Keyman 2007, 2010; Müftüler-Baç and 
Keyman 2012; Öniş 2013; Özbudun 2014). From the transition to multiparty system in 1950 to the 
AKP’s rise to power in 2002, Turkish democracy was interrupted three times by the military 
(1960, 1971 and 1980), which inevitably shaped the nature of institutions, the behaviors of key 
political actors, and the dynamics of the political processes in Turkey. Although the military had 
the upper hand in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish governments slowly extended the frontiers of 
democracy and the public space available for CS. By the end of the 1999, the external impetus 
from the EU accompanied by the domestic pressure pushed Turkey to initiate substantial 
reforms to consolidate its democracy. Clearly, the AKP era constitutes the most significant era 
in the history of Turkish democracy.   
In its first two terms, the AKP has successfully initiated top-down reforms, and different 
segments of CS struggled for a bottom-up democratization. Yet, in light of the discussed political 
developments, one might speak of an authoritarian backlash. These developments include: 
constraints on freedom of expression and the press, palpable deficiencies of the rule of law, 
weakened judicial independence and the politicization of the judiciary, growing defects in the 
checks and balances mechanism that enhances the executive power at the expense of the 
legislature and the judiciary, and last but not least, the disregard of the diverse segments of CS, 
except the government supported Islamist NGOs (or GONGOs). Turkey’s democracy is now at a 
critical juncture, it can either evolve into an “illiberal democracy”, where elections regularly 
take place and the majority rules, but where the political participation and inclusion are 
severely restricted, or it can revitalize its democratic consolidation process and push to reach 
liberal and pluralistic democracy. 
After having explored the historical development and institutional-political context of 
the democratic consolidation process under the AKP, it is possible to examine to what extent 
women’s CSOs could participate in and were included in policy-making processes regarding 
gender issues. In other words, the study can explore to what extent women’s CSOs play a role in 
engendering democracy under AKP rule. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Positive Gender Outcomes  
Before presenting the changes in the legal framework and policies pertaining to women’s lives 
under AKP rule, it is important to examine the laws and regulations which governed gender 
rights in pre-AKP Turkey. 
5.1 Institutional Background: The Legacy of the Kemalist Regime 
Kandiyoti aptly remarks that “[a]mong the countries of the Middle East, Turkey may be singled 
out as a republic that has addressed the question of women's emancipation early, explicitly, and 
extensively” (1987: 320). After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the new 
Turkish state, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), recognized women’s 
emancipation as a key component of the country’s wider modernization project. To this end, the 
Islamic legal order (shariʽa law) was abolished, and secular civil laws and codes introduced, which 
allowed women to be liberated, to a degree unique in the Muslim country, from the restrictions 
of Islamic laws as traditionally imposed (Arat 2010b: 870). In addition to the legal changes, the 
Turkish state secularized the education system, encouraging girls to attend schools and 
universities and to pursue professional careers (White 2003: 150). The republican state elite 
regarded improvement of the symbolic status of women as vital to the cause of dismantling the 
old Islamic order and building a modern, more Western nation (Arat 2010b; Kandiyoti 1987; 
Tekeli 1995). The Turkish Republic’s efforts to make equality and visibility of women in the 
public sphere a national policy in the founding years has even been labeled “state feminism” 
(Arat 1998; White 2003).64 
The most notable legal change regarding women’s rights was the introduction of the 
Turkish Civil Code in 1926 that was adapted from the Swiss Civil Code. The Civil Code banned 
polygamy, subjected marriages to secular law, and gave equal rights to both women and men in 
divorce, inheritance, and custody of children (Arat 1994, 2010b; Kandiyoti 1987; White 2003). 
                                                          
64 For a critical analysis of state’s women’s policies in the nation-building years, see: Kandiyoti (1987), Tekeli 
(1990), and White (2003). 
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Clearly, the legal status of women was improved. But the Civil Code reflected the social values 
and norms of its time and maintained the patriarchal structures in the family. For instance, 
Article 152 stipulated that the husband is the head of the household. Accordingly, men had the 
final say over the choice of domicile and children (Anıl et al. 2002: 5). Also, women needed 
permission of their husbands to travel abroad and to work outside home (Article 159). In case of 
divorce, the law recognized the separate ownership of property, which in reality worked against 
women because they were housewives and could not earn money necessary to acquire property 
(Arat 2010a: 239). Moreover, the Civil Code ruled that the minimum age for marriage for women 
was fifteen and for men seventeen (Article 124). The patriarchal perspective on women’s role 
was maintained in the Turkish Penal Code (1926), which will be presented later. 
The second important reform was the introduction of women’s suffrage. It took place in 
two steps: women were first granted to vote at local elections in 1930 and at the national level 
in 1934 (Kandiyoti 1987; White 2003). In 1935, eighteen women were elected to the Turkish 
Parliament, making up 4.6 percent of the 400-seat parliament (White 2003: 151). This was the 
highest percentage of women’s representation in the Turkish Parliament until the 1999 
parliamentary election. As many scholars contend, Kemalist reforms directly benefitted women 
of the urban middle and upper-middle classes, and did not touch the lives of women in rural 
areas (Arat 1994, 2008; Diner and Toktaş 2010; Kandiyoti 1987; Tekeli 1995). State feminism was 
primarily concerned with women’s formal equality and took little notice of the patriarchal 
values and division of labor within the private sphere. Therefore, Kandiyoti describes Turkish 
women of the time “as emancipated, but unliberated” (1987: 324). Since there were no political 
demands from women to change this situation, these discriminatory laws remained untouched 
until the 1990s. 
5.2 Updating the Gender Rights Regime (1980-2002) 
From the 1970s on, the UN began to promote the idea that “women’s rights are human rights”. 
Thanks to the influence of UN’s world conferences on women, the newly developed 
international mechanisms such as the CEDAW treaty (1979), which is regarded as the 
international bill of women’s rights (cf. Chapter 3), and the rise of feminist women’s movement 
on the global level, national governments were pushed to remedy their gender rights regimes. 
Besides these external forces, the feminist movement in Turkey began to emerge and to voice 
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its gender specific demands for concrete policy changes. Against this backdrop, in 1985, Turkey 
signed and ratified the CEDAW agreement, albeit with reservations to Article 15 and 16 (Ertürk 
2006: 96).65 This bill forced the Turkish state to adjust to the international women’s rights regime 
and to establish the goal of gender equality. Accordingly, in 1990, the Turkish government took 
a major step and established a state body responsible for women’s issues: ‘the General 
Directorate on the Women’s Status and Problems’ (Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü, 
KSSGM) under the authority of the Prime Ministry (Acuner 2007: 128). KSSGM’s primary goal has 
been to engage in activities to improve the status of women and to secure existing gender rights. 
To this end, it collaborated with women’s organizations, activists, universities, local 
governments, and bar associations to increase gender awareness of society (Kardam 2006:12).  
Both Turkey’s CEDAW obligations and the advocacy efforts of the feminist movement 
pushed the Turkish government to annul some of the discriminatory articles in existing statutes. 
In 1990, the Turkish Parliament repealed Article 438 of the Penal Code, which granted a reduced 
sentence (one third of the existing term) for rapists if the victim of rape was a sex worker (Anıl 
et al. 2002; Arat 1994; Ertürk 2006). In 1992, the Constitutional Court annulled aforementioned 
Article 159, allowing women to work without the legal permission of their husbands. Another 
important step in strengthening women’s rights to economic independence was the amendment 
to the ‘Income Tax Act’ (1998), which enabled married women to make independent income tax 
declarations (Anıl et al. 2002: 23). In 1994, a parliamentary commission was formed to prepare a 
new draft for the Civil Code, but the social and political conflicts at the time (cf. Chapter 4) 
hindered the reform process. Meanwhile, feminist activists and KSGM’s feminist bureaucrats 
called for the full implementation of the CEDAW, but Turkey did not lift its reservations to the 
aforementioned Articles 15 and 16 until September 1999 (Kardam 2006: 14). 
In the mid-1990s, some feminist and Kemalist women’s organizations conducted a 
campaign for the annulment of the articles on adultery in the Penal Code. The Penal Code 
stipulated different sentences for adultery committed by men and women. In 1996, Article 441 
                                                          
65 Articles 15 stipulates: “State Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law”. Article 16 states: 
“State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters 
pertaining to marriage and family relations, and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women.” The Turkish government at the time claimed that these articles would threaten the traditions and customs 
of Turkish society, see further: Kardam (2006). 
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regulating adultery committed by men and, in 1998, Article 440 regulating adultery by women 
were annulled by the Constitutional Court on account of violating the constitutional principle 
of equality before the law (Anıl et al. 2002: 18). Furthermore, in 1999, the Ministry of Justice 
passed a statute eliminating virginity testing, which had been employed by schools, universities 
or families to prove of ‘unchastity’ of women (Ibid.: 29).  
As a result of two decades of women’s activism, the Turkish Parliament approved the 
‘Law on the Protection of the Family’ (No. 4320) in January 1998. The law institutionalized the 
state’s responsibility to interfere in cases of domestic violence (Coşar and Onbaşi 2008: 330). 
Under Law 4320, any member of the family exposed to domestic violence could file a suit for a 
‘protection order’ against the perpetrator of the violence (Anıl et al. 2002: 26). The law also gave 
public prosecutors the right to file against abusive partners and to prevent further harassment 
of the victim (Arat 2008: 406). The public prosecutor could take precautionary measures against 
the perpetrators to ensure the protection of the victims: to leave the abode shared with the 
spouse and children, not to damage the property of the spouse, surrender his/her weapon, not 
to cause distress to the spouse and children, not to approach the house under the influence of 
alcohol or any other intoxicating substances (Anıl et al. 2002: 26). Indeed, the enactment of this 
law has institutionalized the combat against domestic violence on the state level.  
In addition to implementing protective laws, the Turkish state also acknowledged the 
need to develop mechanisms to protect women and children from violence. In the mid-1990s, 
the ‘Agency of Social Services and Child Protection’ (Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu, 
SHÇEK) – affiliated with KSSGM – began to establish governmental services and to develop 
programs to overcome violence against women and children. To this end, SHÇEK has established 
‘guesthouses’ and ‘counseling centers’ for women and children experiencing domestic violence 
(Işık 2007: 65).  
As will be delineated in the coming chapters, women’s rights organizations have been 
influential in pushing for changes in laws and regulations in women’s rights. However, the 
Turkish state began to pay more attention to the demands of organized women when Turkey 
was granted an official candidate status for the EU in 1999. Since the Turkish laws relating to 
women rights had to be adopted to the EU’s acquis communautaire, the Turkish government 
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established parliamentary working groups to eliminate the discriminatory provisions in the 
Civil and Penal Codes.  
The New Civil Code (2002) 
As demonstrated above, the Civil Code assigned women a secondary role in the family. Despite 
minor changes, the Civil Code from 1926 remained mostly intact for seven decades. But in April 
2000, the Justice Commission of the Turkish Parliament, which consisted of the representatives 
of the coalition government (DSP-ANAP-MHP), began working on a new draft of the Civil Code 
in cooperation with legal experts from women’s rights organizations. KSSGM also took an active 
role in the drafting process of the Civil Code (Kardam 2006: 15). 
The nationalist and religious-conservative members of the Justice Commission were 
highly critical of several proposed laws and argued that equality between spouses would 
“threaten the foundation of the traditional Turkish family” (Anıl et al 2002: 7). The most 
contentious issue between women’s rights organizations and lawmakers was the division of 
property in case of divorce (Article 202). The opposing lawmakers claimed that equal property 
sharing would change the structures of the Turkish family “from a matrimonial union to a 
corporation” (Anıl et al 2002: 7). As a result of the strong campaigning of women’s CSOs, the 
opposing MPs eventually accepted the new property regime.66 The new Civil Code was approved 
on 22 November 2001, and became effective on 1 January 2002. The new Civil Code (2002) 
abolished the supremacy of men in marriage and established equality of rights and obligations 
between spouses (Article 21). Thus, the law stipulated:  
 The husband is no longer the head of the family.  
 Spouses have equal rights over the family abode. 
 Spouses have equal rights over property acquired during marriage.  
 Spouses have equal representative powers. (Anıl et al. 2002: 7f) 
Furthermore, the new Civil Code has corrected the previous discriminatory provision that 
stipulated different minimum age for women and men and increased the minimum age for legal 
marriage to eighteen for both women and men (Article 124). It also provides the same 
                                                          
66 The role of each group of women’s CSOs in policy-making processes, which led to legal changes in the Civil Code 
will be closely explored in the coming four chapters. Here, I only present changes in laws. 
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inheritance rights to children born out of wedlock as those born within marriage (Article 498). 
This clause recognizes de facto couples who are not legally married as a family, which is a 
remarkable achievement considering the conservative structures of Turkish society and culture. 
Adopted children also acquired equal rights of inheritance (Article 500). Although the new Civil 
Code recognizes the equal division of property in case of divorce (Article 202), it applies only to 
marriages that took place after the renewal of the Civil Code; i.e., after January 2002 (Arat 2008: 
404).  In sum, the new Civil Code guarantees equality between men and women in the family 
and, thereby, improved women’s legal status.67 In October 2001, during the amendment process, 
the clause on ‘equality in the family’ was also enshrined in Article 41 of the Turkish Constitution 
(1982): “The family is the foundation of the Turkish society, and is based on equality between 
spouses” (Amend. 3.10.2001-4709/clause 17).  
Drawing upon their success in reforming the Civil Code, women’s CSOs shifted their focus 
to reforming the Penal Code. Meanwhile, the incumbent government lost in the parliamentary 
election in 2002, and the Islamist AKP came to power in the midst of the reform process (cf. 
Chapter 4). Despite initial suspicion from both international and domestic actors, the newly 
established AKP government continued the institutional reform process to adopt the EU’s acquis 
communautaire, and began to work with women’s CSOs to eliminate the discriminatory 
provisions in laws. 
5.3 Gender Rights Regime in the AKP Era 
A thorough analysis of the impact of women’s CSOs on the process of democratic consolidation 
under AKP rule is possible by looking at: 1) the legal framework and codes, and 2) positive gender 
outcomes in policies. In Turkey, the provisions for women’s rights are regulated primarily in the 
1982 Constitution, but they are also regulated in the Civil Code, Penal Code, the Law on the 
Protection of the Family, the Labor Law, the Law for Provincial Administration, and the 
Municipality Law (Acar and Arıner 2009: 41). 
                                                          
67 For a comprehensive overview of all articles in the Civil Code, see: Anıl et al. (2002). 
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The Legal Framework 
The Labor Law  
While women’s rights organizations had demanded a continuation of the reforms with the Penal 
Code, the AKP government first paid attention to reforming the Labor Law. The draft proposal 
was prepared in the absence of women’s CSOs (Marshall 2013: 94). In May 2003, the new Labor 
Law (No. 4857) was implemented. Article 5 Clause 1 of this Law stipulates that: “Discrimination 
based on language, race, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or similar 
reasons is prohibited in the work environment”.68 This means that no one can be discriminated 
against because of gender, pregnancy, or marital status. It set the legal basis for equal pay for 
equal work, and grants six weeks of maternity leave before delivery, six weeks of paid and six 
months of unpaid leave after delivery (Kardam 2006; Müftüler-Baç 2012; WWHR 2005). After the 
implementation of the Labor Law, the next step was the elimination of discriminatory provisions 
in the Penal Code as advocated by women’s CSOs. 
The Penal Code 
The Turkish Penal Code (1926) was adapted from the Italian Penal Code and included 
discriminatory provisions on women’s bodily rights and integrity. However, Islamic laws, 
customs, and norms about women’s sexuality were maintained in the Penal Code (Kandiyoti 
1987; Ilkkaracan 2007). The Code defined, for instance, sexual crimes such as rape or sexual 
assault as a ‘crime against the public morality and order’, rather than as a ‘violation of the rights 
of the individual’. Article 462 of the Penal Code stipulated that perpetrators who commit murder 
in the name of ‘honor’, ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’ were granted a reduction in their sentences. There 
were no specific references to honor killings and customary killings.69 Although ‘honor killings’ 
have been internationally defined as ‘premeditated murders’, Article 462 was wrongly applied 
to such killings (WWHR 2005). Article 51 Paragraph 2 of the Code regulated all the reductions in 
sentences for crimes committed under mitigating circumstances, such as severe provocation 
(Anıl et al. 2002: 29). One striking article cancelled all punishment for a rapist if he married his 
                                                          
68 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4857.html (rev. 15.02.2014) 
69 In the international law terminology and in all related U.N. decisions, ‘honor killings’ are defined as acts of murder 
of a woman suspected of having transgressed the limits of sexual behavior as imposed by traditions. The term 
‘customary killings’ is primarily associated with local practices in the Kurdish populated eastern regions of Turkey 
and entails the ‘family’s consent’ for murdering the female member of the family who through her ‘inappropriate 
conduct’ dishonored the family.  
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victim (Article 434). This article was predicated on the notion that a woman who had been raped, 
and therefore ‘dishonored’, could restore her ‘honor’ by marrying her rapist, and thus, the 
perpetrator’s offence could be considered ‘undone’ (Arat 2008; Ilkkaracan 2007). Moreover, 
there was no regulation specifically addressing marital rape and sexual abuse in the family in 
the Penal Code. 
  In 2002, twenty-six organizations from different women’s groups formed the ‘Women’s 
Platform on the Turkish Penal Code’ to discuss the existing Penal Code from a gender 
perspective and propose progressive laws on women’s sexual rights and bodily integrity (Eslen-
Ziya 2012; Ilkkaracan 2007). The Platform activists intensively advocated and lobbied for 
substantial changes in the Penal Code. Meanwhile, they complained about the lack of support 
by the State Ministry for Women and Family Policies under Nimet Çubukçu, who had several 
problems with some members of the Women’s Platform.70 Moreover, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
then Prime Minister, intervened in the policy-making process and attempted to reinstitute 
adultery as a crime (Arat 2008; Ertürk 2006; Kardam 2006). Thanks to the vehement protests of 
women’s rights organizations and the pressure from the EU, the AKP government withdrew its 
proposal. The Women’s Platform drove a hard bargain with the Turkish decision-makers, which 
finally resulted in gender-sensitive amendments that aimed to strengthen women’s rights to 
bodily integrity and protect women and children from violence. On 26 September 2004, the 
Turkish Parliament ratified the amendments to the Turkish Penal Code, which took effect on 1 
June 2005. 
The amended Turkish Penal Code contains clearer and more progressive definitions of 
‘rape’, ‘sexual assault’, ‘sexual abuse’, and ‘sexual harassment’. It defines sex crimes as ‘crimes 
against individual integrity’, rather than ‘crimes against society’. The Penal Code also involves 
increased sentences for sexual offences against children and for crimes committed in the name 
of ‘honor’. All vague concepts such as ‘chastity’, ‘public morality’, ‘shame’, ‘purity’, or ‘decency’ 
relating to sex crimes are removed. Another crucial legal change is the recognition of ‘marital 
rape’. The most important development is the removal of the aforementioned controversial 
article canceling punishment in cases where a rapist married his victim. The Table 5.1 shows 
                                                          
70 http://www.turkhukuksitesi.com/showthread.php?t=4562 (rev. 23.10.2014) 
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some of the important legal changes in the Turkish Penal Code by comparing it with the old 
code. Reforming the Penal Code was a major step in the criminalization of violence against 
women and the protection of women’s bodily rights. 
Table (5.1): CHANGES IN THE PENAL CODE (2005) 
The old Penal Code (1926) The new Penal Code (2005) 
Crimes against sexual integrity are 
classified as ‘crimes against society’/ 
‘crimes against public morality and 
decency’ 
 
- Sexual offences are classified as ‘crimes 
against bodily integrity of individuals’ or 
crimes against inviolability of sexual 
integrity’  
- Sentences for sex crimes are increased 
 
Reductions in the sentences for murder in 
the name of ‘honor’ 
 
New measures to prevent sentence 
reductions granted to perpetrators of 
honor killings and murder in the name of 
‘customary law’ are regulated as 
‘aggravated homicide’ 
The Penal Code assumed that rape, sexual 
assault, or sexual abuse of children can 
occur with the ‘consent of the victim’ 
(Article 103) 
- Removal of the notion of ‘consent of the 
child’ in sexual abuse 
- Increased sentences for sexual offences 
against children 
The Penal Code entailed articles foreseeing 
reduction or suspension of sentences in 
case perpetrators of rape or abduction 
married their victims (Article 434) 
This Article has been abolished 
No regulation for marital rape  Marital rape is criminalized (Article 102) 
 
References to vague patriarchal constructs 
such as ‘chastity’, ‘honor’, ‘public morality’, 
‘public customs’, ‘shame’ or ‘decency’ 
All such references are eliminated 
 
If the mother kills a newborn baby born 
out of wedlock, she was given a reduced 
sentence for murdering her child, as this 
crime was considered to be committed to 
cleanse the woman’s honor 
The article is removed 
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Rape and sexual assault were defined as 
forced or consensual seizure/attack on 
‘chastity’ (Article 102/1) 
- Progressive definitions of sexual offences 
are adopted 
- Sexual harassment in the workplace is 
criminalized 
Differentiation between virgin, non-virgin, 
married, and unmarried women 
No discrimination between virgin, non-
virgin, married and unmarried women  
 
Criminalization of so-called ‘indecent 
behaviors’, ‘acts that offend others’ 
‘feelings of chastity and decency’ 
The article regulating ‘indecent behaviors’ 
has been restricted to sexual intercourse in 
public and exhibitionism 
 
Sources: (Arat 2008; Ilkkaracan 2007; WWHR 2005) 
 
During amendments to the Penal Code, some female MPs from the CHP, with the support 
of women’s rights organizations, initiated a campaign calling for the inclusion of a clause on the 
state’s responsibility for gender equality in the Constitution. Subsequently, in May 2004, a clause 
was introduced into Article 10 of the Constitution that stipulates: “Women and men have equal 
rights. The State is responsible for taking all measures to realize gender equality” (Amend: 
7.5.2004-5170/Clause 1). In the same year, Article 90 of the Constitution concerning the ratified 
international agreements was also amended. It ensures that international agreements such as 
the CEDAW treaty take precedence in cases of conflict with national laws (Kardam 2006: 16). 
With these and other reforms, Turkey made a great stride in the protection of women’s human 
rights and the criminalization of violence against women.  
In 2005, the CEDAW Committee evaluated these legal changes as significant 
achievements that would ensure gender equality in Turkey (Acar and Arıner 2009: 42). Women’s 
rights organizations welcomed these legal changes, but they also addressed several 
shortcomings in the amended Penal Code, which will be discussed in the coming chapters. In the 
constitutional referendum 2010, Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution was amended once again, 
and it now stipulates: “applying positive discrimination favoring women, children, the elderly, 
the disabled, widows and orphans of martyrs, and veterans does not violate the principle of 
equality”. This enshrined positive discrimination in favor of women in the Turkish Constitution. 
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The next important gender-sensitive change in the legal framework was the revision of 
the aforementioned Law of Protection of the Family (No. 4320). The law did not provide 
protection to all women. For instance, non-married women, women with religious marriages, 
and women who live in partnership were not protected by law. As a result of intensive advocacy 
and the lobbying efforts of women’s CSOs, the AKP government was push to revise Law 4320. 
The Law of Protection and Prevention Violence against Women 
The Ministry for Family and Social Policies led by Fatma Şahin, which was restructured in 2011, 
began to work on the improvement of the Law on Protection of the Family (4320) and invited 
the representatives from women’s CSOs in the policy-making process. After a long period of 
bargaining with women’s CSOs, the Ministry revised the law and submitted the amendment to 
the Turkish Parliament. On 8 March 2012, the Turkish Parliament voted and passed the new ‘Law 
to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women’ (No. 6284). As the Table 5.2 
demonstrates, the new law institutionalized the protection of all women, irrespective of their 
marital status, and provided harsh sentences for spouses guilty of violence. The Law 6284 Clause 
14 rules that the Ministry for Family and Social Policies would form a new mechanism to monitor 
and prevent violence against women, which will operate on a 24/7 basis: the ‘Centers for 
Preventing and Monitoring Violence’ (Şiddet Önleme ve İzleme Merkezleri, ŞÖNIM). ŞÖNIMs provide 
three different services: 1) monitoring injunctions preventing domestic violence, 2) providing 
services to the victims of violence, and 3) offering services to persons prone to violence.71 The 
government thereby aimed to create general guidelines for all women’s shelters run by the 
Ministry, municipalites, and women’s CSOs. 
Table (5.2): LAW 4320 vs. 6284 
Law No. 4320 Law No. 6284 
Divorced women and women without legal 
marriage were not protected 
It protects all women, regardless of their 
marital status 
Not all courts were authorized to issue 
protection orders 
Women can apply directly to family courts 
for a protection order 
                                                          
71 http://www.kadininstatusu.gov.tr/tr/22931/Siddet-Onleme-ve-Izleme-Merkezleri (rev. 25.11. 2013) 
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A prison sentence was imposed for 
violation of a protection order, but 
imprisonment of the offender was a 
lengthy process 
Offenders who violate a protection order 
will immediately be subjected to 3-10 days' 
imprisonment 
Provision of protection order from the 
court hindered immediate action 
Police officers are authorized to issue a 
protection order, if the victim needs 
immediate protection 
Offenders faced a three-month suspension 
from the home 
Offenders face a prison term of up to six 
months for breaching restraining orders 
No provision concerning identity changes 
for women 
The law also provides for changing the 
woman's identity card if the life of a 
protected woman is in danger. 
There was no mechanism to control the 
implementation of the protection laws  
A new mechanism was introduced in the 
form of ‘Centers for Prevention and 
Monitoring Violence’ (ŞÖNIM) 
Sources: Müftüler-Baç (2012); Tahaoğlu (2012) 
 
Thanks to these constitutional changes, the legal framework became more women-
friendly compared to the pre-AKP period. However, the actual implementation of these reforms 
depends on several factors. Additional laws and decrees are needed to make these reforms more 
effective in practice; women need to be able to take advantage of their new rights. Therefore, in 
the following sections, I look at three different issue areas of gender rights in which the AKP 
government introduced new policy measures: violence against women, women’s rights and 
gender equality, and discrimination against women. 
Positive Gender Outcomes in Gender Policies 
Violence against Women 
Violence against women comprises range of acts from physical and sexual abuse to verbal 
harassment. Until the 1980s, domestic violence was not recognized as a societal problem, but 
thanks to the feminist activism, it became a subject in public debates (see Chapter 6).  
As activists, academics, and members of bar associations emphasized, the most 
influential strategy in combating domestic violence is the establishment of women’s shelters. 
After the reform of the Penal Code, the AKP government paid particular attention to this issue. 
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In July 2005, the Turkish Parliament amended Article 14 of the Municipality Law (No. 5393), 
forcing large municipalities - those with more than 50,000 inhabitants - to establish women’s 
shelters (Erbaydar 2012; Kardam 2006). According to this law, there should be around 300 
shelters run by the municipalities; however, more than 80 percent of the municipalities have no 
shelters (Erbaydar 2012: 3). In densely populated Istanbul, for instance, there are only eight 
shelters run by district municipalities (Karabağlı 2011). Between 2008 and 2010, the General 
Directorate of Local Governments, affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, opened several 
women’s shelters and educated social workers with the financial aid from the EU and technical 
support from the UN’s Population Fund (UNFPA).72 By the end of June 2013, the total number of 
women’s shelters in Turkey reached 120; 32 run by the municipalities, 87 by SHÇEK, and 1 by an 
independent women’s organization (Mor Çatı Activity Report 2013: 22). 
While amending the Penal Code, the AKP government restructured the state institution 
KSSGM and granted a legal basis for the institution. In November 2004, KSSGM was renamed the 
‘General Directorate on the Status of Women’ (Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü, KSGM) and 
acquired a permanent status within the government. 73 In November 2006, KSGM launched a 
two-year project called ‘Combating Domestic Violence’, funded by the EU and offered technical 
support by the UNFPA (Uçar 2009: 12). Orientating itself around the UN’s gender policies, the 
KSGM prepared the first ‘National Action Plan to Fight Domestic Violence against Women’ (2007-
2010), which presented a roadmap for the prevention of violence against women.74 In the second 
National Action Plan (2012-2015), the KSGM addresses five fields of action: “legal arrangements, 
raising public awareness of women’s rights and transforming public opinion, empowerment of 
women, rendering protective and health services, and cooperation between different state 
sectors” (KSGM 2012: 4f.). This plan describes the guiding principles and steps to be undertaken 
in each field and identifies the responsible state institutions and the possible cooperation 
                                                          
72 The UNFPA “focuses on improving the lives of youths and women by advocating for human rights and gender 
equality and by promoting the understanding of population dynamics”, see: http://www.unfpa.org. (rev. 
20.10.2014). 
73 KSGM had no legal basis within the government apparatus until 2004. 
74 The National Action Plans are essential for providing comprehensive, multi-sectoral, and sustainable plan for 
ending violence against women, see: UN Women’s Handbook for National Action Plans on Violence against Women 
(2012). 
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partners from among state institutions, CSOs, bar associations, local governments, universities, 
and the media, and specifies the timelines for implementation. 
In addition to the KSGM’s National Action Plans, in May 2005, the AKP government 
established the ‘Parliamentary Research Commission’, including representatives from the 
political parties represented in the Turkish Parliament, to investigate the causes of violence 
against women and children and to identify measures to overcome domestic violence. In July 
2006, the Commission’s report ‘Violent Acts against Women and Children and the Measures to 
Prevent Customary and Honor Killings’ was published as the Prime Ministerial Circular (No. 
2006/17) (KSGM 2012: 12). This decree specified all state’s institutions responsible for taking 
measures to prevent customary and honor killings and protecting women and children from 
violence. It identified KSGM as the main coordinator. 
Accordingly, the KSGM began to sign ‘training protocols’ with a range of ministries 
responsible in cases of violence against women. In 2006, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
for Women and Family Affairs together signed a protocol in which the KSGM and the Directorate 
of Security were to implement a project aimed at training police officers on violence against 
women (KSGM 2012: 13). This project was funded by the UNFPA and trained 45,000 police officers 
in 2008 alone (Ibid.). In the same year, another protocol was signed with the Ministry of Health 
on the ‘Role of Health Personnel in the Prevention of Violence against Women and Applicable 
Procedures’, and within this project 65,000 health personnel and professionals were trained 
(Ibid.). Likewise, in April 2009, the KSGM, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, initiated 
a project in which 326 Family Court judges and state prosecutors were trained on the role of 
justice personnel in preventing violence against women (Ibid.). The government also established 
a 24-hour hotline for gender-based violence (Hotline 183) in all eighty-one Turkish provinces 
(KSGM 2012: 16).  
In May 2011, the Council of Europe (CoE), following the recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers, signed the ‘Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence’ in Istanbul. The convention “is based on the understanding that 
violence against women is a form of gender-based violence, and that is committed against 
women because they are women. It is the obligation of the state to fully address it in all its forms 
and to take measures to prevent violence against women, protect its victims, and prosecute the 
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perpetrators”.75 During Turkey’s term of the Committee of Ministers, the AKP government 
actively worked in the CoE for the adoption of the convention (Müftüler-Baç 2012: 11). The 
Turkish state thereby increased its international obligations regarding the prevention of 
violence against women. The ‘Istanbul Convention’, as it is known, entered into force on 1 
August 2014. 
In sum, the AKP government integrated the issue of violence against women into its 
social and gender policy agenda and developed strategies to combat violence against women. 
Despite many positive outcomes however, violence against women continues to be a major 
problem. Regarding the enforcement of the laws of the Penal Code, some judges still use 
‘provocation’ as the basis for reduced sentences in honor crimes, and police officers frequently 
attempt to send women experiencing violence back to their homes. Gender-sensitive laws are 
in place but their actual implementation is limited. The state needs therefore to develop 
effective control mechanisms to enforce laws to protect women, simplify women’s access to 
judicial processes, and work on raising awareness among governmental personnel by training 
them on women’s rights and gender equality. 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
The reforms in the Civil and Penal Codes as well as in the Labor Law (No. 4857) were important 
steps for achieving gender equality in Turkey. But as mentioned above, additional laws are 
needed to ensure these reforms are properly implemented. In January 2003, Family Courts were 
established in all cities with a population of more than 100,000 to enforce the Civil Code and to 
ensure gender equality (Müftüler-Baç 2012: 8). These courts are also responsible for issuing 
decrees to protect women and children from domestic violence. 
To ensure gender equality in employment, in January 2004, Prime Ministry issued a 
decree aimed at protecting the gender equality principle in the employment of state personnel 
(Müftüler-Baç 2012: 13). The decree ordered that: ‘State institutions should act in line with the 
Constitution and the international agreements to which Turkey is a signatory’. In May 2006, the 
new ‘Law on Social Security and General Health Insurance’ (No. 5510) was adopted, which 
merged the different security systems into one structure. This law regulates maternity and 
                                                          
75 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/about_en.asp (rev. 20.10.2014) 
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breastfeeding leave, pension plans, and wage of women in line with the Labor Law (No. 4857) 
(Ibid.). 
As mentioned above, in 2004, the institutional and legal basis of the KSGM was 
implemented in government structures. This increased the state’s responsibility in 
strengthening women’s rights and achieving gender equality. In 2005, an Advisory Board on the 
Status of Women was established with the participation of representatives from the ministries, 
academic institutions, and NGOs (KSMG 2012: 14). In aforementioned 2006 and 2007 Prime 
Minister Decrees, the AKP government stressed the importance of the role of women’s CSOs and 
underlined the responsibilities of state agencies rendering service to women. In order to 
improve collaboration and coordination between governmental institutions to improve 
women’s status, meetings were organized with representatives of the Ministries of Health, 
Interior, and Justice.  
In 2007, the KSGM prepared a five year ‘National Action Plan for Gender Equality’ (2008-
2013), which focused on the elimination of gender-based inequalities in the following areas: 
education, health care, poverty, violence, political participation, and the media (Kardam 2006: 
21). This Action Plan was prepared in line with the EU’s project called ‘Promoting Gender 
Equality, Strengthening Institutional Capacity’ and funded by both the Turkish government and 
the EU.76 In a similar vein, in 2010, the KSGM initiated a project with the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı)77 and provided training for Diyanet’s personnel on gender 
equality and domestic violence in order to overcome traditional attitudes hindering gender 
equality (KSGM 2012: 14). Both of these projects were financed by the UNFPA. Since 2009, the 
KSGM has educated 2,400 public officials on gender equality and women’s rights (Ibid.). 
Moreover, the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the Turkish Armed Forces Health 
Commando and the UNFPA, initiated a nationwide education project, which informs soldiers on 
reproduction, sexual health, sexual diseases, gender, and domestic violence (Ibid.: 16). 
Another important institutional development for gender equality in Turkey was the 
establishment of the ‘Commission for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men’ (Kadın Erkek 
Fırsat Eşitliği Komisyonu, KEFEK) in March 2009. According to the Law for the Equal Opportunities 
                                                          
76 http://www.undp.org.tr/publicationsDocuments/National%20Action%20Plan%20on%20 
Gender%20Equality.pdf. (rev. 25.12.2013) 
77 The Directorate of Religious Affairs will be mentioned as ‘Diyanet’ throughout the study. 
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for Women and Men (Law No. 5840), KEFEK, composed of parliamentarians from different 
political parties, is ordered to analyze legal proposals and drafts prepared by the government 
and parliamentary commissions from a gender equality perspective. It works for the adaptation 
of measures that would eliminate gender-based discrimination at all levels of public life. KEFEK 
regularly publishes a series of reports on forced marriages, violence against women, and 
bullying and harassment in the workplace. It aims to ensure the compatibility of Turkish 
legislation with Turkey’s international commitments regarding gender equality.  78  
In sum, the KSGM’s Action Plans and its cooperation with range of governmental bodies, 
and the KEFEK reports increased public awareness of women’s rights and gender equality. 
However, after the constitutional referendum in September 2010, the AKP government began 
increasingly to emphasize its conservative approach built on traditional, religious, and family 
values (Coşar and Yeğenoglu 2011: 561). This tendency manifested itself most clearly in the 
restructuring and renaming the Ministry for Women and Family Affairs as the ‘Ministry for 
Family and Social Policies’ in May 2011. Under this restructuring, the KSGM has been grouped 
together with other directorates that work on family and social services, children policies, 
disabled, and elderly services. Since 2011, it acts under the auspices of the Prime Ministry. The 
omission of the word ‘women’ from the name of the ministry and the removal of gender equality 
mechanisms were negative developments in Turkey’s gender rights regime. Even though a legal 
basis for gender equality has been set up in Turkey, the implementation of this legislations is 
limited, on the one hand by the unwillingness of the state personnel to apply it and, on the other 
hand, by prevalent social norms and practices.  
Discrimination against Women 
Article 1 of the CEDAW treaty defines discrimination against women as follows:  
“[…] any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.”  
                                                          
78 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/kefe/hakkinda.htm (rev. 25.12.2013) 
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According to the CEDAW treaty, Turkey as a ‘State Party’ should condemn all forms of gender-
based discrimination and take all necessary legislative measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women. Thanks to the changes in the Civil Code, women are not discriminated against 
in matters relating to marriage and family relations, except for the fact that the aforementioned 
Article 202 regarding the equal sharing of all acquired property during marriage applies only to 
marriages that took place after the renewal of the Civil Code in 2002. This discriminates women 
married before 2002, the majority of whom have been homemakers and have had no 
independent source of income. 
In 2002, Turkey took an important step and signed the ‘Optional Protocol’ of the CEDAW 
agreement that allowed individuals to complain about violation of their rights to the CEDAW 
Committee directly (Müftüler-Baç 2012: 4). It provides that disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of the treaty to be resolved in the first instance by negotiation or, 
if necessary, by arbitration. In a similar vein, aforementioned parliamentary commission KEFEK 
accepts individual applications and complaints related to gender-based discrimination. 
Although Article 122 of the Penal Code criminalizes gender-based discrimination, women in 
Turkey face discrimination in political, economic, cultural and social life. 
According to comprehensive international survey data on the Turkish economy, 
women’s participation in work force in Turkey is abysmal compared to the EU or the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.79 Despite gender-
sensitive clauses in the Labor Law, women's economic participation rates have been declining 
in the last decade. Both international and domestic actors frequently address the absence of 
women in the Turkish economy. One of the major hindrances to women’s access to the labor 
force is the traditional view which regards women as homemakers and pushes them to stay 
home. But in order to increase women’s employment, in 2010, the Prime Ministerial Circular 
2010/14, ‘Increasing Women’s Employment and Achieving Equality of Opportunity’ was 
adopted, specifying the measures to be taken to increase women’s employment (Müftüler-Baç 
2012: 14). Accordingly, the AKP government adopted a measure that would discriminate 
positively in favor of female workers over the age of 18 by granting employers who hire them 
                                                          
79 See all Global Gender Gap Reports issued by World Economic Forum (WEF). 
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exceptions in social security payments (Ibid.). But further measures such as increasing childcare 
opportunities and educational programs promoting men-women co-existence in the workforce 
are needed. 
Another important measure to increase women’s economic participation is to improve 
access to education. The AKP government has initiated several projects encouraging girls to 
attend to primary and secondary schools (“Girls, let’s go to school”) and expanded educational 
opportunities and access to higher education, especially by building universities in almost every 
Turkish province. Moreover, lifting the ban on headscarves in 2013 has eliminated a serious 
discrimination against women in higher education (see Chapter 7). In recent years however, the 
AKP government has introduced controversial educational reforms that have been heavily 
criticized for their religious leanings, including a trend towards gender segregation in schools. 
The head of the ‘Education Reform Initiative’ Batuhan Aydagül states: “Turkey’s government is 
engaged in positive discrimination toward religious vocational schools known as imam-hatips” 
(Yınanç 2014). Moreover, the AKP government has begun increasingly to emphasize the 
traditional role to women as dedicated housewives and mothers. This tendency has been 
regarded as a hindrance to girls’ access to education. 
As in the economic sphere, women are also underrepresented in the political sphere. 
Although Article 5 of the Political Parties and Elections Act guarantees women political freedoms 
and the absence of discrimination in establishing or joining political parties, the representation 
of women in politics remains low in Turkey. Therefore, as we will discuss in the coming chapter 
on feminist CSOs, women’s rights organizations argue that women are discriminated in politics 
due to social and cultural values and demand introduction of gender quotas. The AKP 
government is fiercely opposing this proposal. 
Put together, under AKP rule, positive gender policy outcomes have been witnessed in 
the struggle to prevent violence against women, in the strengthening of women’s rights, and 
reducing of discrimination against women. Some policy outcomes were easier to achieve than 
others. Understanding how these changes took place and which alliances on the national and 
international level brought about the gendered outcomes will be the task of the subsequent 
chapters.  
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Chapter 6 
 
The Pioneers: Feminist CSOs  
6.1 The Emergence of Feminist Activism 
Turkey witnessed the rise of feminist activism in the 1980s. But as many scholars argue, the roots 
of feminist activism go back to the first wave of women’s movement that emerged in the late 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century (Arat 2008; Kandiyoti 1991; Tekeli 1995; Zihnioğlu 
2003). Like the first wave women’s movements in the West, a group of women activists under 
the Ottoman rule demanded equality with men before the law and participation in public life 
(Kandiyoti, 1995; Zihnioğlu 2003). They in particular demanded women’s right to vote and 
claimed their right to education and employment. These women continued their activism, 
despite the end of the Ottoman rule, and succeeded to put the ‘woman question’ on the political 
agenda of the newly forming Turkish Republic. Although the state elite at the time made 
women’s emancipation a part of their modernization project and granted women equal rights 
in public life (cf. Chapter 5), they gradually marginalized women’s activism.80 The first wave of 
women’s movement accordingly ended in the mid-1930s, and women’s political silence 
continued until the 1980s (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 44). 
After the military intervention in 1980, all kinds of political activism and activity, 
especially the political left and right, were prohibited (cf. Chapter 4). This political vacuum had 
the unintended consequence of mobilizing women. Urban, middle-class, and well-educated 
professional women, most of whom were politicized in the leftist organizations in the 1970s, 
gathered to read and translate feminist texts produced in the West. These women were inspired 
from the second wave feminism81 of the West and formed consciousness-raising groups to 
develop a feminist identity and to create new forms of interaction among women (Arat 2008; 
                                                          
80 For a thorough analysis of the women’s movement in the early years of the Turkish Republic, see: Bodur (2005) 
and Zihnioglu (2003). 
81 The second wave feminism broadened the scope of the first wave feminist movement and politicized issues such 
as violence against women, women’s bodily rights, right to abortion, and combat against gender inequalities. 
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Tekeli 1995). Like second wave feminist activists in the Western world, feminists in Turkey 
focused on issues such as patriarchy, gendered (in)equalities in economic, political, and social 
life, violence against women, sexual harassment, women’s sexuality, and women’s reproductive 
rights (Arat 1994; Diner and Toktaş 2010; Tekeli 1995; Timisi and Ağduk Gevrek 2007). In the first 
half of the 1980s, feminist women began to organize in groups and discussed women’s issues 
from a gender perspective. 
 In their gatherings, feminist activists addressed the secondary role of women in Turkish 
society. They stated that women in Turkey had equal rights with men before law, which were 
granted by the Kemalist reforms, but patriarchal norms and values were continued to be 
practiced (Arat 2005: 18). Feminists thus argued that Kemalist state feminism has been merely 
concerned with the symbolic equality of women and men in the public realm, but failed to 
improve women’s status in general. They discussed how to empower women and how to 
transform the patriarchal structures in Turkish society and culture (Timisi and Ağduk Gevrek 
2007: 15). They also underlined the need for substantial changes in laws pertaining to women’s 
lives.  
During the 1980s, feminist activists managed to put their demands on the political 
agenda. As noted in Chapter 5, Turkey had ratified the CEDAW agreement with some 
reservations. Accordingly, in 1986, feminists launched a petition for the full implementation of 
the CEDAW (Arat 2008:  397).  In 1987, feminist activists in Istanbul organized the “Women’s 
Solidarity March against Violence”, involving around 3,000 women (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 45). 
The reason behind this protest was that a judge in Çankırı82 ruled against an abused woman’s 
request for divorce on the grounds that women can be beaten (Arat 1994; Diner and Toktaş 2010). 
This demonstration was the first public gathering for feminist activists as well as the first 
political protest after the military coup in 1980. Thanks to this demonstration, domestic violence 
against women became publicly visible and began to be considered as a serious social problem. 
Feminist activists also addressed sexual harassment in women’s daily life and ran the “Purple 
Needle” campaigns to combat harassment by handing out needles on the streets in Istanbul’s 
Beyoğlu district. In 1989, feminists gathered in a conference in Ankara and publicly stated that 
                                                          
82 Çankaya is a province north of Ankara. 
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the feminist movement is an independent movement, and that it cannot be reduced to any other 
political movement.83 As demonstrated in the Table 6.1, throughout the 1980s, feminist activists 
organized meetings, conferences, and exhibitions, formed study and action groups, and could 
establish a self-confident and autonomous feminist movement. They discussed and publicized 
women’s problems in various forms of publications. Between 1980 and 1990, feminists published 
44 periodicals (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 46). Meanwhile, as a response to Turkey’s CEDAW 
obligations, the state’s women’s machinery KSSGM was established to improve women’s status 
in Turkey. 
 
Table (6. 1.): MILESTONES OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN TURKEY (1980-1990) 
Years Events and Actions of Feminist Women 
1980-1981 Formation of the first consciousness-raising groups in Istanbul  
 
1982 Symposium held in Istanbul in which ‘feminism’ was discussed for the first time 
1983 Feminists began to write a regular column in the literary magazine Somut 
1984 Establishment of the “Women’s Circle” in Istanbul that translated and published 
feminist texts produced in the West 
1986 A petition campaign for the implementation of the CEDAW agreement 
1987 . A protest demonstration against domestic violence in Istanbul  
. Publishing the magazines Feminist and Kaktüs 
1988 An exhibition on women’s subordination in daily life in Istanbul 
1989 . “Purple Needle Campaign” (feminists handed out needles for women to protest 
against sexual harassment) 
. The first “Feminist Congress” held in Ankara, which summarized ten years of 
feminism in Turkey 
. The Feminist Congress organized by radical and socialist feminists in Istanbul 
concluded: “feminist activism needs to be independent, and will not be integrated into 
any other kind of collective activism”  
1990 . Formation of first feminist CSOs 
. Establishment of the KSSGM with the stated aim of achieving gender equality in 
all ranks of life 
 
Sources: Arat (2008: 397-399); Işık (2007: 44-46); Tekeli (1995: 13-16) 
 
                                                          
83In this conference, feminists decided to carry out their activism independent of the leftist movement that was 
claimed to have an ‘anti-feminist’ perspective on women’s question (Tekeli 1995: 13). Feminists who pursued an 
independent political activism came to be known as ‘radical feminists’, whereas other feminists preferred to keep 
their link to the leftist movement and identified themselves as ‘socialist feminists’. For a comprehensive analysis 
of different discourses within the feminist movement, see: Bodur (2005), Bora (2007). 
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6.2 The Institutionalization of Feminist Activism: Feminist CSOs  
In the beginning of the 1990s, feminists began to organize in associations, foundations, 
cooperatives, and in women’s commissions of the bar associations. Until the 1980s, the number 
of women’s CSOs was ten, but between 1983 and 1992, it reached up to sixty-four (Diner and 
Toktaş 2010: 47). The newly built women’s CSOs focused on gender-specific issues such as 
violence against women, discrimination against women, women’s human rights, women’s 
solidarity, and women’s shelters. Furthermore, several universities in Istanbul and Ankara 
launched women’s studies programs. These research units offered not only study programs for 
students, but also educated women from political parties, trade unions, and women’s CSOs on 
women’s rights (Arat 2008: 400).  
Arguably, the most publicly visible feminist CSO is the ‘Purple Roof Women’s Shelter 
Foundation’ (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı). In 1990, fourteen feminist women in Istanbul, after 
having studied several women’s shelters and counseling centers in Western Europe, formed the 
Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation to consult women subjected to domestic violence. In 
its early years, Purple Roof84 activists - predominantly socialist and radical feminists - initiated 
a 24/7 hours hotline for battered women to call for support and provided legal advice and 
psychological support through its counselling center.85 Purple Roof opened its first independent 
women’s shelter in 1995, which lasted until 1998 due to financial difficulties. Within these three 
years, this shelter provided a secure accommodation for 350 women and 250 children, and the 
counseling center helped women to overcome their experience of violence and to start a new 
life.86 
 Purple Roof has no hierarchy in its organizational structure and makes all decisions 
collectively, also in its women’s shelter.87 Purple Roof helps women in its shelter to realize that 
they are equals with women working in the solidarity center, and this gives them a confidence 
to deal with their own problems (Mor Çatı Bulletin 2010: 3). Because of its long years of 
                                                          
84 From here on, I use ‘Purple Roof’ for the Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Foundation. 
85 This counselling center was the first one in Turkey, see: Işık (2007). 
86 http://www.morcati.org.tr/en/what-are-we-doing/shelters (rev. 15.10.2013) 
87 Personal interview with Deniz Bayram, a supporting committee member of Purple Roof and a lawyer specialized 
on women’s rights, February 2012, Istanbul. Personal interview with Özgür Sunata, a volunteer in the Purple Roof’s 
solidarity center and a member of another women’s group called “Socialist Feminist Collective”, October 2010, 
Istanbul. 
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experience in fighting against domestic violence, Purple Roof became an internationally 
recognized CSO. It cooperates with the UN institutions working on women’s rights as well as 
with the European feminist organizations. Purple Roof activities are partly financed by 
membership donations, and partly through projects that are funded by EU institutions and 
foreign consulates in Istanbul.88  
 Another important feminist organization is ‘Women for Women’s Human Rights – New 
Ways’ (Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği, WWHR), which is formed in 1993. In its initial 
years, the Istanbul-based WWHR conducted nationwide researches on women’s rights and on 
the extent of violence against women. These studies stated that women in Turkey were unaware 
of their legal rights. In 1995, WWHR developed a nationwide program, with the support of the 
‘General Directorate of Social Services’ (Sosyal Hizmetler Genel Müdürlüğü), called the ‘Human 
Rights Education Program for Women’ (HREPW), to enable women to become aware of their 
legal rights and to empower them.89 Another focus of this project is also to encourage women’s 
groups to establish their own grassroots organizations for their needs. 
 WWHR regularly publishes reports on women’s status in Turkey, promotes women’s 
human rights, and lobbies for legislative changes to strengthen women’s rights and to achieve 
gender equality. It focuses on different issues such as economic and legal rights of women and 
girls, women’s sexuality, and reproductive rights. WWHR has a highly organized structure. 
There is an executive committee of the organization, who initiates and runs the projects, and 
the administrative team who manages the finances and public relations.90 Similar to Purple Roof, 
WWHR also operates in non-hierarchical form and pays attention to equality principle within 
its organizational structure.91 Moreover, WWHR has strong international ties and networks. It 
frequently attends the international CEDAW meetings in New York and informs the CEDAW 
Committee on women’s rights in Turkey. Since 2005, WWHR has hold a consultative status 
within the ‘Economic & Social Council’ of the UN. WWHR has also close ties with women’s CSOs 
                                                          
88 Sunata from Purple Roof stated that the organization is selective in accepting donations. For instance, in 2003, 
Purple Roof rejected the donation from the British consulate in Istanbul because the British government was 
involved in American invasion of Iraq. 
89 For more information about the program, see: http://www.wwhr.org/human-rights-education-programme-for-
women-hrep/ (all WWHR websites accessed on 21.10.2014) 
90 http://www.wwhr.org/office-team/  
91 http://www.wwhr.org/our-values-and-priorities/ 
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from the Muslim world. In 2007, WWHR’s founder and executive director Pinar Ilkkaracan 
received “the Women’s Rights Award” issued by the Peter and Patricia Gruber Foundation.92 
WWHR’s projects and activities are, to a great extent, financed by grants offered by international 
and national donors. 
 The third CSO considered here is the ‘Amargi Women’s Solidarity Cooperative’ (Amargi 
Kadın Dayanışma Kooperatifi, Amargi) in Istanbul. Amargi, which means ‘freedom’ and ‘return to 
mother’ in the ancient Sumerian language, was founded in 2001 by a group of radical and social 
feminists to promote feminism and to pursue feminist politics in Turkey. The founder of Amargi 
is an internationally-known feminist author Pınar Selek, who has published several books on 
Kurds, sexual minorities, the poor, and the homeless children in Turkey.93 Amargi points to all 
forms of violence and discrimination prevalent in Turkey and advocates the rights of 
discriminated groups, especially women, homeless children, ethnic minorities, and 
homosexuals. The organization emphasizes its anti-militaristic and anti-nationalist character, 
and believes that the issue of violence can be best resolved by building peace in Turkey.94 Amargi 
activists work closely with homosexual rights groups and criticize heterosexism, defined as an 
attitude and a values system that discriminates against homosexuals. 
 Amargi operates as a feminist academy, and organizes seminars and roundtables on 
women’s issues. Such activities are partly financed through its bookstore and café. The 
organization receives funds for its publications from different EU institutions.  95 Like Purple Roof 
and WWHR, Amargi operates on non-hierarchal grounds and takes decisions collectively. In 
addition to Istanbul, Amargi is organized almost in ten different provinces in Turkey (Çaha 2008: 
41). In December 2012, Amargi-Istanbul was shut down by its own activists by stating: “The 
decision to close down Amargi is a kind of a self-criticism. We could not reinvent ourselves, take 
                                                          
92 http://www.wwhr.org/category/about-us  
93 Between 1998 and 2000, Pınar Selek has been imprisoned with the claim of being a member of the PKK and 
participating in terrorist attacks in the historical Spice Bazaar in Istanbul. Although Selek was acquitted of the 
charges several times, she was consistently harassed by the Turkish judicial authorities. In 2013, while doing her 
doctoral research in France, she has been sentenced to life imprisonment. See further: 
http://www.pinarselek.com/public/page.aspx?id=239. (rev. 10.10.2013) 
94 Personal interview with Yasemin Öz, a member of Amargi and is an influential activist in the LGBT movement, 
Istanbul, October 2011.  
95 Ibid. 
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new actions or develop new perspectives for the feminist struggle.”  96 Since their active period 
corresponds with the time frame of the study, I do not exclude them from the analysis. 
 The three feminist CSOs - Purple Roof, WWHR, and Amargi - have transparent structures 
and are accountable towards women they help. Their activists are, to a great extent, well-
educated, middle-class women in their early twenties or thirties. But the founders of these CSOs, 
who are still active in these organizations, are in their forties and fifties. Some activists describe 
themselves as ‘radical’ feminist, whereas others as ‘socialist’ or ‘liberal’ feminist. Table 6.2 gives 
information about their legal status and the year of establishment, the organizational structure, 
main fields of activity, and financial resources of these three feminist CSOs. 
Table (6.2): FEMINIST CSOs  
Feminist CSOs Legal Status 
/year of 
establishment 
Organizational 
structure, number 
of members 
Main fields of 
activity 
Funding 
Purple Roof 
Women 
Shelter’s 
Foundation 
(Mor Çatı 
Kadın Sığınağı 
Vakfı) 
(Istanbul) 
Foundation 
(1991) 
Non-hierarchical; 
around 150 
members,  
only one 
professional (the 
secretary), 
volunteers about 
400 
Violence against 
women, 
discrimination 
against women, 
women’s rights 
Individual or 
institutional 
donations, 
projects funded 
by the EU 
institutions, 
‘Global Fund’, 
‘Global Dialogue’, 
and the  foreign 
consulates in 
Istanbul 
Women for 
Women’s 
Human 
Rights- New 
Ways (Kadının 
İnsan Hakları 
Yeni Çözümler 
Derneği, 
WWHR) 
 Association 
(1993) 
Non-hierarchical; 
eight professional 
workers 
Women’s rights 
and gender 
equality 
Membership 
dues and 
donations; 
projects funded 
by international 
donors 
                                                          
96 http://amargigroupistanbul.wordpress.com/about-amargi/amargi-closure/.  (rev. 20.10.2014) 
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 (Istanbul) 
AMARGI 
Women’s 
Cooperation 
(Amargi Kadın 
Dayanışma 
Kooperatifi) 
(Istanbul) 
Cooperation 
(2001- 2012) 
Non-hierarchical; 
about30 
volunteers 
Women’s rights 
and discrimination 
against women,  
 
Own sources 
from the 
bookstore and 
café, donations 
 
6.3 The Achievements of Feminist CSOs before AKP Rule 
The institutionalization of feminist activism in Turkey enabled feminist women to put pressure 
on the governments to formulate new policies to protect women’s rights and reduce 
discrimination against women. As stated above, in the late 1980s, feminist activists organized 
protest demonstrations and nationwide campaigns to attract public attention to domestic 
violence and discrimination against women. Their first notable achievement was the annulment 
of aforementioned Article 438 of the Penal Code that reduced sentence for rapists if the victim 
of rape was a sex worker (cf. Chapter 5). In 1989, the Constitutional Court, as a response to an 
appeal of a local judge, ruled that Article 438 was not violating the equality clause of the 
Constitution because this Article aimed to protect “respectable women” (Arat 1994; Ertürk 2006). 
Accordingly, feminist activists embarked upon a campaign for the annulment of this article, 
which attracted the media’s attention and caused a broad public outcry. In 1990, the Turkish 
Parliament had to abolish Article 438 due to the push of the public debate (Anıl et al. 2002; Arat 
1994; Ertürk 2006). Likewise, feminist activists lobbied for the annulment of Article 159 of the 
Civil Code, which stipulated that women had to obtain their husbands’ permission to work (cf. 
Chapter 5). In 1992, the Constitutional Court annulled Article 159 (Anıl et al. 2002; Arat 2008; 
Marshall 2009).  
 Meanwhile, feminist organizations preferred to distance themselves from the Turkish 
state because they considered the state to be perpetuating the patriarchal division of labor 
within society and family (Arat 1994: 244). However, in the second half of the 1990s, feminists 
gradually increased their dialogue and cooperation with the state through the newly formed 
state’s women’s machinery, KSSGM (Altınay and Arat 2009; Marshall 2009). First, it was because 
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feminist bureaucrats filled the ranks of KSSGM and began to act more responsive to women’s 
needs, and this eased the tension between feminists and the state apparatus (Arat 2008: 399). 
Second, influential Turkish feminist scholars emphasized the importance of the 
institutionalization of gender policies under a state’s agency that would help legitimize the 
demands of women’s movement (Acuner 2007; Ertürk 2006). Feminist activists acknowledged 
that they can influence state policies relating to women’s lives through KSSGM. Thanks to 
KSSGM, feminist CSOs could also strengthen their national and international networks and push 
the state to take responsibility for providing equality between women and men (Kardam and 
Ertürk 1999). 
 Clearly, the institutionalization of feminist activism contributed to strengthening the 
fight against domestic violence. Feminist organizations began to establish women’s shelters and 
to convince municipalities to open counseling centers and women’s shelters. Purple Roof, for 
instance, attempted to establish women’s shelters in cooperation with two different district 
municipalities in Istanbul (Bakirköy and Şişli). In September 1990, both municipalities opened 
women’s shelters, but Purple Roof was not included in the management (Işık 2007: 63).97 In 1993, 
the first independent women’s shelter was opened by the ‘Women’s Solidarity Foundation’ 
(Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı) in Ankara, and in 1995 by Purple Roof in Istanbul. But feminists 
continuously underlined the state’s responsibility in providing secure protection for women and 
children who have been exposed to violence. As mentioned in Chapter 5, from the mid-1990s on, 
the Turkish state began to establish ‘guest houses’ for women and children. 
 Furthermore, feminist CSOs, along with Kemalist women’s CSOs, stressed the importance 
of eliminating the discriminatory laws in the Civil Code and the Turkish Penal Code. The 
‘Association of Turkish Jurist Women’ (Türk Hukukçu Kadınlar Derneği), proposed a draft named 
the ‘Amendment and Annulment of some Articles in the Civil Code’. In 1992, the ‘Centre for 
Research and Implementation of Women’s Issues’ at the Istanbul University initiated a petition 
campaign to support this draft proposal (Arat 2010a: 240). Purple Roof, together with the 
feminist ‘Women’s Library and Information Centre’, supported this campaign and gathered 
120,000 signatures (Arat 2008: 402). In 1994, WWHR joined this campaign and mobilized an 
                                                          
97 These women’s shelters were the first women’s shelters in Turkey. However, when the governing municipality 
lost elections in 1994, these two shelters were shut down, see further: Işık (2007). 
133 
 
international support for the implementation of full equality in the Civil Code.98 Although the 
state has not reacted to this campaign, Purple Roof and WWHR kept the issue of amending the 
Civil Code on public debates. By drawing the media’s attention to this campaign, feminist CSOs 
could maintain the pressure on the Turkish state (Marshall 2009: 363).  
 During the 1990s, the international gender agenda positively influenced the struggle of 
feminist CSOs for the empowerment of women. Feminist CSOs often referred to Turkey’s CEDAW 
obligations in negotiating with the state and pointed out the shortcomings in the legal 
framework (Arat 2008; Marshall 2009). Signatory states like Turkey, which have ratified or 
acceded to the CEDAW treaty, are committed, at least every four years, to submit national 
reports on measures they have taken to comply with the treaty obligations.99 For instance, the 
second and third CEDAW periodic report of Turkey (1997) stated that twenty-nine articles in the 
Penal Code did not comply with the CEDAW requirements. The CEDAW agreement clearly played 
an important role in pushing the Turkish state to eliminate discrimination against women. 
Moreover, after the 1995 UN ‘World Conference on Women’ in Beijing, the UN began to 
emphasize its determination to promote “women’s rights as human rights” and to combat 
violence against women worldwide (Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995, Art. 14). 
The UN’s Beijing Declaration positively affected organized women’s efforts to strengthen 
women’s rights worldwide. Through the UN’s conferences, feminist CSOs in Turkey, and also 
other women’s groups, have found the opportunity to exchange information and experiences 
with women activists from different parts of the world and began to frame their demands as 
globally accepted norms in women’s rights.  
 The most important institutional development in the 1990s was the enactment of the law 
regarding women’s protection from domestic violence. As a result of the intensive lobbying 
activities of feminist and Kemalist CSOs and the pressure from the KSSGM, the government 
enacted the ‘Law on the Protection of the Family’ (No. 4320) in January 1998, and 
institutionalized thereby state’s responsibility in protecting women from domestic violence (cf. 
Chapter 5). However, feminist CSOs highlighted the problems in the implementation of Law 4320 
and pointed to the ignorance of judicial personnel. They continued their lobbying activities for 
                                                          
98 http://www.wwhr.org/category/the-campaign-for-full-gender-equality-in-the-civil-code (rev. 21.11.2014) 
99 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm (rev. 20.01.2014) 
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revision of several provisions regarding discrimination against women. In 1999, Turkey lifted its 
reservations to Articles 15 and 16 of the CEDAW treaty that oblige signatory parties of the 
CEDAW agreement to ensure women’s equality with men before the law (CEDAW 2003: 45).  
 In sum, the institutionalization of feminist activism in the 1990s helped feminist women 
establish counseling centers and women’s shelters, and thus strengthen the struggle against 
domestic violence against women (Işık 2007: 52). Feminist CSOs defied patriarchal traditions, 
publicly criticized the male-domination within Turkish society and culture, and brought about 
new perspectives on women’s rights in Turkey. Their persistence in the struggle against 
women’s subordinate status, coupled with the international pressure exerted by the UN 
institutions working on women’s empowerment, forced the Turkish state to take effective 
measures to improve women’s status in Turkey.  
 By the end of the 1990s, feminist women gained an important opportunity for advancing 
women’s rights. As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey’s prospect of EU membership stimulated an 
extensive political reform process in Turkey. During the political reform process, organized 
women in general profited from the liberalized political arena, which included not only 
themselves and the state, but also actors such as EU institutions and European CSOs in policy-
making processes (Kancı et al. 2010: 8). They were encouraged to form stronger links with groups 
such as the European’s Women Lobby (EWL)100 and the European Women Lawyer’s Association 
(Uçar 2009: 5). This European linkage increased the bargaining capacity of women’s CSOs in 
decision-making processes regarding gender policies. Accordingly, feminist CSOs intensified 
their sustained efforts to amend the Civil Code. 
Reforming the Civil Code  
Since the mid-1980s, feminist activists have advocated reforming the Civil Code. They supported 
the draft proposals prepared by legal experts from Kemalist women’s CSOs (Arat 2008, 2010a). 
For instance, in 1994, WWHR initiated a campaign supporting the new draft of the Civil Code 
prepared by a parliamentary commission and demanded full equality for women in the Code 
(Anıl et al. 2002: 6). However, none of the drafts could become law until Turkey began to 
                                                          
100 The EWL is the largest umbrella organization of women’s associations in the EU, which includes more than 2,500 
organizations and works to promote women’s rights and gender equality. 
135 
 
implement political reforms to become an EU member. In April 2000, the Turkish Parliament 
began discussing a new draft for the Civil Code (Arat 2010a: 240). Subsequently, WWHR, together 
with a group of feminist organizations, created a mailing list (Kadın Kurultayı) to discuss the draft 
proposal among each other and to monitor the process of amending the Civil Code. Feminists 
sought to attract public’s attention to this process through the printed and broadcast media. 
Meanwhile, the Justice Commission of the Parliament, which was responsible for amending the 
Civil Code, invited legal experts from several women’s rights organizations to its working 
committee. 
 During amending the Civil Code, the most contentious issue between women’s CSOs and 
the lawmakers from the Justice Commission was the property sharing in case of divorce. 
Feminist and Kemalist women’s CSOs demanded that all property acquired during marriage shall 
be shared equally, which would also recognize the unpaid contributions of women to the 
household (Ertürk 2006: 100). As mentioned in Chapter 5, this proposal met a strong resistance 
from the religious-conservative and nationalist MPs of the Justice Commission, and they 
rejected the proposal in March 2001 (Anıl et al. 2002: 7). Subsequently, WWHR initiated a 
nationwide coalition in which around 120 women’s CSOs from different regions came together 
to reverse this development (Ilkkaracan 2007: 254). WWHR and Purple Roof frequently issued 
press releases to push the draft proposal. Eleven women’s organizations, including WWHR, 
visited the Turkish Parliament and lobbied the key MPs in the Justice Commission to keep the 
draft law on ‘property sharing after divorce’ in the proposal (Arat 2010a: 241). Some other 
feminist activists opted for unconventional forms of protests, such as trekking and climbing, to 
have the law on property sharing amended (Ibid.). Finally, the Justice Commission accepted the 
proposal on property sharing and proposed the whole new draft bill for the Civil Code to the 
Parliament. The new Civil Code became effective on 1 January 2002. It abolished finally the 
supremacy of men in marriage and established equality of rights and obligations between 
spouses (cf. Chapter 5). Although women CSOs succeeded in getting the law on equal property 
sharing through the Turkish Parliament, it was only applicable for the marriages which took 
place after the renewal of the Code. 
In sum, reforming the Civil Code was a major step in strengthening women’s rights and 
eliminating discrimination against women, despite its shortcomings. Some scholars regard the 
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renewal of the Civil Code as the EU’s successful agenda in persuading the Turkish government 
to meet the accession criteria (Kubicek 2005; Müftüler-Baç 2005). But other scholars and feminist 
activists argue that during the reform process the EU might have acted as a catalyst, but women 
CSOs, in particular feminist and Kemalist CSOs, played an essential role in pressuring the state 
for making amendments to the Civil Code (Anıl et. al 2002; Arat 2008, 2010a; Çoşar and Onbaşi 
2008; Ertürk 2006; Marshall 2009). Certainly, many women’s rights organizations saw the EU 
accession process as an impetus for pressuring the Turkish state to implement necessary laws 
for achieving gender equality (Ergun 2010: 517). However, they stressed that their “sustained” 
(Marshall 2009) advocacy efforts and their commitment to bargain pushed the Turkish 
government to amend the Civil Code.   
6.4 The Participation and Inclusion of Feminist CSOs in the AKP Era 
As elaborated in Chapter 4, the AKP came to power in November 2002. The first AKP government 
furthered the political reform process for the prospective EU membership and made significant 
changes in the Constitution that helped lift some restrictions on political rights and civil 
liberties (cf. Chapter 4). Accordingly, civil society actors found more opportunities to influence 
public opinion and affect government policies (Ergun 2010: 509). During the reform process, the 
AKP engaged in dialogue with women’s CSOs, including feminist organizations, and 
incorporated them in policy-making processes, which will be discussed in this chapter. 
 Feminist CSOs have stressed that they strive not only for enactment of laws in 
strengthening women’s rights, but also for their implementation and enforcement. To this end, 
they constantly called for substantial changes and lobbied lawmakers, heavily negotiated with 
the ministry responsible for gender policies, and closely monitored the responsible 
governmental bodies whether they implemented laws correctly. Feminist CSOs are highly active 
in all three issue areas under consideration: violence against women, women’s rights and gender 
equality in the legal framework, and discrimination against women. The most important and 
challenging task for feminist CSOs is combating violence against women in Turkey. 
Violence against Women 
Thanks to the internationalization of the issue of ‘violence against women’ through the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women in 1994 and the Beijing Platform for 
Action (1995), and the increased public awareness of this issue in Turkey, organized feminists 
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have been able to put the issue ‘gender-based violence’ on the national political agenda. As 
indicated above, the first legal improvement with respect to violence against women was the 
enactment of the Protection Law 4320 (1998). However, Law 4320 was not very effective, and 
violence against women continued to be a serious problem in Turkey.  
 Recent researches on violence against women in Turkey show that almost 40 percent of 
women experience violence (Altınay and Arat 2009). Most women experience violence by their 
family members – particularly by their intimate partners. In combating domestic violence 
against women, feminist CSOs have emphasized four important measures: 1) establishing 
women’s shelters, 2) revision of the provisions in the Penal Code relating to violent acts towards 
women, 3) increasing the sentences in the Law on the Protection of the Family, and 4) 
establishing mechanisms that monitor the implementation and enactment of protection laws. 
Women’s Shelters  
As mentioned above, in the 1990s, the first women’s shelters and counseling centers, either 
state-run or run by feminist CSOs, were established in Istanbul and Ankara. In order to increase 
the numbers of women’s shelters and strengthen the fight against domestic violence against 
women, in 1998, Purple Roof embarked upon a nationwide network called the ‘Assembly of 
Women’s Shelters and Counseling/Solidarity Centers’ (Kadın Sığınakları Danışma/Dayanışma 
Merkezleri Kurultayı). The Assembly of Women’s Shelters gathers annually and focuses on 
developing effective strategies to reduce domestic violence against women and children. During 
three days of the Assembly, the representatives of women’s CSOs, the state-run SHÇEK 
guesthouses, and municipalities’ counseling centers address the extent and forms of violence 
against women in Turkey, discuss the shortcomings in laws and regulations, and seek to develop 
new strategies for eliminating violence against women and children.  
 The Assembly is the broadest civil society platform in combating violence against women 
and children, and in recent years, the number of the participants has reached 200 from 80 
women’s CSOs with different political leanings (16th Final Declaration of the Assembly of 
Women’s Shelters, 2013). Purple Roof is a permanent member of the Assembly’s coordination 
committee, advises women’s groups aiming at establishing women’s shelters, and issues 
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pamphlets on how to manage and provide service for women and children.101 Amargi and WWHR 
participate every year in discussion groups and organize workshops presenting their activities 
regarding violence against women. The coordination committee of the Assembly, consisting of 
twenty women’s CSOs from different provinces, annually publicizes a final declaration, 
presenting the final decisions of participant women’s CSOs and pointing out the shortcomings 
in state’s policies in combating violence against women.102 As Purple Roof activist Deniz Bayram 
claimed in our interview, state institutions benefit from these final declarations in policy-
making, despite the fact that the Turkish state dislikes the feminist values and methods of these 
organized women. 
 Feminist CSOs have often pointed out the inadequacy of women’s shelters in Turkey. 
Despite the enactment of Article 14 of the Municipality Law (No. 5393), which obligates 
municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants to establish women’s shelters, the number of 
women’s shelters in Turkey remains low compare to Turkey’s large population.103 Feminist CSOs, 
together with other women’s groups, have criticized the municipalities that have more than 
50,000 inhabitants, but no shelters, and reminded them of their obligation to establish women’s 
shelters. By June 2012, there were 91 women’s shelters, and in June 2013, the number reached 
120 (cf. Chapter 5). But Purple Roof, WWHR and Amargi have been highly critical of the state-
run women’s shelters. WWHR, already before the enactment of the Municipality Law (No.5393), 
claimed that municipalities lack the financial resources, and that they are completely 
inexperienced in managing a women’s shelter (WWHR 2005: 6). Furthermore, there are no 
guidelines how to manage a women’s shelter and a counselling center. The Purple Roof activist 
Deniz Bayram stated in our interview:  
“Government officials do not really understand the cause and aim of a women’s shelter. 
The personnel at the municipality- or KSSGM-run women’s shelters attempt to reconcile 
women with their abusers, and even let them in the shelter. The personnel do not 
                                                          
101 Personal interview with Ö. Sunata, October 2010, Istanbul. 
102 http://www.siginaksizbirdunya.org/kurultaylar/siginaksiz-bir-dunya-tarihce (rev. 17.11.2013) 
103 According to the Turkish Statistical Institution’s website, by the end of January 2013 Turkey’s population reached 
76, 667,864, see: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15974 (rev. 23.10.2014) 
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understand to what purpose the shelter serves and how to treat and strengthen women 
who are exposed to violence. They rather focus on bringing husband and wife together.”  
Feminist CSOs have stressed that state-run women’s shelters need to provide an effective and 
secure protection, and that the management should be in accordance with international 
standards, i.e., the shelter’s location is secret and counseling services to resident women and 
children are provided for by a qualified staff. Therefore, feminist activists have claimed that it 
would be more effective if the state-run shelters are managed according to feminist practices, 
i.e. protecting women effectively from their abusers, or the management is given to the more 
experienced feminist organizations (16th Final Declaration of the Assembly, 2013).  
 In combating violence against women, another important aim of feminist CSOs was to 
alter the Turkish Penal Code (1926), which was highly problematic in protection of women from 
violence and included discriminatory provisions regarding women’s rights to bodily integrity. 
The Amending Process of the Turkish Penal Code  
In early 2002, WWHR initiated a working group on the Penal Code, consisting of fifteen 
representatives from women’s organizations and lawyer’s associations (Ilkkaracan 2007: 254). 
Later that year, WWHR formed the aforementioned ‘Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal 
Code’ (cf. Chapter 4 & 5), which included legal experts, academics, and activists from twenty-
five women’s CSOs from different regions of Turkey 104 (WWHR 2005). While WWHR coordinated 
the secretariat, both Purple Roof and Amargi have been active members of the Women’s 
Platform on the Turkish Penal Code.105 The legal experts of the Platform worked for one year to 
study both the Turkish Penal Code in effect and the penal codes from different countries. They 
pointed out that the existing Penal Code was violating women’s rights to bodily integrity (Eslen-
Ziya 2012: 130). The Platform’s activists lobbied MPs for two years and launched a nationwide 
                                                          
104 The Women’s Platform on the Penal Code included women’s CSOs with different political leanings: AMARGI; 
Amnesty International Turkey Office; Ankara Women’s Solidarity Foundation; Association for the Support and 
Training of Women Candidates (KADER); Association for Supporting Sincan Society Center; Association of 
Çanakkale Women’s Handicraft Evaluation – Women’s Counselling Center; CEDAW NGO Forum; Edirne Women’s 
Human Rights and Handicraft Initiative; Purple Film Women’s Cooperative; IRIS Equality Monitoring Group; 
Istanbul Bar Association Women’s Rights Center; Human Rights Desk of the Istanbul Governorate; Izmir Bar 
Association Women’s Commission; Improving Women’s Perspective Initiative; Kibele Women’s Cooperative; KAOS- 
GL; LAMBDA; Okmeydanı Purple Paper Women’s Atelier; Purple Roof; Republican Women’s Association; Turkish 
Women’s Union; Solidarizing with Women Foundation, and WWHR. 
105 Personal interviews with Y. Öz from Amargi and D. Bayram from Purple Roof. 
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campaign for the reform of the Turkish Penal Code (WWHR 2005: 2). WWHR, which was holding 
the secretariat of the Women’s Platform, has described the lobbying methods as follows:  
“WWHR-New Ways pursues these [advocacy] efforts by directly getting in contact with 
[individuals] and targeting decision-making mechanisms, influencing public opinion 
through the press, radio and television stations, creating pressure groups and organizing 
advocacy campaigns together with other organizations, while also supporting and 
disseminating its demands through publications, brochures, discussions, and 
research.”106 
 The Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code worked to ensure that the legal 
changes demanded by women activists be reflected in the new code. In doing so, the platform 
also addressed Turkey’s obligations ‘to enshrine gender equality’ due to the CEDAW treaty and 
the EU accession criteria. The members of the Women’s Platform have been in touch with 
European women’s CSOs and informed the EU’s institutions on the draft proposals (Eslen-Ziya 
2012: 137). Meanwhile, several female MPs, particularly members of the oppositional CHP, 
regularly informed the Platform on the parliamentary meetings and discussions on the Code.107 
To promote their cause, feminist CSOs organized mass protests to attract media’s attention to 
the process of amending the Penal Code. Shortly before the ratification of the new Code, the 
Women’s Platform managed to gather activists of eighty women’s CSOs around the country with 
banners to walk to the Turkish Parliament (Marshall 2009: 366). The media’s involvement 
attracted the public’s attention to the reform process and created an alternative channel to push 
the government for taking necessary measures.  
During the reform process of the Penal Code, policy-makers and women’s CSOs ran into 
several controversies. When Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a last-minute 
interference in the policy-making process to criminalize adultery, drawing on the alleged 
demands of ‘the Anatolian woman’ (referring to women living in rural areas), feminist CSOs 
organized a public protest and launched a petition to counteract this proposal. They also 
contacted their international networks, and thereby attracted the EU’s attention. Erdoğan’s 
move met with sharp criticism from the EU officials, and the secular Turkish media supported 
                                                          
106 http://www.wwhr.org/advocacy/ (rev. 23.10.2014) 
107 Personal interview with Ö. Sunata from Purple Roof. 
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the cause of feminist CSOs (Ilkkaracan 2007; Kardam 2006). In response to the domestic and 
international pressure, the AKP government retracted the proposal on criminalizing adultery.  
Relying upon their long-term expertise and knowledge as well as the support of the 
domestic and international actors, feminist CSOs, in cooperation with other groups of women’s 
organizations, achieved the passage of forty amendments out of forty-five that they lobbied for 
(Eslen-Ziya 2012; Ilkkaracan 2007). The amended Penal Code took effect on 1 June 2005. The 
revisions made in the Penal Code represented a major step in criminalization of violence against 
women and guaranteeing women’s rights to bodily integrity. 
Further Efforts to Prevent Violence against Women 
In 2010, the Ministry of Justice published a research which reveals that between 2002 and 2010 
the number of women killed swelled 1,400 per cent (Bianet, 15 September 2011). Domestic 
violence or so called honor killings can be seen every day in the media. According to feminist 
CSOs, the problem is not the lack of necessary measures to prevent violence, but the practical 
implementation of laws. Therefore, feminist CSOs in cooperation with other women’s 
organizations have continue to push the ruling AKP to take further measures to protect women 
from violence.  
 Purple Roof continues to provide psychological counseling for women. In 2005, the 
‘Administrative District of Beyoğlu’ (kaymakamlık, a governmental department) in Istanbul asked 
Purple Roof to run a women’s shelter, which has been built by loan of the World Bank. This 
shelter survived until the Administrative District of Beyoğlu ended the project in December 
2008.108 Since March 2009, Purple Roof has opened another women’s shelter whose building has 
been provided by the ‘Municipality of Şişli’ in Istanbul.109 This women’s shelter is managed by 
trained Purple Roof volunteers. Since its establishment in 1990, Purple Roof has supported about 
30,000 women through its solidarity center and accommodated more than 1,000 women in its 
women’s shelters (Mor Çatı Bullettin 2010: 16). 
 The Purple Roof’s women’s shelter is partly financed by the European Commission 
Delegation of Turkey and also by donations of private individuals and institutions. In order to 
                                                          
108 http://www.morcati.org.tr/en/what-are-we-doing/shelters (rev. 01.11.2013) 
109 Personal interview with D. Bayram, February 2012, Istanbul. 
142 
 
maintain its women’s shelter, Purple Roof keeps searching for funds. For instance, in 2010, 
popular Turkish artists, musicians, and journalists contributed to a promotional activity by 
wearing t-shirts designed for Purple Roof.110 The pictures of these celebrities were on billboards 
in Istanbul to raise public awareness of domestic violence. Purple Roof also uses its networks in 
the visual and printed media and visits public or private schools (The Purple Roof Activity 
Report 2013). Also, Purple Roof regularly organizes workshops, seminars, and marches in the 
week of 8th of March (International Women’s Day) and 25th of November (International Day for 
the Elimination of Violence against Women), and publishes bulletins and leaflets on domestic 
violence (Ibid.).  
Likewise, Amargi also regularly organized meetings and seminars to discuss the causes, 
forms, and the impact of domestic violence against women and the possible measures to end 
it.111 In September 2005, Amargi published two pamphlets named ‘Violence against Women’ and 
‘Solidarity Centers and Women’s Shelters’, which were distributed to promote legal changes in 
the Civil and Penal Code and inform women on their rights in case of violence (Durukan 2005). 
An important issue Amargi raised is violence against transsexual women in Turkey. With the 
help of LGBTI organizations, Amargi organized diverse activities to make violence against LGBTI 
individuals visible. The organization succeeded to put sexual orientation-based violence on the 
agenda of feminist groups and demanded protection of LGBTI individuals. 
 To counteract violence against women, WWHR underlines the importance of protecting 
and improving women’s rights in a legal framework.112 To this end, WWHR pays special attention 
to lobbying activities, forming pressure groups, and to monitoring state institutions that are 
responsible for preventing violence against women. WWHR states on its webpage: 
“International documents, conventions and agreements Turkey has signed, and achievements 
in other countries are among significant reference points for our work in this program area 
[advocacy]. … WWHR is committed to monitoring and following up on these obligations and 
their implementation.”113 Thus, WWHR regularly prepares evaluation reports whether the laws 
and policies have been implemented. Since the reform of the Penal Code in 2004, WWHR has 
                                                          
110 Ibid. 
111 Personal interview with Y. Öz, October 2011, Istanbul. 
112 http://www.wwhr.org/our-values-and-priorities/ (rev. 23.10. 2014) 
113 http://www.wwhr.org/advocacy/ (rev. 23. 10.2014) 
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insisted that Article 82 of the Turkish Penal Code regarding murder committed as ‘blood feud’ 
(vendetta killings) should include honor killings as an aggravated crime (WWHR 2005: 3). On 
WWHR’s website, women can find necessary information about protection laws and a list of state 
institutions in every province that are responsible for protecting women.114 
Feminist CSOs have used their contacts in the mass media to deliver latest information 
about their activities and the magnitude of domestic violence in Turkey. In recent years, 
prominent journalists have regularly brought the issue in their columns to raise public 
awareness and to urge politicians to take necessary measures in combating domestic violence. 
In their public statements and lobbying activities, feminist CSOs have referred to the ‘Istanbul 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence’ that 
was actively promoted by the AKP government. 
 In combating violence against women, feminist CSOs have often stressed the need to 
revise the existing Law on the Protection of the Family (No. 4320). In 2007, the law was extended 
to include all members of the family subjected to violence (Müftüler-Baç 2012: 9). The amended 
law provided measures to contain the risk of domestic violence and also waived the fees for 
court processes.115 However, the law did not grant protection for non-married women who live 
in a partnership (Ibid.).  
Reform Process of the Protection of the Family Law 
In 2011, 241 women’s rights organizations, including feminist, Islamist, Kurdish, and Kemalist 
women’s CSOs, formed a platform called ‘Stop Violence Platform’ (Şiddete Son Platformu) to 
increase the pressure on the ruling AKP government to amend the Law on the Protection of the 
Family (No 4320). Accordingly, the Ministry for Family and Social Policies began to work on the 
improvement of this law and included the representatives of the Stop Violence Platform in the 
policy-making process. In the beginning of 2012, the parliamentary commission KEFEK prepared 
a draft proposal. However, women’s rights organizations were disappointed about this proposal 
and stated that the draft did not reflect their demands, and that it was even worse than the 
                                                          
114 http://www.kadinininsanhaklari.org/destek-almak-icin/siddete-karsi/ (rev. 23.10.2014) 
115 See for further information on the website of the ‘Legal Support Center for Women’ (Kadınlara Hukuki Destek 
Merkezi, KAHDEM): www.kahdem.org.tr 
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existing law (No. 4320).116 To hinder the ministry’s proposal, the Platform members voiced their 
doubts about the draft proposal through demonstrations, press statements, and social media. 
Meanwhile, feminist activists from diverse organizations found themselves in a dispute with the 
decision-makers from KSGM. Purple Roof activist Deniz Bayram, as a lawyer, was active in the 
bargaining process and stated:  
“During the process of amending Law 4320, we have been screening the draft proposal 
and addressing the problematic formulations such as excluding ‘non-married women’ 
from the protection law. The Minister [for Family and Social Policies] Fatma Şahin and 
her officials were mostly responsive to our demands, but they were feeling the pressure 
of the conservative basis of the party [AKP]. But we insisted on our demands and strived 
for the passage of the law for all women, without any discriminatory definitions. Since 
we could not reach a consensus, the Minister said: “We do not go anywhere until we 
finish our job!” Neither the Minister and her officials, nor we, as representatives of 
women’s CSOs, had slept for three days, and worked for the renewal of Law 4320.” 
 During the reform process, feminist CSOs formed nationwide networks and established 
web-based blogs to inform the Turkish public on the reform process of the Protection Law 4320.  
Thanks to the persistency of feminist groups in their advocacy and the support of the other 
women’s CSOs from the Stop Violence Platform, the Ministry for Family and Social Policies 
decided to revise the draft law. The ministry submitted the revised draft proposal to the Turkish 
Parliament in February and Law 6284 was amended on 8 March 2012, for honoring the 
International Women’s Day. The new law increased the sentences for violence against women 
and developed a central mechanism - the ‘Centers for Preventing and Monitoring Violence 
(Şiddet Önizleme Merkezleri, ŞÖNİMs) - to prevent violence against women (cf. Chapter 5). But 
feminist CSOs pointed to the danger that a centralized guideline for women’s shelters would 
constrain the independence of women’s CSOs and self-governance of municipalities (the 16th 
Declaration of the Assembly of Women’s Shelters, 2013). Furthermore, women’s CSOs, 
particularly feminist and Kurdish women’s organizations, criticized the AKP government that 
the new law was not named as the ‘Law to Protect Women and Individual Family Members from 
Violence’, even it was agreed upon between women’s CSOs and the Ministry, but rather it 
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became the ‘Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women’. All feminist activists 
pointed out in our interviews that the AKP did, once again, not consider women to be 
‘individuals’, but only to be members of their family.  
Monitoring the State: Building Broader Platforms 
In the combat against domestic violence, feminist CSOs have stressed that the main obstacle is 
the actual implementation of laws. In court trials, judges do not base their decisions on women’s 
statements on sexual violence, but they rather take into account the defense lawyers’ claim of  
‘provocative behavior of women’ or ‘remorse of the offender’; and reduce sentences of sex 
offenders. In their public appearances or interaction with state institutions, feminist CSOs have 
often underlined that women who are exposed to violence are not protected effectively, and 
they live with the threat of ‘being killed’. In order to monitor the implementation of laws, 
feminist CSOs have formed joint groups and platforms. These platforms are successful in 
attracting public’s attention to trials pertaining to violence against women and in pushing the 
judicial authorities to implement the existing laws.117  
In the aftermath of the aforementioned declaration of the Ministry of Justice in summer 
2010 – that killings of women increased 1,400 percent between 2003 and 2010 – representatives 
of feminist CSOs, smaller political parties, labor unions, and NGOs from different regions formed 
the ‘We Will Stop Women Homicides Platform’ (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu) 
(Platform’s Booklet 2013: 1). Activists from Purple Roof, WWHR, and Amargi have regularly 
participated in the activities of this platform. The Stop Women Homicides Platform followed the 
court trials in different provinces in Turkey regarding murders of women (Şen 2013). The 
platform has pointed out that majority of the murder cases are committed by the intimate 
partners and involve ongoing abuse in home, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or 
situations where women have less power than their partners. The Platform successfully 
included the families of murdered women in its lobbying activities. In cases where the platform 
publicized a trial on sexual violence against women and was present at the courthouse, the 
lawyers of the (male) defendants have accused feminist activists of “trying to interfere with the 
                                                          
117 Istanbul Feminist Collective (Istanbul Feminist Kolektif) is a well-known feminist platform comprising around ten 
feminist organizations. They organize 8th of March (International Women’s Day) and 25th of November 
(International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women) demonstrations and make public statements on 
important issues pertaining to women’s lives in Taksim Square, Istanbul. 
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due process” or “manipulating the court” because feminist activists supported claimants who 
are mostly women.118  
 The Platform has also been active in the reform process of Law 6284 by lobbying the MPs 
and proposing a draft law. Although the Platform is a new establishment, they have exerted 
considerable influence on the public agenda regarding the issue of gender-based murder. As 
they state on their website, the notable achievements are as follows: 
 The Turkish state as well as the media acknowledge that women are killed 
because of their gender.  
 In the Turkish media, murder of women is not labeled as ‘love, jealousy, or 
insanity’ murder anymore, rather the term ‘women homicide’ is being used.   
 The representatives of individual women’s CSOs have not the right to participate 
in court trials relating to murder of a woman, but the Women Killings Platform 
gained in several cases the right to take part in trials. The lawyers from the 
platform try to participate in the judicial process in order that the court gives 
severe punishment to the perpetrators.  
 The Ministry for Family and Social Policies sends also an expert to the court trials 
to monitor the due processes. 119 
At the moment, the Stop Women Homicides Platform struggles for the introduction of the term 
‘women homicide’ explicitly in the Turkish Penal Code. Drawing upon the newspaper reports, 
the Platform regularly updates the number of murdered women on its website. It receives help 
from different segments of Turkish society, in forms of voluntary work for its public relations, 
and became an essential civil society actor on the issue of violence against women (Şen 2013).  
In sum, feminist CSOs in Turkey, as their counterparts in other countries, have played an 
essential role both in raising public awareness of the problems caused by domestic violence and 
                                                          
118 The most prominent trial is known as Fethiye Trial (Fethiye davasi). A defendant’s lawyer was protested by 
feminist organizations, and he denunciated these organizations with manipulating the case, see Bianet: 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/137886-tecavuz-sanigini-baro-baskani-neden-savunamaz (rev. 
21.01.2014) 
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developing strategies for eliminating violence against women. They also became influential 
actors participating in decision-making processes. 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
While combating violence against women, organized feminists have emphasized the importance 
of strengthening women’s legal rights. As noted above, the new Civil Code and the amendments 
to the Turkish Penal Code were major steps in strengthening women’s human rights. But women 
in Turkey are not aware of their rights, and that cultural norms hinder women to exercise their 
rights (Altınay and Arat 2009).  
 In order to raise women’s awareness of their legal rights, Purple Roof and WWHR have 
published booklets on the amended Civil Code and Turkish Penal Code, and put necessary 
information about the legal procedures on their websites. Purple Roof activists also participated 
in national and international conferences and stressed the importance of empowering women 
for human development and democracy in Turkey. Likewise, in 2005, Amargi Magazine 
published several articles to inform women of the new property regime in the Civil Code and 
the revised Penal Code.120 Moreover, Amargi has organized workshops and participated in panels 
to raise women’s awareness of their rights. 
 Since 1995, WWHR, in collaboration with SHÇEK, has conducted the ‘Human Rights 
Education Program for Women’ (HREPW), which was endorsed by Article 5 of the CEDAW treaty. 
The program emphasizes the importance of independent women’s organizing to reduce 
discrimination against women, and to this end it trains women activists. Since 2002, participants 
of HREP trainings have formed twenty different women’s organizations or initiatives in thirteen 
provinces around Turkey.121 In its nationwide activities, WWHR underlines the importance of 
working with the state agencies to raise awareness of gender equality among state officials. 
Within the framework of the ‘Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights Project’ (CSBR), WWHR 
annually brings together forty NGOs and many academics from the Muslim world and promotes 
women’s reproductive rights as human rights in Muslim societies.  122 It has played an important 
role in breaking the taboos around ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) 
                                                          
120 http://amargigroupistanbul.wordpress.com/about-amargi/information/ (rev. 21.11.2013) 
121 http://www.wwhr.org/human-rights-education-programme-for-women-hrep/ (rev. 23.10.2014) 
122 http://www.wwhr.org/category/the-coalition-for-sexual-and-bodily-rights-in-muslim-societies-csbr (last 
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rights’ in many Muslim countries and strengthened its membership base by building networks 
among different regions and developing common frameworks in advocating women’s rights. 
During the amending process of the Penal Code, feminist CSOs have lobbied key female 
parliamentarians to have gender equality enshrined in the Constitution. In May 2004, the AKP 
government revised Article 10 of the Constitution and introduced: “Women and men have equal 
rights. The State is responsible for taking all measures to realize gender equality” (cf. Chapter 
5). While lobbying policy-makers, feminist CSOs have often reminded the AKP that 
developments in women’s rights and gender equality are the key to gain entry into the EU 
(Marshall 2009: 368). Since 2005, the European Commission has annually prepared a Turkey 
Progress Report by integrating the viewpoints of influential CSOs, including women’s CSOs. 
These Progress Reports monitor the implementation of the EU accession criteria in candidate 
countries, in which gender equality has an important place. In 2005, the European Commission, 
relying upon the collected data provided by feminist organizations in Turkey, welcomed the 
amendments to the Civil and Penal Code, but pointed out problems in the practical 
implementation of existing laws (Turkey Progress Report 2005: 32). According to the report, the 
main concerns for women in Turkey were the problems in the areas of violence against women, 
honor killings, a high illiteracy rate, and women’s participation in politics and labor market, all 
of which hinders the progress towards achieving true gender equality in Turkey (Ibid.). In order 
to emphasize the importance of the prospect of EU membership for achieving gender equality, 
women’s groups in Ankara and Istanbul held meetings in Turkey and invited the European 
women’s organizations. After one such meeting, Yıldız Ecevit, a prominent feminist activist and 
scholar from Ankara, asserted: “We should [see] the EU accession process as a chance to 
strengthen our relationships with the global women’s movement [,] and especially with 
European women’s movement” (quoted in Marshall 2009: 369).  
  Meanwhile, feminist CSOs, together with other women’s groups, joined the discussion 
on reforming the 1982 Constitution. When a group of law professors began to prepare a draft 
proposal for the new Constitution in 2007, more than 200 women’s CSOs formed the ‘Women’s 
Platform for the Constitution’ (Anayasa Kadın Platformu) to monitor the reform process. This 
Platform criticized the draft that allegedly ignored women’s rights and gender equality, and it 
stressed the importance of taking gender perspective into account in reforming the Constitution 
(Bianet, 4 December 2007). WWHR and Purple Roof engaged in diverse working groups to lobby 
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for introducing gender equality perspective in the draft of the new Constitution and proposed 
gender-sensitive changes. They also publicized their views in press releases to influence public 
debates. In 2013, the Women’s Platform for the Constitution joined the aforementioned Checks-
and Balances Network (see Chapter 4) to strengthen the civil society struggle for a more 
democratic constitution. 
 Another controversial topic in achieving gender equality is the issue of affirmative action 
regarding women’s political participation. Feminist CSOs reiterate the low number of women in 
representational politics and regard this issue as a serious problem for the consolidation of 
democracy in Turkey.  
Quota Debate  
As discussed in Chapter 2, gender scholars argue that women’s substantive representation, i.e. 
the expression of women’s interests in policies, depends also on women’s numerical 
representation in formal politics. In their efforts for strengthening women’s rights, feminist 
CSOs in Turkey often pointed out the barriers to political participation of women. It is clear that 
women are almost absent from political institutions. Until the 2000s, the percentage of women 
in the Turkish Parliament has only increased by 5 percent. The numbers are even lower in local 
governments and municipalities.  
 In order to increase the number of women representatives in politics, a group of 
professional women from Istanbul formed the ‘Association for the Support and Training of 
Women Candidates’ (Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği, KADER) in 1997. Among its 
founding members were feminist and Kemalist women from different organizations. KADER 
works for improving economic, social, and political conditions of women to reach genuine 
gender equality in political participation.123 To this end, it campaigns for quotas for women 
candidates in the parliamentary and local elections. An important characteristic of KADER is its 
‘equal distance’ approach towards women candidates from different political parties in Turkey. 
But embracing women from different political movements causes internal strains among KADER 
members (Arat 2008: 409). Especially, the tension between Islamist and Kemalist women 
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activists, have often undermined KADER’s effectiveness in its activities. Despite these conflicts, 
KADER became one of the most influential and broadly-organized women’s CSOs in Turkey.124  
 KADER specifically focus on women’s political representation, and to this end train 
women who aim to run for elections. Çiğdem Aydın, the head of KADER, stated: “We attach high 
importance to have women in political and public institutions. We believe that women can 
represent women better in gender issues because they can be sensitive to women’s issues.”  125 
Aydın emphasized that gender quotas would ensure the inclusion of women into politics and 
thereby strengthen democracy in Turkey. She added that KADER’s networks with different 
political parties and the Turkish Parliament helped to establish a healthy relation between 
organized women and female representatives.  
 Aydın stated that KADER demands introduction of a minimum 30 percent gender quota 
in the Political Parties and Elections Acts. In 2005, the ‘Committee on Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality’ of the European Parliament also pointed out the absence of women in politics 
and supported KADER’s claim. This report suggested that Turkey needs “to adopt a mandatory 
quota system combined with a zipper placement on the election lists as the best possible way to 
improve women’s participation in Turkish politics in the short term” (Report No. 2004/2215 
(INI)). Moreover, many public figures such as prominent businesswomen, journalists, actors and 
actresses contributed to KADER’s campaigns to encourage women to participate in local 
governments and municipalities. According to KADER’s 2012 statistics, since Turkish women 
have acquired the right to vote and to run for elections in 1934, 1,159 mayors have been elected 
to office, and only 6 of them were women. Table 6.3 demonstrates the percentages of men and 
women elected to local governments between 1930 and 2011. 
 
Table (6. 3): WOMEN IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 Men Women Total  Percentage 
Elected Mayors 
(provinces, cities, 
city districts and 
villages) 
2,924 26 2,950 % 0.8 
                                                          
124 KADER has branches in seven large provinces, eight representative offices, and two initiative groups in 
different provinces around Turkey. 
125 Personal interview with Çiğdem Aydın, the head of KADER 2010-2014, November 2010, Istanbul. 
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Municipal 
Council 
Members 
30,450 1,340 31,790 % 4.2 
Provincial 
Assembly 
Members 
3,269 110 3,379 % 3.2 
Source: KADER 2012-2013 Women Statistics based on the data from the Ministry of Interior, February 
2012 
 
 Çiğdem Aydın mentioned in our interview that between April 2008 and January 2009 
KADER worked with feminist activists and academics on education programs and trained women 
candidates in different provinces in the project called “Political Schools for Women”, which  is 
financed by the Swedish Embassy in Istanbul. These schools enabled communication and 
cooperation among women from different political parties and raised their awareness of gender 
issues. About 250 women took part in these trainings and many of them succeeded in running 
as candidates and being elected.  
 However, the AKP hesitates to include gender quotas in the Political Parties and Elections 
Act. For instance, Erdoğan often expressed his critical stance of gender quotas in his public 
speeches. The Turkish daily newspaper Radikal reported that in the opening reception of the 
Turkish Parliament in 2007, influential feminist activist Hülya Gülbahar, the head of KADER at 
the time, conveyed women’s demands for quotas to the prime minister. Erdoğan’s response was 
unexpected and negative: 
“For me, gender quota is unjust. Everyone is equal. I do not think quota provides equality. 
At the moment, equal opportunities for participation exist for women and men. You can 
enter and win the elections. If there is a quota, it means women are being protected by 
men. Is there a quota in the USA? Or what is the quota in France? You want to be Rwanda, 
go and be Rwanda”126 
The former Women and Family Minister Nimet Çubukçu has not endorsed the demand for 
political quotas. In AKP’s view, quotas can be used by political parties, but should not be enforced 
through a national legislation (Arat 2008: 409). Since then, the AKP has not changed its attitude 
towards gender quotas in politics and turned a blind eye to the demands of organized women. 
The party, within its own institutional structure, put women in some positions, but did not 
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introduce a quota system. Ayata and Tütüncü (2008) interviewed some female members of the 
AKP who remarked that the party organization is highly male dominated. Both scholars contend 
that women who are active in the local organizations of the AKP claimed that the party allows 
women to have “the responsibility, but not the authority” (2008: 376).  
 Despite the negative attitude of the AKP’s leadership, KADER’s successive campaigns to 
raise women’s participation in politics have been successful. Since 2002, the numbers of women 
in the Turkish Parliament has increased after every parliamentary election. The head of WWHR 
Pınar Ilkkaracan contended that this increase is due to the Kurdish BDP’s efforts in introducing 
quotas for women candidates on its election lists (Şenerdem 2010). For instance, the number of 
women in the parliament increased from 50 to 79 after the 2011 elections. Thus, the female ratio 
of the 550-seats Turkish Parliament has increased from 9.1 percent to 14.4 percent (KADER 
Women Statistics 2012-2013: 1).  
 In order to raise women activists’ awareness of their political rights, KADER launched a 
project called ‘Strengthening Women Citizens’, which was funded by UN Democracy Fund 
(UNDEF). Between 2008 and 2011, 358 women representatives of women’s organizations as well 
as of other CSOs from seven different regions of Turkey have been trained and obtained 
certificates on women’s human rights within the framework of the project.127 These trained 
women activists informed 2,496 women citizens on their legal rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution, Penal and Civil Code and in the Labor Law. In a similar vein, at the beginning of 
2013, KADER launched another two-year project called ‘Strengthening Women Citizens and 
Activists as Voters and Active Citizens’ with the financial aid of the ‘European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights’.128 This project aimed at encouraging women to become 
politically active citizens before the elections in 2014 and 2015. Using a snowball effect, KADER 
trains women activists on their rights as citizens and on gender equality, and these women will 
create their own training programs where they will inform other women about their political 
and civil rights. With the help of this project, KADER plans to reach 8,000 citizens and raise 
                                                          
127http://www.ka-der.org.tr/tr-TR/Page/News/27/kadin-yurttaslarin-guclendirilmesi-projesi-
20082011.html?bid=395 (rev. 01.02.2014) 
128 EIDHR was launched in 2006 and replaces and builds upon the European Initiative (2000-2006). Its aim is to 
provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries, see: 
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women’s awareness of their rights as citizens, to strengthen their networks and enable them to 
exchange their experiences among each other.129 
 Although the efforts of feminist CSOs to strengthen women’s rights and achieve gender 
equality have brought about remarkable women-friendly outcomes in laws, discrimination 
against women continues to be a serious problem in Turkey.  
Discrimination against Women 
As mentioned earlier, Turkey, as a ‘State party’ of the CEDAW treaty, must periodically report 
on the progress it has made in implementing the CEDAW obligations. Therefore, the state’s 
women’s machinery KSGM cooperates with different governmental institutions, academics, and 
representatives of women’s CSOs to prepare the report that has to specifically deal with each 
article of the CEDAW agreement. The last report, presenting the achievements between 1997 
and 2003, was submitted in 2003 and stated that: “For Turkey, the period since 1997 has been 
marked by milestone legal reforms that eliminated fundamental discriminatory provisions 
against women as well as other initiatives that contributed towards expanding the boundaries 
of equality and human rights of women.” (CEDAW 4th-5th Periodic Report 2003: 2).  
In its aftermath, WWHR, in the name of the Women’s Platform for the Turkish Penal Code 
(including Purple Roof and Amargi) prepared a ‘shadow report’130 to the CEDAW Committee. The 
shadow report welcomed the changes both in the Turkish Civil and Penal Code, but listed the 
following provisions in the new Turkish Penal Code that needed to be amended: 
 Article 82 (Aggravated Homicide), defining aggravated circumstances for homicides, 
needs to be revised to include killings in the name of ‘honor’ as an aggravating 
circumstance. This would make honor killings subject to harsher sentences such as life-
time imprisonment. 
                                                          
129 http://www.ka-der.org.tr/tr-TR/Page/News/2419/kadin-yurttaslarin-ve-aktivistlerin-secmenler-ve-aktif-
yurttaslar-olarak-guclendirilmesi-projesi-20132015.html?bid=395 (rev. 30.11.2014) 
130 Shadow reports are produced by the CSOs from the countries that signed the CEDAW. These CSOs provide inputs 
and information on legislative changes in their countries and highlight shortcomings in gender policies from their 
own perspective. The first Shadow Report on Turkey was prepared by WWHR in 1997. Since then, the preparation 
of Shadow Reports has been institutionalized and submitted by different women’s CSOs. 
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 Article 104, penalizing sexual relations of minors (15-18 years) upon complaint, needs to 
be revised. It leaves room for complaints from third parties, such as parents, families, or 
school administrators, and provides a ground to penalize consensual sexual relations 
between young people. Therefore, it would be better to abolish Article 104, and add a 
provision to Article 103 overseeing ‘Sexual Abuse of Children’ that penalizes only in cases 
of use of coercion, violence, and threats, and in the lack of the involved parties’ consent. 
 Article 122 criminalizes discrimination based on language, race, color, sex, political 
opinion in public services, and economic activities. But there is no regulation on the 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. This article needs to be amended to include 
the sexual orientation-based discrimination. 
 Article 287 should explicitly ban and criminalize the practice of virginity testing and 
women’s consent should be a necessary condition for all tests authorized by judges or 
prosecutors (WWHR 2005: 2f.).  
The Women’s Platform insisted that the Penal Code needs to recognize “women’s rights to full 
autonomy over their bodies and sexuality, independent of their age, marital status, socio-
economic background, or sexual orientation” for the full implementation of the CEDAW treaty 
(Ilkkaracan 2007: 255). The same report also stated that Article 10 of the Civil Code regarding the 
ownership of acquired property during marriage is only applicable to marriages that took effect 
after the adoption of the new Civil Code in January 2002. Therefore, the law discriminates 
women who have been married before the amendment to the Code. The Women’s Platform 
underscored the mere fact that “the change of the property regime has been most crucial for 
women of older age, a majority of whom have been forced to take on the role of full-time 
homemakers and as a result lacked an independent source of income.” (WWHR 2005: 12). 
 WWHR, Purple Roof, and Amargi continue to call for further reforms in the Penal Code 
to fully eliminate discrimination against women. For instance, Purple Roof points out that 
immigrant and refugee women, who work as housekeepers or caretakers for Turkish families, 
experience violence in their workplace and have no access to legal information how to deal with 
it (Mor Çatı Activity Report 2013). Accordingly, Purple Roof refers to the aforementioned Article 
122 and demands that immigrant women in Turkey be protected by Turkish laws. In a similar 
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vein, all three CSOs point out the discrimination against LGBTI individuals in their public 
statements and reports. They state that transsexual women are subject to hate crimes, killings, 
lynching attempts, and mass assaults (Shadow NGO Report 2010: 24). Thus, they demand the 
recognition of sexual identity of LGBTI individual in the legal framework. Some Amargi activists 
continued to discuss diverse forms of discrimination in women’s lives in the magazines of LGBTI 
organizations and pointed to discriminatory social norms and practices.  
Moreover, Purple Roof works on ‘gender justice’ and ‘gender equality’ in collaboration 
with other feminist organizations that run consultation centers for women. Its latest project 
‘Women’s Cooperation for Gender Justice’, which began in January 2012 and was financed by the 
EU’s Turkey Delegation, included two other feminist CSOs (Van Women’s Association and 
Antalya Women Counseling Center and Solidarity Association) as well as Istanbul Bilgi 
University ‘Center for Research and Practice of Human Rights Law’.  131 The project highlighted 
the obstacles in the access to judicial processes and the shortcomings in the implementation of 
laws relating to women’s rights. These issues were discussed with legal experts in panels and 
workshops, and all the information gathered were publicized in reports and pamphlets. 
Both Purple Roof and Amargi activists argued in our interview that the AKP does not 
implement policies effectively and completely. Likewise, WWHR claimed in its public statements 
that the AKP-dominated-parliament does not take initiatives or introduce necessary public and 
administrative reforms to fully eliminate discrimination against women.132 
Current Efforts of Feminist CSOs 
Although there have been remarkable changes in the legal framework and the AKP developed 
diverse strategies to eliminate discrimination against women (cf. Chapter 5), women in Turkey 
continue to be discriminated in political, economic, and social life. According to feminist CSOs, 
Turkey makes a strikingly slow progress in shrinking its gender gap due to the conservative, 
‘non-women-friendly’ approach and policies of the ruling AKP (Şenerdem 2010).  
 Women in Turkey face hidden discrimination in political life. Due to cultural and political 
hindrances, women are not equally represented in politics. As mentioned above, KADER 
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advocates quotas to increase the percentage of women in political life. Although Purple Roof 
and WWHR do not specifically work on political empowerment of women, but they support the 
campaigns organized by KADER. Moreover, Purple Roof organizes, in cooperation with KADER, 
seminars to inform women about their political rights and how to become politically active. 
Deniz Bayram from Purple Roof mentioned in our interview that a woman who lived in the 
Purple Roof’s women’s shelter, after participating KADER’s seminars, was elected in the 2009 
local elections as the head of a neighborhood in the Beyoğlu District of Istanbul.  
 Feminist CSOs underline the discriminatory practices that hinder girls from obtaining 
education. Although the Turkish educational system mandates both females and males to attend 
primary and secondary school, families still hesitate to send their girls to secondary school. 
Purple Roof, WWHR, and Amargi mostly support the campaigns for girls’ enrolment in schools, 
but do not explicitly focus on this issue or develop projects related to it. They suggest that the 
state must develop sustainable strategies to overcome the traditional values of the families and 
encourage girls to attend school. In the last decade, the AKP passed several educational bills to 
overcome the low levels of girls’ enrolment in secondary education. A great number of women’s 
CSOs, in particular Kemalist women’s CSOs, as well as governmental bodies organized campaigns 
to enroll girls to school.  
 Feminist CSOs have often pointed out that women are also discriminated in economic 
life. Turkish women are greatly underrepresented in the work force, making up only about 30 
percent of it. As regards economic participation of women, there are several women’s CSOs that 
specifically highlight the obstacles to gender equality in work environment, and that develop 
projects to encourage women to participate in labor market. These women’s CSOs argue that 
social norms and practices in Turkey certainly hinder women from participation in economic 
activities. But they also state that the Labor Law has to be amended and push the AKP to change 
laws. In this regard, feminist CSOs have underlined four measures that would encourage women 
to participate in the labor market: 1) the importance of providing childcare and elderly care 
services to working women, 2) guaranteeing equal opportunities in hiring processes, 3) 
promoting programs targeting eradication of cultural hindrances on women’s employment, and 
4) the state must develop sustainable strategies and measures for women’s economic 
participation (Shadow NGO Reports Turkey 2005 and 2010). But feminist claim that the AKP 
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obviously ascribes a traditional role to women as dedicated housewives and mothers. For 
instance, Tayyip Erdoğan and other AKP leaders often called women to have three children in 
their speeches. The AKP has thereby aimed to encourage population growth to make its 
domestic market broader, and thereby slide in the top ten economies of the world, without really 
including women into the labor market (Çağlar 2011). 
 To this end, the AKP also attempted to restrict the right to an abortion. Since 1983, 
abortion has not been an issue in Turkey, and women have legally been able to have abortions, 
albeit up to the tenth week of pregnancy. But in the summer 2012, Erdoğan started a public 
debate by equating abortion with murder. Like the conservative ‘pro-life’ groups in the US and 
Europe, he stressed that abortion is not an issue of women’s bodily rights, but rather it is the 
right of the embryo to be born. The majority of feminist, Kurdish, and Kemalist women’s CSOs, 
members of the Turkish Doctors Union, and journalists harshly criticized the AKP and its 
political discourse on women’s bodily rights. Feminist activists immediately initiated a 
campaign called “Abortion is a Right”, which reached an international audience, and organized 
demonstrations and sit-ins in different cities, and they opposed the newly planned policies on 
birth control and abortion (Letsch 2013). The AKP government had to withdraw its draft 
proposal due to the domestic and international reactions. But feminist women argue that 
currently public hospitals try to intimidate women who request abortions and encourage them 
to give birth without considering their opinions, choices, and financial status. 133  
When the AKP-government omitted the name ‘women’ from the Ministry for Women 
and Family, and renamed it to the Ministry for Family and Social Policies, feminist CSOs initiated 
a petition campaign and collected more than 3,000 signatures to keep ‘women’ in the name of 
the ministry (Belge 2011). Many feminist, Kurdish, and Kemalist women activists stressed that 
removing gender equality mechanism, i.e. Ministry for Women, implies that women are not 
regarded as individuals, but only within the context of the family (Cinmen 2011). In June 2011, 
they sent their concern to the Prime Minister’s Office, but Erdoğan rejected their proposal by 
saying that: “We are a conservative party. For us, what is important is the family.” (Belge 2011). 
                                                          
133 See daily newspapers such as Radikal, Hürriyet or the internet-based Bianet. 
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Although there has been many positive developments on the issue of women’s rights during AKP 
rule, the restructuring of KSGM and the Ministry have alarmed feminist CSOs. 
In the last decade, feminist CSOs began to work with some Islamist women’s CSOs who 
frequently pointed out the discrimination against headscarf-wearing women. In their activities, 
WWHR, Purple Roof, and Amargi stressed that religious women have been prevented from 
receiving a university education or from participating in professional or political life due to the 
headscarf ban.134 Feminist CSOs have in general supported the petitions organized by Islamist 
women, but they never prioritized the issue on their agenda. WWHR has, for instance, not 
mentioned the headscarf ban as a discriminatory provision in its shadow reports to the CEDAW 
committee. 
Conclusion 
Overall, organized feminist women in Turkey have accomplished a lot in improving women’s 
rights. As Marshall claims: “their strategy, which I call sustained-pressure, has helped feminist 
groups to influence changes in gender policies in Turkey, especially since the late 1990s [italics 
added]” (2009: 359). As indicated in this chapter, feminist CSOs have pursued their activities on 
two levels to have an impact on gender policies. First, on the national level, their advocacy 
efforts shaped public debates regarding women’s issues that in turn pushed the ruling AKP. 
Second, on the international level, feminist CSOs contacted the international organizations that 
regularly report on Turkey on different platforms, such as the CEDAW Committee, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission, to exert influence on the AKP governments. Feminist 
CSOs have participated almost in all the phases of policy-making processes: in the agenda 
setting, in decision-making, implementation, monitoring, and finally in the policy evaluation. 
As the length of the section on violence against women demonstrates, feminist CSOs have 
played an essential role in the struggle against violence against women and promoted 
sustainable legal changes for the prevention of violence. Clearly, Purple Roof has proved to be 
the address in protecting women from domestic violence. Thanks to its long years of experience 
in preventing women from violence, Purple Roof has become a cooperation partner for the 
state-run guesthouses for women (SHÇEK’s) and violence monitoring centers (ŞÖNIMs). While 
                                                          
134 The discrimination against women because of the headscarf ban will be discussed in great depth in the next 
chapter. 
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Amargi has played an important role in raising women’s awareness of the issue of domestic 
violence through its journal and public seminars, and participated in groups working on policy 
changes, WWHR, drawing on its strong international ties, was an influential actor in lobbying 
policy-makers and in negotiating with state institutions in political decision-making processes. 
As demonstrated above, these three feminist CSOs have been, to a great extent, successful in 
translating their claims into concrete policies protecting women from violence. But all feminist 
interviewees claimed in our interview that the struggle against violence can only succeed when 
the state also becomes committed to end gender-based violence, and to this end, implements 
effective policies and disincentives.  
The issue of violence against women is also closely related with women’s rights and 
gender equality. In this regard, feminist CSOs made great strides in raising women’s awareness 
of their legal rights and in achieving gender-sensitive policies. They participated in the 
processes to amend the Civil Code and Penal Code, and the Constitution. In lobbying, and 
monitoring the government, WWHR and Purple Roof have been very effective, despite the 
differences between how they framed gender equality and what the AKP understood under that 
term. Amargi has participated in women’s platforms working on improving women’s rights, 
especially during the amendment process of the Civil and Penal Codes. Feminist CSOs however 
failed to convince the AKP to introduce quotas in the election laws. But thanks to the KADER’s 
efforts, the number of women in the parliament increased over the years.  
WWHR, Purple Roof, and Amargi have played a considerable role in the elimination of 
discrimination against women in laws, especially regarding women’s bodily integrity, marital 
and reproductive rights, and women’s sexuality. They prepared shadow reports to the CEDAW 
Committee in which they highlighted discriminatory provisions in the legal framework and 
called for immediate actions. This created an external pressure for AKP governments. WWHR 
and Purple Roof had diverse activities such as seminars and special training programs 
developing strategies to tackle with discrimination in daily life. Amargi has organized seminars 
discussing discriminatory practices and values prevalent in Turkish society and culture, and 
how to empower women. 
Despite the rising conservative rhetoric of the AKP leadership and hostility towards 
feminist demands, feminist CSOs have managed to coalesce the broader women’s movement on 
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common platforms and activated their international networks to stop the government in 
reversing women-friendly laws, as was the case in abortion debate. But as all interviewees from 
examined feminist CSOs remarked, all Turkish governments were conservative when it comes 
to women’s issues, and none of them were enthusiastic over feminist ideals. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Entangled between Islamism, Secularism, and Feminism: 
Islamist Women’s CSO  
 
7.1 The Emergence of Islamist Women’s Activism  
The rise of Islamist women’s activism in the 1990s can be traced back to two factors: 1) feminist 
activism helped lay the foundation for new paradigms of women’s political participation and 
quest for citizenship rights, and 2) the Islamist movement increased its influence in Turkish 
politics and attracted many women to its political struggle. Women began to join Islamist 
parties, or CSOs, and worked effectively to strengthen Islamist politics in Turkey.135 Islamist 
women activists demanded participation in the public sphere with their headscarves, especially 
in universities (Arat 1998, 2005; Göle 1996b; Marshall 2005; Ozcetin 2009). But the state elites 
considered the visibility of headscarves in public institutions as a challenge, if not a threat, to 
the secularist principle of the Turkish state (Arat 1998; Göle 1997; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 
2008). Since Kemalist elites believed that Islamic traditions and values hindered the 
modernization of Turkish society, they discouraged all religious symbols in public institutions. 
Nevertheless, the number of women wearing headscarves has increased remarkably, especially 
in university campuses.  
 In 1982, ‘the Higher Education Council’ (Yüksek Öğrenim Kurumu, YÖK), which controls the 
higher education system in the country, banned the headscarf in universities for the first time. 
Later in 1984, YÖK issued a decree that allowed a modern form of the headscarf on campuses 
(Kurban 2010). In January 1987, because of President Kenan Evren’s pressure on the government, 
YÖK added a decree (7/h) to the Student Disciplinary Regulations stating that: “Headscarf is not 
an ‘article of clothing’, but symbolizes certain ideological orientations, and that university 
                                                          
135 Arat (2005) argues that mobilization of women for the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP) was an unprecedented 
phenomenon. No other political party in the 1990s could obtain such a high membership of women. According to a 
report prepared by the RP’s Istanbul organization, between 1995 and 1997 the women member increased from 
158,287 to 377,888. See further: Eligür (2010). 
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administrations should decide whether or not to ban headscarves on their campuses”. In 1989, 
the Constitutional Court decided that the YÖK’s decree contradicts the secularity principle 
(Article 2) of the Constitution.136 Accordingly, university administrations in Istanbul and Ankara 
became stricter and began to exclude students with headscarves from entering their campuses. 
In response to the prohibition, banned female students organized demonstrations and sit-in 
protests in front of the universities and demanded to pursue their higher education by wearing 
headscarves. From the 1990s on, headscarves came to symbolize the Islamist women’s 
movement (Arat 1998; Marshall 2005; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008).  
7.2 The Institutionalization of Islamist Women’s Activism: Islamist Women’s CSOs 
In the 1990s, the Islamist RP under the lead of Necmettin Erbakan largely benefited from 
women’s involvement in its mobilization nationwide. Islamist women activists were organized 
at the grassroots level, mostly in the shantytowns of the big cities, and worked for the election 
campaigns of the RP (Ayata and Tütüncü 2008: 369). According to RP leaders, women activists 
could reach potential female voters in their neighborhoods more easily than men. The campaign 
manager and the head of the Women’s Commission of the RP Sibel Eraslan worked with 18,000 
women on the March 1994 local elections (Arat 1998; Ayata and Tütüncü 2008). The RP won the 
local elections in major cities including Istanbul and Ankara, but Eraslan was not given any 
political position within the party organization afterwards (Arat 1998: 124). Accordingly, a group 
of Islamist women activists began questioning and criticizing male dominance in the Islamist 
political movement.  
 In order to voice their demand for participation and inclusion in the public sphere, 
without being pushed back by Islamist men, Islamist women activists began to form their own 
CSOs with different purposes and develop a political agenda from women’s perspective. Like 
early feminist activists, the initiators of independent Islamist women’s activism were mostly 
well-educated, middle-class women from urban centers, who were either university students or 
                                                          
136 Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution stipulates that: “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social 
state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity, and justice; 
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the 
Preamble.”, see: http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_i.html#article_2 (rev.19.11.2014) 
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professionals. They aimed to find common solutions for religious women’s problems in 
voluntary organizations.  
 The oldest Islamist women’s organization in Turkey is the ‘Rainbow Istanbul Women’s 
Organizations Platform’ (Gökkuşağı Istanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu, GIKAP). At the National 
Women’s Congress (1993), the state’s body KSSGM called women activists to establish civil 
society groups.137 In 1995, Islamist women from different organizations and groups in Istanbul 
established GIKAP. It was comprised of forty-six women’s groups from the Islamist movement 
and primarily focused on improving the everyday lives of women and the family (Erarslan 2007: 
253). Its participants decided to keep their distance from all Islamic groups or parties. The 
majority of the founding members were educated women from Istanbul, who were 
professionals, university students or housewives.  
 GIKAP has attached great importance to educational activities that target women’s self-
development, and to encouraging women to participate in social and cultural life. It also 
emphasizes the need to strengthen civil rights in Turkey to overcome the problems of Islamist 
women.138 To this end, it encourages its member organizations to take an active role in social 
projects and to participate in political decision-making processes. According to its website, its 
political influence has grown since it became a member of the consultative committee of the 
‘General Directorate of Family and Social Research’, which acts under the auspices of the Prime 
Ministry. GIKAP’s representatives participate in regional meetings on women’s status and 
problems in the Muslim world and exchange their experiences in empowering women and 
family.  
 GIKAP’s member groups reached fifty-four by 2011.139It has a semi-hierarchical 
organizational structure that allows selecting an executive committee by democratic voting. It 
publicizes its activities through press releases as well as on its website. The organization has 
close ties with the women’s organizations from the Muslim world, especially from the Turkic 
states in Central Asia. GIKAP’s projects are financed through individual and state donations.  
                                                          
137 http://gikap.org/Tarihce.html (rev. 15.02.2014) 
138 http://gikap.org/VizyonMisyon.html (rev. 15.02.2014) 
139 http://gikap.org/Tarihce.html (rev. 15.02.2014) 
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 In 1995, another group of well-educated Islamist women in Ankara formed the ‘Capital 
City Women’s Platform’ (Başkent Kadın Platformu, BKP) to focus on women’s rights and problems 
arising from discriminatory practices in Turkish society and culture. These middle- and upper-
middle-class Islamist women discussed the subordinate status of women in Turkish society and 
family, and underscored the importance of women’s perspectives in dealing with women’s 
problems. BKP, as the first religious women’s CSO in Ankara, aimed to form a platform for 
religious women. In 2002, BKP transformed into the Association of Capital City Women’s 
Platform (Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği) to act in a more structured and organized way (Güler 
2009). The aim of BKP is: “[d]etermining women’s problems and producing alternative 
perspectives, and theoretical and practical solutions, to improve women’s intellectual, 
psychological, social, and economic situation; providing dialogue, communication, and 
solidarity between women; and conducting activities by gathering different women around 
common benefits”.140  The former president of BKP Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, who was banned 
from teaching at the theology faculty of University of Ankara because of her headscarf, argued 
that BKP was critical of the Turkish state’s assumption that women can only participate in the 
public sphere by suppressing their religious identity.141 Furthermore, BKP also criticized the 
approach of Islamist traditionalists towards women’s role in society.  
 BKP has a participative and non-hierarchical organizational structure. The delegates of 
all member organizations are represented in its plenary council. Its executive committee is 
elected by the plenary assembly and serves for a two-year term.142 BKP has 180 members, and 
the number reaches 500, if volunteers are included (Güler 2009). It is financed through 
donations, dues, and income from its courses. As Tuksal stated in our communication, women 
reach BKP through telephone, mail, its website, or friends. Over the years, it has expanded its 
international and national networks through its participation in different platforms such as the 
UN’s World Conferences on Women, ‘the Executive Committee for NGO Forum on CEDAW’ , and 
Amnesty International.  
                                                          
140 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?cat=6 (rev.16.02.2014) 
141 Personal communication with Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, the founding member of BKP, October 2010, Ankara. She 
is a famous activists and academic working on women and Islam and writes regularly for Turkish dailies. 
142 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=358 (rev. 16.02.2014) 
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 In the aftermath of the 28 February 1997 military intervention, stricter enforcement of 
the headscarf ban excluded more women from public institutions (cf. Chapter 4). In 1999, the 
‘Women’s Rights Association against Discrimination’ (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği, 
AKDER), the third CSO analyzed here, was formed by students and professionals in Istanbul, after 
they were expelled from their universities or jobs because of the headscarf ban. Thus, the initial 
aim of AKDER was to provide financial support and legal advice to students and professionals 
with headscarves. Neslihan Akbulut, the general secretary of AKDER, stated: “Dozens of veiled 
students who could not pursue their education in Turkish universities were sent to universities 
abroad through the donations AKDER collected”.143 Since its establishment, AKDER has 
organized meetings, seminars, and symposiums on the problems arising from the headscarf ban 
and demanded the inclusion of religious identity in public space.  
 AKDER also tries to attract public attention to discrimination against women in a broader 
sense. To this end, it regularly publishes reports and articles on women’s legal rights with regard 
to family, work, political participation, and education. In these reports, it highlights 
discriminatory laws and social norms that restrain women from exercising their basic rights and 
discusses how to overcome these hindrances.144 AKDER publicizes its activities on its website, or 
through mailing lists and social media. Like BKP, it is also a well-organized but semi-hierarchical 
association. Its plenary council votes to determine the tasks of its working groups. The executive 
committee implements projects, takes decisions, and communicates with state institutions, and 
is controlled by the advisory board.145 AKDER’s expenses are mainly financed by membership 
dues, but its scholarships are funded through donations. 
 The three organizations - GIKAP, BKP, and AKDER – are the most prominent and visible 
independent Islamist women’s CSOs in Turkey. Table (7.1) below lists some information about 
these three Islamist women’s CSOs. They define themselves as women’s rights organizations, 
differentiating themselves from other Islamist women’s organizations engaged in charity and 
religious activities, and they are not under the influence of any Islamist political party. As 
                                                          
143 Personal interview with Neslihan Akbulut (Arıkan), October 2011, Istanbul. Akbulut has been the general 
secretary of AKDER between June 2007 and April 2012, now she is working as an academic. She was also banned 
from her university in Istanbul and completed her sociology study in Sweden. 
144 Personal interview with Fatma Benli, the member of the advisory board and the former general secretary of 
AKDER (1999-2006) and a prominent human and women’s rights lawyer, November 2010, Istanbul. 
145 http://www.ak-der.org/tuzuk.gbt (rev. 17.02.2014) 
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mentioned above, the founders of these CSOs are mostly educated women, but the members are 
from middle or lower-middle class women mostly with headscarves. Most do not call themselves 
as feminists, but some do, and they have come to be known as ‘Islamist feminists’ in the Turkish 
media (Akman 2008; Arat 2008; Marshall 2005).  
 
Table (7.1): ISLAMIST WOMEN’S CSOs  
Islamist women’s 
CSOs 
Legal Status 
/year of 
establishment 
Organizational 
structure/ 
number of 
members 
Main fields of 
activity 
Funding 
Rainbow Istanbul 
Women’s 
Organizations 
Platform (Gökkuşsağı 
Istanbul Kadın 
Kuruluşları Platformu, 
GIKAP) 
(Istanbul) 
Platform 
(1995) 
Semi-
Hierarchical; 
54 member 
CSOs 
 
Empowerment 
of women and 
family; 
discrimination 
against women 
Individual or 
institutional 
donations; some 
projects funded 
by ministries 
Capital City 
Women’s Platform 
Association (Başkent 
Kadın Platformu 
Derneği, BKP) 
(Ankara) 
Platform 
(1995), 
became an 
association in 
2002 
Non- 
hierarchical; 
around 180 
registered 
members, with 
volunteers 
around 500 
Women’s rights 
and gender 
equality, 
discrimination 
against women, 
violence 
against women 
Dues, donations, 
and earnings 
from their 
courses; some 
projects funded 
by national and 
international 
donors 
Women’s Rights 
Association against 
Discrimination 
(Ayrımcılığa Karşı 
Kadın Hakları 
Derneği, AKDER) 
(Istanbul) 
Association 
(1997) 
Semi-
hierarchical; 
150 registered 
members, 
including 
volunteers 
around 400, 
(1 professional 
worker, the 
Discrimination 
against women, 
empowerment 
of women 
 
Mainly 
donations, 
projects funded 
by national 
donors 
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general 
secretary) 
 
7.3 The Achievements of Islamist Women’s CSOs before AKP Rule 
In the 1990s, these three Islamist women’s CSOs pursued their struggle on two fronts. First, they 
contested the Kemalist state’s understanding of secularism and rejected its control over religion. 
The Kemalist secularism required Turkish citizens “to leave their religious beliefs behind in the 
private sphere” (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008: 798). Therefore, the Kemalist state discouraged all 
religious symbols and practices in the public sphere (Marshall 2005; Ozcetin 2009). Second, these 
organized Islamist women contested the patriarchal structures of the Islamist movement. They 
realized that Islamist male politicians instrumentalized the visibility and the dynamism of 
organized Islamist women only for their political purposes, but in reality, they believed that 
women should primarily fulfill their domestic duties. Organized Islamist women thus criticized 
the gender roles ascribed to them as ‘housewives and mothers’ and argued that women can 
reconcile their family and everyday life (work or university) with Islamic duties (Marshall 2005; 
Saktanber 2002). BK, for instance, publicly criticized the patriarchal perspectives and policies of 
the Diyanet and organized seminars on feminist readings of Islamic texts (Akman 2008: 85).  
 As mentioned previously, in the aftermath of the 28 February 1997 military intervention, 
the headscarf ban was strictly applied in public institutions. More than a hundred thousand 
students and ten thousand public servants were deprived of their status (AKDER 2010: 16). All 
three Islamist women’s CSOs – GIKAP, BKP, and AKDER - argued that the headscarf ban is a 
violation of the basic rights of women, as it hinders women’s participation in the educational, 
professional, and political life. Therefore, the struggle against headscarf-related discrimination 
against women was the most important issue on their agenda. In addition to organizing public 
protests calling for lifting the headscarf-ban, members of BKP, GIKAP, and AKDER held public 
events to discuss and publicize their right to wear headscarves in public institutions as a matter 
of ‘right to education and work’ and ‘freedom of religion’ (Marshall 2005; Saktanber and 
Çorbacıoğlu 2008). In other words, they based their arguments on a universal human rights 
discourse (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008: 792). BKP emphasized that the participation of women, 
veiled or not, in educational and professional life will strengthen women’s status within Turkish 
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society.146 These Islamist women had nothing in common with the traditional image of Muslim 
women as uneducated, passive, and devoted to the family; on the contrary, they were publicly 
visible, politically active and educated women (Arat 2005; Göle 1996b).   
 Islamist women’s demand to be recognized as equal citizens, free to claim entitlement to 
education, work and political participation, was a fully democratic claim (Seckinelgin 2006: 751). 
However, Turkish public opinion in the 1990s did not consider these Islamist women with 
headscarves as democratic agents. The secularist state elite, the media, and the Kemalist 
segments in society made headscarves into “the object of fear of Islamization” (Ozcetin 2009: 
113). They have not tolerated the presence of Islamist women activists in the public sphere. 
Turam rightly argues that Islamist women became the “scapegoat’” of the tension between 
Islamist politics and the Kemalist state (2008: 479).  
 While the headscarf issue was a priority for organized Islamist women, they have also 
paid attention to the issue of women’s rights. Before forming their organizations, a group of 
women from BKP and GIKAP participated in international meetings such as the Beijing UN 
Conference on Women (1995) and Istanbul Habitat II Conference on Human Settlements (1996). 
As they discussed women’s problems with other women activists from different parts of the 
world, they acknowledged that women, independent of their social, cultural, religious, or ethnic 
identity, experience discrimination because of their gender. Accordingly, both GIKAP and BKP 
began to develop their arguments from a woman’s perspective. They began to criticize the 
headscarf ban not only as the state’s interference in the religiosity of its citizens, but also as a 
violation of women’s rights to education and work.  
 In the 1990s, Islamist women’s CSOs were not very active in the issue of violence against 
women. They emphasized improving women’s status in their families, but without focusing on 
domestic violence. In the second half of the 1990s, they addressed the state’s violent acts towards 
women with headscarves, but only few Islamist women activists referred to the issue of domestic 
violence. The reasons for Islamist women’s groups’ lack of interest in this issue can be explained 
as follows: First, they were primarily occupied with asserting themselves as citizens in the 
strictly secularist public space and as individual actors within the Islamist movement. Hence, 
                                                          
146 Personal communication with H. Tuksal, October 2010, Ankara. 
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they rather focused on the question of social and political inclusion. Second, Islamist women’s 
CSOs were newcomers within the broader women’s movement; thus, they were inexperienced 
in framing women’s problems and finding solutions. Third, they neglected the issue of violence 
because the experts in the area were feminist CSOs, with whom Islamist women were not in a 
dialogue.  
 Islamist women’s CSOs in the 1990s brought about a variety of political and cultural 
debates in Turkey. Most importantly, they led to a reconsideration of the Kemalist 
understanding of secularism and the secular public sphere. Interestingly, the efforts of Islamist 
women activists led organized feminists to realize that religious women were prevented from 
participating in public life because of their gender identity, while Islamist men could enjoy 
public life without facing any kind of discrimination. Feminists in Turkey normally criticized 
the Islamist doctrines regarding the covering women’s bodies, on the ground that these 
doctrines suppress women’s sexuality. In contrast, Islamist women activists claimed that 
wearing a headscarf “frees them from being sexual objects” and enables them to participate in 
public life (Marshall 2005: 110). Accordingly, some feminists began to understand and defend 
Islamist women’s claims. These feminists argued that women might be able to participate in 
public life regardless of their style of dress (Arat 2008: 412). Conversely, secularist Kemalist 
women disliked the visibility of Islamist women in the public sphere and considered them a 
‘threat’ to Turkish secularism.147  
 At the end of the 1990s, there were more than 300 Islamist women’s CSOs including 
associations, foundations, cultural clubs, and other groups. Islamist women activists were 
divided among themselves with regard to their approaches to women’s issues (Marshall 2005: 
107). The “orthodox” groups interpreted women’s role and gender relations in society in 
traditional Islamic terms, whereas “non-orthodox”, or “reformist”, groups supported women’s 
participation in public and political life (Akman 2008: 75; Marshall 2005: 107). But both sides have 
agreed that Islam requires veiling and expressed a commitment to Islamic duties.  
Organized Islamist women have managed to establish themselves as an important group 
within the broader scope of organized women in Turkey, but they have not always found a 
                                                          
147  Chapter 9 discusses in detail how Kemalist women activists approach the headscarf issue and Islamist women’s 
activism. 
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common ground on which to work on women’s issues together with other women’s groups (Arat 
2008; Marshall 2005). However, the democratized political realm in the aftermath of Turkey’s 
acceptance for EU membership candidacy (1999) provided Islamist women’s organizations with 
opportunities to interact with the broader women’s rights movement in Turkey. During the 
political reform process for the EU candidacy, the most important topic on women’s rights 
movement was reforming the Civil Code.  
The Process of Amending the Civil Code  
The working and lobbying groups dealing with the revision of the Civil Code were dominated by 
feminist and secularist Kemalist women, who had been working on the Civil Code since the 
1980s. The Islamist women’s CSOs considered here were not included in these groups. But during 
the nationwide campaign launched by WWHR in 2001 (cf. Chapter 6), activists of BKP and AKDER 
supported the draft proposal on equal property sharing in case of divorce. After the new Civil 
Code was enacted in January 2002, organized Islamist women were involved in promoting the 
new Code. To this end, they organized meetings and seminars that informed women on their 
rights in marriage. Fatma Benli, a member of the advisory board of AKDER, emphasized in our 
interview: “The important thing is to inform society about changes in the laws pertaining to 
women’s lives. If society acknowledges that women have equal rights, then we can have real 
change”.  
 During the amending process of the Civil Code, the cooperation among different 
women’s CSOs displayed that a women’s coalition can overcome barriers among organized 
women. Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal from BKP was well known in feminist circles, and she worked 
with women activists from diverse groups on different platforms. In December 2001, after the 
USA invaded Afghanistan, BKP joined the anti-war platform called the ‘Permanent Women’s 
Platform for Peace’ with women from feminist, leftist, and Kurdish CSOs and parties in Ankara.148 
This platform stressed that since women and children suffer most in wars, it aims to challenge 
militaristic violence and the oppression of women and to struggle against rising nationalism and 
racism (Işık 2004). This experience helped BKP develop closer relations with secular feminists, 
leftist and Kurdish groups. In the midst of the political reform process for EU candidacy, the 
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parliamentary elections took place in November 2002 and the newly formed Islamist AKP came 
to power.  
7.4 The Participation and Inclusion of Islamist Women’s CSOs in the AKP Era 
Some members of BKP were founders of the AKP.149 The party came to power with the promise 
of removing constraints on civil rights and freedoms, including the headscarf ban, and offered 
a golden opportunity for Islamist segments of CS to integrate in the political system. Not 
surprisingly, Islamist women’s CSOs hoped to solve the problems arising from the headscarf ban. 
They believed that it would be easier to interact and cooperate with the Islamist AKP than with 
previous Turkish governments. 
 In the decade since the AKP came to power, organized Islamist women have widened 
their scope in the struggle for women’s empowerment. Although the primary focus of Islamist 
women’s CSOs has been discrimination against religious women because of the headscarf ban, 
they have also engaged in strengthening women’s equal rights and combating violence against 
women.  
Violence against Women 
Organized Islamist women first joined the struggle against violence against women in the 2000s, 
especially during the process of amending the Turkish Penal Code. They began to engage in 
campaigns against domestic violence and developed their own ways of preventing violence 
against women.  Like other women’s group, they used a human rights framework and declared 
that domestic violence is a violation of human rights. In combating violence against women, 
Islamist women organizations have emphasized three important points: 1) improving existing 
laws regarding violence against women, 2) increasing the cooperation between local state 
institutions, such as municipalities and governorates, and CSOs in establishing women’s 
shelters, and 3) raising women’s awareness of their legal rights. The amendment to the Penal 
Code was an important step in the struggle against violence against women.  
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The Reform Process of the Turkish Penal Code  
When the Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code prepared legal proposals to make 
gender-sensitive amendments to the Penal Code, Fatma Benli from AKDER participated in this 
working group and drew attention to the discrepancy between the existing laws in the Penal 
Code and the requirements of the CEDAW treaty. Likewise, Fatma Bostan Ünsal from BKP was 
also active in the Women’s Platform (Alemdar 2013: 144). It was the first time that Islamist 
women CSOs worked together with secularist Kemalist women’s CSOs. 
During the reform process, some legal proposals encountered strong resistance from 
religiously conservative MPs. Both Benli and Akbulut from AKDER underlined in our interview 
that it was important to lobby AKP politicians by conveying the views of politically active 
Islamist women, who were seen by Islamist politicians as their own clientele. GIKAP was 
indirectly included in the reform process since AKDER is one of its member organizations. As a 
result of the intensive advocacy and lobbying activities of all women’s groups and the pressure 
rising from the EU accession process, the majority of the proposals of the Women’s Platform 
were accepted (cf. Chapter 5).  
 After the ratification of the revised Penal Code in September 2004, BKP also joined the 
‘Ankara Women’s Platform on the Penal Code’, which was coordinated by the influential feminist 
CSO ‘Flying Broom’ (Uçan Süpürge). The BKP was invited to the meeting of the Ankara Platform 
that was formed to promote the amended Penal Code. Safiye Özdemir from BKP contributed to 
the preparation of the public statement and presented the views of BKP: “We have worked a lot, 
struggled a lot, and the achievements are our success. But women of this country deserve more. 
For more freedom, for more democratic Turkey we must continue our struggle!”150 Like other 
women’s CSOs, BKP also published brochures, posters, and CDs presenting the changes in the 
Penal Code and sent them to different regions in Turkey. 
 All three CSOs have promoted the new laws in the Penal Code. Fatma Benli from AKDER, 
for instance, prepared reports explaining the new regulations and laws protecting women and 
children from violence. She also prepared a detailed brochure on the Penal Code. Similarly, BKP 
listed the new laws in the Penal Code on its website and worked to inform women about their 
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rights in cases of domestic violence.151 GIKAP welcomed the new regulations such as the removal 
of the notion of ‘consent of the child’ in sexual abuse, harsher sentences for ‘honor killings’, and 
the clarification of the definition of sex crimes. Islamist women’s CSOs have also organized 
meetings to discuss the new laws and their benefits for the family. Some traditionalist Islamist 
women from GIKAP were not necessarily advocates of new provisions such as ‘decriminalizing 
adultery’. They rather stressed the regulations that deal with sexual offences against women 
and children.152 
 After the revision of the Penal Code, Islamist women’s CSOs began to engage in the 
struggle against domestic violence and underlined the importance of women’s shelters for 
protection of women and children from violence.  
Women’s Shelters 
None of the Islamist women’s CSOs analyzed here run a women’s shelter. However, they 
participate in the annual meetings of the aforementioned Assembly of Women’s Shelters and 
Counseling/Solidarity Centers (cf. Chapter 6). There they participate in workshops, acquire the 
latest information about the extent of violence against women in Turkey, and exchange ideas 
with other women’s rights organizations and state officials on how to better protect women and 
children from violence. Özgür Sunata from the feminist group Purple Roof claimed in our 
interview that there were minor disputes between Islamist and Kemalist women activists in the 
working groups at the Assembly. This was mainly because Kemalist women were showing their 
disapproval of headscarves, which did not fit the image of a ‘modern’ Turkish woman. Organized 
Islamist women, especially the AKDER and BKP, have avoided these kinds of confrontations.  
 Islamist women’s CSOs are pleased with the new regulations aimed at protecting women 
and children from violence, but they argue that the AKP government needs to be stricter in the 
enforcement of the laws. Both BKP and AKDER underline on their websites the need to establish 
more women’s shelters in Turkey. In this regard, they welcomed the enactment of Article 14 of 
the Municipality Law (No 5393) that requires municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants 
to establish women’s shelters. Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER pointed out in our interview: 
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“The most effective action against domestic violence is to enable women to move away 
from the violent environment, in other words, to provide women with shelters. Although 
municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are required to establish women’s 
shelters, the number of women’s shelters in Turkey is low, and municipalities that fail to 
implement the law face no sanctions. If the political parties in the Turkish Parliament 
are sincere in this policy, they need to push the local authorities and impose sanctions. 
Most of the time, women experiencing violence, including the ones who apply to AKDER, 
think that they cannot live alone because they are dependent on their husbands’ income. 
Therefore, state institutions should offer women guarantees enabling them to live on 
their own. This is why AKDER sees women’s shelters as vital in rehabilitating women and 
enabling them to get on with their lives in a healthy way.” 
One of the member organizations of GIKAP, the ‘Association of Compassion’ (Şefkat Derneği, 
ŞEFKAT-DER) has a women’s shelter in Konya, a major province in Central Anatolia. It has helped 
approximately 6,000 women and children who were poor, homeless, victims of violence and 
prostitution, homeless children, or orphans.153 ŞEFKAT-DER collects donations through a variety 
of activities, offers educational courses for women, helps children in the shelter in their 
homework, and informs schools about the sensitive situation of these children. It has also 
directed many needy women to other women’s organizations. 
Further Efforts for the Prevention of Domestic Violence 
Despite the positive legal changes in the Penal Code, violence against women, especially 
domestic violence, continues to be a major problem in Turkey. Organized women have thus 
pointed to the need to revise the aforementioned Law on the Protection of the Family (No. 4320). 
The law was amended in 2007, but did not provide protection for non-married women. This 
implied that women with religious marriages (imam nikahı) could not benefit from this law. 
Islamist women’s CSOs argued that women, married (religiously or legally) or not, can be victims 
of violence, and that they have to be protected under any circumstances. Therefore, they joined 
the aforementioned ‘Stop Violence Platform’, where they worked together with feminist, 
Kurdish, and secularist Kemalist women’s CSOs (cf. Chapter 6). 
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 During the process of amending Law 4320, Fatma Benli from AKDER, for instance, worked 
on several legal proposals pertaining to violence against women. She defined different forms of 
violence and prepared highly detailed reports on laws and regulations relating to domestic 
violence. Similarly, legal experts from BKP were also active in the process and participated in 
the working group on Law 4320. These Islamist women activists tried to balance between 
women’s CSOs and officials of KSGM. After long disputes between women activists and officials, 
on 8 March 2011, the new Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women (6284) 
was enacted. Fatma Benli from AKDER argued in our interview that the new law provides 
extensive protection and assistance to victims of violence, but she agrees with feminist 
organizations that the law emphasized ‘the protection of the family’, rather than ‘the protection 
of women as individuals’.   
 On the issue of violence against women, BKP is the most engaged Islamist women’s CSO. 
It emphasizes two important points in combating domestic violence against women: the 
importance of the state’s responsibility and raising men’s awareness of violence against women. 
In July 2007, BKP participated in the workshop of KSGM’s first National Action Plan to Fight 
Domestic Violence against Women (2007-2010) (cf. Chapter 5). Initially, participants from 
various state institutions, CSOs, and universities defined different forms of violence.  As Nurşen 
Orakçı from BKP explained, the participants then discussed short and long-term plans to reduce 
domestic violence against women with the representatives of KSGM.154 They pointed to several 
problems in the implementation of the project and worked on developing alternatives and 
solutions for combating domestic violence. BKP actively participated in drafting the first 
National Action Plan against Domestic Violence.155 One of its main tasks was to train state 
officials in gender equality and the issue of violence against women. In this regard, BKP assisted 
in the trainings given by KSGM to the personnel of Diyanet. Moreover, in 2014, BKP embarked on 
a new project called “Its Subject is Man” in cooperation with the Maraş branch of the Union of 
Personnel of Diyanet, which is supported by the influential Turkish CSO Sabancı Foundation and 
the UNDP.156  
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 Fatma Benli from AKDER stated in our interview that she, as a lawyer, supported three 
projects dealing with the violence against women in 2011, two of which were in Ankara. She said 
that: “To combat violence against women, both CSOs and state institutions have to develop 
concrete solutions. In particular, state institutions talk about the urgency of the problem, but 
do not act accordingly. For instance, they do not implement laws correctly”. Benli argued that 
the Supreme Court (Yargıtay) and the Council of State (Danıştay) of the Turkish Republic have 
not changed their sexist views on women’s bodily rights, and that judicial personnel still see 
women as a symbol of the family’s honor. For instance, both the Supreme Court and the Council 
of State still want evidence of the family’s intent in cases of ‘murder following customary law’ 
to understand the background of the murder. However, the decision to kill a female member of 
the family is usually taken in a family gathering, and this collective decision is not easy to prove. 
Fatma Benli thus argues that murder in the name of customary law needs to be classified as an 
‘aggravated homicide’ in the Penal Code, and that the sentence of the perpetrator may not be 
reduced in any circumstances. 
 In sum, Islamist women CSOs joined the struggle to eliminate violence against women 
and children. But a prominent women’s rights lawyer from the ‘Izmir Women’s Solidarity 
Association’ (Izmir Kadın Dayanışma Derneği) claimed that Islamist women’s CSOs in general are 
not well organized in dealing with the issue of violence against women.157 As discussed above, 
Islamist women’s organizations are not as persistent as feminist or Kemalist women CSOs are, 
but they work for the recognition of the domestic violence as an ‘unacceptable practice’ among 
religious segments of society. Encounters with legal experts from Islamist women’s CSOs equip 
more traditionalist religious women with up-to-date information about their legal rights and 
improve their ability to be vocal or to act against domestic violence. As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
Altınay and Arat (2009) underline the efforts of women’s organizations in raising public 
awareness of domestic violence, and Islamist women’s CSOs have arguably contributed to this 
effect. 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
In the last decade, Islamist women activists have paid a great deal of attention to strengthening 
women’s rights and gender equality. As mentioned above, they actively participated in the 
                                                          
157 Personal interview with Sevgi Binbir, September 2011, Izmir. 
177 
 
reform process of the Penal Code and lobbied the AKP politicians to push for changes. However, 
they assert that the most important step in strengthening women’s rights is to inform women 
of their existing rights both in the Civil and Penal Code. To this end, AKDER launched a national 
project in 2011, which aimed to supervise women’s groups in different regions of Turkey in their 
struggle for women’s empowerment.158 AKDER thereby aimed to equip these women’s CSOs with 
necessary information about the existing laws and regulations on women’s rights. Likewise, BKP 
worked with the aforementioned Sabancı Foundation on empowering women in accordance with 
the UNDP’s gender equality strategy, which aims to empower women and girls to fully realize 
their rights in all spheres of life.159 
 As mentioned above, the Civil Code provision regarding equal share of property in case 
of divorce applies only to marriages that took place after the renewal of the Civil Code in 2002. 
Like feminist CSOs, Islamist women’s CSOs have criticized this regulation and advocated the 
application of this law to all marriages. In this regard, AKDER provides legal counseling for 
women and helps them with issues such as property sharing and custody after divorce. Fatma 
Benli from AKDER is also a prominent advocate of amending the law on property sharing. At the 
time of our interview, she was working on a case in which her female client could not acquire 
half of the property because she was married before 2002. She stated that if her client’s claim 
was not accepted in the Turkish courts, she would apply to the CEDAW committee. If the CEDAW 
committee decides that her client is discriminated against, then Turkey as a signatory state has 
to reconsider and revise the law concerning property sharing. Fatma Benli also provides free 
legal services to women applying to the Istanbul Bar Association. Other than AKDER, both GIKAP 
and BKP also direct women to legal experts in case of divorce, or inform them by individual 
correspondence about their rights according to the Civil Code.  
 In order to raise awareness of gender equality, both BKP and AKDER were supportive of 
the KSGM’s project on training the personnel of Diyanet on gender equality and domestic 
violence and emphasized the need to overcome traditional customs inhibiting gender equality 
(KSGM 2012: 14). Since 2009, KSGM in cooperation with BKP and AKDER has educated 2,400 
public servants of Diyanet on gender equality and women’s rights (Ibid.). Moreover, both AKDER 
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and GIKAP are members of the KSGM commissions dealing with women’s education and health 
and have thereby direct influence in policy-making and implementation processes.  
 Furthermore, Islamist women’s CSOs pay special attention to women’s education. They 
see women’s education as crucial in enabling women to acquire economic and social 
independence (Ozcetin 2009: 113). To this end, they provide financial support to female students 
and girls from poor families. As the interviewees stated, BKP and AKDER also offer educational 
courses and programs for women, such as English course, computer usage, music or handicrafts, 
to strengthen women’s personal development. Likewise, GIKAP organizes workshops on youth 
and consumption, education, social media and social responsibilities.160 Some organizations 
under the umbrella of GIKAP have also organized seminars on Western and Islamic sciences and 
created working groups on women’s and human rights.161  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, KADER has demanded introduction of a minimum 
30 percent gender quota system in political parties and elections laws. In different occasions, 
BKP and AKDER have supported the introduction of political quotas and approved of KADER’s 
efforts to support and train female candidates with headscarves in local and parliamentary 
elections. Nevertheless, none of the Islamist women’s CSOs considered here have been directly 
engaged in encouraging women to participate in politics.  
 Islamist women’s CSOs also stress that health facilities are essential for the well-being of 
women and children. They have drawn attention to the poor condition in health facilities, which 
increases infant mortality rates and endangers women’s health. GIKAP and AKDER, for instance, 
organize educational seminars on family and health and offer information about sexual health 
and reproductive rights with the aim of strengthening families.162 These activities have been 
conducted with the help of women from other CSOs that work on physical and mental health in 
Turkish society. With regard to women’s reproductive rights, the most contentious issue is 
access to abortion. Unlike feminist women, who see the right to abortion as a fundamental part 
of woman’s right to control her own body, Islamist women in general are against abortion, 
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except under certain circumstances such as rape, or if the mother’s life is endangered. However, 
in the summer of 2012, when there were intense public debates about abortion in Turkey, they 
supported the claims of feminist CSOs. 
Islamist Women and the Abortion Debate 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, abortion was not a public debate since the military 
legalized it in 1983. But, on 26 May 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan gave a speech at the third 
congress of the AKP’s women’s branch, in which he equated abortion with murder. He stated 
that “every abortion is Uludure”, referring to the Kurdish village close to the Turkey-Iraq border 
where thirty-four civilians, mostly children, were killed by the Turkish military forces on 30 
December 2011 (Radikal 26 May 2012).163 This speech provoked a furious public response. 
Through his speech, Erdoğan exposed not only his religious-conservative opinion on the bodily 
rights of women, but also his exclusionary political discourse towards Kurdish citizens. In 
February 2013, the AKP government drafted a bill to make legal abortion almost impossible. 
Later, the government appeared to retreat from its initial position when challenged by women’s 
CSOs, the national and international press as well as the international organizations such as the 
UN. However, despite the right to have abortion until the tenth week of pregnancy, many 
doctors in state hospitals reject to perform abortions by saying that it is prohibited (Yüncüler 
2014). 
 Meanwhile, some Islamist women have criticized the AKP’s discourse on abortion. 
Meryem Ilayda Atlas, an Islamist activist and journalist, criticized Erdoğan in her column in a 
Turkish daily newspaper, saying that “he is trying to impose specific beliefs and views on 
citizens and uses an exclusionist discourse” (Atlas 2012). Similarly, Hidayet Tuksal from BKP 
criticized Erdoğan in an interview with Turkish daily newspaper Akşam: “The government failed 
to manage the abortion debate. It has been raised without discussing it with NGOs, experts or 
medical doctors. It is absurd that rather than building a participative and pluralist democracy, 
we move towards a one-man presidency system where only the prime minister will decide” 
(Çelik 2012). Likewise, Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER stressed in an interview: “We [Islamist 
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women] are from our perspective against abortion, if it is used as birth control. But women do 
not undergo abortions on a whim. One has to look first at the reasons behind the abortion; it can 
be the result of rape or incest. Hence, government representatives should avoid making such 
harsh statements” (Kara 2012). Both Tuksal and Akbulut underscored women’s bodily rights, 
which also include wearing a headscarf, and argued that the state may not interfere in women’s 
bodily rights. They were disturbed by the patronizing language of the AKP government and 
believed that the AKP was using the abortion issue as a political maneuver to conceal the truth 
behind the bombing incident that took place in Uludere (Aksoy 2015). In contrast, GIKAP was 
silent on this issue. One of GIKAP activities is family planning, and it rather encourages women 
to have children. But surprisingly, in 2004, GIKAP was involved in meetings in east of Turkey 
that aimed to inform women in the region about ‘women and legal developments’, ‘right to life-
abortion’, and ‘women’s reproductive health’ by women’s organizations from Istanbul. This 
partly shows that they are open to the issue, but abstain from publicly discussing abortion.  
 In general, organized Islamist women see abortion as an issue concerning the female 
body and suggest that it needs to be discussed in relation to women’s experiences. Since they 
suffered under the secularist state’s intervention into their physical appearance in the headscarf 
issue, they did not hesitate to criticize the state’s interference with women’s bodily rights. Non-
orthodox Islamist women activists from BKP took part in the petition (Abortion is a Right) 
initiated by feminist women and supported their cause in their public statements or in their 
interviews in Turkish newspapers. As discussed, some Islamist women activists publicly blamed 
the AKP leadership for using the issue politically, rather than thinking reasonably about 
women’s health or birth control.  
 The efforts of Islamist women’s CSOs and their cooperation with other women’s 
organizations in strengthening women’s rights brought remarkable changes in the legal 
framework (in the Penal Code and in Law 6284) and women-friendly outcomes in gender 
policies. According to Neslihan Akbulut, the general secretary of AKDER, their lobbying 
activities for improving women’s rights have been fruitful in general, except for the attempt to 
lift the headscarf ban. Discrimination against women with headscarves has continued to be a 
problem. 
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Discrimination against Women  
Once or twice a year since 2003, Islamist women have organized a meeting called ‘Women’s 
Meetings’ (Kadın Buluşmaları) to discuss women’s rights and discrimination against women. This 
event brings more than seventy-five Islamist women’s CSOs together with state officials, 
journalists, academics, and politicians. The participants discuss traditions, customs, and laws 
that discriminate women in economic, social, cultural, and political life.164 They also delve into 
issues such as family, children, abortion, sexual problems, women’s labor and productivity, and 
the effects of war on women. These meetings provide religious women with a form of platform 
in which to exchange their experiences, to develop solutions to their problems, and to support 
each other. Both Hidayet Tuksal from BKP and Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER stressed the 
importance of Women’s Meetings that provide organized Islamist women a common platform 
to discuss about women’s status in Turkey.  
 The Islamist women’s CSOs considered here have also attended international events 
focusing on women’s rights and gender equality. There they have discussed the deficiencies of 
the Turkish legal framework, especially regarding the headscarf ban. BKP was the first Islamist 
women’s CSO involved in the ‘CEDAW Civil Society Platform’ in 2005 and participated in the pre-
session working group drafting the aforementioned shadow reports that are submitted to the 
CEDAW Committee. BKP and AKDER members also disseminated information to the CEDAW 
Committee about the headscarf ban in Turkey. They realized that the Committee members had 
no information about the ban. As a result of their lobbying efforts, in 2006, the CEDAW 
Committee asked the Turkish state about the headscarf ban (Turkey’s Interim Report to the 
CEDAW Committee 2012). This was a major breakthrough because they thereby pushed the 
Turkish state to explain the headscarf ban and its consequences on women’s lives in its next 
report. 
Similarly, AKDER participated in the meetings of the CEDAW Committee in New York and 
presented reports about women’s human rights in Turkey. In 2007, AKDER and twenty other 
women’s CSOs prepared a shadow report, explaining how women experience discrimination 
because of the headscarf ban, and criticized the deficiencies in Turkish laws. As Fatma Benli 
                                                          
164 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=513#more-513 (rev. 30.03.2014) 
182 
 
explained in our interview: “A woman journalist, who was a member of an NGO, supported our 
shadow report and talked about our meeting in her article. Afterwards, we were asked by the 
local government to submit our written documents and reports, otherwise we would be 
punished. We were then put under state’s investigation”.  According to Benli, this investigation 
was motivated by the discomfort of secularists within the judiciary with the report. However, 
the Islamist AKP government, despite its promises to lift the headscarf ban, has not supported 
AKDER. In 2010, the CEDAW Committee asked Turkey to undertake studies to evaluate the 
impact of the ban on wearing headscarves in the fields of education, employment, health 
services, political and public life (Turkey’s Interim Report to the CEDAW Committee 2012). 
 Both interviewees from AKDER and BKP argued that in order to combat discriminatory 
practices towards women, it is very important to strengthen and extend fundamental rights and 
freedoms. They stated that the struggle against gender-based discrimination cannot be 
undertaken without the struggle for human rights and democracy. To this end, BKP regularly 
cooperates with other segments of CS (especially with Kurdish CSOs) on campaigns regarding 
human rights and torture, and use their websites, or the printed media, to voice their opinions 
about human rights and democracy.165 For instance, in 2012, both AKDER and BKP criticized the 
approach of the AKP government towards aforementioned Uludere incident, in which 34 
Kurdish citizens died when they were attacked by Turkish military forces. They participated in 
a petition calling for an investigation and demanding that the perpetrators should face trial.166  
 As mentioned earlier, Islamist women’s CSOs have framed their opposition to the 
headscarf ban in the context of discrimination against women. The Kemalist state and Kemalist 
civil society groups have seen women wearing headscarves in public institutions as opponents 
of secularism, rather than considering their demands in terms of citizenship rights (Seckinelgin 
2006: 763). As both interviewees remarked, AKDER and BKP have been involved in the EU 
accession process by informing European officials about the problems of veiled women in public 
institutions and by cooperating with women’s CSOs in Europe. In 2004, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) decided in a lawsuit, filed by a headscarf-wearing university student 
(Leyla Şahin) against the Turkish state, that the headscarf ban is indeed violation of the right to 
                                                          
165 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=664, and http://www.ak-der.org/vizyon.gbt (rev. 20.11.2014) 
166 http://roboskiicinadalet.wordpress.com/ (rev. 9.12.2014) 
183 
 
education and freedom of religion, but that the ban was justified considering the Turkish 
political context (Kancı et al. 2010: 25). Islamist women’s CSOs saw this decision as guided by the 
EU’s political agenda and inconsistent with European ideals of freedom (Ibid.: 26). After the 
ECtHR decision, Islamist women’s CSOs remained silent until the headscarf once again became 
the object of conflict between the AKP and the secularist military in 2007. 
Headscarf Debate 
As discussed in Chapter 4, under the AKP government, the first political contention relating to 
the headscarf debate was during the April 2007 presidential elections. The AKP’s candidate was 
the former foreign minister Abdullah Gül. The military objected to Mr. Gül’s candidacy on the 
grounds that he had an Islamist background and that his wife wore a headscarf. Kemalist civil 
society groups, especially Kemalist women, organized mass demonstrations to show that they 
were not comfortable with the idea of having a headscarf-wearing first lady, which in their view 
would ruin Turkey’s modern and secular image (Aksoy 2015). Also, they wanted to prevent the 
AKP from consolidating its power by controlling the presidency. On their websites and in their 
newspaper interviews, BKP, AKDER, and GIKAP denounced the military’s discriminatory attitude 
towards Gül’s wife because of her headscarf.  
 The main confrontation between secularist elites and the AKP took place in January 2008, 
when the AKP government proposed a law to lift the ban on headscarves in public universities. 
The AKP avoided using religious references and aimed to amend Article 10 on “equality and 
equal treatment before law” and Article 42 on “right to education” in the Constitution (Arat 
2010b: 872). With the help of the nationalist MPs from the MHP, the Turkish Parliament passed 
the proposal for the constitutional change that allowed headscarves at universities (Akboğa 
2013; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 2008; Turam 2008). Secularist segments of CS were in an uproar 
over this law and demonstrated to demand the resignation of the AKP government. However, 
public universities continued to enforce the total ban on headscarves. As mentioned in Chapter 
4, the AKP faced closure in March 2008 because of “undermining the constitutional principle of 
secularism”, but the Constitutional Court decided not to ban the party. On 5 June 2008, however, 
the Constitutional Court annulled the new law and reinstated the headscarf ban in universities. 
GIKAP, BKP, and AKDER condemned the decision of the Constitutional Court and remarked that 
all citizens must be treated equally, independent of their religious identity. During the drafting 
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of the law, the AKP has not consulted with Islamist women’s CSOs, who are considered to be  the 
main experts on the issue. Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER argued that: “All political parties, 
including the incumbent AKP, use the headscarf issue as a part of their political games”. She 
believes that it would have been much easier if the AKP government had cooperated with 
Islamist women’s CSOs that work on the headscarf ban ever since they were founded. These CSOs 
have vast amounts of information on the impact of the headscarf ban on religious women’s lives, 
which would have better supported the draft proposal on lifting the headscarf ban. 
 While Kemalist women organized mass demonstrations to protest the attempt to legalize 
headscarves in public institutions, organized Islamist women were not mobilized. As Hidayet 
Tuksal from BKP stated in our interview, the reason for the silence and invisibility of Islamist 
women activists is that “veiled women strongly believe that the AKP would at some point solve 
the headscarf problem”. Islamist women’s CSOs employed other strategies to deal with the 
headscarf issue. At the beginning of 2010, AKDER launched a petition called “28 February will 
not continue 100 years” (28 Şubat 100 yıl sürmez) on an Internet blog, calling for the headscarf ban 
to be lifted.167 In this campaign, AKDER criticized the strict secularism of the Turkish state and 
claimed that the headscarf ban is an offence against their religious identity and individual 
freedom as well as against their personal choices. Both GIKAP and BKP supported this claim and 
argued that the Turkish state restricts women’s bodily rights by defining how they should 
appear in public life. This campaign was also supported by several feminist organizations, 
academics, writers, and journalists. In fact, Islamist women were successful in keeping the topic 
alive in public debates, but they did not manage to influence the AKP government.  
 In February 2013, BKP, in a public statement, presented its suggestions for the 
improvement of laws relating to the rights of state officials, especially for veiled state officials 
banned from their jobs. Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER and Hidayet Tuksal from BKP argued in 
our interviews that the AKP and its predecessors have instrumentalized the headscarf issue to 
gain electoral support from their conservative, traditionalist base, who in reality would not want 
to see women participate in the public realm. Saktanber rightly states that Islamists men tend 
to interpret women’s presence in the public sphere not as a matter of empowering women’s 
                                                          
167 http://28subat1000yilsuremez.blogspot.com/ (rev. 1.09.2012) 
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individual autonomy or freedom, but as a way of increasing the symbolic presence of Islam in 
society (2006: 27). Thus, the AKP leadership did not take the gender-based needs and interests 
of Islamist women into account in dealing with the headscarf issue. Moreover, both organized 
Islamist and feminist women argued that the AKP and Erdoğan have used the headscarf debate 
to divide the women’s movement into conflicting camps and weaken their solidarity. 
 Surprisingly, on 12 July 2013, the Turkish Parliament accepted an amnesty law that 
allows veiled women banned from their works at state institutions between 28 February 1997 
and 14 February 2005 to return to their jobs, and veiled students to return to their educational 
institutions.168 This law came into effect in a ‘law package No. 6495’ (torba yasa) and lifted the 
long-standing restriction on wearing headscarves. On 30 September 2013, as part of a greater 
reform package for further democratization, the AKP government lifted the headscarf ban in 
state institutions, except for judges, prosecutors, police officers and members of the armed 
forces.169 In October 2013, four AKP MPs entered the Turkish Parliament wearing headscarves 
for the first time in the history of Turkish Republic. Although the ban on headscarves is still 
effective in the judiciary and in security forces, Islamist women activists welcomed this 
groundbreaking development. They immediately began to inform veiled women on how they 
can return to their jobs at the state institutions and obtain compensation for health insurance 
premiums and pension contributions.170 In principle, Islamist women finally succeeded in being 
accepted as equal citizens and can now participate in the public sphere without any hindrances. 
But as the prominent female Islamist activist Yıldız Ramazanoğlu emphasized in an interview, 
“lifting the ban does not lift the boundaries in people’s mind” (Tahaoğlu 2013). 
Conclusion 
From the 1980s to the end of the 1990s, the struggle of organized Islamist women concentrated 
on expanding public space for women with headscarves. Islamist women’s CSOs thus demanded 
to be treated equally; i.e., without impediments to their participation in economic, political, and 
social life. In the 2000s, their political rhetoric evolved from being ‘victims’ towards being 
‘agents of change’. As discussed in the present chapter, they aimed at women’s participation and 
                                                          
168 http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?m=201308 (rev. 01.04.2014) 
169 http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/150276-demokratiklesme-paketinde-neler-var (rev. 01.04.2014) 
170 http://www.ak-der.org/haberoku.aspx?hid=279 (rev. 20.11.2014) 
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inclusion in the newly forming public space during the AKP government. Besides discrimination 
against women, Islamist women, especially BKP and AKDER, began to engage in combating 
violence against women and in improving women’s rights and gender equality in Turkey. 
Contrary to the claims of several scholars (Coşar and Onbaşi 2008; Kadıoğlu 2005; Marshall 2005), 
Islamist women CSOs under consideration do not refuse to cooperate with other women’s CSOs 
or exclude non-Islamist political identities. It became especially clear when AKDER, GIKAP, and 
BKP collaborated with other women’s groups during policy-making processes for the laws 
concerning prevention of violence against women and women’s rights. As recent literature on 
Islamist women has also shown, Islamist women’s CSOs fight not only for the freedom to wear 
headscarves in public life, though this has been their priority, but also for the improvement of 
women’s status in society (Ozcetin 2009; Seckinelgin 2006).  
 The examination of the activities of AKDER, BKP, and GIKAP and their participation in 
decision-making processes shows that they have been active agents in the democratic 
consolidation process in Turkey. Their autonomy from the AKP has enabled them to act 
independently and to critically monitor the government. GIKAP, for instance, has closely 
worked with the state’s women’s machinery KSGM to translate its demands into concrete 
policies. Since GIKAP’s aims in women and family polices extensively matched the government’s 
framework, the organization could exert influence on state’s gender policies. On the other hand, 
both AKDER and BKP have worked with other women’s CSOs to push or monitor the AKP 
government to continue reform gender policies. For instance, Hidayet Tuksal from BKP has 
openly criticized the government’s authoritarian mentality not only in women’s issues, but also 
in social policies. Thus, she became the target of the AKP leadership.171 However, the Islamist 
women’s CSOs considered here represent only one part of organized Islamist women. Within that 
broader field, there are orthodox groups that may cooperate with different segments of CS on 
the headscarf issue, but not on abortion or any other issue that contradicts their views.  
 However, as Islamist women activists stated, the AKP from 2007 onwards slowed down 
the reform process and instrumentalized reforms for its political interests. Hidayet Tuksal from 
                                                          
171 http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-kizdi-karaalioglu-haklisiniz-dedi-hidayet-tuksal-stardan-gitti,253648 (rev. 
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BKP contended in our interview that Erdoğan does not agree with women’s CSOs in general, and 
she added: “The only way to transmit the information on women’s demands is to influence the 
female deputies of the AKP, who in turn can convince Prime Minister Erdoğan”. It was mostly 
Fatma Şahin, the former Minister for Family and Social Policies, who tried to convince Erdoğan 
to reform gender policies. Although the AKP nominated approximately sixty women before the 
parliamentary elections in 2011, most of these women have represented Erdoğan’s political 
orientation rather than the perspectives of the Islamist women’s CSOs described in this chapter. 
Meanwhile, the AKP strives to build a conservative society acting according to its interpretation 
of Islamic tradition, and encourages diverse Islamist CSOs. As Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER 
claimed in our interview:  
“The AKP began to build its own Islamist NGOs, mostly run by the female relatives of the 
AKP leadership. These organizations conduct charity work to reach women, the poor and 
needy people, elderly or youngsters. They try to dominate the civil society sphere with 
their gender-blind political discourse and inhibit other CSOs or groups like us, which 
work on civil rights and freedoms”.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Fighting against Double Discrimination: Kurdish 
Women’s CSOs 
 
8.1 The Emergence of Kurdish Women’s Activism  
The emergence of Kurdish women’s activism in the 1990s can be seen as an amalgam of the two 
social movements: 1) the Kurdish national movement, and 2) the feminist movement. When the 
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military peaked in the 1990s, it had severe social costs 
to Kurdish women living in the south-east of Turkey: destruction of their homes or villages, 
forced migration into cities, death of their husbands and sons, which meant that women were 
left behind without any income, and abuses by the Turkish security forces. These experiences 
and the propinquity to the Kurdish political movement through the PKK-dominated ethnic 
propaganda and mobilization resulted in increased political awareness among Kurdish women 
(Gökalp 2010: 562). They began to sympathize with the Kurdish national struggle and take a more 
active role in daily and political affairs. 
 Furthermore, some Kurdish women have become active in feminist groups in Istanbul 
and Ankara, and have developed feminist consciousness. They stated that women were 
subordinated in the patriarchal tribal system dominant in Kurdish society and culture (Diner 
and Toktaş 2010; Pope 2013). Domestic violence, arranged or forced marriages, and honor 
killings were widespread phenomena in Kurdish society, and Kurdish women were accustomed 
to living without legal protection (Akkoç 2007; Arat 2008). While some young Kurdish women 
were joining the armed struggle of the PKK172, others were questioning the prevalent sexism in 
Kurdish society and the gender roles imposed upon them by Kurdish men. This process of 
questioning eventually gave way to an organized political activism of Kurdish women. Since 
                                                          
172 The PKK embraced a Marxist ideology that targeted the region's feudal system. Many Kurdish women saw in the 
PKK’s struggle not only a national cause, but also a way to their own liberation.  
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Turkish feminists have disregarded or failed to see the distinct set of experiences of Kurdish 
women, women’s rights activists across the Kurdish region began to form their own 
organizations (Arat 2008; Diner and Toktaş 2010; Yüksel 2003). The ‘Kurdishness’ became the 
defining element of the independent Kurdish women’s activism, but the main focus was to 
struggle against the patriarchal rule in Kurdish and Turkish society and to put an end to gender-
based violence. 
8.2 The Institutionalization of Kurdish Women’s Activism: Kurdish Women’s CSOs 
In contrast to the members of the early feminist and Islamist women’s activism, the forerunners 
of Kurdish women’s activism were not only middle class, educated women from urban centers, 
but also lower class women from rural areas. While some were employed, most were trying to 
find livelihood in the cities they recently moved in. The main argument of the Kurdish women 
activists was that Kurdish women face double-discrimination: they are discriminated first 
because of their ethnic identity, and second because of their gender identity. Although not all 
Kurdish women activists have been politicized within the Kurdish national movement, their 
political leanings were mainly formed in a pro-Kurdish political atmosphere. Three Kurdish 
women’s organizations stand out as the most prominent and publicly visible Kurdish women’s 
CSOs in Turkey, and they will be taken in close consideration in this chapter. 
 Arguably the most publicly known and recognized Kurdish women’s CSO in Turkey is the 
‘Women’s Center Foundation’ (Kadın Merkezi Vakfı, KAMER). A group of politically active 
educated Kurdish women in Diyarbakır173 began to question the reasons behind violence against 
women in the Kurdish region and decided to form a women’s organization to deal with the 
violence issue from a women’s perspective.174 But in the 1990s, it was difficult to establish an 
association working on social problems due to the restrictive political circumstances in the 
Kurdish region (cf. Chapter 4). Given these circumstances, in 1997, KAMER activists formed a 
small private firm and agency (Akkoç 2007: 208). The founder Nebahat Akkoç stated in our 
                                                          
173 Diyarbakır is the second largest Kurdish populated province in Turkey. 
174 Personal interview with the head of KAMER Nebahat Akkoç, November 2010, Diyarbakır. Akkoç worked as an 
elementary school teacher in Diyarbakır and was a member of the leftist teacher’s union (Eğitim-Sen) in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Her husband, also a Kurdish leftist, was killed in 1993 and he was one of the thousands of victims of death 
squads linked to the state. Akkoç said: “I was occasionally detained by security forces and severely tortured. The 
state violence, especially against women, brought me to the idea of establishing a civil society organization.” 
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interview that KAMER set two goals: 1) combating all forms of violence against women, and 2) 
raising women’s awareness of their legal rights.  
 In 2004, KAMER became an association, and since 2005 it has served as a foundation. 
KAMER regularly conducts surveys to identify cultural and traditional practices that are 
detrimental to women and children. To this end, KAMER volunteers make face-to-face 
interviews with women in their homes. Based on the findings, the organization initiates projects 
to fight discrimination and violence against women in the Kurdish region. KAMER disseminates 
gathered data and information about its activities through its website175, both in Turkish and 
Kurdish, and through the local media. It also encourages women’s entrepreneurship and 
counsels them to find access to know-how and financial resources for their start-ups (Akkoç 
2007: 210). Over the years, KAMER spread around in the Kurdish populated east and south-east 
of Turkey, opening twenty-three branches. These branches have similar aims and encourage 
women who want to actively participate in public life. Nebahat Akkoç stated in our interview 
that KAMER, as a feminist organization, has a non-hierarchical structure and takes decisions on 
the basis of voting by unanimity.176 It has working groups focusing on specific issues, but it has 
no commissions or committees.  
 Moreover, KAMER’s work for women’s empowerment is recognized internationally. 
Nebahat Akkoç has been awarded as an influential women’s rights activist on several 
international platforms. She has been listed in Time Magazine’s “Heroes of the Middle East and 
Europe” (2003) and received the “Ginetta Sagan Award” (2004) by Amnesty International  and 
the “Legion d' Honneur Medal” by France (2006). KAMER’s projects are to a great extent funded 
through international institutions such as the European Commission, the Open Society Institute, 
German political foundations (Friedrich Ebert and Heinrich Böll Foundations), and foreign 
consulates in Turkey. KAMER has also acquired grants from national donors such as the 
aforementioned Sabancı Foundation (cf. Chapter 7) and the ‘Central Finance and Contract Units’ 
                                                          
175 See: http://www.kamer.org.tr/ (rev. 07.04.2014) 
176 During the interview, I asked Nebahat Akkoç how long she acted as the head of the organization. She replied that 
she has always been the head of KAMER since she was the founder of the organization. Although she claims that 
the organization rejects hierarchy, and everyone has equal voice, it is clear that she is highly influential in the 
organization and has the final word in decision-making. 
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affiliated with the Prime Ministry. In addition to donations and grants, KAMER has a restaurant 
that partly finances the regular expenses of the organization. 
KAMER was initially viewed with suspicion by the Kurdish national movement. In its 
forming years, Nebahat Akkoç came under pressure from the PKK, which wanted to take control 
over Kurdish women’s activities (Pope 2013). Akkoç remarked in our interview: “The [Kurdish] 
BDP does not like KAMER’s autonomy and blames us to be ‘close’ to the state. Here, in the Kurdish 
region, you are either seen as a ‘statist’ or a ‘PKK-supporter’. But we are independent of all 
political parties or groups in the region.” She emphasized that KAMER believes in democratic 
plurality and embraces women from all ethnicities who search for help and support. 
 Another Diyarbakır-based Kurdish women’s organization is the ‘SELIS Women’s 
Association’ (SELIS Kadın Derneği). In 2002, a group of women, who have been active in the 
Kurdish national movement, established SELIS Women’s Center to provide legal advice, 
psychological and health care counseling to displaced Kurdish women, who are fifteen years old 
and above.177  Since 2008, SELIS has pursued its activities as an association and opened its first 
branch in cooperation with the municipality of Ergani, a town in the Diyarbakır province (SELIS 
brochure 2010). The primary aim of SELIS is to empower Kurdish women affected by the 
Kurdish-Turkish war, militarism, displacement, poverty, patriarchal traditions, and violence 
(Ibid.). Like KAMER, SELIS conducts surveys to identify the problems and needs of Kurdish 
women living in the Kurdish region and aims to develop solutions accordingly. It encourages 
women to articulate their social, economic, and political demands freely and to become active 
political subjects that are sensitive to women’s issues (Ibid.). 
 SELIS pursues its activities on a voluntary basis and hosts lawyers, psychological 
counsellors, and sociologists under its umbrella. In particular, volunteering lawyers play a 
highly important role by advising women in legal issues regarding family affairs, marriage, and 
domestic violence. SELIS has also a non-hierarchical structure. Active members build working 
committees on the issues at hand, take decisions democratically, and launch the projects. It 
                                                          
177 Personal interview with the member of the executive committee Perihan Kaya from SELIS, November 2010, 
Diyarbakır. Prior to SELIS, she has worked in the umbrella organization called the ‘Free Democratic Women’s 
Movement’ (Demokratik Özgür Kadın Hareketi, DÖKH) that is formed by women activists of the Kurdish DTP. 
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regularly collaborates with other active women’s organizations in Diyarbakır to develop 
projects to empower Kurdish women in the Kurdish region.178 It uses the local media to inform 
the public about its activities. The municipal council of Diyarbakır, run by the BDP, is one of the 
largest supporters of the organization, providing it with space for public events and gatherings 
and financial support. SELIS assists also the projects of the ‘Diyarbakır Research and 
Implementation Center for Women’s Problems’ (Diyarbakır Kadın Sorunlarını Araştırma ve 
Uygulama Merkezi, DIKASUM) of the ‘Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality’. In our interview, 
Perihan Kaya remarked that SELIS takes a distant stance towards KAMER and does not cooperate 
with it. Despite being active in the same city and working on similar issues, KAMER’s distant 
approach towards the BDP is not approved by SELIS. 
 The third Kurdish women’s CSO under consideration is the ‘Van Women’s Association’ 
(Van Kadın Derneği, VAKAD). In April 2004, a small group of Kurdish professional women formed 
VAKAD in Van179, after attending the women’s human rights training programs of the WWHR. 
VAKAD’s primary aim is to empower women’s status in every sphere of life. Since its 
establishment, it has conducted women’s rights training programs in assistance with WWHR 
and recruited volunteers through these programs.180 VAKAD focuses on three issues: 1) raising 
women’s awareness of their legal rights, 2) advocacy and lobbying for strengthening women’s 
rights, and 3) counseling victims of domestic violence. It runs a women’s shelter and a 
counseling center for women who were subjected to domestic violence. Moreover, VAKAD helps 
women to find employment and directs them to CSOs and governmental institutions that offer 
financial support to women. The organization regularly prepares reports on its activities, 
submits draft law proposals to the Turkish Parliament demanding substantial changes in the 
legal framework, and lobbies MPs and government officials for women-friendly changes in state 
policies. 
                                                          
178 SELIS works together with the Kardelen Women’s Association, Ceren Women’s Association, Umut Işığı Women, 
Environment and Culture Cooperative, Bağlar Women’s Cooperative, Stop Violence Law Office, and Genel Gündem 
Women’s Council. 
179 Van is the largest Kurdish populated province in eastern Turkey. 
180 Personal communication with Zozan Özgökçe, the founder of VAKAD, November 2010. Özgökçe is an accountant 
and has a small firm, which operates in the same office with VAKAD.  She mentioned that at the beginning it was 
necessary to finance the rent and additional expenses of VAKAD through her accounting firm. 
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 Zozan Özgökçe, the founder of VAKAD, frequently attends international conferences and 
panels on women’s rights to present VAKAD’s activities. On the national level, VAKAD 
cooperates with different women’s CSOs on platforms such as the ‘Women’s Labor and 
Employment Initiative’ (Kadın Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi, KEIG) and the Turkish branch of the 
‘International Criminal Court Coalition’. On the international level, it works with the European 
Women Lobby (EWL). To promote its activities and reach more women, it conducts diverse 
cultural activities. It hosts, for instance, every year the women’s film festival called the 
‘FILMMOR Women’s Movies Festival’. VAKAD conveys information about its activities through 
social media (Facebook and Twitter), their own website, and mail lists. Its activities are mainly 
financed through funds and donations. Majority of its funding comes from international 
institutions like the ‘Global Fund for Women’ and the EU Commission, and from foreign 
embassies in Turkey. VAKAD also receives grants from national donors such as the state-led 
‘Eastern Anatolia Development Program’ (Doğu Anadolu Kalkınma Programı) and the private 
Sabancı Foundation. Membership fees constitute only a minor part of VAKAD’s income. Different 
than SELIS, VAKAD cooperates with both state institutions and the BDP in its activities. 
 Majority of the members of these Kurdish women’s CSOs define themselves as feminists, 
but they underscore their Kurdish identity. While KAMER and VAKAD can be labeled Kurdish 
feminist, SELIS can be defined as Kurdish women’s group. Members and volunteers are mostly 
in their 20s and 30s, only Nebahat Akkoç and some other founding members of KAMER are in 
their 50s. Table (8.1) sums up some information about these three organizations. 
 
Table (8.1): KURDISH WOMEN’S CSOs  
Kurdish 
women’s 
CSOs 
Legal Status 
/year of 
establishment 
Organizational 
structure, 
number of 
members 
Main fields of 
activity 
Funding 
Women’s 
Center 
(Kadın 
Merkezi, 
KAMER) 
(Diyarbakır) 
 
Private 
company 
(1997-2004), 
since 2005 
functions as a 
foundation 
Non-hierarchical; 
about 200 
members, with  
volunteers 
around 500 
Violence and 
discrimination 
against women, 
women’s rights 
Individual or 
institutional 
donations, projects 
funded by the EU 
and European 
foundations 
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SELIS 
Women’s 
Association 
(SELIS Kadın 
Derneği) 
(Diyarbakır) 
Women’s 
center (2002-
2008); since 
2008- an 
association 
Non-hierarchical; 
about 65-70 
members,  
15 active 
members, with 
volunteers 
about 130 
Discrimination 
against women, 
violence against 
women 
Projects funded by 
the Diyarbakır 
Municipality and 
international NGOs 
Van 
Women’s 
Association  
(Van Kadın 
Derneği, 
VAKAD) 
(Van) 
Association 
(2005) 
Non-hierarchical; 
60 members, with 
volunteers about 
200 
 
Women’s rights, 
violence against 
women, and 
discrimination 
ag. women 
Mainly donations, 
projects funded by 
EU institutions 
 
8.3 The Achievement of Kurdish Women’s Activism before AKP rule 
Many organized Kurdish women have sympathized with the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s ideas 
on women’s role. Öcalan was among the first who questioned the subordination of women in 
Kurdish society and encouraged women to participate in the Kurdish struggle (Açık 2007; Gökalp 
2010). Since Kurdish women’s activism was extensively influenced by the political agenda of the 
PKK, it was not regarded as a form of democratic resistance by many in the Turkish political 
context. In the 1990s, Kurdish women’s activism developed as a reaction to: 1) the nationalistic 
character of the Turkish state, 2) the patriarchal structures of the Kurdish tribal system, and 3) 
the ‘ethnic-blindness’ of Turkish feminism.  
 In the second half of the 1990s, different groups of organized Kurdish women in Istanbul 
published journals such as Roza, Jujin, Jin u Jiyan, and Yaşamda Özgür Kadın (Free Woman in Life), 
which focused on women’s problems and developed a new Kurdish feminism that differentiated 
itself from Turkish feminism (Açık 2007: 281f.). They were highly important for voicing the 
concerns and demands of politically active Kurdish women. These journals were short-lived 
because the Turkish courts have banned them with the argument that they propagated Kurdish 
separatism and challenged the unity of the Turkish state.181 They have strongly criticized the 
state’s policies towards Kurdish women. One of the most controversial issues raised by these 
                                                          
181 For a detailed and comparative analysis of Kurdish women’s journals, see: Açık (2007). 
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journals was the state’s birth-control measures in the predominantly Kurdish region. Birth-
control services were provided through the ‘Multi-Purpose Community Centers’ (Çok Amaçlı 
Toplum Merkezleri, ÇATOM) that were established in 1995 and located in the poor urban areas and 
in centrally located villages. They aimed to improve women’s status in the context of the 
‘Southeastern Anatolia Project’ (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP) (Arat 2008; Yüksel 2003).182 
Kurdish feminists claimed that the Turkish state aimed thereby to control the growth of Kurdish 
population (Açık 2007: 295). These centers have also taught Turkish to Kurdish women, an 
activity which was perceived as another assimilation strategy of the Turkish state (Arat 2008: 
415).  
 A small group of Kurdish feminists writing in Roza and Jujin were also critical of their own 
society and culture. Kurdish feminists, for instance, addressed the instrumentalization of 
women within the Kurdish national movement and emphasized the importance of an 
independent Kurdish women’s activism (Açık 2013: 115). They raised their concerns on gender 
issues and discussed taboo subjects such as woman’s sexuality, marriage, domestic violence, 
incest, rape, the understanding of shame and honor within Kurdish society. These critical 
Kurdish women, as Nebahat Akkoç from KAMER also remarked, have felt themselves excluded 
from the Kurdish nationalist movement because of their feminist identity (Açık 2007: 281). 
 Furthermore, Kurdish feminists were vocal about the “ethnic-blindness” of Turkish 
feminists (Yüksel 2003). They claimed that Turkish feminists ignored the ethnicity dimension of 
women’s subordination and failed to realize that Kurdish women suffer double-discrimination, 
both ethnic- and gender-based discrimination (Bodur 2005; Yüksel 2003).183 Like Islamist 
women’s efforts to criticize their exclusion from the secular public realm, Kurdish women 
activists have pointed to their ethnic-based exclusion and pushed Turkish feminists to question 
how they relate to the nationalist character of the Turkish state (Diner and Toktaş 2010: 49). 
Some scholars argued that Kurdish women activists showed feminists the “Turkishness” of their 
                                                          
182 GAP is a multi-sector regional development project based on the concept of sustainable development for the 
Southeastern Anatolia region of Turkey. For further information see: http://www.gap.gov.tr/proje-ve-
faaliyetler/insani-ve-sosyal-gelisme-genel-koordinatorlugu/sosyal-projeler/uygulamalar/cok-amacli-toplum-
merkezleri (rev. 17. 10.2014) 
183 Both Yüksel (2003) and Bodur (2005) analyze the relationship between the Turkish and Kurdish feminist 
movements in the 1990s in great depth. They compare Kurdish women’s reactions towards Turkish mainstream 
feminists with the reactions of ‘black feminists’ towards ‘white feminists’ in the US because of their ‘race-blind’ 
approach and the middle class background. 
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movement (Arat 2008; Bora 2007; Diner and Toktaş 2010; Yüksel 2003). At the end of the 1990s, 
Kurdish women’s CSOs have succeeded in transforming the language of Turkish feminist 
activism and exposed the ethnic heterogeneity of women in Turkey (Bodur 2005: 266). Turkish 
feminists began to understand the distinctiveness of Kurdish women’s experiences. 
Accordingly, some Kurdish women could voice their concerns and criticize the nationalist and 
militaristic character of the Turkish state in the feminist journal ‘Pazartesi’ (Monday) (Arat 2008; 
Diner and Toktaş 2010).  
 The violent and insecure environment in the Kurdish region led to diverse forms of 
politicization among Kurdish women. A group of Kurdish women, who had not been politically 
active previously, emerged with an unusual form of protest in the 1990s: the silent protests of 
‘Saturday Mothers’ (Cumartesi Anneleri) in Istanbul. This group of Kurdish women, whose sons, 
husbands, or brothers ‘disappeared’ under custody in the Kurdish region, instigated their first 
protest on 27 May 1995. Saturday Mothers consisted mainly of uneducated and lower class 
women from rural Kurdish populated areas. Their protests took place every Saturday in 
Galatasaray, a visible spot in the central neighborhood of Taksim, and continued 200 weeks until 
1999.184 Their aim was twofold: 1) to stop the disappearances of people under police custody, and 
2) to learn the whereabouts of those who disappeared (Göker 2011: 111). Saturday Mothers were 
the first Kurdish women’s group who could attract widespread public attention to the Kurdish 
question from women’s perspective. Like the protesting mothers in Argentina (Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo) in 1977, Saturday Mothers politicized women’s identities as mothers and 
contested the military’s authoritarian strategies in dealing with the Kurdish question. 
 In the 1990s, Kurdish women primarily focused on violence against women. As 
mentioned earlier, KAMER is the most prominent women’s CSO combating violence against 
women. In October 1997, Purple Roof activists came to Diyarbakır and presented their work and 
activities to the members of KAMER (Akkoç 2007: 211). Shortly after, KAMER activists launched 
an emergency call line to help and support women who were exposed to domestic violence. 
Through this emergency line, KAMER’s volunteers have been directing victims of domestic 
                                                          
184 As Göker (2011) claims, the protests of Saturday Mothers were the long-lasting act of civil disobedience in modern 
Turkish history. 
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violence to women and family rights lawyers or helped them to find ways to gain economic 
independence from men. Moreover, Kurdish women organized within human rights 
organizations have also focused on the issue of violence against women. Eren Keskin, one of the 
most influential Kurdish human and women’s rights lawyer from the IHD (Human Rights 
Organization) addressed the systematic use of sexual violence against Kurdish women by 
security forces in the region (Akgül 2013). She and some other Kurdish women activists have 
sharply criticized security forces’ sexual violence under custody. They called for solidarity in 
supporting the victims and observed hearings pertaining to sexual abuse and rape of Kurdish 
women by members of Turkish security forces (Ibid.). However, in those years, men from 
Kurdish national movement have not supported their cause and interpreted security forces’ 
sexual abuse as a form of torture against the Kurdish nation, rather than as an offence against 
women (Açık 2007; Akgül 2013). Eren Keskin has been accused of making ‘propaganda for the 
terrorist organization PKK’ by state institutions and was put in prison several times. 
 In addition to violence against women, women’s rights, and discrimination against 
women were also on the agenda of Kurdish women activists. To raise women’s awareness of 
their gender identity and gender issues, KAMER organized eight consciousness-raising groups 
per year, reaching 120 women (Akkoç 2007: 210). Likewise, KAMER formed working groups 
dealing with diverse subjects pertaining to women’s lives. At the end of 2001, KAMER prepared 
fifteen handbooks that defined different forms of discrimination against women and 
disseminated these handbooks in the Kurdish populated south-east region in Turkey.  
 Despite having the common identity ‘Kurdishness’, Kurdish women activists were 
divided among themselves with regard to their diverging approaches to women’s issues. Women 
from the Kurdish national movement and Kurdish feminists became involved in discussions on 
“[…] how roles for women should be played out within the movement” (Açık 2013: 114). While 
some Kurdish women activist have named themselves as ‘feminists’ or ‘Kurdish feminists’, 
others have called themselves as ‘Kurdish nationalists’ (Yüksel 2003: 71). Kurdish women’s 
activism in the 1990s contributed to a variety of discursive and cultural changes in Turkey. On 
the one hand, it pushed the public debate to reconsider the nationalist character of Turkish 
citizenship created by the Kemalist ideology and demanded recognition of the Kurdish identity. 
On the other hand, it contested male-dominance within the Kurdish national movement and 
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challenged the traditional gender roles ascribed to women by the Kurdish culture. Politically 
active Kurdish women, whether organized as women’s CSOs or operating as a part the Kurdish 
national movement, contested the notions of Turkish citizenship, national identity, and unity, 
as well as ethnic-blindness of Turkish feminism. 
 In February 1999, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested and sentenced to 
death, but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. This radically changed the course 
of events in the Kurdish-Turkish conflict and pushed the PKK to develop a new strategy that 
would pursue non-violent activism through Kurdish political parties and CSOs. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, in the same year, Turkey was granted an official candidate status for the EU that 
generated a domestic political reform process. It was within this context that an important 
number of women’s CSOs pushed for reforming the Civil Code.   
Amending the Civil Code  
During the amendment process of the Civil Code, Kurdish women’s CSOs have not participated 
in any working or lobbying group. For Kurdish women, it was not easy to lobby the MPs at that 
time because the Turkish Parliament consisted of nationalist, religious, and Kemalist parties that 
perceived Kurds as ‘separatists’ or ‘terrorists’. Furthermore, Kurdish women were preoccupied 
with the issue of violence in the Kurdish region. The impact of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict 
accelerated the magnitude of the obstacles they had to deal with.  
 Moreover, Kemalist women activists were first to call for the renewal of the Civil Code. 
Later on, these women involved many feminist activists, academics, and legal experts in the 
efforts to revise the Code, but Kemalist women remained the majority. Arguably, the dominance 
of the Kemalist leanings in the working groups and the burden of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict 
have led to ignoring, or excluding, Kurdish women during the amendment process of the Civil 
Code. But women realized that it was more influential to form a broader pressure group for 
lobbying decision-makers and pushing for substantial legal changes. Thus, in the aftermath of 
the enactment of the Civil Code in 2002, women’s CSOs with different ideological convictions 
began to develop the capacity of cooperation on platforms addressing gender-specific issues 
(Coşar and Onbaşi 2008: 325).  
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8.4 The Participation and Inclusion of Kurdish Women’s CSOs in the AKP Era   
The new Civil Code was certainly an important step in improving women’s legal rights in the 
family union. But the laws protecting women’s rights and realizing the gender equality were far 
from complete. As discussed in the previous chapters, in its first term in the government, the 
AKP engaged in dialogue with women’s CSOs, including Kurdish women’s CSOs, in policy-making 
processes. During AKP rule, Kurdish women began to collaborate with other women’s groups - 
despite the prevailing ideological differences. Kurdish women’s CSOs have also been highly 
active in the three issue areas under consideration – violence against women, women’s rights 
and gender equality, and discrimination against women. 
 Like other feminist CSOs, the primary focus of Kurdish women’s CSOs is combatting 
violence against women. During the last decade, violence against women became rampant 
across Turkey, regardless of ethnic and social divides (Bila 2013). However, in the Kurdish 
populated region of Turkey, violence against women becomes multi-faceted. In this region, both 
the traditional structures within Kurdish society and the authoritarian approach of the Turkish 
state towards Kurds amplify the problem of violence. According to a survey prepared by the 
human rights association İHD-Diyarbakır, 56 women were killed in the Kurdish populated 
Southeast and Eastern Anatolia in the first ten months of 2012. 12 of these women were 
murdered by their own families, 1 by the security forces, and 27 women committed suicide.185 
Moreover, 45 were wounded, 6 were raped, and 10 were sexually abused (Bianet, 26 November 
2012).186  
Violence against Women  
Kurdish women’s CSOs and feminist CSOs have similar methods to combat violence against 
women. Both groups have often cooperated in lobbying policy-makers for changes in laws. In 
their struggle, organized Kurdish women emphasize four important points: 1) raising public 
awareness of the problems caused by violence against women, 2) increasing women’s awareness 
                                                          
185 In the Kurdish region, female suicide is a relatively new phenomenon. Instead of killing women to “cleanse the 
family honor”, women are allegedly told to kill themselves in order to spare their murderers from a prison sentence. 
186 It is important to remark that high numbers of violence against women incidents are not limited to the eastern 
parts of Turkey or to its Kurdish population, it is a nationwide problem. 
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of their legal rights, 3) establishing women’s shelters, and 4) lobbying for improvement in laws 
protecting women against violence. 
 KAMER, as the oldest among organized Kurdish women, is the most experienced and 
successful CSO in the struggle against domestic violence. Nebahat Akkoç from KAMER said in 
our interview that they try to find methods to deal with the intertwined problems of domestic 
violence, political violence, gender inequalities, and poverty that shape the lives of women in 
the Kurdish region. KAMER’s region-wide surveys gather evidences on the extent and nature of 
violence against women. Since KAMER has branches in many cities in eastern Turkey, it has the 
capacity of interviewing more than 50,000 women in one survey.187 Many Kurdish families lost 
their livelihood due to the state’s evacuation of Kurdish villages, and these families migrated to 
urban areas where they barely managed to eke out a living (Akkoç 2007; Gökalp 2010). Poverty 
and frustration in the cities led to increased domestic violence. Akkoç remarked in our 
interview: 
“Some women have not complained about domestic violence because their foremost 
concern was poverty. When we interviewed women, they said: “We are hungry, what can 
one or two slaps do to us?” It is, therefore, very important to organize campaigns and 
working groups to raise women’s awareness of the prevalent gender roles, which 
constantly produce violence and discrimination against women. Women who became 
aware of their subordinate status within the traditional society began to question gender 
roles and joined us in creating a better world.” 
Akkoç further claimed that KAMER’s consciousness-raising groups bear fruit, and Kurdish 
women no longer keep silent when they are subjected to violence. These women began to share 
their stories, stand up against violence, and they do not give up. Through its emergency call line, 
KAMER supports women subjected to domestic violence and provides psychological counseling 
and legal advice. One problem KAMER addresses is that it is difficult to find Kurdish speaking 
psychological consultants. This difficulty stems from the fact that the general school and higher 
education enrollment in the Kurdish populated Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia regions is 
lower compared to the western regions of the country (KSGM 2008: 34). KAMER argues that the 
                                                          
187 http://www.kamer.org.tr/icerik_detay.php?id=62 (rev. 15.04.2014) 
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use of Kurdish as a language of instruction in the region would ease the access to education and 
create Kurdish speaking well-educated generations.188 Many Kurdish women do not speak 
Turkish, and consultants, most of whom do not understand Kurdish, are unable to communicate 
with victims who want to explain their experiences of violence, incest or rape. As Akkoç stated, 
the need for Kurdish speaking social workers or psychological consultants is immense and 
urgent.  
 Another focus of KAMER’s activities for the prevention of domestic violence is the early 
childhood education. KAMER tries to develop alternative approaches for child education that 
challenge all forms of violence and discrimination (Akkoç 2007: 212). Through training 
programs, KAMER volunteers present women alternative methods of child-rearing that avoids 
sexist language. The aim of this project is to prevent the formation of the predominant sexist 
mentality starting from the early ages. Akkoç underlined in our interview that this will help to 
raise gender-sensitive generations.  
 Likewise, SELIS also organizes consciousness-raising groups about domestic violence. In 
2010, SELIS organized educational seminars in twenty-five neighborhoods of Diyarbakır to 
discuss how to deal with violence and what women’s rights are.189 Although women were their 
main target group, SELIS also invited men to these seminars to show them long term effects of 
violence on families. Some male participants reacted positively and acknowledged that violence 
against women damage the relations within the family and the well-being of children.190 In SELIS’ 
counseling center, volunteers offer women psychological and social counseling as well as legal 
advice. Perihan Kaya said that SELIS labels the high numbers of murdered women a “massacre 
of women”, because at least three women are killed every day in Turkey. Moreover, to identify 
the impact of displacement and war on family structures, especially on women, SELIS conducts 
surveys in the Kurdish region. As mentioned before, the organization works closely with the 
Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality and emphasizes the importance of the municipality’s role 
in preventing domestic violence. Kaya stated that the Municipality opened a women’s 
                                                          
188 Personal interview with Nebahat Akkoç, November 2010, Diyarbakır. 
189 Interview with Perihan Kaya, November 2010, Diyarbakır. 
190 Ibid. 
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counseling center in its women’s center DIKASUM in 2008 and provides help to women subjected 
to domestic violence. She praised a policy implemented by the Diyarbakır Municipality: 
“There is a new regulation in Diyarbakır municipality. In case male personnel of the 
municipality use violence against his wife, he is fined for it. The consequence is that the 
municipality administration does not pay the salary to the perpetrator, rather to his wife. 
Thereby, the man cannot force his economic power onto the woman. These kinds of 
punishments are very effective in preventing domestic violence.” 
While praising the approach of the municipality, Kaya criticized the unwillingness of the AKP 
government in the issue of violence against women. Like many other women activists, she also 
points to the conservative approach of the AKP leadership, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s attitude in 
particular. She added: “The AKP government does not regard violence as a vital problem and 
mainly points to the importance of keeping the family together”.  Moreover, she remarked that 
the Turkish mainstream media and TV shows also normalize violence against women, counter-
acting organized women’s efforts to break the taboos and men’s mentality. 
 VAKAD also conducts an impressive struggle against violence against women. Zozan 
Özgökçe stated that VAKAD offers women legal advice, and social, psychological, economic and 
medical counseling at its ‘Women’s Solidarity Center’ (Kadın Danışma Merkezi). Here, VAKAD 
provides temporary accommodation for women and their children who are under the threat of 
domestic violence or the risk of honor killing. It organizes informative meetings on violence 
against women and violence prevention as well as informal ‘house meetings’ that allow women 
to gather in a home to discuss such issues.191 To monitor whether women’s rights laws are 
implemented, VAKAD actively follows the court cases pertaining to violence against women. Its 
members stand as witnesses for complainant in court trials and help with technical aspects (e.g. 
taking pictures of victims of violence).192 To support victimized women, they contact 
psychologists to prepare reports and serve these as evidence.  
 Both SELIS and VAKAD are permanent members of the coordination committee of the 
aforementioned Assembly of Women’s Shelters. There, both CSOs exchange their experiences 
and knowledge with the newly established women’s CSOs working on violence against women. 
                                                          
191 http://www.vakad.org.tr/index.php?action=icerik&sayfa_no=5 (rev. 20.11.2014) 
192 Ibid. 
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In the Assembly’s meetings, they also discuss controversial subjects such as incest, rape, sexual 
harassment, and how to struggle against these practices. Zozan Özgökçe from VAKAD claimed 
that the state only appoints personnel from Diyanet who do not know how to support and 
empower women staying in the shelters. Like Purple Roof activist Deniz Bayram (cf. Chapter 6), 
Özgökçe emphasized in our communication that women’s shelters need to secure protection for 
women, and therefore the shelter’s location may not be publicly known, and counseling services 
to resident women and children have to be offered by qualified and trained staff. In her view, 
the state has the responsibility to establish new shelters and administer the counseling centers 
and women’s shelters according to international standards.  
Another serious problem Kurdish women face and Kurdish women’s CSOs deal with is 
the so-called honor killings. 
Honor Killings 
‘Honor killings’ are the acts of murder committed in the name of honor. In the Turkish public 
debate, the term ‘customary killings’ is primarily associated with local practices in the Kurdish 
populated regions of Turkey. The ‘custom’ entails the so-called extended ‘family assembly’ 
issuing a death warrant for the female member of the family alleged to ‘dishonor’ the family 
through some ‘inappropriate’ conduct such as refusing an arranged marriage, having a 
boyfriend, speaking to a male stranger, or not being a virgin on her wedding night (WWHR 2005: 
3).  
 KAMER became a leading organization campaigning against honor killings. In 2003, it 
began working on honor killings and initially aimed to reach and secure three women under 
threat and to acquire more information on the extent of honor killings in the Kurdish region. 
Surprisingly, they managed to work with more women than they planned and reached twenty-
three women. Akkoç said in our interview: 
“While working with these women, who were able to escape from a possible act of honor 
killing, KAMER focused on what grounds women were sentenced to honor killings. We 
realized that the main reason was “disobedience”. Every woman has to obey the moral 
values and rules of the feudal family structures, and if they disobey there is a cost: either 
violence or killing!”  
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In fighting honor killings, Kurdish women’s CSOs stressed the need to eliminate the 
discriminatory provisions in the Turkish Penal Code (1926). The old Turkish Penal Code (1926) 
reflected the belief that women were the property of men, and sex crimes against women were 
defined as crimes against ‘family honor’, not necessarily against women as individuals (ESI 2007: 
13). The old Code allowed sentence reductions to perpetrators of ‘honor killings’, and thereby 
legitimized this kind of violent practices by giving way to the prevalence of customs over law.  
Reforming the Penal Code (2005) 
During the preparation of the draft proposals for the reform of the Penal Code, Kurdish women’s 
CSOs were not included in the Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code. It was mainly 
because KAMER was preoccupied with the project on honor killings, whereas SELIS was newly 
formed and VAKAD did not exist. In May 2003, the Women’s Platform launched a nationwide 
campaign promoting the reform of the Penal Code by including eighty women’s organizations 
(Eslen- Ziya 2012: 136). All the necessary information and discussions ran through an e-mail 
group called ‘Women’s Council’ (Kadın Kurultayı), which still exists. KAMER was a member of this 
e-mail group and provided input to the discussions on the definition of honor and customary 
killings. The organization emphasized that the crimes committed in the name of honor need to 
be punished with more severe sentences. 
 When VAKAD was formed in April 2004, women’s CSOs were mainly focused on lobbying 
MPs, the Justice Commission of the Parliament, and the media. VAKAD joined the Women’s 
Platform and contributed to lobbying activities. When the Justice Commission of the Parliament 
rejected the draft laws on honor killings and virginity testing, women’s CSOs intensified their 
lobbying activities (Eslen Ziya 2012: 137). VAKAD as a member of the Women’s Platform insisted 
on the inclusion of the term ‘honor killings’ as an aggravating circumstance, and that the 
sentences for murder in the name of honor need to be increased.193 
 In September 2004, the revised provisions of the Penal Code were ratified. Article 29 of 
the Penal Code pertaining to ‘unjust provocation’ has been amended to include in its justification 
that the article shall not apply to honor killings. It increased the terms of sentences for crimes 
committed in the name of ‘honor’ and ‘custom’ (cf. Chapter 5). It also removed the possibility of 
                                                          
193 Personal communication with Z. Özgökçe, November 2010. 
205 
 
reduced sentences in cases where perceived ‘stains to honor’ could be claimed to have provoked 
the crime in question. The legal changes were welcomed by women’s CSOs in general, Kurdish 
women’s CSOs in particular. All three Kurdish women’s CSOs began immediately to promote the 
reformed Penal Code in the Kurdish region. Both KAMER and VAKAD prepared pamphlets in 
which they explained the new regulations and laws protecting women and children from 
violence, both in Kurdish and Turkish. SELIS together with the Diyarbakır Municipality 
organized informatory seminars on the revised laws in the Penal Code. 
 However, there are still problems in the revised Penal Code. Article 82, for instance, does 
not include killings in the name of ‘honor’ as an aggravating circumstance (WWHR 2005: 3). 
Despite the calls of the Women’s Platform upon the Turkish Parliament, the Code still contains 
the expression ‘customary killings’ as an aggravating circumstance, rather than ‘honor killings’. 
In July 2006, as mentioned in Chapter 5 on gender policy outcomes, the AKP government issued 
the Prime Ministry’s Circular (no. 2006/17) that described the responsibilities of state 
institutions and the measures that need to be taken in case of domestic violence and honor 
killings. Kurdish women’s CSOs welcomed this development and reminded the responsible state 
institutions that women’s CSOs and the state need to work together in preventing honor killings. 
However, according to Kurdish women’s CSOs, there is still a gap between laws and the actual 
implementation of the Penal Code in the Kurdish region. Kurdish women’s CSOs have claimed 
that if forced and religious marriages continue to be common practice, and the state fails to 
protect women against these customs, violence against women will continue to be a major 
problem.194 
Further Efforts and Claims 
In 2008, SELIS became active in a campaign called “We are women and nobody’s honor; our 
freedom is our honor!” organized by the ‘Democratic Free Women Initiative’ (Demokratik Özgür 
Kadın Haraketi, DÖKH).195 With this campaign, SELIS and other DÖKH members questioned the 
concept of ‘honor’ and rejected its identification with women’s body alone. Instead, they claimed 
that honor needs to be understood to encapsulate the identity, culture, language, land and 
freedom of Kurdish society, and the struggle given for these values (DÖKH brochure 2010). This 
                                                          
194 http://www.kamer.org.tr/icerik_detay.php?id=127 (rev. 10.12.2014) 
195 DÖKH was formed in 2003 as an umbrella organization of women organized in the Kurdish national movement, 
who were also members of, or closely affiliated with, the BDP. 
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political rhetoric is, to a great extent, promoted by the municipalities run by the BDP and reflects 
the antagonism between the Turkish state and Kurdish citizens.  
 Like KAMER and SELIS, VAKAD also works on honor killings. During its initial years, 
VAKAD has often been harassed by men searching for their wives or female relatives. Zozan 
Özgökçe from VAKAD stated:  
“Sometimes women coming to us are really in danger. After carefully evaluating their 
situation, we decide to send them out of the city and direct them to other women’s 
organizations that offer a secure protection in a women’s shelter. In such cases, we need 
the help of the gendarmerie to protect us from the family members who aim to kill these 
women”.  
In 2009, VAKAD followed a trial on honor killing, in cooperation with the London-based ‘Kurdish 
Human Rights Project’.196 Both organizations together prepared a trial observation report in 
which they discussed the background of the case and the trial process. Based on their 
observation, they addressed the causes of violence against women and deficiencies of the 
Turkish judiciary system, and made some recommendations to state institutions. In addition to 
these activities, VAKAD has regularly conveyed information to European women’s CSOs and to 
the ‘Gender and Equality Commission’ of the European Parliament and the European 
Commission that monitor the legal developments in gender policies in the candidate countries. 
KAMER, VAKAD, and SELIS as members of the ‘Stop Violence Platform’ have also 
participated in the reform process of the Law on the Protection of the Family (4320) (cf. Chapter 
6). They discussed the flaws in Law 4320, prepared their own suggestions and informed Kurdish 
women on the reform process. After the enactment of the new law (No. 6284) in 2012, KAMER 
and VAKAD put the newest information on the law on their website,197 and SELIS presented it 
through seminars.  
 In sum, all three Kurdish women’s CSOs have been highly active in preventing violence 
against women and children. In particular, KAMER with its twenty-three branches, is strikingly 
successful in reaching women in the Kurdish region and responding to the needs of Kurdish 
                                                          
196 The Trial of Kerem Cakan, see: http://www.vakad.org.tr/index.php?action=icerik&sayfa_no=42 (rev. 18.04.2014) 
197 See for VAKAD: www.vakad.org.tr, and for KAMER: http://www.kamer.org.tr/icerik_detay.php?id=89 (rev. 
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women who are exposed to violence. The three Kurdish women’s CSOs claim that in the absence 
of state’s will to enforce laws for prevention of violence and protection of women, the number 
of incidents of violence against women will remain high. Organized Kurdish women emphasize 
that the key state policy should be the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality 
nationwide and to raise awareness among public officials of the issue of women’s rights and 
discrimination against women. 
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
Like other women’s groups, Kurdish women’s CSOs have also been highly active in advocating 
the advancement of women’s rights and gender equality. Similar to feminist CSOs, Kurdish 
women’s CSOs also emphasize that women and men need to receive equal treatment in all 
spheres of life. One of the leading principles of KAMER is the acceptance of women’s rights as 
human rights.198 Therefore, KAMER sees its struggle for women’s empowerment as intertwined 
with the struggle for improving human rights. To promote the new Civil Code for instance, 
KAMER established working groups and organized seminars and house visits to raise women’s 
awareness of their legal rights in marriage and divorce. By contacting individuals directly, 
KAMER was able to detect women’s needs and problems, to create awareness of patriarchal 
division of labor among men and women, to share information on the institutions and 
organizations providing support to women. As mentioned above, Nebahat Akkoç argued that 
women who attended the consciousness-raising meetings have certainly changed their lives or 
become more determined to struggle against discrimination and violence against women. She 
said: 
“Since KAMER’s establishment, we have worked with almost 300,000 women through our 
consciousness-raising activities. Knowing that each woman can affect ten women around 
her and each woman is responsible of five children increases the importance of the 
efforts and the results achieved. We can, thus, claim that an incredible number of women 
question the prevalent gender roles, domestic violence, and discrimination against 
women, and became aware of their legal rights.” (Akkoç 2007: 209f.) 
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Furthermore, KAMER encourages women to participate in economic life. It promotes women’s 
entrepreneurship and support women in starting, formalizing, and growing their enterprises. 
For instance, KAMER activists opened a restaurant where only women work, and these women 
share their experiences with women contacting KAMER. Akkoç argued in our interview that 
such initiatives help women gain financial independence from their husbands or fathers and 
increase their self-esteem. In addition to the restaurant, KAMER has a nursery where women 
can leave their children to trained staff and participate in consciousness-raising groups or work 
in the restaurant. In strengthening women’s rights, KAMER also uses its networks on the 
international level. As a member of the EWL, it regularly communicates with European women’s 
CSOs and exchange ideas and strategies to empower women’s rights on a national and global 
level.  
 In order to promote women’s rights, SELIS organizes educational seminars on subjects 
that vary from women’s health, child-rearing, women’s legal rights, discrimination and violence 
against women. In 2010, SELIS organized educational seminars on equality between men and 
women in four neighborhoods in Diyarbakır. Men who participated in these seminars admitted 
that they were thinking differently before participating to these seminars. Perihan Kaya said: 
“We believe that fundamental changes can be achieved by talking to men. If we can change their 
[men’s] mentality, we can overcome women’s problems more easily”. Moreover, SELIS worked 
with the ‘Women Entrepreneurs Association of Turkey’ (Türkiye Kadın Girişimciler Derneği, 
KAGIDER) in a project for strengthening women’s status economically. With this project, 
KAGIDER aimed at reaching 300 women in the region and offered mentorship and training 
programs for potential women entrepreneurs. Perihan Kaya claimed that SELIS found jobs for 
about 150 women and brought employers and unemployed women together to convey 
information about how to develop business proposals. The organization promoted this project 
through distributing brochures and flyers. 
 In a similar vein, VAKAD informs women about their legal rights concerning divorce, 
children’s custody, property sharing, and alimony through its seminars and website.199 The 
organization releases press statements on women’s problems monthly through the local and 
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social media (Twitter, Facebook), and regularly participates in TV programs to communicate 
their work to a wider public. As mentioned in Chapter 6 on feminist CSOs, in January 2012, 
VAKAD, in cooperation with Purple Roof, began to work in a project called ‘Women’s 
Cooperation for Gender Justice’. The project aimed to reveal the shortcomings in the laws and 
regulations pertaining to gender equality and to discuss with experts and activists about how to 
take practical steps to accelerate women-friendly changes in the legal framework. VAKAD 
publicized the results of this working group through booklets and reports, and conveyed the 
information to women in Van. 
 VAKAD stresses that it is important to support women’s education in efforts to empower 
women. To this end, the association, in cooperation with the Municipality of Van, encourages 
girls to attend high school and pursue their education further. Furthermore, VAKAD 
underscores the improvement of women’s economic, political, and social status. It owns a 
second-hand ‘solidarity shop’ in which women, who are counseled by the association, can work 
for a living.200 The organization also helps and informs women to access hospitals that deliver 
planned health care services that target women. VAKAD put great effort to help people after the 
disastrous earthquake in the Van province in October 2011.201 Its activists collected many relief 
supplies, contacted women in need, brought the items to families in destroyed villages, and 
supported women to recover after the trauma of the earthquake by offering psychological 
counseling.202 Surprisingly, in February 2013, the chief public prosecutor of Van initiated legal 
proceedings to ban ten civil society groups, including VAKAD, on charges of their alleged links 
with the PKK (Bianet, 23 Febrary 2013). VAKAD claimed that the state was uncomfortable with 
VAKAD’s efforts to help women in the areas “where the administrative units had the 
responsibility, and this exposed the inadequacy of administrative units in preventing violence 
against women.”203 In May 2013, these charges were dropped. 
In strengthening women’s rights, Kurdish women’s CSOs are also in favor of quotas for 
women in politics. Although the number of women in the parliament has slightly increased in 
the last two parliamentary elections (2007, 2011), the rate of women’s participation in 
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202 http://www.vakad.org.tr/index.php?action=haber&haber_no=62 (rev. 21.04.2014) 
203 http://rojwomen.org/2013/04/12/helping-women-is-called-divisive-activity/ (rev. 27.10.2014) 
210 
 
representation and decision-making mechanisms remains low in Turkey (cf. Chapter 6). 
Representation of women in local governments and in municipalities is even lower. Conversely, 
the representation of women in the Kurdish BDP is remarkably high. The BDP has a quota of a 
minimum 40 percent for women candidates in the party. Özlem Özen, a senior member of the 
BDP, stated in an interview that gender equality is at the heart of the Kurdish political 
movement and said: “Our party is attractive to women, as it is the only political party that gives 
importance to women's empowerment and equality, and that enables women to participate in 
the democratic process” (Jones 2013).  
Although Article 10 of the Constitution was amended in 2004 and stipulates that women 
and men have the equal rights, women are discriminated in political, economic, social, and 
cultural life. Kurdish women’s CSOs argue that further reforms in laws are needed to eliminate 
discrimination against women. 
Discrimination against Women 
Kurdish women’s CSOs argue that to combat discriminatory practices towards women, it is of 
utmost importance to strengthen and extend fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey. 
Kurdish women suffer from both gender discriminatory practices and ethnic discrimination. 
Therefore, Kurdish women’s CSOs have reiterated the double-discrimination Kurdish women 
face. While KAMER and VAKAD mainly focus on gender-based discrimination, SELIS rather 
emphasizes the ethnic-based discrimination. All the interviewees firmly stated that the struggle 
against gender-based discrimination cannot be considered without the struggle for human 
rights and democracy. To this end, these three Kurdish women’s CSOs make public statements 
on the need to strengthen civil rights and freedoms, cooperate with other segments of CS in 
various campaigns concerning the protection of minority rights and the improvement of human 
rights, and use their websites and the printed media to voice their concerns and demands. 
 Akkoç from KAMER claimed that women in the Kurdish region suffer from cultural, 
social, and political discrimination. While working on violence against women, KAMER pointed 
at how political violence in the Kurdish region deeply affected the lives of Kurdish women. In 
this regard, Gökalp claims in her research that Kurdish women in general see their problems, 
such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment as the consequence of being Kurds; i.e., they 
believe that they suffer because of being Kurdish, and the Turkish state deliberately hinders 
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Kurds from having jobs or being wealthy (2010: 568). Therefore, Kurdish women strongly 
emphasize their Kurdish identity and support the cause of the Kurdish national movement. 
KAMER emphasizes that to overcome the discrimination Kurdish women face, the Turkish state 
has to implement progressive policies providing women equal opportunities at home, in the 
workplace, and in the public sphere. In this regard, the organization keeps advocating and 
lobbying for substantial changes in laws and policies pertaining to women’s lives. 
 SELIS directly addresses the state’s systematic discrimination against Kurdish women. In 
our interview, Perihan Kaya claimed that governmental institutions such as the district 
governorate (kaymakamlık), the provincial governorate (valilik) and the security directorate in 
Diyarbakır often hinder SELIS’ work because they regard SELIS as a ‘separatist’ group. These 
governmental bodies have obstructed, or often have not allowed, SELIS to organize street 
demonstrations or to make public statements. Furthermore, Kurdish women also face the 
language barrier in their daily lives. Many Kurdish women do not speak Turkish, and therefore, 
they cannot run their errands at banks, police stations, hospitals or courts.  
Perihan Kaya also criticized the dismissive attitude of some organized Kemalist women 
towards organized Kurdish women. To exemplify this tension, one incident is important to 
mention. During the 12th Assembly of Women’s Shelters in 2009, the Constitutional Court 
publicized its decision to ban the Kurdish DTP - the predecessor of the BDP - due to its activities 
that conflicted with “the independence of the Turkish state, its indivisible integrity with its 
territory and nation”.204 Purple Roof activist Özgür Sunata recalled in our interview: 
“At the 12th Assembly, some organized Kurdish women from the Kurdish region 
(including from SELIS) requested to leave the assembly to go back to their cities to 
provide support to other activists in the Kurdish party. One socialist feminist group 
supported the Kurdish women’s claim and openly criticized repressive policies of the 
Turkish state. While Kurdish women were leaving, some organized Kemalist women 
protested Kurdish women and used an improper language towards Kurdish women such 
as ‘terrorists’. This has led to an extreme tension within the Assembly of Women’s 
Shelters.” 
                                                          
204 http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25030653/ (rev. 20.04.2014) 
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Accordingly, Purple Roof withdrew from the Assembly of Women’s Shelters as a main 
coordinator and launched in 2010 a smaller meeting with another coordination committee, 
including VAKAD and SELIS, to discuss the conflicts among organized women. In this meeting, 
feminist and Kurdish women activists condemned the usage of an exclusionary and anti-
democratic language, and emphasized the importance of acting together despite differences 
within organized women (12th Final Declaration of the Assembly, 2010). It is evident that the 
Kurdish-Turkish conflict remains influential and shapes the civil society space in Turkey. 
Zozan Özgökçe from VAKAD argued that women are not only discriminated because of 
their gender identity, but also because of their sexual identity, headscarves, disability, 
Kurdishness, being divorced, or for being a member of a minority group. Therefore, organized 
women’s effort to reach solidarity within the women’s movement is highly important in the 
fight against discrimination against women. To this end, VAKAD regularly organizes panels and 
conferences with national and international participation during the week of 8th of March and 
25th of November where the participants from different women’s CSOs discuss various topics 
such as homosexuality, sexual health, problems of Kurdish and disabled women. 
 In 2005, VAKAD contributed to the ‘Shadow Report’ on the Turkey’s fourth and fifth 
combined periodic report to the CEDAW Committee, prepared by WWHR. It reported that during 
the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were displaced from 
their villages into large cities, where women faced many difficulties to adapt the city life in the 
region because they could not speak Turkish (VAKAD Report 2005).  These women, according to 
the report, felt isolated and alienated from this new environment. Public workers and state 
officials did not acknowledge that these women only speak Kurdish and often refused to provide 
public services to these women. The ethnic based discrimination in the Kurdish region led to 
poverty and the marginalization of Kurdish women and children, and generated hatred against 
the Turkish state. By reporting these issues, VAKAD underlined the importance of the 
counseling work Kurdish women’s organizations are doing in dealing with Kurdish women’s 
problems. 
 The struggle to eliminate discrimination against Kurdish citizens in general is a part of 
the ongoing peace process between the BDP, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, and the AKP 
government. Organized Kurdish women participate in civil society meetings that bring different 
213 
 
actors together to discuss how to build peace together and how to eliminate discrimination 
against the Kurdish population in Turkey. They convey information to Kurdish politicians about 
women’s perspective. But it remains to be seen, whether this process will lead to a peaceful 
solution to the Kurdish question and eliminate discrimination against Kurds. 
 Furthermore, VAKAD addresses the problems of refugee women from different countries 
in Van, who live in temporary shelters or tents, illegally work for Turkish families, experience 
violence, and have no access to vital information about their rights.205 VAKAD claims that these 
women need also to be protected by Turkish laws, by referring to Article 122 of the Penal Code 
that criminalizes any discrimination based on language, race, color, sex, political opinion etc. in 
public services and economic activity. Although some women’s organizations focus on the 
problems of refugee women, they cannot develop sustainable solutions since Turkey lacks 
serious refugee policies in general. For instance, Turkey opened its borders to Syrian refugees 
after the civil war and put 200,000 refugees in refugee camps, but the number of refugees has 
increased up to 1.5 million and this began to affect the social life and economic structures in 
Turkish cities (Idiz 2014). The AKP government remains oblivious to the situation of Syrian 
refugees, and Syrian women in particular. 
Conclusion 
The three organizations - KAMER, SELIS, and VAKAD – define themselves as Kurdish feminist 
organizations. Clearly, their Kurdishness had influenced their relations with the Turkish state. 
While KAMER has worked with state institutions, SELIS has rejected to work with state 
institutions such as the ministries, the governorate, or the security directorate. But SELIS, as a 
constituent of the Kurdish national movement, acts in accordance with the Diyarbakır 
Metropolitan Municipality under the control of the BDP. VAKAD, on the other hand, has 
cooperated with both state institutions and the BDP in its activities.  
 As discussed in the present chapter, Kurdish women’s CSOs have primarily focused on 
the issue of violence against women, in particular, eliminating honor killings. All interviewees 
firmly stated that violence against women is a violation of human rights and raised two issues 
with regard to its causes. First, they pointed to the repercussions of the Kurdish – Turkish 
                                                          
205 http://www.vakad.org.tr/index.php?action=haber&haber_no=55 (rev. 20.11.2014) 
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conflict on women’s lives in the Kurdish populated region, claiming that prevailing state 
violence towards Kurds produces and legitimizes a ‘culture of violence’ in the daily lives of 
Kurds, and this, in turn, makes domestic violence common practice in Kurdish homes. Second, 
they blamed the patriarchal structures within Kurdish society that subordinate women under 
men and limit women’s individual freedoms. In order to prevent domestic violence against 
women, Kurdish women’s CSOs have emphasized the need to establish much more women’s 
shelters and to offer psychological counseling and legal advice to women exposed to violence. 
The interviewees remarked that the governmental staff dealing with violence against women 
need to employ gender equality perspective. In this regard, they also emphasized that it is 
important to spread information on women’s legal rights both in Kurdish and Turkish languages.  
The efforts of Kurdish women’s CSOs in combating violence against women are closely 
related with their efforts for strengthening women’s rights and eliminating discrimination 
against women. Their valuable contribution is that they have Kurdish activists who easily 
convey information in Kurdish and raise the awareness among Kurdish women of their legal 
rights. As regards the promotion of women’s rights, SELIS prefers the regional cooperation 
among Kurdish women’s groups as well as with Kurdish CSOs and the BDP. Both VAKAD and 
KAMER collaborate not only in the Kurdish region but also on the national level with women’s 
organizations having different political orientations, and also with international agencies and 
organizations to strengthen women’s rights.  
During the AKP era, KAMER and VAKAD have played important roles in negotiating with 
state institutions on changes in gender policies. Both organizations have shown remarkable 
efforts in lobbying for the classification of honor killings as an ‘aggravated circumstance’. This 
found its way in the reform process of the Penal Code and the revision of the Law on the 
Protection of Women from Violence (Law 6284). Since SELIS refuses to work with the 
government institutions, it had no direct effect on legal changes in gender policies, but 
indirectly through participating in petitions initiated by broad women’s platforms. 
Furthermore, these three CSOs cooperate with other feminist CSOs and female lawyers in 
different cities to follow court trials relating to sexual assaults against women. They monitor 
whether the laws and regulations regarding the prevention of violence and discrimination 
against women are implemented correctly. Nevertheless, as the interviewees from KAMER and 
215 
 
VAKAD stressed, the state needs to develop control mechanisms and measures to enforce laws 
that protect women from violence, that eliminate discrimination against women and strengthen 
women’s rights. 
Above all, Kurdish women’s CSOs have argued that the most effective way to achieve 
substantial changes in law is to develop state policies that promote women’s rights and gender 
equality, and support women in every sphere of life. It is also highly important that the Turkish 
state ends its militaristic approach toward the Kurdish question and employs a more inclusive 
political discourse towards its Kurdish citizens and works with Kurdish CS groups to build a 
peaceful and democratic environment. To this effect, Kurdish women’s CSOs support and 
participate in grassroots initiatives for building peace in the Kurdish region. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Advocates of State Feminism: Kemalist women’s CSOs 
 
9.1 The Emergence of Kemalist Women’s Activism  
Kemalist women’s activism can be seen as a historical sequence evolving from the first wave in 
the early years of the Turkish Republic to the second wave in the 1990s. As mentioned in Chapter 
5, the Turkish state elite under the leadership of Atatürk introduced a series of legal reforms, 
which granted women equality before law and encouraged women to participate in public life 
and the nation-building process (Arat 2008, 2010b; Kandiyoti 1987; White 2003). Women who 
have benefitted from the opportunities offered by the so-called state feminism are the first 
generation of “emancipated” women in Turkey (Kandiyoti 1987). These ‘emancipated’ women, 
carrying the responsibility of being the agents of Turkish modernization, put themselves to the 
service of the secular Turkish Republic and became involved in philanthropic organizations 
promoting Kemalist reforms (Ecevit 2007; Patton 2010; White 2003). This generation of Kemalist 
women were well-educated, upper class, professional women from urban centers who have 
never contested the state’s discourse on women (White 2003: 146). They were the first women’s 
group that were organized in the CS arena. 
 In the 1990s, the second wave of Kemalist women’s activism emerged to counteract 
Islamist revivalism. Majority of these Kemalist women were already active in diverse CSOs that 
were dealing with diverse issues such as promotion of education for youth from disadvantaged 
families, charity work, or encouragement of women’s entrepreneurship. They called themselves 
‘secularist’ or ‘republican’, and based their political activism and worldview on ‘laicism’, a rigid 
form of secularism in which religion is strictly controlled by the state (Turam 2008: 477). 
Kemalist women activists stressed that secularism needs to be vigilantly protected because it 
enabled Turkish women to gain equality with men in the public realm. Their understanding of 
equality between men and women was based on the formal equality in the legal framework that 
has been introduced by ‘state feminism’, and that substantially differed from the understanding 
of other feminist activists in Turkey (cf. Chapter 6). In contrast to the feminist activists, who 
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were secular but anti-statist, Kemalist women believed that the Turkish state was the sole 
protector of women’s rights and gender equality (Arat 2008; Turam 2008). In the mid-1990s, with 
the resurgence of the Islamist movement and the proliferation of women with headscarves in 
public space, Kemalist women saw themselves as the bearers of the Republican ideals and began 
to unite in associations to contest the ‘Islamist threat’ (Arat 2008; Turam 2008; White 2003). Like 
their forebears, this generation of Kemalist women were also educated, middle-class women 
from urban centers (Turam 2008: 477). 
9.2 The Institutionalization of Kemalist Women’s Activism:  Kemalist Women’s CSOs 
Women’s organizations in Turkey first emerged after the end of the single-party rule in 1946. As 
mentioned in the chapter on feminists, the number of women’s organizations until the 1980s 
was not more than ten, and they were largely Kemalist women’s organizations. These 
organizations were engaged in professional or in charity activities, and they have been 
promoting women’s rights.206 The oldest and arguably the most influential Kemalist women’s 
organization is the ‘Turkish Women’s Union’ (Türk Kadınlar Birliği, TKB) that has a long history 
with several intervals (1923-1935 and 1949-). In 1923, a group of women’s rights activists led by 
the feminist author Nezihe Muhiddin requested from the state elites authorization to establish 
a women’s political party (Arat 2000; Zihnioğlu 2003). But the government at the time refused 
their request, claiming that women had no political rights, and this initiative turned into TKB 
on 7 February 1924 (Zihnioğlu 2003: 147). TKB, as the first women’s organization in the Turkish 
Republic, strived to obtain women’s political, social and economic rights, and encouraged 
women to actively participate in public life.207 Meanwhile, the Turkish state implemented 
secular laws and codes, and introduced women’s suffrage (cf. Chapter 5). However, these legal 
gains had also a downside: the state elites argued that since the Republican regime had given 
women all their rights, there was no longer a need to struggle for women’s emancipation (Coşar 
and Onbaşi 2008; White 2003). They perceived TKB as an independent voice in the public realm 
that could threaten the national interest of the newly established Turkish Republic (Zihnioğlu 
                                                          
206 Kemalist women formed several associations in the 1940s and 1950s such as the ‘Association of Soroptimists’ 
(1948), the ‘Association of Turkish Women University Graduates’ (1949), the ‘Association Investigating Women’s 
Social Life’ (1953) and the ‘Association for Protecting Women’, see further Ecevit (2007). 
207 Members of the early TKB, who were organized in the beginning of the 1900s under the Ottoman rule, were well-
educated, professional women from upper class families of Istanbul. See for a detailed account of TKB’s history: 
Zihnioglu (2003). 
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2003: 256). Subsequently, the members of TKB decided to dissolve their organization on the 
request of the state elites (Arat 1994, 2000). Some scholars regard the closure of TKB as the end 
of the first wave of independent women’s movement in Turkey (Arat 2000; Diner and Toktaş 
2010). 
 On 13 April 1949, a group of Kemalist women under Mevhibe Inönü, the wife of the then-
President Ismet Inönü, re-opened TKB in order to protect and improve women’s rights provided 
by the Kemalist reforms.208 In 1954, TKB acquired the status of an association ‘working for public 
interest’. The head of the TKB in Istanbul Selma Durak stated in our interview that the 
organization aims to improve women’s access to education and health services, to strengthen 
women’s legal rights, and to support women’s participation in politics and social life.209  It 
conducts its advocacy and lobbying activities both on national and international level to raise 
the public’s awareness of women’s equality and to influence policy-making processes.  
The headquarters of TKB is in Ankara. The number of its branches reached eighty, eight 
out of them are active in Northern Cyprus. It cooperates with diverse groups of women’s CSOs, 
municipalities, and state institutions to empower women’s status and eliminate discriminatory 
laws against women. It has six commissions under its board: international relations, law, 
education, health and environment, cooperation with public and civil institutions, and media 
and public relations.210 TKB Ankara is the host institution and conducts the secretariat of the 
‘Executive Committee for NGO Forum on CEDAW - Turkey’. It has a strong international network: 
it is a member of the executive commission of the ‘EWL-Turkish National Coordination’ and 
participates regularly in the UN’s World Congresses on Women and the CEDAW meetings.211 
 The executive committee of TKB is selected by the votes of the members and serves for 
three years. The head of TKB-Istanbul Selma Durak explained: “There are ten branches of TKB 
in various districts of Istanbul. Among its members, there are psychologists, lawyers, and 
doctors who voluntarily give educational seminars on women’s health, child education, and 
consumption culture in high schools”. She added that the number of its members is about 100. 
TKB-Istanbul works closely with the ‘Istanbul Directorate of National Education’, which is 
                                                          
208 http://www.turkkadinlarbirligi.org/index.php?p=genel_icerik&content=tarihce_tuzuk (rev. 20.06.2014) 
209 Personal Interview with Selma Durak, the head of TKB Istanbul branch since 2008, October 2011, Istanbul. 
210 Ibid. 
211 http://www.turkkadinlarbirligi.org/index.php?p=genel_icerik&content=tarihce_tuzuk (rev. 20.06.2014) 
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responsible for the school system, to find schools for its educational seminars on women’s rights. 
It also supports the women’s shelter run by the Küçükçekmece Municipality of Istanbul. Its 
activities are financed through membership dues and donations, and it is logistically supported 
by the local governments ran by the CHP in Istanbul.  
 The second Kemalist women’s CSO under consideration is the ‘Istanbul Women’s 
Associations Union’ (Istanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği, IKKB) that hosts about fifty Kemalist 
women’s organizations, including TKB-Istanbul, and representatives from the ‘Women’s Rights 
Center of the Istanbul Bar Association’ and from Kemalist political parties. It was formed in 1995 
to launch a broad - based campaign for the annulment of some articles in the Civil Code (1926). 
The head of IKKB Nazan Moroğlu is a well-known legal expert and lecturer who publishes 
reports and books addressing the deficiencies of Turkish laws pertaining to women’s rights.  212 
IKKB’s primary aim is to improve women’s status in Turkey. To this end, it addresses gender 
discriminatory laws in the legal framework and uses the legal system to initiate change.  
 Nazan Moroğlu noted in our interview that IKKB organizes diverse activities to attract 
public’s attention to women’s rights issues: the anniversary of the Turkish women’s suffrage on 
5 of December, the anniversary of the introduction of the 1926 Civil Code on 17 of February, and 
8 of March (International Women’s Day). Legal experts from IKKB participate in international 
meetings on women’s status and problems, especially in CEDAW and UN meetings on women, to 
exchange their ideas and experiences on women’s rights and gender equality with organized 
women from other countries. The representatives of the member organizations of IKKB gather 
every month to exchange information on the latest debates on women’s rights and distribute 
the tasks for initiated projects according to the candidacy of the member organizations.213 Its 
activities are mainly financed through membership dues and donations from individuals, 
Turkish firms and companies.  
                                                          
212 Personal interview with Nazan Moroğlu, October 2011, Istanbul. She is also the head of the ‘Association for 
Turkish Women University Graduates’ (Türk Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği) and of ‘the Women’s Rights Commission’ 
of the Istanbul Bar Association as well as a member of the ‘Turkish Women Jurists Association’ (Türk Hukukçu 
Kadınlar Derneği). 
213 Personal interview with N. Moroğlu, October 2011, Istanbul. 
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 The third Kemalist women’s CSO examined here is the ‘Izmir Women’s Association 
Union’ (Izmir Kadın Kuruluşları Birliği, IKKB-Izmir), which was formed in 2000.214 IKKB-Izmir brings 
about forty Kemalist women’s organizations and women activists from Kemalist CSOs and 
parties in Izmir together. It provides a common platform to develop strategies to achieve 
women’s empowerment in the workforce, politics, legal framework, and education. The head of 
IKKB-Izmir Emel Denizaslanı stated in our interview that IKKB-Izmir mainly focuses on three 
issues: 1) women and politics, 2) violence against women, and 3) women’s entrepreneuership.215 
IKKB-Izmir collabrates with the ‘Center for Women’s Research’ of the Ege University in Izmir to 
organize panels on women’s issues during 8 March celebrations. With the help of the CHP in 
Izmir, it finds many opportunities to voice its gender specific demands on different platforms.  
 The general assembly of IKKB-Izmir gathers once a year and evaluates the results and 
the impact of its activities. The executive committee is elected for two-year terms. Emel 
Denizaslanı stated: “Our members represent different ideological positions, there are women 
from social democrats as well as from the nationalist parties. We try to bring women from 
different political identities together who would work for women’s empowerment”. IKKB-Izmir 
uses its local networks with political parties and municipalities to organize panels and meetings 
on women’s rights issues.  Since the Women’s Council of the Province of Izmir is a member of 
IKKB-Izmir, it acquires EU funds that are designed for regional development of the EU member 
and candidate countries. IKKB-Izmir receives also funding from the foreign consulates and 
international organizations that are active in Izmir. 
 The members of these three CSOs are well-educated, professional or retired, middle or 
upper class women who embrace Kemalist ideology and secularism. They specifically focus on 
improving women’s legal rights within the Kemalist framework. Table (9.1) below presents some 
basic information about these three CSOs. While some of their activists define themselves as 
feminist, others neglect this label. But some scholars call Kemalist women “Kemalist feminists” 
                                                          
214 Since the initials for the Istanbul Women’s Associations Union and the Izmir Women’s Associations Union are 
the same, I refer to the latter as IKKB-Izmir. 
215 Personal interview with Emel Denizaslanı, September 2011, Izmir. She was a member of the CHP and a candidate 
in the 2007 general election, but has not been elected. 
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(Arat 2008; Coşar and Onbaşi 2008; Turam 2008) or “liberal feminist”216 (Arat 1998; Marshall 
2009). 
 
Table (9.1): KEMALIST WOMEN’S CSOs  
Kemalist 
women’s CSOs 
Legal Status 
/year of 
establishme
nt 
Organization, 
number of 
members 
Main fields of 
activity 
Funding 
Turkish Women’s 
Association  
(Türk Kadınlar 
Birliği, TKB)  
(Istanbul) 
Association 
(1923; 1949) 
Hierarchic; 100 
members, 
volunteers 
Women’s rights 
and gender 
equality 
Dues and 
donations, projects 
supported by 
municipalities or 
state institutions 
Istanbul 
Women’s 
Association 
Union (Istanbul 
Kadın Kuruluşları 
Birliği, IKKB  
(Istanbul) 
Platform 
(1995) 
Semi-hierarchic; 
50 CSOs and 
female 
representatives 
of Kemalist 
political parties 
Women’s rights 
and gender 
equality; 
violence against 
women 
Dues, donations 
from national 
actors 
Izmir Women’s 
Association 
Union (Izmir 
Kadın Kuruluşları 
Birliği, IKKB-
Izmir) 
(Izmir) 
Platform 
(2000) 
Semi-hierarchic; 
around 40 CSOs 
and female 
representatives 
of Kemalist CSOs 
and parties 
Women’s rights Dues and 
donations, projects 
funded by 
international NGOs 
and foreign 
consulates in 
Turkey 
 
                                                          
216 Liberal feminism claims that inequality between sexes is rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that 
prevent women’s access to the public life. Therefore, it claims that it is highly important to provide equality of men 
and women through political and legal reforms, see further: Donovan (2000). 
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9.3 The Achievements of the Kemalist Women’s CSOs before the AKP 
Until the emergence of the feminist movement in the 1980s, organized Kemalist women have 
focused on two issues: empowerment of women in education and in politics.  To this end, they 
have supported girls by providing scholarships for higher education and offered lower- and 
higher-level literacy programs for girls and women, who were unable to attend schools due to 
traditional norms and values. Moreover, they supported Kemalist women to participate in 
politics. TKB, for instance, was influential in encouraging women’s candidacy for the Turkish 
Parliament.217 Organized Kemalist women also carried out nationwide campaigns to improve 
women’s health. To this end, they worked with the ‘Turkish Medical Association’ (Türk Tabipleri 
Birliği, TTB) that provided volunteer health services for women in rural areas. Organized 
Kemalist women never questioned the laws on women’s rights introduced by the Kemalist 
regime or the women’s status in the private sphere, i.e. within the family (Arat 2008; Marshall 
2009).  
 When feminist activism has criticized the Kemalist approach to women’s rights and 
addressed the issue of domestic violence and discrimination against women, some Kemalist 
women began to acknowledge and voice that women were not equal to men in the existing laws, 
in particular in the much celebrated Civil Code from 1926. At the end of the 1980s, organized 
feminist women initiated a broad-based struggle in collaboration with Kemalist women’s groups 
to have the Civil Code amended. The aforementioned Association of Turkish Jurist Women (cf. 
Chapter 6), formed by Kemalist women in 1968, has prepared a draft proposing annulment of 
discriminatory laws in the Civil Code (Arat 2010a: 240). In 1992, organized feminist and Kemalist 
women together initiated a campaign to support this draft proposal (Marshall 2009: 362). As 
Nazan Moroğlu stated in our interview, IKKB has collected 107,000 signatures for the renewal of 
the Civil Cod,e and presented them to the Turkish Parliament.  
 In the 1990s, legal experts both from the Kemalist women’s and feminist CSOs closely 
monitored the implementation of the CEDAW agreement that was signed by Turkey in 1985. By 
pointing at Turkey’s obligations for the CEDAW agreement, the Kemalist women’s organizations 
                                                          
217 In the 1960s, TKB members Zerrin Tüzün ve Übeyde Belli have been appointed as senators to the Turkish 
Parliament. Later on, the first female mayors Müfide İlhan, Leyla Atakan, Lale Müldür ve Çağlayan Ege were also 
members of TKB, see further: 
http://www.turkkadinlarbirligi.org/index.php?p=genel_icerik&content=tarihce_tuzuk (rev. 20.06.2014) 
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stressed the need to eliminate the discriminatory laws in the Civil and the Penal Codes. To this 
end, both TKB-Istanbul and IKKB conducted numerous panels and seminars with prominent 
legal experts and activists. Also, the Kemalist legal experts in collaboration with feminist 
lawyers were influential in gender mainstreaming the bar associations by forming women’s 
commissions. In 1999, Nazan Moroğlu from IKKB, as the head of the Istanbul Bar Association’s 
Women’s Commission, called for the establishment of the ‘Women’s Rights Commission of the 
Union of Turkish Bar Associations’ (Türkiye Barolar Birliği Kadın Hukuku Komisyonu, TÜBAKKOM). 
TÜBAKKOM’s primary aim has been to form a pressure group to influence decision-makers to 
change and revise the discriminatory laws in the Civil and Penal Codes, and the Labor Law. It 
coordinated thirty women’s commissions providing legal advice for women in various cities and 
has been active in monitoring the implementation of Law 4320 on the Protection of the Family 
(Işık 2007: 51). 
 In contrast to organized feminists, organized Kemalist women were loyal supporters of 
the secularist state. They closely worked with the state’s women’s machinery KSSGM and 
governmental institutions (Ecevit 2007: 196). Kemalist women were not critical of the 
patriarchal nature of the Turkish state and have sought women’s emancipation solely through 
legal reforms. But when political Islam began to rise in the 1990s, organized Kemalist women 
focused on contesting the Islamization of political and social life. They organized 
demonstrations and used their networks in the media and political parties to oppose the 
presence of Islamist women with headscarves in public institutions and to challenge the rise of 
Islamist politics (Marschall 2009; Turam 2008). The Kemalist women’s CSOs also distanced 
themselves from the organized Kurdish women’s groups. They considered the demands of 
Kurdish feminists for the recognition of their ethnic and cultural identity as a threat towards 
the unity and the nationalist character of the Turkish state. They stressed that the problems 
Kurdish women face were the consequences of the low educational level and poverty in the 
Kurdish region, and the traditional and Islamic lifestyles of the Kurdish clans (Arat 2008; Yüksel 
2003). 
 The struggle against domestic violence and the process of amending the 1926 Civil Code 
were two salient issues that united Kemalist women with other women’s rights organizations in 
Turkey (Arat 2010a: 239). 
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Amending the Civil Code 
During the reform process of the Civil Code, the Kemalist women’s CSOs were the most active 
group in the working and lobbying groups along with feminists. As mentioned before, the 
Kemalist Association of Turkish Jurist Women were the first group that proposed a new draft for 
the Civil Code. Based on this draft, a commission under the Ministry of Justice drafted a new 
Civil Code in 1998 and presented it to the Turkish Parliament, but it has been dismissed due to 
the coming general election in 1999 (Arat 2010a: 240). 
 In 2000, feminist WWHR, in collaboration with KADER, set up a monitoring committee 
that worked closely with the aforementioned Justice Commission of the parliament (see Chapter 
6). Nazan Moroğlu from IKKB, as a legal expert on women’s rights, was the member of this 
committee. She stated in our interview that she has been highly active during the advocacy and 
lobbying, and had to travel back and forth between Istanbul and Ankara. Meanwhile, both IKKB 
(Istanbul) and IKKB-Izmir gathered signatures for the WWHR’s campaign promoting the 
changes in the Civil Code. TKB-Istanbul was involved in raising public awareness of the 
importance of the Civil Code reform, but lobbying was the task of the TKB’s general office in 
Ankara. The head of TKB Sema Kendirci was the member of the aforementioned monitoring 
committee as a women’s rights lawyer. Kemalist women activists worked closely with feminist 
activists and created a women’s coalition to push the Turkish Parliament to reform the Civil 
Code. In particular, during the negotiations on the division of property in cases of divorce, both 
organized Kemalist women and organized feminists gave an outstanding performance and 
convinced the Justice Commission and the Turkish Parliament to pass the law on equal property 
sharing. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, in November 2001, the new Civil Code was 
amended and became effective in January 2002. 
  Reform of the Civil Code was a common victory for both organized Kemalist and feminist 
women (Arat 2010a; Çoşar and Onbaşi 2008; Marshall 2009). Organized Kemalist women have 
welcomed the legal changes, but were committed to push the government for further legal 
reforms regarding women’s rights, but in the midst of the political reform process, the AKP came 
to power. 
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9.4 The Participation and Inclusion of the Kemalist Women’s CSOs in the AKP Era 
Kemalist segments of CS were uncomfortable with idea of having an Islamist party in power. In 
particular, organized Kemalist women were afraid that the Islamist AKP would terminate the 
reform process regarding women’s rights and gender equality. However, the AKP initially 
engaged in dialogue with women’s organizations, including the Kemalist women’s CSOs, to 
advance women’s rights and included them in policy-making. Under AKP rule, organized 
Kemalist women continued to be active in strengthening women’s rights to achieve gender 
equality. Similar to feminist CSOs, they were highly vocal in combating violence against women. 
Violence against Women 
Legal experts from the Kemalist women’s CSOs worked actively on drafting Law 4320, which was 
implemented to protect women and children from violence. As noted before, the Protection Law 
was not very effective, and violence against women continued to be a serious problem in Turkey. 
Like other women’s groups, the Kemalist women’s CSOs address three important points in the 
prevention of violence against women: 1) the improvement of the existing laws and mechanisms 
regarding protection of women from violence, 2) the cooperation of CSOs with the local state 
institutions such as municipalities and provincial governorates (valilik) in establishing women’s 
shelters, and 3) raising women’s awareness of their legal rights.  
 After the amendment to the Civil Code, Kemalist women CSOs have argued that it was 
necessary to amend the Penal Code in order to protect women and children from all forms of 
violence. 
Reforming the Penal Code 
Organized Kemalist women were highly active in the aforementioned Women’s Platform on the 
Turkish Penal Code (cf. Chapter 6 and 7). TKB was a member of this platform and has actively 
participated in the discussions of how to revise the discriminatory laws in the Penal Code. Nazan 
Moroğlu from IKKB was both a member of the Women’s Platform and the ‘Monitoring Group’ of 
the Justice Commission that was responsible for amending the Penal Code. She kept the 
Women’s Platform up to date with the progress of the parliament’s draft proposal. After 
analyzing the draft proposals, the Platform realized that the draft was neither fulfilling Turkey’s 
obligations for the EU accession nor the CEDAW agreement (Eslen-Ziya 2012: 133). After a 
meticulous research, the Women’s Platform proposed forty-five modifications in laws that 
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would eliminate the discriminatory provisions in the Penal Code and help improve women’s 
status as individuals (Ilkkaracan 2007: 255). In 2003, when feminist WWHR organized a mass 
march to the Turkish Parliament to pressure the legislators to reform the Penal Code, some 
members of both IKKB and IKKB-Izmir participated in this march. TKB-Istanbul organized 
seminars and panels, and released public statements to promote the revised Penal Code.  
 Organized Kemalist women played a key role in coordinating lobbying efforts during the 
amendment process of the Penal Code. All three Kemalist women’s CSOs had good relations with 
the CHP, whose members were helpful in conveying information to women’s CSOs about the 
latest discussions on the proposal.218 This helped the Women’s Platform to prepare public 
statements and to organize activities to attract public’s attention to the controversies with 
policy-makers. For instance, when Prime Minister Erdoğan attempted to re-criminalize 
adultery, the Kemalist women’s CSOs, like the feminist CSOs, used their networks in the secular 
media and informed the EU institutions to reject this draft proposal. They thereby succeeded to 
hinder the legalization of the proposal on adultery. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the 
Women’s Platform on the Penal Code was successful in achieving forty amendments out of forty-
five it lobbied for. In September 2004, the Turkish Parliament ratified the amendments to the 
Penal Code, and it took effect in June 2005.  
Women’s Shelters and Common Platforms to Combat Domestic Violence 
It can be noted that there is a consensus among organized women in Turkey that the 
establishment of women’s shelters is an important mechanism in preventing domestic violence. 
Like organized feminists, the Kemalist women CSOs are also involved in supporting the existing 
women’s shelters or in forming new ones. As Selma Durak from TKB-Istanbul stated, TKB 
together with some members of IKKB support ‘Küçükçekmece Municipality Women’s Shelter’ in 
Istanbul. In contrast to other municipality-run women’s shelters in Istanbul, which were closed 
down when the party in power lost local elections, this shelter is the only one that continued to 
work without any interval until now. However, Selma Durak stated in our interview that:  
                                                          
218 Personal interviews with the activists from Purple Roof, AMARGI and with N. Moroğlu, October and November 
2010, Istanbul.  
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“Women who are exposed to domestic violence do not easily consider to contact a 
women’s shelter. Women are subjected to violence by their fathers, husbands, father-in-
laws, and brothers, and even by their sons. Thus, the coming generation thinks that 
beating is an acceptable practice and a right of men. This mentality among Turkish men 
has to be shattered. Therefore, we carry out different projects on violence against 
women in suburban areas of Istanbul and try to raise women’s awareness of their legal 
rights.” 
The Kemalist women’s CSOs have also participated in the aforementioned ‘Assembly of Women’s 
Shelters’. At the annually gathering Assembly, TKB-Istanbul, IKKB and IKKB-Izmir activists 
exchange information about women’s shelters with other women’s organizations as well as with 
social workers from the state-run shelters. The three interviewees from the Kemalist CSOs have 
stressed the importance of increasing the numbers of women’s shelters. Similar to the feminist 
CSOs, the Kemalist women’s CSOs also remarked that the number of women’s shelters in Turkey 
is not sufficient considering Turkey’s population.  
One important point to mention is the tense relationship between organized Kemalist 
women and Kurdish feminist groups at the Assembly. A feminist lawyer from Izmir, who 
regularly participates in the Assembly Women Shelters, claimed in our interview that organized 
Kemalist women have criticized feminist groups for including “terrorists”, referring to Kurdish 
women activists, in the Assembly.219 As noted in the previous chapter, the hostile approach of 
organized Kemalist women towards organized Kurdish women has been harshly criticized by 
the Assembly’s organizing committee. Thus, the committee developed a control mechanism to 
balance the relations among organized women by forming working groups to discuss social 
values such as tolerance, respect, democratic values, and social organizing through a feminist 
perspective. 220 
 In order to combat domestic violence, Kemalist women’s CSOs often joined the broad-
based campaigns and platforms to become more influential in pressuring the AKP-government. 
For instance, TKB-Istanbul participated in a widely-acknowledged campaign for the prevention 
                                                          
219 Personal interview with Sevgi B., September 2011, Izmir. 
220 http://www.siginaksizbirdunya.org/kurultaylar/siginaksiz-bir-dunya-sonuc-bildirgeleri/19-onikinci-kurultay-
sonuc-bildirgesi (rev. 18.11.2014) 
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of domestic violence. In 2004, the major Turkish daily Hürriyet, which has a largely secular 
readership, launched a campaign called “End Domestic Violence” with the support of the 
television channels CNN Türk and Star TV, Kemalist women’s CSOs and the ‘Governorship of 
Istanbul’. The campaign aimed to raise public awareness of domestic violence, to change the 
perspectives of society on violence and produce solutions at the political level.221 The initiators 
launched a hotline for abused persons, organized educational programs on domestic violence 
for social workers, psychologists and psychological counselors, and the members of security 
forces. This campaign even reached Germany, and educated volunteers and social workers who 
had worked with the Turkish community.222 Between 2007 and 2012, this campaign informed 
11,420 mistreated individuals or their relatives on what to do in case of domestic violence. The 
supporting teams helped 1,468 emergent cases and directed them to women’s shelters.223 Both 
interviewees from TKB-Istanbul and IKKB have stressed the greater impact of such broad 
campaigns, which are supported by the media, in influencing both public debates and policy-
makers. 
 Both IKKB and IKKB-Izmir also have organized educational seminars in rural areas to 
raise public awareness of the problems caused by domestic violence. As the interviewees stated, 
the legal experts who are active in both organizations work to inform women on their legal 
rights in case they are exposed to violence. Similarly, their members who are social workers and 
psychologists inform women about the different forms of violence and counsel them how to 
counteract violence. Emel Denizaslanı from IKKB-Izmir’s stated in our interview:  
“We [IKKB-Izmir] participate in activities during the week of 25 November (International 
Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women) with other women’s organizations, 
and on 9 November we protest the practice of ‘stoning of women’ (recm) in some Muslim 
countries that has been condemned as a violation of women’s human rights and a form 
of discrimination against women.”  
TKB-Istanbul, IKKB, and IKKB-Izmir were also highly active in the aforementioned ‘Stop 
Violence Platform’, which was formed in 2011 and incorporated 241 women’s organizations (see 
Chapter 6). This platform pushed the AKP government to make amendments to the Law on the 
                                                          
221 http://aileicisiddeteson.com/category/kampanya-hakkinda/ (rev. 18.11.2014) 
222 Ibid. 
223 http://aileicisiddeteson.com/neler-yaptik33/ (rev. 18.11.2014) 
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Protection of the Family (No. 4320). The Kemalist women’s CSOs formed broad networks, used 
their webpages and networks in the media to inform the Turkish public on the reform process 
of the Protection Law. On the international level, such as the CEDAW meetings, they participated 
in petitions and voiced their demands for increasing the protective measures for women.  
Organized Kemalist women played an important role in the enactment of the new Law 
to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women (No. 6284). As all the interviewee 
remarked, the main obstacle in securing women’s protection is the unwillingness, or the 
ignorance, of the governmental personnel in the implementation of laws. Therefore, TKB-
Istanbul, IKKB, and IKKB-Izmir prefer to act in broader women’s platforms to push the AKP-
government more strongly. The interviewees underlined that the government should develop 
control mechanisms that would enforce laws to protect women from violence and simplify 
women’s access to judicial processes. They pointed out that it is highly important to raise 
governmental personnel’s awareness of violence, especially police and military officers, judges, 
and state prosecutors, through training them in preventing violence against women. To this 
end, IKKB organizes panels in which women’s rights activists and legal experts discuss with the 
representatives of the Turkish military, police departments, and the judiciary on how to protect 
women from violence effectively. Both TKB-Istanbul and IKKB have supported the training of 
governmental personnel on violence against women through the campaign called ‘End Domestic 
Violence’.  
Women’s Rights and Gender Equality 
Kemalist women activists have been mostly involved in strengthening women’s rights in the 
legal framework. In 2003, Nazan Moroğlu from IKKB was a member of the advisory committee 
on gender equality of the ‘Turkish Parliamentary Union’ and of the ‘Women’s Initiative’ for 
Turkey’s membership in the EU. She mentioned in our interview that she published several 
books on women’s legal rights in Turkey as well as commemorative books on promoting the 
importance of the CEDAW agreement. Likewise, legal experts from TKB and IKKB were highly 
active both in the process of amending the Civil Code and the Turkish Penal Code. TKB-Istanbul 
and both IKKB and IKKB-Izmir have launched several campaigns to promote the new Civil Code, 
regularly organized panels and discussed the positive outcomes as well as the shortcomings of 
the Code. To monitor the implementation of laws regarding women’s rights, lawyers from the 
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three Kemalist women’s CSOs, who are also involved in the Women’s Commissions of the Turkish 
Bar Associations (TÜBAKKOMs), provide legal advice for women in thirty different provinces in 
Turkey. In a newspaper interview, Moroğlu stated that TÜBAKKOMs aimed to pressure for the 
introduction of the basic democratic principles ‘equality before law and ‘no-discrimination in 
the Turkish legal framework’ (Koçali 2003). TÜBAKKOM lawyers worked, for instance, for the 
implementation of the clause on gender equality. In May 2004, the clause was introduced into 
Article 10 of the Constitution that stipulates: “Women and men have equal rights. The State is 
responsible for taking all measures to realize gender equality” (Amend: 7.5.2004-5170/Clause 1).  
 Furthermore, organized Kemalist women were the most vocal group when the AKP-
government restructured the ‘State Ministry for Family and Women’ in June 2011 and re-named 
it as the ‘Ministry for Family and Social Policies’. Nazan Moroğlu from IKKB made several public 
statements and underscored: “The omission of the word ‘women’ from the Ministry’s name 
means that women are not regarded as individuals, but only as members of families. Considering 
women’s role in the context of family only would hinder us to develop gender-sensitive 
strategies to solve women’s problems in the labor market, social life, and politics or to combat 
violence against women” (June 2011 IKKB Press Release). IKKB also stated that the AKP 
government is ought to consider that the newly created ‘Ministry for European Union Affairs’ 
would have difficulties without a ‘Ministry for Women’ in implementing gender equality 
principle in diverse policy areas. IKKB suggested that the restructured ministry needs to be 
named the ‘Ministry for Women, Family, and Social Policies’. TKB-Istanbul in coordination with 
other TKB branches in different cities issued similar press releases and criticized the AKP-
government for acting against the requirements of the CEDAW and EU membership agreements. 
Moreover, IKKB, TKB-Istanbul, and IKKB-Izmir supported the petition campaign, which was 
initiated by the feminist CSOs, to re-integrate the name ‘women’ in the ministry’s name. 
However, this campaign was not successful, and the ministry’s name remained the ‘Ministry for 
Family and Social Policies’. 
 In addition to the struggle for legal changes, the Kemalist women’s CSOs also worked to 
improve the lives of women and girls in social and economic spheres. To this end, TKB-Istanbul, 
IKKB, and IKKB-Izmir participate in broad-based projects for girls’ enrolment in secondary 
education and in higher education. A publicly known campaign was the ‘Snowdrops’ 
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(Kardelenler)224 that was initiated in 2000 by the largest private Turkish telecommunication 
company Turkcell in cooperation with the Kemalist CSO ‘Society for Supporting Modern Life’ 
(Çağdas Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, ÇYDD). The project’s aims were to provide equal educational 
opportunities to girls who were unable to continue their education due to the economic 
disadvantages of their families or girls who were hindered by traditional norms. Since 2000, this 
campaign has provided 100,000 Turkcell scholarships and reached 28,000 pupils and students. 
17,000 ‘Kardelens’ (supported girls) finished high school, and 1,800 young women finished their 
higher education.225 In March 2010, the UN awarded this project as an exemplary project and 
will support it until 2015. Since the objectives of this project were in line with the Kemalist ideal 
of educating modern and secular generations of women, TKB-Istanbul and some member 
organizations of IKKB also made donations to the project.  
 Kemalist women’s CSOs also point at the problem of women’s literacy rate in Turkey. 
According to the Turkey’s Statistical Institute’s 2012 report, 7 percent of women were 
illiterate.226 The worst rate was in Kurdish populated province Şırnak in southeast Turkey: 18.2 
percent. Selma Durak from TKB-Istanbul stated that TKB offers literacy programs for women in 
collaboration with public education centers in the poor suburban areas of Istanbul. 
Furthermore, both interviewees from IKKB and TKB-Istanbul noted that their organizations 
conduct seminars on gender equality to educate school counselors in primary and secondary 
schools. Therefore, they need to work with the ‘Directorate for National Education’ in Istanbul. 
These educational seminars stress that ‘women’s rights are human rights’, and they aim to raise 
children’s awareness of women’s rights and gender equality. 
 Organized Kemalist women also focus on women’s economic participation and 
entrepreneurship. All three CSOs have been involved in projects encouraging women to 
participate in economic activities. For instance, every year in the week of 8 March, IKKB-Izmir 
organizes, together with the ‘Center of Women’s Studies’ at the Ege University in Izmir, seminars 
informing women about micro-credits and discuss the factors that discourage women from 
                                                          
224 The name “snowdrop”, a small white flower that come out in early spring through snow, was chosen because it 
symbolizes the struggle of the girls that wish to further their education despite the harsh conditions, referring to 
both the geographical and social difficulties in the Eastern region of Turkey. 
225 http://www.turkcell.com.tr/tr/hakkimizda/sosyal-sorumluluk/egitim/kardelenler (rev. 18.11.2014) 
226 http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16056 (rev. 18.11.2014) 
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taking up the option of entrepreneurship. IKKB-Izmir also invites businesswomen to convey 
information about their own experiences and how to set-up a new business. Moreover, both 
IKKB and IKKB-Izmir organize charity sales to help women present and sell their handicrafts, 
art works or other products.  
 As will be delineated below, Kemalist women activists are also highly vocal on the low 
levels of women’s participation in politics and demand the introduction of the political quotas.  
Quota Debate 
TKB-Istanbul, IKKB, and IKKB-Izmir regularly celebrate the day Turkish women acquired 
suffrage (5 December) by organizing panels and round-tables on women’s political rights. They 
invite well-known women’s rights activists to transmit information about the latest data about 
women’s representation in different levels of politics. All the interviewed Kemalist women 
emphasized that “democracy without women cannot be a true democracy”. Nazan Moroğlu 
from IKKB emphasized in our interview:  
“A progressive and democratic governance is only possible by achieving gender equality. 
Women’s political participation is an important indicator for gender equality. Thus, the 
under-representation of women in politics is a problem of democracy. Although Turkish 
women have acquired suffrage and have been represented in the parliament long before 
other women in the world, Turkey unfortunately ranks 126 among 136 countries in the 
level of women’s representation in the 2010 Global Gender Gap Report. This is an 
ominous fact of Turkish democracy”. 
The three Kemalist women’s CSOs support KADER’s demand for the introduction of a minimum 
30 percent gender quota system in the ‘Political Parties and Elections Acts’. Some members of 
IKKB and TKB-Istanbul have membership in KADER. Emel Denizaslanı from IKKB-Izmir has even 
acted as the head of KADER-Izmir between 2000 and 2002 and as a member of the executive 
committee from 2002 to 2004. But she was critical of KADER’s work and claimed: “I find KADER’s 
‘equal distance’ approach to different political parties utopian, especially considering the 
fragmented political environment in Turkey. To conduct a joint struggle for women’s problems 
is highly important, but we have to put it straight, we [women activists] have huge ideological 
differences.” Denizaslanı added that both Kurdish and Islamist women activists are ‘used’ by 
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their respective political movements, and they do not act according to women’s perspectives, 
but serve to their movements’ political aims and agenda.227  
 Before the June 2011 parliamentary election, influential businesswoman Vuslat Doğan 
Sabancı, a chairwoman from the newspaper Hürriyet, formed a platform called the ‘Women are 
Right Platform’ (Haklı Kadın Platformu) coalescing forty-one broad-based and influential women’s 
CSOs, prominent businesswomen, academics, lawyers, and media institutions.228 Its primary aim 
was to enable women to be represented in the Turkish Parliament on equal terms with men. To 
this end, it released public statements and open letters addressed to the leaders of different 
political parties. The Platform represents around 100,000 women, including TKB-Istanbul, many 
member organizations of IKKB, and also feminist organizations such as Purple Roof. The 
initiators of the Platform emphasize that women’s equal representation would enable female 
politicians to be involved directly in formulating policies to protect women from violence, to 
introduce affirmative action in the labor market, and to ensure that measures necessary for 
gender equality are implemented.229  
 Despite the relentless efforts of Kemalist women to strengthen women’s rights and 
achieve gender equality in different spheres of life, discrimination against women continues to 
be a major problem in Turkey. 
Discrimination against Women 
TKB, IKKB and IKKB-Izmir as the members of the Women’s Platform for the Constitution have 
insisted on amending Article 10 of the Constitution stipulating that the state is responsible for 
ensuring gender equality. The aforementioned Women’s Platform for the Constitution (cf. 
Chapter 6) demanded that the law must guarantee gender equality without discriminating on 
the grounds of sexual orientation, sexual identity, marital status, age, and disability. After the 
September 2010 referendum, the Constitution was amended (Amendment Law No. 5982), and 
the phrase “measures to be taken to this effect cannot be considered contrary to the principle 
of equality” has been added to Article 10 (KSGM Interim Report 2012). Thereby, the Turkish state 
took greater responsibility for preventing gender-based discrimination. Moreover, the state was 
                                                          
227 This is a good example that crystalizes the political cleavages (Turkish vs. Kurdish and religious vs. seculars) 
which divide not only women’s movements but also Turkish society in general. 
228 http://www.haklikadinplatformu.org/icerik/20-hayatin-her-alaninda-esit-temsil-istiyoruz (rev. 18.11.2014) 
229 http://www.haklikadinplatformu.org/icerik/46-rightful-women-platform (rev. 18.11.2014) 
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assigned to formulate and implement policies, regulations, and measures providing equal rights 
and opportunities for women and men. Article 10 has also determined that these measures 
should ensure equality for children, elderly, disabled, widows and orphans of martyrs, and war 
veterans (cf. Chapter 5). This amendment did not include sexual orientation or identity. 
 Like other women’s groups, Kemalist women’s CSOs also address the CEDAW obligations 
and the EU acquis that require Turkey to implement political mechanisms to secure gender 
equality and to reduce discrimination against women. As mentioned before, the state women’s 
machinery KSGM periodically submits a report to the CEDAW Committee in which it presents 
the legal developments regarding the elimination of the gender-discriminatory laws in Turkey. 
In the last interim report submitted in July 2012, KSGM emphasized that Turkey has taken 
further steps to eliminate the discriminatory laws in the legal framework. 
 As mentioned before, since 2005, TKB Ankara has been conducting CEDAW’s Turkey 
Secretariat, which assists the preparation of the KSGM’s CEDAW reports. TKB has, thus, been 
involved in advocacy, lobbying, and outreach activities to promote the CEDAW agreement 
nationwide. Selma Durak from TKB-Istanbul remarked that TKB works with different women’s 
CSOs, collects the opinions on draft laws aiming at eliminating discrimination against women, 
and conveys information to the KSGM. Both TKB-Istanbul and IKKB issue press releases pointing 
out the shortcoming in the new Civil Code (2002) regarding “sharing of acquired property in 
case of divorce”. Like all other women’s groups, they claim that the law should also be applicable 
for marriages that took place prior to the adoption of the Civil Code in January 2002. Moreover, 
these two organizations voice their demand that Article 82 of the Penal Code, which defines 
aggravated circumstances for homicides, needs to be revised to include killings in the name of 
‘honor’ as an aggravating circumstance. They stress that the notion of ‘honor’ is used to 
discriminate women in their bodily rights. 
 The Kemalist women’s CSOs also address discriminatory practices in the patriarchal 
Turkish society that hinder women and girls in education, political or economic participation. 
TKB, for instance, contends that the campaigns and training activities for the public officials are 
important in combating discrimination against women, but the government needs to continue 
to persevere with the efforts to implement further laws and mechanisms (Shadow Report 2010). 
Also, Nazan Moroğlu from IKKB argued that TÜBAKKOMs carry out activities to find solutions 
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to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women. Likewise, IKKB-Izmir addresses 
discriminatory practices women face in political, economic, and educational spheres. All three 
Kemalist women’s CSOs argue that the struggle against gender-based discrimination is closely 
related to the struggle for democracy.  
 However, Kemalist women CSOs have not worked on the prevention of discrimination 
Kurdish or Islamist women face. As mentioned before, they have not agreed with organized 
Islamist women on the right to wear headscarves in public institutions. Likewise, organized 
Kemalist women have never acknowledged the claim that Turkish security forces systematically 
perpetrated sexual violence against Kurdish women under custody in the 1990s.230 Thus, they 
have not supported the demands of Kurdish feminist women for the investigation of state’s 
violent acts against Kurdish women in those years. Only in the 2000s, when Kurdish feminist 
CSOs such as KAMER and VAKAD became visible and effective in the fight against domestic 
violence and in improving women’s equal rights, some organized Kemalist women from TKB and 
IKKB began to work with them in various women’s platforms. Although they collaborated with 
Kurdish feminists in drafting Law 6284 and laws regarding women’s equal rights, Kemalist 
women have not supported the demand of Kurdish women’s CSOs to use Kurdish language in 
public institutions. 
  Likewise, in the debate on the discriminatory consequences of the headscarf ban, 
Kemalist women activists support the ban in the public institutions and contend that headscarf 
wearing at universities or public institutions is a form of pushing religion into politics. 
Headscarf Debate under AKP rule 
As mentioned in Chapter 7 on Islamist women, the first contention between secularists and 
Islamists was during the presidential elections in April 2007. The candidacy of Abdullah Gül from 
the AKP prompted a strong secularist backlash. A diverse array of Kemalist women’s groups 
organized mass demonstrations, labeled ‘Republic Rallies’ (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri), in Ankara, 
Istanbul, and Izmir that gathered almost a million participants (Turam 2008: 482). Secularist 
                                                          
230 Feminist and Kurdish feminist activists I interviewed criticized organized Kemalist women for ignoring the fact 
that state officials have raped Kurdish women during Kurdish-Turkish conflict in the 1990s. For instance, Emel 
Denizaslanı from IKKB-Izmir rejected this claim when she was talking about the common and different perspectives 
on the issue of violence among organized women. 
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segments aimed to prevent the consolidation of Islamist politics within the structures of power, 
and they were not comfortable with the idea of having a headscarf wearing first lady, which 
would, according to them, ruin Turkey’s modern and secular image (Cindoglu and Zencirci 2008; 
Turam 2008). Nazan Moroğlu from IKKB was in the organizing committee of the Istanbul 
Republic Rally, and IKKB’s member organizations, including TKB-Istanbul, participated in the 
rally in Istanbul. Emel Denizaslanı from IKKB-Izmir remarked that she joined the protests in 
2007 to remind the ruling AKP that there was a strong secular opposition to the Islamist politics. 
In their public speeches and statements, Kemalist women expressed their fear of becoming like 
staunchly Islamist Iran and of the suppression of women by shari’a laws in case Islamists take all 
levels of state power. Kemalist women activists stated in our interviews that they became active 
because they felt responsible to protect Turkish women’s freedom. One important outcome of 
this tension was that the headscarf debate under the AKP lost its real agents, Islamist women’s 
CSOs, and that made the wives of the political elite the actors of the debate (Cindoglu and 
Zencirci 2008: 804). 
 The second contention between secularists and Islamists took place in February 2008, 
when the AKP government proposed a change in Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution which 
would allow headscarf wearing at public universities. The Turkish Parliament passed this draft 
proposal, despite the objections from secular MPs (Akboğa 2013; Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu 
2008; Turam 2008). In February 2008, Kemalist women again organized ‘Republic Rallies’ in 
Istanbul and Ankara, which were smaller than the previous ones, and demanded the resignation 
of the AKP government. In the immediate aftermath, secular MPs from CHP applied the 
Constitutional Court for the annulment of the proposed law lifting the headscarf ban.  In June 
2008, the Constitutional Court annulled the new law (Decision No. 2008/116), and reinstated the 
headscarf ban in universities.  
 Both crises showed the predicament of the headscarf issue in Turkey. While Kemalist 
women’s activism became vitalized during the headscarf debate, organized Islamist women have 
not mobilized collectively to defend their ‘right to education’ and ‘freedom of religion’. Kemalist 
women activists whom I interviewed emphasized at that time they have perceived the headscarf 
as a political symbol, and therefore, they objected to wearing headscarves in public institutions. 
Despite the ideological differences, Kemalist women activists stated in our interviews that they 
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have collaborated with Islamist women in the issue of violence against women because it is an 
issue in which all women activists need to unite to improve the disastrous situation in Turkey.  
Conclusion 
Kemalist women are the first organized women’s group in Turkey, thus have long-standing 
institutions that have a countrywide presence and reputation in the strengthening women’s 
rights. Drawing upon the Kemalist principles pertaining to women’s rights, they have solely 
focused on increasing legal and political equality between genders in the public sphere, but as 
scholars also underline, they have not questioned the underlying mechanisms of patriarchy and 
women’s subordination in the private sphere (Arat 2008; Marshall 2009).  
Organized Kemalist women stressed that the social and cultural transformation for 
gender equality is only possible through substantial changes in laws and regulations. To this 
end, they intensely lobby policy-makers and work with governmental institutions to achieve 
improvement in gender policies. The Kemalist women’s organizations are commonly partners 
in the activities of the state’s women’s machinery KSGM, which aims to advance women’s status 
in the country. Their international networks with the CEDAW Committee and the EWL increase 
their efficiency in bargaining with governmental institutions. As this chapter demonstrated, 
unlike some feminist and Kurdish women’s groups, the Kemalist women’s CSOs do not hold an 
anti-state position. 
 Like other organized women’s groups, the Kemalist women’s CSOs have also mainly 
focused on combating violence against women in the AKP era. Since they have effective 
networks within the secularist media and the main oppositional party CHP, they have initiated 
broad-based campaigns addressing domestic violence. All interviewees argued that the laws that 
are necessary to protect women and children from violence are passed, but there are serious 
problems in the implementation of the laws. To raise public’s awareness of domestic violence, 
they pay particular attention to educational activities in state schools that inform pupils and 
their parents about the issue. Interestingly, the Kemalist women’s CSOs, like the Islamist 
women’s CSOs, see women’s role as mothers and wives essential for the well-being of the family, 
and pursue activities in this regard. They do not necessarily question the male dominance in the 
family structure, but blame the Islamic traditions for women’s subordinate status in the family. 
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 The Kemalist women’s organizations are remarkably influential in negotiating with 
governmental institutions to achieve gender equality. Since a great deal of the members in 
Kemalist women’s CSOs are legal experts, they find more opportunity to participate in decision-
making processes to advance women’s rights. In amending the Civil and Penal Codes, in revising 
the gender equality clause in the Constitution, and in many other legal reforms regarding 
gender-mainstreaming, activists from both TKB and IKKB could put pressure on policy-makers 
through their networks within the oppositional party CHP. Moreover, the Kemalist women’s 
organizations have also links in the business world and can acquire financial or logistic support 
from wealthy businesswomen for the cause of empowerment of women in the education and 
the economy. As regards women’s representation, organized Kemalist women together with 
feminist CSOs, often call for the introduction of gender quotas in Law on Political Parties and 
Elections. 
 Organized Kemalist women have noted that women’s human rights have been integrated 
into national laws, but the progress is insufficient. In their activities, they remind the AKP 
government Turkey’s obligations for the elimination of discriminatory laws required by the 
CEDAW agreement and the EU accession criteria. As mentioned above, lawyers and legal experts 
from the Kemalist women’s CSOs assist the KSGM in preparing the CEDAW country reports that 
present the legal changes to reduce discrimination against women. The interviewed Kemalist 
women have also underlined the importance of having a ‘Ministry of Women and Family Affairs’ 
that integrates women’s perspective into governmental policies. There is no doubt that 
integrating the name ‘women’ in the ministry’s name would at least have a symbolic effect and 
might attract women’s CSOs that keep their distance to state institutions. But a real change in 
state’s policies towards women is more likely to occur through the vitality and strength of 
organized women that push and produce enduring impacts on gender policies. 
Kemalist women activists have stressed that women’s CSOs are regarded as important 
actors in fighting against discrimination against women by state authorities and public opinion. 
As this chapter also presented, they increased their cooperation with a diverse array of women’s 
groups to be more effective in lobbying legislators and negotiating with the AKP-government.  
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Chapter 10 
Turkish Democracy Engendered?  
 
After extensively examining the four groups of women’s CSOs, some general remarks emerge to 
conclude the empirical part. Yet, any general remark should remain tentative because the 
examination of the democratic consolidation process in Turkey, as noted in ‘Introduction’, is 
like aiming at a moving target. It was not the aim to provide all-encompassing analysis of the 
relationship between women and democratic consolidation in Turkey. Rather, the evidences 
from three different gender issue areas which I selected are relevant for both capturing the 
extent of reforms in gender policies and for understanding how engendered Turkish democracy 
has become under AKP rule. Accordingly, this chapter discusses if Turkish democracy is 
engendered. To this end, I compare the evidences on the role of four groups of women’s CSOs in 
the process of democratic consolidation under AKP rule. In doing so, it also makes inferences 
how the consolidation process influenced women’s CSOs in general.  
 The leading hypothesis of the present study is that the high level of women’s activism 
in the civil society sphere is vital for the consolidation of democracy, understood also as 
engendering democracy. In other words, the greater the participation and the inclusion of 
organized women’s groups in politics, the more engendered and consolidated democracy 
becomes. Thus, the present study claims that engendering democratic consolidation can be best 
understood as the strengthening of democracy in its two core dimensions: a) participation, b) 
inclusion with respect to the specific demands, needs, and interests of women, which are 
explicitly recognized by political decision-making in all relevant policy areas.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, this entails looking at the extent of participation and inclusion 
of organized women in political processes linked to democratic consolidation. To this end, the 
preceding chapters have extensively examined the civic engagement of four groups of women’s 
CSOs in the three issue areas – violence against women, women’s rights and gender equality, 
and discrimination against women – and displayed how and to what extent they could 
participate in policy-making processes regarding those issue areas. In order to understand the 
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influence of women’s CSOs on policy-making, the study looked at gendered outcomes in laws 
and policies in Chapter 5. 
As the analysis has shown, there are some differences between the four groups of 
women’s CSOs – feminist, Islamist, Kurdish, and Kemalist women’s CSOs - in their level of 
participation and inclusion in policy-making processes regarding the three aforementioned 
issue areas. Despite the differences between the internal structures of women’s CSOs, their 
relationship to the state, and their activities and strategies, they also have several similarities 
that allow for some generalizations. Highlighting these differences and similarities could 
provide a fertile ground for some generalizations, which can even be applied beyond the case 
study.  
I will begin with presenting the common and different traits of the women’s CSOs under 
consideration. The common traits of four women’s groups are: the institutionalization and the 
democratic principles they share in their internal management. Majority of these women’s 
rights organizations became institutionalized in the 1990s, except the two Kurdish women’s 
organizations which were established in the 2000s (i.e. VAKAD and SELIS). The 
institutionalization of women’s activism enabled them to formulate and articulate their 
demands in a more structured way and to interact more easily with state institutions. The 
formalization of women’s activism in different forms of CSOs have also enabled them to interact 
with the international women’s networks (such as UN Women, CEDAW Committee, or the EWL) 
and with foreign, regional, and international organizations that support women’s 
empowerment (European CSOs, EU institutions, the WHO etc.). Despite the differences in their 
internal management (hierarchic, semi-, or non-hierarchic), they all function on the basis of 
some basic democratic principles, such as collective decision-making, accountability, and 
transparency.  
But these groups also differ in their aims and objectives as well as in their organizational 
size. As the study has shown, women’s groups in Turkey have different gender agendas. 
Organized feminists embarked upon their activism by challenging the patriarchal structures in 
society and making violence and discrimination against women visible. The Kemalist women’s 
movement has been close to the liberal feminist tradition and aimed at expanding gender 
equality in the legal framework. While the Kurdish women have initially focused on the 
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elimination of ethnic discrimination against women, the organized Islamist women struggled 
against the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in public universities and offices. Despite their 
diverging views on women’s issues, they all demand full citizenship rights for women. Also, 
there are variations in their organizational size. The Kemalist and Islamist women’s 
organizations considered here are larger in size compared to the feminist and Kurdish women’s 
CSOs.  
When analyzing the circumstances in which organized women’s groups put their 
demands on the political agenda and participated in policy-making arenas, the study looked at 
different factors. The first factor has been the institutional context that has extensively shaped 
the leeway of each group of women’s CSOs differently. In the 1990s, while the feminist and 
Kemalist women’s organizations had access to the civil society and political sphere without 
facing any threats from the state, both organized Islamist and Kurdish women had a problematic 
relationship with the Kemalist state due to their demands to participate in public space with 
their ethnic or religious identity. Both women’s groups played a key role in revealing 
discrimination against Kurdish and Islamist women by state power. Their gendered demands 
were manifestation of the need to democratize state-society relations in Turkey. All women’s 
CSOs have secured a place for gender-based concerns in public opinion and on the political 
agenda, but they had limited access to resources and political decision-making in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the ideological fragmentation among organized women’s groups was an 
important reason for the weak influence on policy-making regarding gender issues.  
As political space became more open, the range of the actors involved in political 
processes has increased in the 2000s. In this changing political atmosphere, a women’s working 
group, consisting of feminist, non-feminist, and Kemalist women activists, succeeded to push 
the nationalist coalition government in 2001 to renew the Civil Code (cf. Chapter 6 and 9). When 
the AKP came to power in 2002, the party proceeded the political reform process in cooperation 
with CS. Thanks to the diminished political role of the military and the removal of some 
constraints on political rights and civil liberties (cf. Chapter 4), both organized Islamist and 
Kurdish women began to enjoy more political freedom. Two of the Kurdish women’s CSOs, SELIS 
and VAKAD, have been established in such a political atmosphere. The amending process of the 
Civil Code has shown that building broader women’s coalitions and coordinated pressure groups 
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increase the chances of influencing policy-making. Thus, in 2002, different groups of women’s 
CSOs coalesced under the Women’s Platform for the Turkish Penal Code to monitor the 
government’s proposals and to exert influence on policy-makers. Thanks to this platform, the 
Islamist, and Kurdish women’s CSOs have participated in lobbying activities and the decision-
making process. Islamist women activists in particular were influential in lobbying the 
conservative MPs from the AKP. The amending process of the Penal Code marked a turning point 
in history of women’s organizing in Turkey. They acknowledged that overcoming the ideological 
barriers immensely helps organized women’s groups to push the government to introduce 
women-friendly changes in the legal framework. Thanks to the democratic consolidation 
process, women’s CSOs found more opportunities to engage in the political sphere and 
participate in policy-making. 
Increased cooperation between women’s CSOs enriched women’s repertoires of action 
and areas of interest. They were not only engaged in the civil society sphere, but also became 
active in all the phases of policy processes: in the agenda setting, in the decision-making, 
implementation, monitoring, and finally in the policy evaluation. For instance, all women’s 
groups examined here have prepared evaluation reports on gender laws and policies for their 
own public statements and for the national and international organizations engaged in women’s 
issues. Also, women’s CSOs have broadened their areas of interests regarding women’s issues. 
Islamist women’s CSOs began to deal with violence against women and domestic violence, 
whereas feminist and Kurdish women’s CSOs have increasingly stressed discrimination against 
women due to the headscarf ban. Kemalist women’s CSOs have intensified their activities to 
eliminate domestic violence. Convergence in issue areas strengthened the overall struggle of 
organized women’s groups in bargaining with the state on policy changes. The more the 
coalition of women’s CSOs sustained their pressure on the AKP government, the more success 
they had in gender policy changes of the 2000s in Turkey. 
The democratized political sphere has also improved the relationship between women 
CSOs and political parties. For instance, the three Kemalist women’s CSOs – TKB-Istanbul, IKKB-
Istanbul, and IKKB-Izmir – have several members that are also members of the main oppositional 
party CHP, which is known for its Kemalist identity. In the same vein, the Kurdish women’s 
organizations SELIS and VAKAD had ties with the Kurdish BDP (since October 2013 HDP), 
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especially with the party’s women’s branch. While the feminist CSOs could lobby MPs that are 
open to feminist ideas or progressive gender policies, mainly from the CHP and the BDP, the 
Islamist women’s organizations could easily communicate with the Islamist and nationalist 
parties due to some shared religious norms and beliefs. Clearly, the improved relations with the 
political parties increased the level of participation, and even inclusion, of each group of 
women’s CSOs in policy-making processes. The key actors of political society in Turkey, i.e. the 
political parties, thus began to fulfill their task in intermediating between the state and CS, and 
the structuring of compromise between them. 
The second important factor is the external environment that shaped the activities and 
opportunities of organized women’s groups. The UN’s women’s conferences, especially from 
Beijing Conference in 1995 on, raised the profile of gender issues on the global level. Many states 
began to accept women’s human rights as a part of international norms. Feminist, Kemalist, and 
Islamist women activists began to frame their gendered arguments with regards to 
internationally accepted norms. For instance, organized feminists framed their struggle against 
domestic violence as women’s right to bodily integrity free from gender-based violence. 
Likewise, organized Islamist women framed their demand to lift the headscarf ban as part of the 
right to education and work. Organized Kurdish women pointed out discrimination against 
women based on gender and ethnicity.  
More importantly, the CEDAW treaty, which is considered the international bill of 
women’s right, has helped women’s CSOs to put their gendered demands on the political agenda 
and bargain with the state. Feminist WWHR in the name of the twenty-five members of the 
Women’s Platform for the Penal Code, the Kemalist TKB as well as the Islamist AKDER and BKP 
have prepared reports based on the CEDAW criteria to point out discriminatory regulations in 
the Turkish legal framework from their point of view. Using international gender norms and 
frameworks, the policy environment has become open to allow relatively cohesive alliances of 
actors, both women’s CSOs and female legislators and bureaucrats, to achieve reforms.  
In addition to international women’s networks, the EU had also leverage on engendering 
democracy in Turkey. In the AKP’s first term in the government (2002-2007), the possibility of 
EU accession has affected political and policy developments with important implications for 
gender norms and relations. Since the European Commission encourages the active 
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participation of citizens in the making of collective choices and provides financial assistance for 
the civil society development, the women’s rights organizations in Turkey have benefited from 
the EU funds.231 Also, the effectiveness of women’s CSOs in Turkey significantly increased with 
the degree to which they are linked to and affiliated with the European women’s CSOs. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, the feminist organizations WWHR and Purple Roof, the 
Kurdish women’s CSO KAMER and the Islamist women’s CSO BKP have been in the secretariat of 
the European Women’s Lobby. The international link increased these women’s CSOs capacity in 
bargaining with state institutions for women-friendly changes in the legal framework.  
In sum, the dynamism of women’s CSOs had a remarkable impact on state-CS relations 
in Turkey. Organized women’s groups in Turkey played an important role in encouraging wider 
citizen participation and in checking abuses of state power manifested as gender-based 
discrimination. Thus, they became crucial actors within the democratic CS in Turkey. In turn, 
the democratic consolidation process has also positively influenced the relations between 
women’s groups. 
Differences and Similarities in the Extent of Participation and Inclusion of Women’s 
Groups 
As shown in the previous chapters, the extent of participation and inclusion of each women’s 
group in decision-making processes varies. In the issue of violence against women, feminist and 
Kurdish women’s CSOs are most visible and influential civil society actors. The enduring efforts 
of feminist, Kemalist, and Kurdish women’s CSOs to push for protection laws and to monitor the 
implementation of those laws by following court cases have demonstrated the essential role of 
organized women in engendering democracy in Turkey. These three groups have also been 
influential in putting their concerns on public debate due to their networks in the mainstream 
media that in turn created pressure on the AKP government. Furthermore, the feminist, 
Kemalist, and Kurdish women’s CSOs have referred to international treaties signed by Turkey 
that obligate states to eliminate gender-based violence (cf. the CEDAW treaty, the Istanbul 
                                                          
231 All the interviewees remarked that the financial aid from the EU for regional civil society development has been 
directed to regional development agencies in Turkey that are closely linked with the central government; thus, 
women’s rights organizations have lost their access to these European funds. But they could find other funds 
coming from different EU bodies, see for more information: Kancı et al. 2010. 
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agreement of Council of Europe). Also, women’s CSOs often stressed the need to establish state-
run women’s shelters that effectively protect women and children from violence by referring to 
the Municipality Law (No. 5393), which obligates municipalities with more than 50,000 
inhabitants to establish women’s shelters. These efforts of organized feminist, Kemalist, and 
Kurdish women could produce an enduring impact on protection laws and policies in Turkey. 
However, Islamist women’s CSOs joined the struggle against domestic violence relatively later 
and support women mostly in legal issues, rather than offering protection through women’s 
shelters. BKP, in particular, has engaged in women’s broader platforms to combat violence 
against women, but the bargaining capacities of organized Islamist women with the religious-
conservative AKP make a slow progress. Clearly, violence against women is one common issue 
area in which all women’s groups are open to make joint efforts to eliminate violence against 
women and to push the AKP government for actual implementation of protection laws and 
policies.  
In promoting women’s rights and gender equality, all women’s groups have developed 
effective working strategies and recorded significant achievements in their bargain with the 
AKP. The most important achievement was the new Civil Code that granted equality between 
women and men in the family. While Kemalist, Kurdish, and Islamist women’s groups advocated 
and lobbied for policies that should provide women full access to the economy sector, health 
care and education system, the feminist CSOs lobbied for the implementation of the equality 
principle in all policies pertaining to women’s lives. For instance, Article 10 in the Constitution 
that obligates the state to take all necessary measures to ensure gender equality before law, was 
implemented due to the efforts of the Women’s Platforms for the Turkish Penal Code. All 
women’s groups have in varying degrees participated in educating governmental officials on 
issues of gender equality and domestic violence. 
In the struggle against discrimination against women, the four groups of women’s CSOs 
jointly managed to push for amending the Penal Code. The Women’s Platform for the Turkish 
Penal Code has regularly revised laws and made proposals to state institutions to lift 
discriminatory regulations in the legal framework. While Kurdish and Islamist women’s CSOs 
have exclusively pointed out the regulations that inherently discriminate against Kurdish and 
religious women, feminist and Kemalist women’s CSOs have addressed patriarchal constructs 
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within the Code that needs to be lifted or amended. The Constitution has criminalized gender-
based discrimination, but discriminatory regulations and practices continue to exist. 
Interestingly, the long-standing headscarf ban has been lifted in October 2013, but Islamist 
women’s CSOs have not been included into this decision-making process. As emphasized by 
Islamist women activists whom I interviewed, the AKP’s leadership, especially then-Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, has instrumentalized the headscarf debate on several occasions to polarize 
the public opinion and to divide broader women’s movement into conflicting camps in order to 
weaken their solidarity. Moreover, as one interviewee remarked, the AKP establishes its own 
Islamist NGOs or supports NGOs (GONGOs) that do not reject the AKP’s claims on women’s issues. 
Thus, the AKP tries to exclude the autonomous Islamist women’s CSOs that criticize the party’s 
views on women’s issues. 
Although it is difficult to precisely differentiate between the level of activities and 
inclusion of women’s CSOs in decision-making processes, the table 10.1 gives an approximate 
idea about which women’s groups have been more active in civic engagement and which have 
been more influential in the three issue areas considered here. The most active and influential 
women’s group is listed in the first place. 
 
Table 10. 1: THE ROLE of WOMEN’s CSOs IN ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY 
 Activities and strategies 
of women CSOs 
The level of inclusion of 
women’s CSOs in 
decision-making 
Positive gender 
outcomes 
Violence against 
women 
Feminist CSOs 
Kurdish women’s CSOs 
Kemalist women’s CSOs 
Islamist women’s CSOs 
 
Feminist CSOs 
Kemalist women’s CSOs 
Kurdish women’s CSOs 
Islamist women’s CSOs 
Yes 
Women’s rights 
and gender 
equality 
Kemalist women CSOs 
Feminists CSOs 
Kurdish women’s CSOs 
Islamist women’s CSOs 
Kemalist women’s CSOs 
Feminist CSOs 
 
 
Yes 
Discrimination 
against women 
Kurdish and Islamist 
women CSOs 
Feminist CSOs 
Kemalist women’s CSOs 
 
Kemalist women’s CSOs 
Feminist CSOs 
Kurdish women’s CSOs 
 
Yes 
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The increased participation of women’s CSOs through women’s coalitions and platforms 
enabled them to push the ruling AKP to reform gender policies or to reject government’s 
proposals that do not accord with their demands. However, some groups of women’s CSOs have 
not participated or had less impact on policy-making than others. The well-organized CSOs in all 
women’s groups had better capacity to exert influence on policy-making processes. Feminist Amargi and 
the Kurdish women’s organization SELIS have been visible and influential actors in promoting 
women’s rights or in combating violence against women, but they were not as influential as the 
other women’s CSOs in policy-making, unless they were represented on common platforms.  
Also, the experience of women’s CSOs gathered in any specific issue area increases the 
chances of influencing public debates and politicians, thus policy-making processes. For 
instance, the feminist organizations in Turkey have been the first group to make domestic 
violence issue visible and to develop multiple strategies to protect women. They became the 
most influential in combating violence against women. Altınay and Arat argue that increasing 
awareness of domestic violence is a result of twenty years of successful struggle of organized 
feminists (2009: xi). Therefore, although the Turkish governments mostly resisted feminist 
demands, they had to include the feminist CSOs in policy-making processes. 
Moreover, the nature of the relations with the state also determines how effective women’s 
organizations are in policy-making processes. Since women’s CSOs increased their interaction 
with the state’s women’s machinery KSGM and ministries that have responsibilities in women’s 
issues, their impact on policy-making has increased. In developing new strategies for 
empowering women, the state’s women’s machinery KSGM selects representatives from five 
different women’s CSOs and they participate in four commissions: health, education, 
employment, and law (Kardam and Acuner 2007; Şener 2009). Activists are aware of the fact that 
women representatives might not be feminists, but they can be more sympathetic to women’s 
needs and interests than their male colleagues. For instance, all interviewees, without 
exception, mentioned that the Minister for Family and Social Policies Fatma Şahin (2011-2013), 
who has been the head of the AKP’s women’s branch for years, had a positive attitude towards 
organized women’s groups during her service as minister.  
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All interviewees underlined the importance of being financially and structurally 
independent from the state and acting autonomously from political parties or movements. This is one of 
the factors that explains why women’s CSOs in Turkey have become key actors within CS and 
could pursue hard bargains with the governments. In other words, their collectivity and 
autonomy gave them the power to continue their struggle in the civil society arena to monitor 
government policies, and to influence policy-making. 
The international gender norms help organized women’s movement in Turkey in various 
ways to put their demands and interests on the political agenda. Moreover, the degree of 
international links with women’s networks or international organizations strengthen women’s CSOs in 
their struggle to put their demands on the political agenda.  
The following hypotheses enable us to make general statements on the role of organized 
women’s movement in engendering democracy: 
 Well-organized women’s CSOs have more chance to put their demands on the 
consolidation agenda, to participate in decision-making processes regarding women’s 
issues, and they are more likely to achieve progressive gender outcomes. 
 The more women’s CSOs have dialogue and cooperation with the state, they are more 
likely to participate and be included in decision-making processes during democratic 
consolidation, and thus they can translate their demands into women-friendly changes 
in laws and policies. 
 If women’s CSOs are financially and structurally independent from the state, they can 
more strongly push decision-makers for positive gender outcomes. 
 Likewise, if women’s CSOs act autonomously from political parties or movements, they 
advocate their gendered concerns more easily and put them on the political agenda. 
 The more women’s CSOs are linked with international or regional women’s networks, 
the higher the chances are in influencing policy-making. 
 The more politically experienced women’s CSOs are, the more likely they can influence 
public debates, and in turn push the government to change policies. 
Challenges and Obstacles in Engendering Democracy in Turkey 
Despite the remarkable progress in the legal framework with regards to women’s rights, women 
in Turkey still face serious problems in their public and private lives. Women most suffer under 
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violence, be it domestic violence, honor killings, or sexual assault. Under AKP rule, women’s 
CSOs often remind that killings of women increased 1400 percent between 2003 and 2010. The 
issue of violence against women became a highly visible topic in public debates. One of the main 
obstacles in the struggle against domestic violence is that the AKP government do not effectively 
or fully enforce the existing laws to protect victims from violence. All women’s CSOs considered 
here claim that the effective strategy is not to increase sentences, rather actual implementation 
of existing laws and regulations, and comprehensive policies that target eliminating violence 
against women. Thus, the state is expected to show more political will in combating violence 
against women effectively. 
Also, the prevalent social and traditional norms in Turkey hinder the implementation of 
laws. In recent years, the key figures of the AKP, especially former Prime Minister Erdoğan, 
underlined the importance of women’s role as family makers, and hence, the AKP government 
took more and more a religious-conservative approach towards gender issues. Erdoğan has 
often urged Turkish women to have three children and proposing to limit abortion rights, access 
to the morning-after pill and caesarean sections. Hülya Gülbahar, an influential women’s rights 
lawyer and a member of KADER, argued that the AKP has regressed in its stance towards the 
notion of women’s equality (Alemdar 2013: 145). The AKP government’s growing patriarchal 
rhetoric in recent years does not help much to improve gender rights regime in Turkey. 
To understand the extent of gendered differences in Turkey, women activists, 
journalists, academics, international organizations, or politicians refer to the ‘Global Gender Gap 
Report’ released annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The index is designed to 
measure the gender-based gaps in access to resources and opportunities in 135 countries 
(Gender Gap Report 2013: 3). It examines the gap in four fundamental categories: the levels of 
economic participation and opportunity, political empowerment, educational attainment, and 
health and survival. 232 Each report manifested that Turkey is in the lowest ranks of the whole 
index, moving along the last twenty countries. Table 10.1 demonstrates the progress Turkey 
made in the Global Gender Report between 2006 and 2012. 
                                                          
232 The equality benchmark is 1 and the inequality is 0. See: http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-gender-
gap (rev. 1.11.2014) 
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Table 10.2: WEF’s GENDER GAP REPORTS on TURKEY 
 Overall Economic 
Participation 
Educational 
Attainment  
Health and 
Survival 
Political 
Participation 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2013 
Rank   Score 
120      0.608 
Rank    Score 
127       0.427 
Rank    Score 
104       0.930 
Rank   Score 
59         0.976 
Rank     Score 
103       0.087 
 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2012 
124     0.601 129        0.414 108       0.930 62        0.976 98         0.087 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2011 
122    0.595 132        0.389 106        0.920 62        0.976 89          0.097 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2010 
126    0.588 131        0.386 109        0.912 61        0.976 99          0.077 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2009 
129    0.583 130        0.400 110       0.892 93       0.971 107      0.068 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2008 
123    0.585 124        0.412 108       0.890 88       0.971 106      0.068 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2007 
121    0.577 118        0.431 110       0.854 87        0.971 108       0.052 
Global 
Gender Gap 
Report 2006 
105   0.585 106        0.434 92         0.885 85      0.969 96         0.052 
Source: The Global Gender Gap Report 2013 
Since the AKP began to mainstream a religious-conservative discourse on women’s 
rights, it publicly shows distaste towards feminist demands (Çoşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011: 557). 
The party utilizes a sexist approach to hold its conservative base among the electorate that in 
turn leads to marginalization of women’s rights CSOs, especially the feminist CSOs. But women’s 
CSOs have rejected the AKP’s religious-conservative rhetoric to women. As the AKP leadership 
raised the question on abortion, feminist and Kurdish women activists have successfully 
organized protests, stimulated national and international reactions, and managed to stop the 
AKP government to implement the draft proposal limiting abortion. Likewise, in amending the 
Law on the Protection of the Family, women’s CSOs resisted the law proposal, which did not 
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effectively protected women, and continued their pressure on the government to make their 
demands translated into concrete policies. At the time of writing in fall 2014, women’s CSOs 
pursue their struggle for not losing acquired rights and put great efforts to stop the AKP 
government in its religious-conservative politics. The four groups of women’s CSOs equally 
stress the need to democratize the country to protect individual rights in general, women’s 
rights in particular. 
Relying upon the evidences gathered from the examination of four groups of women’s 
CSOs, I claim that organized women’s groups in Turkey are the key actors in engendering 
democracy. This claim is consistent with the literature on women’s movements in Turkey that 
also underlined the important role of women’s rights organizations in democratization of 
Turkish politics (see Arat 1994, 2000, 2008; Bodur 2005; Bora and Günal 2007; Coşar and Onbaşi 
2008; Marshall 2009). Different than the existing knowledge, this study not only demonstrates 
this claim by the latest empirical evidences by specifically focusing on the period of AKP rule, 
but also delineates how exactly and to what extent organized women’s movement played a role 
in the consolidation of democracy.  
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Conclusions 
 
The democratic consolidation process under AKP rule has brought significant changes with 
respect to participation and inclusion of women, but the party has failed to fully consolidate and 
engender Turkish democracy. This study has explored what role women’s CSOs played in 
consolidating and engendering Turkish democracy. Through a detailed analysis of four groups of 
women’s CSOs, it examined how they could put their gendered objectives on the political 
agenda, participate in policy-making processes, and to what extent they achieved women-
friendly changes in laws and policies. This concluding chapter first summarizes the approach of 
the present study, and then presents the key findings. These conclusions also raise issues that 
could inform current debates and future research agendas of both democratization and gender-
and-politics literature. It ends with a brief outlook on the future of Turkish democracy and 
women. 
Summary 
Women’s rights organizations have played important roles in the processes of transition to and 
consolidation of democracy. The role of non-state actors in democratization processes needs to 
be assessed through a bottom-up analysis. But before delving into the question of the 
relationship between women’s organizing and democratic consolidation, the study began with 
the discussion of the concept of democracy and the notion of democratic consolidation. After 
reviewing different approaches to democratic consolidation, the study questioned what role CS 
plays in democratic consolidation processes. It was then possible to examine the role of women’s 
rights organizations. But to categorically analyze the relationship between women and 
democratic consolidation processes, a gendered perspective is necessary. In order to build an 
alternative conceptual framework, the study relied upon the assumptions of both the 
mainstream democratization literature and the gender-and-politics literature. It showed how 
gender is implicated in the structures and dynamics of CS and democratization processes that, 
in turn, have implications for the analysis of the role of women’s CSOs in democratic 
consolidation. As gender scholars argue, this entails looking at women’s participation and 
representation in political processes (Jaquette 2001; Waylen 2003, 2007). Here, women’s 
representation is understood not only as the descriptive representation in formal politics, but 
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also as the substantive representation, i.e. the expression of women’s interests and demands in 
all levels of policy-making (Waylen 2007: 3). Hence, the question is if organized women’s groups 
can put their claims on political agenda and translate them to progressive gender policies. It is 
then possible to understand the relationship between democratic consolidation, CS, and women 
from a gendered lens. 
The chapter on methods thoroughly described the research design and justified the 
qualitative approach. It then presented methods used, units of analysis – four groups of women’s 
CSOs - and sources and explained how the data has been collected. The considered period is the 
AKP rule; i.e., since the party came to power in November 2002 until the end of 2013. Before 
embarking upon the empirical analysis, the study described the historical and institutional 
context in which women’s CSOs emerged, operated, and exerted influence on policy-making 
processes regarding women’s issues. In the empirical part, the study first presented positive 
gender outcomes in laws and policies to avoid repetition in the proceeding empirical chapters. 
Since the extent of the role of each women’s groups in policy-making differ, but the outcomes do 
not vary, the study transposed the analytical chain, and presented first outcomes, then analyzed 
the exact role of each women’s group. The empirical chapters on four groups of women’s CSOs 
(feminist, Kurdish, Islamist, and Kemalist women) began with describing under what 
circumstances these women’s groups emerged, how they became institutionalized, and what 
their activities are, and subsequently explained what they achieved before AKP rule. This 
historical perspective enables us to understand the development of women’s CSOs into 
important democratic agents and to see clearly the changes in laws and policies under AKP rule. 
It then elaborated on how and to what extent four groups of women’s CSOs influenced policy-
making processes under AKP rule in three issue areas: violence against women, violence against 
women, women’s rights and gender equality, and discrimination against women. The discussion 
compared, and contrasted, the roles of four groups of women’s CSOs.  
Key findings 
The first decade of AKP rule marked undoubtedly a turning point in the gender rights regime in 
Turkey. Thanks to bottom-up processes shaped through advocacy efforts of women’s rights 
organizations, and the contribution of the top-down pressure from the EU, the AKP in its first 
term (2002-2007) in power has implemented progressive gender policies that enhanced women’s 
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rights remarkably. But in recent years, the AKP has taken steps, as part of its Islamist-
conservative character, to undermine women’s rights by categorically rejecting gender equality. 
The party has tried to marginalize women’s rights organizations and promoted traditional roles 
for women as mothers that was often manifested in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s public speeches.  
The key finding of the study is that women organized as women have played a crucial 
role in engendering democratic consolidation in Turkey. At first glance, the assumption, the more 
organized women’s groups participate, the more engendered and consolidated democracy 
becomes, is verified in the Turkish case. Since their emergence in the 1980s, women’s CSOs have 
become influential democratic actors within the civil society arena through their dynamism and 
advocacy for women’s participation and inclusion. Thus, they pluralized democratic politics in 
Turkey, which has been demonstrated in the empirical chapters. The literature on women’s 
movements in Turkey also confirms that women’s CSOs played a crucial role in social and 
political change reflected in the Turkish democratic consolidation process (Arat 1994, 2008; 
Bodur 2005; Diner and Toktaş 2010; Marshall 2009).  
Under AKP rule, women’s CSOs have become central actors in democratic CS. They 
effectively put their demands on the political agenda of democratic consolidation, and 
translated them into progressive gender outcomes - understood as measurable improvements 
in women’s rights regime. Thus, women’s organizing seems a necessary condition for substantial 
changes in gender policies. For instance, in the issue of violence against women, women’s CSOs 
are the key actors in articulating women’s needs and in addressing the remedies to eliminate 
violence against women. Their work with women experiencing violence keeps them updated on 
the extent and the nature of the problem, and enables them to develop manifold strategies 
combating violence against women such as providing women’s shelters, counselling and 
providing legal advice services. Most recent quantitative and large-n study of Htun and Weldon 
(2012) also shows that the analysis of women’s CSOs - and social movements - is crucial to 
understanding progressive policy changes with regards to violence against women. 
The nature of women’s organizing, especially the degree of women’s CSOs’ cohesion and 
their interaction with the state and the conventional political arena, are important (Waylen 
2007: 202). Cohesion in organized women’s groups to interact with the state produced positive 
outcomes, for instance, during the amending process of the Civil Code, Penal Code, and the Law 
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on the Protection of Family from Violence (Law No. 6284), and in enshrining gender equality 
principle into the Constitution (Article 10). However, women’s organizing on its own is not 
enough to achieve progressive gender outcomes. It also depends on several other factors: the 
democraticness of the institutional context, the presence of state’s women’s machinery, the 
impact of international gender norms - such as the CEDAW treaty -, and the influence of 
international or regional organizations (UN, EU) that foster democratization with regard to 
improving women’s rights. All these factors that have been examined in the empirical chapters 
enable women’s CSOs get their demands on the agenda of consolidation, and translate them into 
progressive gender policies. 
A closer look at the roles of different women’s groups brought about some general 
conclusions. The more women’s CSOs had dialogue and cooperation with the state, the more 
likely they participated, and were included in decision-making processes pertaining to women’s 
issues. All women’s groups increased their dialogue with the state during AKP rule because they 
acknowledged that they can exert more influence on policy-making processes if they interact 
with state institutions. Also, the well-organized women’s CSOs, such as Kemalist women’s CSOs 
and feminist WWHR and Purple Roof, gained more chances to participate in and influence on 
decision-making processes. The independence from the state yields women’s CSOs more leeway 
to participate in political processes and in bargaining with the state. Similarly, the autonomy of 
women’s CSOs from their political movements or groups, particularly in the case of Kurdish and 
Islamist women, provided them more opportunities to articulate and prioritize their gendered 
concerns.  
Furthermore, strong international links increased the likelihood of the translation of 
women’s demands into improvements in women’s rights and gender equality. In this regard, 
feminist WWHR and Purple Roof, the Kurdish women’s organization KAMER, the Islamist BKP 
and the Kemalist TKB were successful in activating their international networks each time they 
found it necessary to lobby policy-makers and to push the AKP government for changes, or 
retreat its conservative policies. The political experience in particular issue areas women’s CSOs 
gathered through years strengthened the likelihood of their participation in policy-making in 
that issue area. In this regard, state institutions had to cooperate with feminists CSOs in the 
struggle against domestic violence, irrespective of their remote attitude to feminists’ demands. 
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But some newcomers such as the Kurdish VAKAD proved itself quite influential by participating 
in broader women’s platforms, and thus increasing its chance to be party of policy-making 
processes. 
However, it is also crucial to inspect the areas in which women’s CSOs failed to translate 
their demands into concrete policies. Interestingly, feminist women’s demands for electoral 
quotas, which has been easily passed in many other consolidating democracies (Latin American 
countries and South Africa), were not legally implemented by the AKP government. Women are 
underrepresented in all levels of politics, especially in local governments. But the AKP 
leadership completely rejects the idea of introducing quotas. Moreover, gender inequalities 
persisted in the economic sector under AKP rule. Despite Turkey’s economic successes in the 
last decade, Turkey ranked 123 out of 136 countries with only 30 percent of women participating 
in the labor force (Gender Gap Report 2013). The main reason for the low numbers of women’s 
labor force participation is the prevailing social and cultural norms. Women’s CSOs considered 
here have often remarked the low numbers as regards women’s labor force participation, and 
some of them have encouraged women to participate in work life (especially Kurdish women’s 
CSOs KAMER and SELIS, Kemalist women’s CSOs), but this issue has not been their priority. 
Furthermore, despite the efforts of women’s CSOs and positive developments in laws, violence 
against women continues to be a severe problem under AKP rule. Many activists underlined that 
the problem in Turkey is not the absence of laws and regulations regarding the issue of violence, 
rather the actual implementation of laws and missing comprehensive policies that target 
eliminating violence against women.  
A remarkable finding is that despite the rising conservative agenda of the AKP and its 
occasional attacks on women’s rights organizations, women’s CSOs kept their contacts and 
cooperation with the state women’s machinery KSGM and Ministry for Family and Social Policies 
to protect women’s existing legal rights, to keep their access to decision-making processes, and 
to push back AKP’s conservative policies disfavoring women. The extent of their inclusion in 
decision-making had slightly narrowed in recent years, however the AKP government continues 
to work with representatives from women’s rights organizations. 
One of the feminist activists I interviewed has claimed that women’s movement in 
Turkey is strongly affected by the conflicts and the divisions prevalent in Turkish politics and 
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society. This situation pushes organized women’s groups not only to being active in women’s 
issues, but also “to do politics” in a wider sense. This hinders women’s groups to act together. 
But interestingly, since the AKP increased its religious-conservative rhetoric, especially after 
the 2010 constitutional referendum, women’s CSOs began to form broad platforms to contest 
conservative policies of the AKP government. For instance, the Stop Violence Platform or the 
Stop Women Homicide Platforms include more than 200 women’s rights organizations. Hence, 
it is clear that different groups of women’s CSOs need to form stronger coalitions for women of 
Turkey that can go beyond the constructed differences and achieve collaboration on main 
political agendas. 
This study rejects the statement that progressive gender policies under AKP rule took 
place because of the Turkey’s EU membership process (Kubicek 2005; Marshall 2013). This study 
agrees that the EU might have acted as a catalyst, but women CSOs played an essential role in 
pressuring the state for the amendments to the Civil and Penal Codes, and the Law on the 
Protection of the Family. Thus, the improvements in gender policies under AKP rule cannot be 
explained only by looking at the EU’s impact or Europeanization discussions. 
Assets and Limits of the Analysis and Further Research 
Scholarly works on women’s CSOs in Turkey agree on the differences among women’s CSOs. 
Many of them differentiate between feminist, Kurdish, and Islamist women’s groups, and counts 
Kemalist women under feminist activism (Arat 1994, 2000, 2008; Bodur 2005; Bora and Günal 
2007; Diner and Toktaş 2010; Tekeli 1995). They elaborate on their different demands, but 
conclude hastily that they play a democratic role in Turkey. A small number of studies have 
begun to analyze organized Kemalist women with respect to their confrontational activism 
against Islamist women’s activism (Turam 2008). Some other studies rather focus on the 
successes of women’s activism in achieving gender policies without paying much attention to 
differences among women’s groups (Coşar and Yeğenoglu 2011; Marshall 2009). The present 
study combines all these approaches by carefully examining each group of women’s CSOs and 
investigating their exact role in the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. 
 But is the examination of the role of women’s CSOs enough to conclude about engendering 
democracy in Turkey? Relying upon both the democratization and gender-and-democratization 
literatures, the study has combined different perspectives in the analysis. Both the institutional 
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context in which women’s CSOs operate and the role of women’s CSOs in engendering democratic 
consolidation have been taken into account. One shortcoming is that the study marginally 
considered alliances of women’s CSOs with key players such as political parties or female 
politicians. It might also yield intriguing results to look at the role of such alliances and what 
can they achieve in engendering Turkish democracy.  
The present study has also shown the significance of a range of international factors that 
had implications for substantial changes in gender policies. In this regard, the study elaborated 
on the impact of international gender norms such as the CEDAW treaty that has framed the 
advocacy and lobbying campaigns of women’s CSOs, and positively influenced the national 
gender rights regime in Turkey. Also, the impact of the EU accession process has been discussed, 
but the study has not exclusively examined the specific role the EU played in the 
implementation of progressive gender policies. An exact analysis of the impact of international 
actors could also provide a valuable insight in understanding how changes take place in gender 
rights regimes. 
The impact of the state women’s machinery KSGM on gender policies could have been 
analyzed more in detail to offer a broader picture of how gender policies come about. The 
present study described the relation between women’s CSOs and female politicians and the state 
women’s machinery (SWM) in policy-making processes, but did not examine how exactly KSGM 
and female politicians shaped gender policies. It might also be interesting to give state-actors’ 
perspective on engendering Turkish democracy. 
Overall, the proposed conceptual framework allowed a nuanced analysis of the role of 
women’s CSOs as non-state actors in engendering democratic consolidation in Turkey by looking 
at their interaction with the state. However, further research agendas can focus on their 
interaction with the international actors in achieving progressive gender policies. There are 
already some studies that look at the impact of the Europeanization process on gender policies, 
but as the study also demonstrated the EU has, at the moment, lost its transformative power on 
Turkish politics. As Waylen also argues, external factors are not constant, and can lose their 
effects in the rapidly changing world (2007: 206). 
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Clearly, the proposed framework can be applied to other case studies to understand how 
women’s organizing play a role in democratic consolidation processes. A comparative study 
would even highlight under what circumstances women’s organizing are more likely to 
influence political outcomes regarding gender issues, and how different gender outcomes come 
about.  
The issues raised here have some implications for both the gender-and-transition 
literature and the democratization research. The study reinforced that to capture women’s 
participation in democratization processes, democratization scholars need to regard women as 
political subjects. While dealing with political institutions and processes, the mainstream 
democratization scholars mainly ignore the fact that women participate in those processes and 
are also key actors as much as men are. Thus, the look at women’s participation and inclusion is 
not like taking a ‘side road’ in democratization research, rather it only needs to actually 
operationalize the analytical tools by not dismissing women as a category of the analysis. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the institutional context needs to be integrated in the gendered 
analysis of democratization processes. It helps to understand gendered nature of political 
institutions that shape the leeway of political, economic, and social actors. Thus, feminist 
scholars need to pay attention not only to the processes that include or exclude women, but also 
to the state and other political institutions as organizing categories for analyzing gendered 
relations.  
The Future of Turkey’s Democracy: With or Without Women? 
As discussed in Chapter 4, since the constitutional referendum in September 2010, the AKP has 
consolidated its power in the political landscape and began to undermine the institutions of 
political pluralism. According to the latest Freedom House Index, political rights and civil 
liberties, in particular freedom of press and of assembly, experienced serious setbacks in 
Turkey’s democracy (Freedom in the World Turkey Report 2013). The AKP and President 
Erdoğan not only dominate the executive and legislative branches, but also attempts to control 
the judiciary, the economy, the media, CS, and even the lifestyles of citizens. Public and scholarly 
debates on Turkey now discuss the authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government and its 
rising Islamist rhetoric that has been accumulated in the party’s recent actions and political 
statements. The AKP’s leadership have employed this Islamist rhetoric in social policies 
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concerning women’s, children’s, or youth’s live. Some scholars and researchers argue that the 
AKP instrumentalizes social issues to keep its conservative-religious voters content, especially 
for the coming general election in 2015, whereas others fear that the recent policy changes 
pertaining to social life would transform the country into an authoritarian political system with 
strong Islamist character (Öniş 2013; Özbudun 2014). The more power the AKP gained, the less 
interested it has become into furthering democratic reforms. Clearly, there is much to be 
accomplished both to consolidate democracy, and to empower women in Turkey. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey has never been paradise for women, women’s CSOs 
point out the scope of problems women face under AKP rule. Violence against women is 
rampant, about 7,000 women have been murdered since 2002 (Sezgin 2014). Turkey scores the 
lowest ranks in women’s economic participation within the OECD countries (OECD Regions at a 
Glance 2013). Gendered inequalities in economic, political, and cultural life hinder women from 
full participation in public life. The rising Islamist-conservative political rhetoric of the AKP has 
serious repercussions on women’s lives. Women’s CSOs often declare that the AKP leaders aim 
to restrict women’s choices and participation in public life, and pushes women to accept the 
secondary roles ascribed to them by traditional and religious norms. This approach leads to 
exclusion of women from political, economic, and social spheres. Therefore, women’s CSOs 
shifted their focus on protecting their rights that have been acquired in the last decade, rather 
than pushing the government to implement more progressive gender policies. A strong alliance 
between women’s groups with female politicians, businesswomen, political parties, and the 
broader CS can help contain the risks posed by the AKP.  
Unless the solutions to the gender specific problems devised by women’s organizations 
are put into practice as government policy measures, the situation women’s rights organizations 
address will not be changed. Women therefore need to exercise a practical influence on politics. 
Clearly, this entails a strong political will, which the AKP government at the time lacks. 
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Agencies, Websites, and Newspapers 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
www.akparti.org.tr 
Aile İçi Şiddete Son Campaign: 
www.aileicisiddeteson.com 
AMARGI:  
http://amargigroupistanbul.wordpress.com/ 
Assembly for Women’s Shelters and Advisory/Solidarity Centers: 
http://www.siginaksizbirdunya.org/kurultaylar/siginaksiz-bir-dunya-tarihce 
Ayrımcılığa Karşı kadın hakları Derneği (AKDER): 
http://www.ak-der.org/default.gbt#tab=tab-1 
Başkent Kadın Platformu (BKP):  
http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?p=137 
BBC Türkce 
Bianet Online 
Biraradayız Campaign: 
www.biraradayiz.org 
Brookings Institute 
The Economist 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence 
(Istanbul): http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/about_en.asp 
European Women Lobby:  
http//:www.womenlobby.org 
Gökkuşağı İstanbul Kadın Kuruluşları Platformu GIKAP:  
http://gikap.org/3g.html 
Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi: 
http://www.gap.gov.tr 
KADER:   
http://www.ka-der.org.tr 
Kadın Cinayetlerini Durdurucagiz Platformu:  
http://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/arsiv 
Kadınlara Hukuki Destek Merkezi (KAHDEM): 
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www.kahdem.org.tr 
Kadın Erkek Fırsat Eşitliği Komisyonu (KEFEK):  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/kefe/ 
Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü (KSGM):  
http://www.kadininstatusu.gov.tr 
Kadın Merkezi (KAMER): 
http://www.kamer.org.tr/ 
Lifting the Headscarf Ban Campaign:  
http://28subat1000yilsuremez.blogspot.com/ 
Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı (Purple Roof):  
http://www.morcati.org.tr 
Pınar Selek: 
http://www.pinarselek.com/public/page.aspx?id=239 
Radikal Online 
Reporters Withour Borders 
Roj haber 
The “End Domestic Violence” Campaign:  
http://aileicisiddeteson.com/ 
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Labor Law:  
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k4857.html 
Türk Hukuk Sitesi: 
turkhukuksitesi.com 
Uçan Süpürge: 
http://www.ucansupurge.org/dernekler/derneklerlist.php  
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA):  
http://www.unfpa.org/turkeytr/haberler.htm.Gender%20Equality.pdf. 
Van Kadın Derneği (VAKAD): 
http://www.vakad.org.tr/ 
WWHR:  
http://www.wwhr.org 
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Appendix 
 
List of Interview Questions 
Personal questions:  
How long have you been working with this organization? 
What led you to join to this organization? What consequences did you have to bear 
(negative/positive)? 
About the NGO and its activities:  
How would you define your organization? NGO/CSO/grassroots/advocacy group?  
When was the organization established? What are your main goals?   
 How many co-workers do you have in the organization? How many volunteers? 
 How often do you have meetings? 
To what extent can you articulate your demands as a civil societal actor?  
Is there any change in the relationship between your organization and the state after the AKP 
came to power?  
Could you walk me through what your organization did in response to “violence against 
women” before the amendments to the new Civil Code and the Penal Code? 
 Could you put pressure on the government? Were there red lines drawn by the 
state? Can you give me an example?  
What have you undertaken on the issue of violence against women after amendments in the 
Penal Code?  
 Especially, what do you do against honor killings/murdering of women and 
domestic violence? 
Can you give me examples of your activities for achieving gender equality?  
Could you describe what you are trying to accomplish on the issue women’s rights 
(discrimination against women) and what type of action are you taking? 
Do you work/cooperate with other women’s organizations? 
 In what ways do you cooperate with other women’s organizations? And in 
which issues?  
Do you work with the state institutions? Joint projects with municipalities or local 
institutions?  
Do you cooperate with other civil society organizations other than women’s groups?  
How do you spread information about your activities?   
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Do you get any support from abroad (foreign funds, governments, or organizations)? Do you 
personally think they contribute to your activities?  
 To what extent does the international community influence women’s 
organizations in Turkey since 2002? 
How would you interpret/evaluate the attitude of AKP towards women’s organizations in 
general? Towards your organization in particular?  
Do you think that certain groups enjoy more direct access to decision-making processes? (For 
instance, other women’s organizations that have another agenda) 
Do you have seminars to raise the interests in the women issues? 
Do you think that your message and activities are understood by women?  
 
Interview Partners 
Neslihan Akbulut Arıkan - AKDER 
Nebahat Akkoç - KAMER 
Çiğdem Aydın - KADER 
Deniz Bayram – Purple Roof 
Fatma Benli - AKDER 
Sevgi Binbir – İzmir Kadın Dayanışma Vakfı 
Emel Denizaslanı - IKKB-Izmir 
Selma Durak – TKB Istanbul 
Perihan Kaya – SELIS  
Nazan Moroğlu - IKKB-Istanbul 
Zozan Özgökçe - VAKAD 
Yasemin Öz - AMARGI 
Özgür Sunata – Purple Roof 
Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal - BKP 
 
 
 
  
 
